What if MacArthur called for use of nukes in the first summer of the Korean War, as US and ROK forces were being driven south? Probably after the 4 July North Korean defeat of the US forces at Osan.
[I figure this is not an unreasonable question to ask, because, MacArthur did call for nukes after the Chinese entered the war. But, the US and ROK were also losing in the midsummer of 1950 in Korea, with the North Koreans ultimately pushing further south that August than combined North Korean and Chinese forces would ever get at any later period]
What would MacArthur and his staff advocate as targets? Pyongyang? North Korean spearheads, now within the south? Is there any target of high tactical/operational utility still within North Korean borders?
What would the JCS think of this from a military point of view?
I don't know what the number of deliverable US atomic bombs was at the time, but I would imagine the JCS, if they consider the merits of atomic bombs, will want to ensure that very few are used so the rest are available to deter the USSR.
Is Truman guaranteed to have the same determination to not use atomic bombs at this point in the war?
On the one hand, he may see it as a bad precedent, bad for image, and disproportionate to the issue at hand. However, in this early stage of the war, with it clear there is no open Chinese and Soviet involvement, there may be less concern about escalation risk than after the Chinese entry.
If the US does use atomics in the summer (If Truman would never approve if the idea is MacArthur's, we could change the PoD to have the POTUS, be it Truman or Dewey or someone else, be the one to originate the idea of atomic escalation), what is the effect?
Before we consider escalation, how are the North Koreans going to react? And would atomic bombs only be used in conjunction with a demand that North Korea submit to UN occupation, or would there be room for North Korea to retreat or surrender in place without submitting occupation being demanded like after the the 1991 Gulf War?
[I figure this is not an unreasonable question to ask, because, MacArthur did call for nukes after the Chinese entered the war. But, the US and ROK were also losing in the midsummer of 1950 in Korea, with the North Koreans ultimately pushing further south that August than combined North Korean and Chinese forces would ever get at any later period]
What would MacArthur and his staff advocate as targets? Pyongyang? North Korean spearheads, now within the south? Is there any target of high tactical/operational utility still within North Korean borders?
What would the JCS think of this from a military point of view?
I don't know what the number of deliverable US atomic bombs was at the time, but I would imagine the JCS, if they consider the merits of atomic bombs, will want to ensure that very few are used so the rest are available to deter the USSR.
Is Truman guaranteed to have the same determination to not use atomic bombs at this point in the war?
On the one hand, he may see it as a bad precedent, bad for image, and disproportionate to the issue at hand. However, in this early stage of the war, with it clear there is no open Chinese and Soviet involvement, there may be less concern about escalation risk than after the Chinese entry.
If the US does use atomics in the summer (If Truman would never approve if the idea is MacArthur's, we could change the PoD to have the POTUS, be it Truman or Dewey or someone else, be the one to originate the idea of atomic escalation), what is the effect?
Before we consider escalation, how are the North Koreans going to react? And would atomic bombs only be used in conjunction with a demand that North Korea submit to UN occupation, or would there be room for North Korea to retreat or surrender in place without submitting occupation being demanded like after the the 1991 Gulf War?