What if Louis XIV reaches agreement with de Witt over Spanish Netherlands?

Early in the 1660s, Louis XIV and the Dutch pensioner de Witt tried to reach an agreement to divide the Spanish Netherlands between them in a war. de Witt eventually couldn't be satisfied by the king's demands and they never got it finalized.

What if they had?

De Witt was concerned over French power, so let's say France is occupied elsewhere or fears financial problems and decides to accept de Witt's territorial demands. (Or maybe Mazarin lives just a bit longer?) Louis XIV wanted a lot, but he might have been willing to take less if he knew he could grab land elsewhere.

Perhaps Louis is even convinced that the Navy is the big thing and that he should try to seize Algeirs and even Tunis, meaning that he doesn't have the funds to spend on acquiring even more Dutch land.
 
Early in the 1660s, Louis XIV and the Dutch pensioner de Witt tried to reach an agreement to divide the Spanish Netherlands between them in a war. de Witt eventually couldn't be satisfied by the king's demands and they never got it finalized.

What if they had?

De Witt was concerned over French power, so let's say France is occupied elsewhere or fears financial problems and decides to accept de Witt's territorial demands. (Or maybe Mazarin lives just a bit longer?) Louis XIV wanted a lot, but he might have been willing to take less if he knew he could grab land elsewhere.

Perhaps Louis is even convinced that the Navy is the big thing and that he should try to seize Algeirs and even Tunis, meaning that he doesn't have the funds to spend on acquiring even more Dutch land.
Just a thought but wouldn't LouisXIV be better making a deal with the Grand Pensionary, rather than approaching retirees. Maybe that was the cause of the problem. The French King was talking to the wrong person.
 
Early in the 1660s, Louis XIV and the Dutch pensioner de Witt tried to reach an agreement to divide the Spanish Netherlands between them in a war. de Witt eventually couldn't be satisfied by the king's demands and they never got it finalized.

What if they had?

De Witt was concerned over French power, so let's say France is occupied elsewhere or fears financial problems and decides to accept de Witt's territorial demands. (Or maybe Mazarin lives just a bit longer?) Louis XIV wanted a lot, but he might have been willing to take less if he knew he could grab land elsewhere.

Perhaps Louis is even convinced that the Navy is the big thing and that he should try to seize Algeirs and even Tunis, meaning that he doesn't have the funds to spend on acquiring even more Dutch land.

France, in the 17th and 18th century, wanted to reach the Rhine as a frontier.

Its population was 10 times as big as the United Provinces' population. It had fought in support of the United Provinces' independance, so it thought the UP should not oppose french territorial and strategic goals. France felt a vital need to secure its north-eastern frontier which was too close to Paris.

Most invasions and crushing defeats France had to face calme from this frontier : from Calais and Agincourt to may 1940.

In 1672, when It successfully invaded the UP in a revenue war, France could even have accepted the dutch offer to set the Rhine as their common frontier. It did not and that enabled the UP not to lose its share of Brabant, Guelder and Limburg.
 
In 1672, when It successfully invaded the UP in a revenue war, France could even have accepted the dutch offer to set the Rhine as their common frontier. It did not and that enabled the UP not to lose its share of Brabant, Guelder and Limburg.

Would that have been acceptable to others, though?

I was under the impression that France caved after the War of Devolution because they felt they couldn't get that far and hold it - but it sounds like they could have. So, what changed between them being forced to accept the reaty of Aix-le-Chapelle and 1672?

(In another thread someone said others had said we were running out of ideas - at least this is new, I think.)
 
There were several devision plans most form the 1630ties which were more or less allong the languages borders ( which were not an issue in the 17th century) and roughly came down of Flanders, Brabant and Limburg for the North and the rest for France, which is quite a lot.

De Witt did not aked this, but a line much more North, which can be doubt if this was a serious demand. Most likely there was no long term strategy behind this.

Louis XIV did not only conquered nearly the complete Spanish Nethelands but also France Comte which is a larger size than the Spanish Netherlands.

Louis was not only driven by conquest of real estate but for most he was eager for glory. The 'blitz krieg' of the Spanish Netherlands was impressive and the long prepared plans worked like a clock work. The ocupation of the France Comte was initally a side show but was a conquest full of glory and nearly whitout a fight. The conquest of the France Comte would complete the French realm by adding the last remnants of the Burgundy lands.

De Witt had to play it more better, by asking more and in return supporting Louis XIV with his other conquests.
Note the Spanish king offered de Witt nearly all the Spanish Netherlands in exchange of stopping Louis XIV.

Instead of this de Wit fabricated the Triple Aliance which forced Louis XIV to give back nearly all his conquest, except some, relative very small, portions of the Spanish Netherlands, and most impportant deny him his glory at the treaty of Aix a Chapelle.

This treaty and the role of de Witt enraged Louis XIV in such way that it was the main reason of the later Dutch war of 1672 with the sole aim to humiliate the Dutch and drive them North of the Rhine. It was only at this war when the idea came to make the French border to the Rhine not earlier.
Fighting wars in the 17th and large part of the 18th century was not a matter of population but fore most a matter of who had the deepest coffers, and in the 17th and early 18th century it were the Dutch.

Verdelingsplannen_Zuidelijke_Nederlanden_17e_eeuw eddit.png
 
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Bottom line, if De Witt does not deny Louis's his glory and get a better real estate deal there will be no Dutch war in 1672 and it will reduce the chances of William III of Orange to rise to power and even deny his chances to become king of England.
And with that, no nine years war ( Williams war) and future rival/revenge wars between Louis XIV and other European royals.
This would stop the use of the Spanish Netherlands as a battle field in the conflicts we know and would not ruin the finances of the Dutch Republic whihc in the long run means a more prosperos 18th century.
It would most likely end the political carreer of Johan de Witt but on a normal way and not with a lynch party.
 
wasn't also part of the problem that louis xiv still thought in terms of bloodlines/ dynastic?

Note the Spanish king offered de Witt nearly all the Spanish Netherlands in exchange of stopping Louis XIV.
how big was the chance that an agreement would be reached with spain about the spanish netherlands (as a result of a alliance)?
 
This treaty and the role of de Witt enraged Louis XIV in such way that it was the main reason of the later Dutch war of 1672 with the sole aim to humiliate the Dutch and drive them North of the Rhine. It was only at this war when the idea came to make the French border to the Rhine not earlier.
Fighting wars in the 17th and large part of the 18th century was not a matter of population but fore most a matter of who had the deepest coffers, and in the 17th and early 18th century it were the Dutch.

It is not the dutch finance that saved it but the dutch polder and the coalition that rallied around the United Provinces to prevent France winning this war.

I also disagree with your assertion that the idea of making the Rhine the french border did not come earlier. The idea was already quite clear at the time of Louis XIII and Richelieu. And it can easily be traced back to the 13th century when, after digesting the gigantic increase of royal power inside the borders of the kingdom of France under the reign of Philip II Augustus, France was able to project power in Lotharingia and Burgundia-Provence. This began as early as the reign of Louis IX.

And the story of the Valois Burgundy is the story of a first attempt of the french royal familiy to take back control of Lotharingia that was initially successful but that finally backfired because of personal conflict among the branches of the capetian dynasty.

And the french capetians considered themselves as the heirs of the carolingians. They developed this propaganda with the son of Philip II Augustus whose mother was branded as a carolingian. This was aimed at ending once and for all dispute over which dynasty was the legitimate ruler of France. And this was also aimed at legitimizing territorial claim of the capetian kings of France over the territory that embodied more than any other the memory of carolingian rule and that was the craddle of the carolingian dynasty : Lotharingia.

They lost Lotharingia in 923 when the capetians/robertians betrayed and upset their carolingian king of western Francia, Charles III. Then in the 10the century, the last significant carolingian kings tried to take Lotharingia back but the ottonian were too strong and could count on the support of the capetians/robertians until they favoured the upset of the carolingians in 987 to end the carolingian claim over Lotharingia.

Kings and dynasts took a strong interest in the history of their ancestors and on the claims oever lands which had once been ruled by their ancestors. This still was the basis of legitimacy in the 17th century. That's why Louis XIV forged a trick with the so called custom of Brabant to start his devolution war.
 
Interesting discussion, thanks.

One otehr query, the English and Dutch had their 2nd war from 166-7, would Louis have been able to get his way better if he'd attacked a couple years earlier? It's still after Philip's death, and he'd lose the problem of England and the Netherlands uniting against him. Granted, he wouldn't ahve as many troops, but he could always start building up more.
 
The French quest for Rhine border was in my opinion the biggest mistake the French made. It basicly meant that France was at war with the rest of Europe during the 17th and 18th century. France didn't need a Rhine border to be safe. With the exception of Spain, France was surrounded on all sides by minor states that could not threaten France. The moment Spain collapsed in the 17th century France was as safe as it could have been, which is shown by the fact that France managed to increase in size and barely fought a battle on its own territory. In my opinion the Rhine border was merely an excuse for French expansionism.If they got the Rhine border I am certain another river suddenly would become Frances natural border, the IJssel, the Ems, the Elbe, the Volga. Actualy since France annexed quite a lot of teritories across the Rhine (including the Netherlands) within months after it finaly got its Rhine border, I think i am not far from the thruth.

A better, safer and cheaper method would, in my opinion, be making a deal with the Netherlands to divide up the Southern Netherlands, thus removing the only threat to France in that area (Spain) while remaining allied to the Netherlands and so providing a counter to the Engglish naval power.Together France and the Netherlands will probably be able to effectively avoid an English naval supremacy.

To be fair, the biggest problem with this idea, besides French greed for more land, is Dutch greed for more money. Basicly, the Dutch merchants after the 80 year war weren't interested in more Dutch land. They wanted to trade and get rich, not fight any costly wars or support expensive armies. The Dutch merchants (at least the ones from Holland), and thus the Dutch regents (at least the ones from Hollands) were against a deal with France (and thus were responsible for the rift between the Dutch Republic and France). My solution would be a surviving Stadholder Willem II, who defeats the more republican faction in the Republuc, makes a deal with France dividing up the Southern Netherlands and thus creating an alliance between the two countries (at least for a couple of decades, not unlike the Anglo-Dutch alliance). The northern Flank of France would be secure, with an ally that wouldn't be able to conquer France and the eastern flank would be secured, since only relatively small and unimportant countries lie to the east (besides Austria, which is still pretty far away). If the Netherlands and France divide their colonial spheres of interest, I think this could mean a profitable alliance for both of them.
 
The French quest for Rhine border was in my opinion the biggest mistake the French made. It basicly meant that France was at war with the rest of Europe during the 17th and 18th century. France didn't need a Rhine border to be safe. With the exception of Spain, France was surrounded on all sides by minor states that could not threaten France.
The moment Spain collapsed in the 17th century France was as safe as it could have been, which is shown by the fact that France managed to increase in size and barely fought a battle on its own territory. In my opinion the Rhine border was merely an excuse for French expansionism.If they got the Rhine border I am certain another river suddenly would become Frances natural border, the IJssel, the Ems, the Elbe, the Volga. Actualy since France annexed quite a lot of teritories across the Rhine (including the Netherlands) within months after it finaly got its Rhine border, I think i am not far from the thruth.

A better, safer and cheaper method would, in my opinion, be making a deal with the Netherlands to divide up the Southern Netherlands, thus removing the only threat to France in that area (Spain) while remaining allied to the Netherlands and so providing a counter to the Engglish naval power.Together France and the Netherlands will probably be able to effectively avoid an English naval supremacy.

To be fair, the biggest problem with this idea, besides French greed for more land, is Dutch greed for more money. Basicly, the Dutch merchants after the 80 year war weren't interested in more Dutch land. They wanted to trade and get rich, not fight any costly wars or support expensive armies. The Dutch merchants (at least the ones from Holland), and thus the Dutch regents (at least the ones from Hollands) were against a deal with France (and thus were responsible for the rift between the Dutch Republic and France). My solution would be a surviving Stadholder Willem II, who defeats the more republican faction in the Republuc, makes a deal with France dividing up the Southern Netherlands and thus creating an alliance between the two countries (at least for a couple of decades, not unlike the Anglo-Dutch alliance). The northern Flank of France would be secure, with an ally that wouldn't be able to conquer France and the eastern flank would be secured, since only relatively small and unimportant countries lie to the east (besides Austria, which is still pretty far away). If the Netherlands and France divide their colonial spheres of interest, I think this could mean a profitable alliance for both of them.

You are making a countersense.

The rulers of France had just weakened the encirclment It had faced for 140 years with the treaties of Westphalia. But then still were surrounded by a Habsburg dominated HRE, although the HRE was weakened, and by a Habsburg Spain.

And the HRE was, for any neighbour able to weaken it further, still too big a neighbour. The french rulers knew what It could mean to have a HRE with a strong central power. Their forebears had faced It for 2 and a half centuries, that's to say from 936 to 1198. They knew what It meant.

And even without such a potential threat, It was in the nature of any State to expand. France was not an exception on this ground. The austrian Habsburgs went for the Balkans and Germany. England went for all the british islands and took care that no continental'State become too strong. Russian went for acces to the Baltic and Black seas, ... Etc.
 
You are making a countersense.

The rulers of France had just weakened the encirclment It had faced for 140 years with the treaties of Westphalia. But then still were surrounded by a Habsburg dominated HRE, although the HRE was weakened, and by a Habsburg Spain.

And the HRE was, for any neighbour able to weaken it further, still too big a neighbour. The french rulers knew what It could mean to have a HRE with a strong central power. Their forebears had faced It for 2 and a half centuries, that's to say from 936 to 1198. They knew what It meant.

And even without such a potential threat, It was in the nature of any State to expand. France was not an exception on this ground. The austrian Habsburgs went for the Balkans and Germany. England went for all the british islands and took care that no continental'State become too strong. Russian went for acces to the Baltic and Black seas, ... Etc.


After the 30 year war both the HRE as well as Spain were no threat anymore to France. In the late 17th century and 18th century France was safe from any other country in Europe. France was the strongest country of the continent and noone could touch it. France did not need the Rhine border for protection. It only wanted it. Not because it needed, just because it was there and close by.

Actualy I would say that the Rhine border (or at least the idea of the Rhine border) was a bigger threat to France than all the other European countries combined. Because for the French desire for the Rhine, it foughth several wars against the rest of Europe, since it was obvious to everyone that France was the major threat to the other countries in Europe. Those wars it fought basicly bankrupted France and in the end caused the French revolution and thus the collapse of the French kingdom. Louis XIV might have been a brilliant king, but he was the cause for the collapse of France in the late 18th century. In the end France was its own worst enemy.

Yes, you are right that other countries were also expansionistic, but France basicly killed itself by its expansionism. A less expansionistic France, would have been better for France. Well at least for the French kingdom. That said, I am not so confident about the positive results of the French revolution. After the Napoleonic wars, France actualy lost all territory it had gained during the revolutionary wars, it had lost a lot of people in its wars and ended up with the Bourbons restored to the throne. Besides that it effectively caused German nationalism and thus it created a strong enemy out of a bunch of divided countries France could walk over (and had actualy done so in the last two centuries).
 
It is not the dutch finance that saved it but the dutch polder and the coalition that rallied around the United Provinces to prevent France winning this war.


I also disagree with your assertion that the idea of making the Rhine the french border did not come earlier. The idea was already quite clear at the time of Louis XIII and Richelieu. And it can easily be traced back to the 13th century when, after digesting the gigantic increase of royal power inside the borders of the kingdom of France under the reign of Philip II Augustus, France was able to project power in Lotharingia and Burgundia-Provence. This began as early as the reign of Louis IX.

And the story of the Valois Burgundy is the story of a first attempt of the french royal familiy to take back control of Lotharingia that was initially successful but that finally backfired because of personal conflict among the branches of the capetian dynasty.

And the french capetians considered themselves as the heirs of the carolingians. They developed this propaganda with the son of Philip II Augustus whose mother was branded as a carolingian. This was aimed at ending once and for all dispute over which dynasty was the legitimate ruler of France. And this was also aimed at legitimizing territorial claim of the capetian kings of France over the territory that embodied more than any other the memory of carolingian rule and that was the craddle of the carolingian dynasty : Lotharingia.

They lost Lotharingia in 923 when the capetians/robertians betrayed and upset their carolingian king of western Francia, Charles III. Then in the 10the century, the last significant carolingian kings tried to take Lotharingia back but the ottonian were too strong and could count on the support of the capetians/robertians until they favoured the upset of the carolingians in 987 to end the carolingian claim over Lotharingia.

Kings and dynasts took a strong interest in the history of their ancestors and on the claims oever lands which had once been ruled by their ancestors. This still was the basis of legitimacy in the 17th century. That's why Louis XIV forged a trick with the so called custom of Brabant to start his devolution war.

You are correct in 1672. But I refered to the general flow of European wars. The side with the largest amount of money, or with the best financial system, could resit larger factions.

Agree as well, that the Rhine border idea was always at the back of the mind of French rulers, and it did not matter if they regard them self beiing of ancient dynastic lines or just more common back ground. How ever this idea was always secondair to the political situation of the day.

I am not sure if it was after or before the Devolution War but the border of France and the Spanish Netherlands was extremly fortified under Vauban, creating a man made barrier in absence of a natural one.

But what are your ideas if De Witt and Louis XIV come to terms and Louis XIV can close his Devolution War with a glorious peace treaty instead of a humiliating treaty as the treaty of Aix a la Chhapelle. Despite dynastic motivations I still think that the Dutch War of 1672 was a war of revenge and the Nine Years war was, among other geo-political reasons, also a war if rivalery between Louis XIV and William III
 
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Do not rule out the Ottomans empire which was still a considerable danger in the 17th and partly 18th century for the East part of the Habsburg realm.

If The French- Dutch border is neutraliazed I would think Louis XIV would focuss his attention to Savoye and later of course will try to get a relative on the throne of Spain.
 
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