What if Mao decided to end the Korean War in 1951?

raharris1973

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What if Mao decided after the end of his spring 1951 offensive and the beginning of the truce talks in July 1951 that winding down the Korean War ASAP was a good idea? What if he's willing to compromise early on the POW repatriation issue to achieve that end?

His rationale is that: 1) the war will end subjectively on a high note for him and his regime at this time, 2) Nothing more will be gained internationally by continuing, 3) the war has served its purpose sufficiently for domestic mobilization and now there's other projects to work on.

Saya truce is put into effect by September.

What are the further effects on all countries concerned?
 
Truman would likely be in a stronger position in the 1952 election. If this happens before McArthur is "relieved" then he could be in a stronger position for the 1952 elections.
 
Truman would likely be in a stronger position in the 1952 election. If this happens before McArthur is "relieved" then he could be in a stronger position for the 1952 elections.

The proposal is that Mao decides to stand down after the Communist "Spring Offensive", which began on 22 April, and lasted until 20 May. Macarthur was relieved on 11 April. Actually, after truce negotiations start in July.
 

raharris1973

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I would venture to say Truman would be unelectable in '52 anyway, and that might be clear enough even to him that he doesn't run.
 

raharris1973

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To clarify, I am envisioning the ultimate compromise on PoWs being made in a matter of two months, instead of two years. [It involved acceptance of the voluntary repatriation concept, with the proviso that non-returnees would be interviewed by a panel of home country, neutral and allied personnel before the determination would be made]. Why does Mao lead us to this outcome earlier? Because, having decided for other reasons to end the war, he rationalizes that letting a few traitors escape...for now...is OK. Chinese population growth would replace them in a couple weeks.

...moving on from that...

Follow-on considerations:

1. After the OTL armistice at the beginning of the Eisenhower administration, Truman is alleged to have said he would have gotten politically raked over the coals for accepting the same (stalemated) terms.

On the other hand, its not like the continuation of the stalemated war on its current trajectory was politically beneficial for him either.

Net political impact within US?

2. Stalin is cited as having pushed keeeping the war going, even while the North Koreans were hoping to end it. If Mao's decision to end the fighting is disappointing to Stalin, will there be any payback in Sino-Soviet relations?

3.If China is not engaged in active fighting in Korea after the middle of 1951, can it reallocate major support [short of combat troops] to the Viet Minh? Could this accelerate their success, and generate a Dien Bien Phu or an analogous French defeat and decision to quit the fighting in 1952? [I found it notable that Dien Bien Phu in OTL came within a year of the Korean armistice and was aided by significant Chinese support].

4. Acceleration of 5 year planning, industrial programs, anti-landlord campaign and collectivization in mainland China?

5. The fighting as it was from say June 1950 to May 1951 had already set several developments in motion helpful to Japanese and West European economic recovery and rearmament. But without partial war mobilization for another two years [as in OTL],would this be significantly reduced, resulting in less economic success for US allies and a less prosperous 1950s in the west overall?
Would West Germany be inducted into NATO later, earlier or on OTL's schedule (1955)


6. Are there any other foreign policy crises that Truman would have been more hands-on with, in the absence of a regional war for the last year and a half of his term?

7. Would Stalin still send his note on German reunification in 1952?

8. What would be the consequences for North and South Korea? I think South Korea would benefit, but for North Korea it would be hugely positive.
 

raharris1973

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A rough outline of the knock-ons that proceed from the PoD-

-July 1951, Korean armistice (on terms matching those of OTL July 1953)

-In China, armistice accomplished, the PRC can begin the first 5 year plan, 1951-1956

-1952 In Indochina, Viet Minh aided by the Chinese defeat the French at Dien Bien Phu, Geneva agreements end the French Indochina War. Vietnam is de facto partitioned at the 17th parallel, but elections are promised for 2 years hence. Truman criticized for "no-win" approach to Asia, exemplified by the Korean War armistice and the Geneva agreements on Indochina.

-1952 - Encouraged by the French defeat and retreat in Indochina, the FLN rebel in Algeria.

-1953 - Eisenhower administration pledges support to Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. Diem opposes the planned 1954 elections, and is supported by Washington

-1954 - pressured by the Algerian war, the French grant independence to Tunisia and Morrocco.

-1955 - "Viet Cong" assassination campaign begins in South Vietnam

-1956 -Suez and Hungary crises, Eisenhower reelected.

-1956 - Chinese 2nd 5 year plan (1956-1961), which starts to include "Great Leap Forward" campaigns by 1957.

-1957- Acute political crisis in France over Algeria, De Gaulle called in to usher in 5th Republic

-1957 - North Vietnam begins to establish formal mechanisms and logistics to support Communist fighters in South Vietnam and Laos.

-1958 - France grants independence to most African colonies (except Algeria)

-1958 - Communists in South Vietnam have grown in strength and control of rural bases enough that they decide to officially form a political front organization, the "National Liberation Front"

-1958 -Fidel Castro takes over Cuba

-1959 - rapid growth of VC power in South Vietnam

-1960 - French under De Gaulle grant Algeria independence.

-1961 - with the situation in Vietnam more deteriorated upon taking office, the Kennedy Administration accepts the recommendations of the Taylor-Rostow report to send a small contingent (20,000-30,000) US troops into Vietnam.
 
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