What if Kurita's Center Force has not been attacked by US submarines

The main problem here is that Kurita was unaware what forces he had bumped onto in the OTL, so in any alternate timeline, this would be not very different. His believe was he had encountered a fast USN 7th Fleet Taskgroup,

He shouldn't have made that mistake. Had those been fleet carriers, still there, why did they stop plastering him late on the 24th, and why weren't they hitting him since daybreak? He should've stuck to his original mission.


Thirdly, the surface actiongroup of Kurita was not on a bombardment sorty and the orders were to engage shipping with guns and torpedoes. Using AP shells and torpedoes

He must've had HE shells.
 
That they did (it's not referred to simply as The Bombardment for nothing), but the second attempt failed as the USN drove them off. The IJN failed miserably at Wake in their first attempt.
 
Starman


My thoughts here are that Japan might - and in my opinion this is stretching things to the level of ASB but still - might be able to negotiate a peace with the Allies at this point if they offered the following "carrots."

  1. Japan agrees to withdraw from ALL of the possessions it took after December 7, 1941.
  2. Japan declares null and void its alliance with the Axis Powers.
  3. Japan agrees to pay reparations - to be decided later.
In return Japan would ask for the following:

  1. Japan's territorial sovereignty be respected - i.e. the Home Islands and Manchuria and Korea.
  2. Japan gets to keep what's left of its navy.
  3. Japan would agree to trial of "war criminals" on Japanese soil.
(Believe it or not items 2 and 3 were parts of a Japanese peace proposal they were floating before the Allies by 1944.)
.



Seriously?
Are you confused with the Versailles Treaty Terms? Reparations is a declaration of war as we have seen it. Germany started WW2 just because of these reparations part, so better is to leave it out, of have the USA pay the reparations, as they were the most powerful economy in the world.
 
It did OK at Guadalcanal, blowing up US planes etc.

How many aircaft were lost on Henderson Field by shelling from navalships? The actual number is neglecable, as there were not that many to start with, all scattered over the whole field, resulting in damage to some, but still remaining a small sized airforce to count with, as the airstrip itself was not so easily knocked out permanently, being a soft strip of sand moslty. (Not concrete, as such a runway can be damaged more easily.)
 
Starman

In the scenario you posit I still see the IJN losing all of their carriers. Halsey wanted those carriers badly.

Sure but Shinano would soon be ready. It was sunk but survival of more ships or DDs might've saved it.

For instance, the U.S. naval force suffers major losses but Japan still loses Musashi for example and several other ships. The IJN fleet does make it back to Brunei but still with heavy losses.

My scenario envisages the IJN gunship fleet traversing the Sibuyan without trouble, and then fighting Oldendorf's forces. That would undoubtedly cause some losses but more likely other ships besides the toughest, Yamato class pair.

That doesn't mean as I indicated above that the U.S. gets off lightly in your scenario. Far from it. I think this simple approach might catch the U.S. off guard and lead to the loss of several of their CVEs and other ships.

BBs and cruisers in my scenario. That is a major loss.

Problem: U.S. industrial might can make up on that loss. Japan at this point cannot. A victory at Leyte would be a pyrrhic one at best.

From a military point of view perhaps but the idea is to facilitate a more favorable political outcome.

Does one bloody setback equal peace talks? The U.S. didn't cave after Pearl Harbor like the Japanese hoped. Neither did it do so after the loss of the Philippines, Wake Island, Guam, or the Battles of the Java Sea, or Savo Island.


But actual, irretrievable military loses were nothing compared to hypothetical losses here--up to 6 BBs and 8 cruisers etc, plus high casualties and losses ashore.

I suspect it is very likely as someone suggested earlier that Halsey gets canned for abandoning the task forces. The Philippines campaign is slowed by several months as naval assets are shuffled between the Atlantic and the Pacific. In the end the Japanese may have gained themselves a few extra months. Which they could use to good advantage.

My thoughts here are that Japan might - and in my opinion this is stretching things to the level of ASB but still - might be able to negotiate a peace with the Allies at this point if they offered the following "carrots."

  1. Japan agrees to withdraw from ALL of the possessions it took after December 7, 1941.
  2. Japan declares null and void its alliance with the Axis Powers.
  3. Japan agrees to pay reparations - to be decided later.
In return Japan would ask for the following:

  1. Japan's territorial sovereignty be respected - i.e. the Home Islands and Manchuria and Korea.
  2. Japan gets to keep what's left of its navy.
  3. Japan would agree to trial of "war criminals" on Japanese soil.
(Believe it or not items 2 and 3 were parts of a Japanese peace proposal they were floating before the Allies by 1944.)

To be clear I do NOT expect the U.S. to buy any of the above conditions even with a bloody nose at Leyte. But assuming that either FDR dies early in this scenario or loses a fourth term and is replaced by a complete idiot this is the best case scenario I think the Japanese could expect. And even then it is stretching it beyond the believability limit.

But nobody expects the US to throw in the towel completely. If news of the disaster--a very serious affair especially when the public was getting used to steady victories--gets lots of voters, especially women, to have second thoughts about fighting to achieve unconditional surrender at all costs, and FDR loses, loss of public support inevitably would have an effect on policy. The US would be prepared to keep fighting for a satisfactory outcome but not unconditional surrender. In other words a changed political landscape might force it to negotiate.


To wax on a bit - remember the U.S. was bloody well ticked off! If you thought we were angry after 9/11, from what I understand that was nothing compared to the collective anger Americans felt at the Pearl Harbor attack and the later defeats at the Philippines, et al. People wanted Japan to pay for what it had done.

To a considerable degree it already had by late '44.

What I've outlined above is frankly in my opinion not likely at all. But, I think it is the best Japan could hope for if they could force the U.S. to the bargaining table.

Sure I wasn't suggesting they'd win outright.
 

nbcman

Donor
Sure but Shinano would soon be ready. It was sunk but survival of more ships or DDs might've saved it.

So the IJN would get a carrier or two as compared to the US who was turning out Essex class CVs at the rate of about 1 per month in 1944 (11 launched in 12 months) along with every other class of ship.

My scenario envisages the IJN gunship fleet traversing the Sibuyan without trouble, and then fighting Oldendorf's forces. That would undoubtedly cause some losses but more likely other ships besides the toughest, Yamato class pair.

BBs and cruisers in my scenario. That is a major loss.

The IJN gunship fleet would have ran into US screening vessels first which would have caused losses in the IJN formation as well as triggered air attacks by any US planes which are in range prior to the IJN meeting the 7th fleet battleline. It is unlikely that the IJN fleet could have been in any shape to fight a cohesive battle such that they could wipe out the 7th Fleet Support Force.

From a military point of view perhaps but the idea is to facilitate a more favorable political outcome.

US losses prior to this didn't create a more favorable political outcome why would it change now? The US sentiment in 1944 was to defeat and even destroy the Japanese. Fully 13% of people who responded to a poll in 1944 wanted to exterminate the Japanese as a race. That is telling on the US psyche at the time which would preclude the thoughts of offering a negotiated peace to the Japanese after years of anti-Japanese propaganda.

But actual, irretrievable military loses were nothing compared to hypothetical losses here--up to 6 BBs and 8 cruisers etc, plus high casualties and losses ashore.

Putting aside whether or not the IJN could destroy Oldendorf's taskgroup, losing 6 BBs that are going to be decommissioned after the war is unfortunate but would have been considered an acceptable exchange to destroy the IJN gunship fleet. As noted previously, the IJN would probably have no or minimal HE ammunition. Would you want to sail with the plans to meet the US fleet in battle without having as much AP ammunition as possible?

But nobody expects the US to throw in the towel completely. If news of the disaster--a very serious affair especially when the public was getting used to steady victories--gets lots of voters, especially women, to have second thoughts about fighting to achieve unconditional surrender at all costs, and FDR loses, loss of public support inevitably would have an effect on policy. The US would be prepared to keep fighting for a satisfactory outcome but not unconditional surrender. In other words a changed political landscape might force it to negotiate.

Not only is that unrealistic, it is sexist in implying that the US female population would pressure the US government to seek conditional terms of surrender after a large number of US losses. If that was the case, why didn't the US negotiate after the battle of Okinawa which resulted in over 25k deaths and over 50k wounded? These OTL casualties would be greater than what would be caused in your proposed battle.

To a considerable degree it already had by late '44.

Not in the least bit. IJ was still occupying a substantial part of their pre and post Pearl Harbor conquests.

Sure I wasn't suggesting they'd win outright.
 
Starman I think you're giving far too much credit to the IJN at this point. With the USN reading their mail and having pretty much dominance of the air where they chose to deploy their carriers, with lots of recon and the like. You seem to think that the IJN will just skip up to the landing ships (the empty landing ships) somehow whilst not being spotted at all. Or if they are, brush aside the USN screen and oldendorfs forces with ease before sinking everything in the region. And then skip out again with little more than a fare-thee-well.

Against oldendorfs ships unless the IJN keeps both Yamato and Musashi in fighting trim, the old BB's actually outgun them.

USN Forces

2 x Colorado class battleships - Equal to the Nagato, well protected too.
4 x 12 x 14-inch gunned Standards
4 x CA 3 with 9 x 8-inch guns, one with 8 x 8-inch guns
4 x Cleaveland class CLs with 12 x 6-inch guns
28 x DD

IJN forces (assuming no losses beforehand which is basically impossible but here we are)

Yamato and Musashi - both exceptionally potent combattants but not super-godship invincible.
Nagato - Roughly equal to a 16-inch gunned Colorado class BB (faster, weaker protection).
Kongo and Haruna - 8 x 14-inch gunned battlecruisers who are very vulnerable to 14-inch and 16-inch shells.
10 x CA with 8-inch guns
15 x DD

The USN BB's are all pretty uniform, being evolutions of one another (they were called the Standards for a very good reason) and all are uniformly well protected and have up to date fire control systems and radars, as well as extensive gunnery practice. The IJN lacked the USN's gunnery systems and had suffered a noticable decay in the quality of their gunnery training from the Guadacanal standards at the start of the Pacific portion of the War. Whilst the USN battle line is slower giving up 4 knots to the IJN one, their ships are superior to basically all but two of them. And have better fire control, radar and gunners than ALL of them.

If you was in a Kongo you will know your 8-inch belt WILL be penetrated by a 14-inch shell and these ships simply can't go into a slugging match with a Standard type ship. The Colorado's are equal to the Nagato's and their 16-inch shells can still hurt a Yamato type ship. Same as the 14-inch guns who could help mission kill the IJN mega-ships (please don't believe everything you see on Discovery). And if you go "Okay preserve the Kongo's let them do their job of going after the cruisers." grats, you've just turned a 5 v 6 fight into a 3 v 6 and even a Yamato will not like being slapped again and again by 14 and 16-inch shells if you don't have the Kongo's taking part in the battle line.

And assuming that the USN sinks the Musashi on the way in then its now a 2 vs 6 fight.

The cruisers are a bit of a toss up, the IJN cruisers are all very good but they never had a great success rate with long lances and those torps didn't take well to getting hit. Also the USN's CL's are all VERY good, by any standard they are heavy cruisers, if but for their gun caliber with them having heavier protection than the IJN CAs and a large 6-inch gun battery.

The USN also has nearly double the DD strength and these are not 4-stackers but Fletchers up the yazoo which are easily equal to IJN DDs. And this isn't counting any of the 80 odd DDs and DE's that were shielding the landing zone getting involved. If they come along en-mass then the IJN ships will simply be swamped with a torpedo attack on the scale not seen since Jutland.

If by some Kame induced miracle the IJN gets close to the landing ships, then they are not going home, simple as.

You're also misjudging the USA's view towards the Japanese on a scale like Imperial Japan did. Cause enough casualties and they will suddenly go "PEACE!". No, the US wanted to see Imperial Japan torn down, thrown into a muddy puddle and then kicked in the ribs and teeth until it stopped being funny. Even if an absolute disaster took place where somehow ALL of Oldendorfs ships were sunk for minimal losses by the IJN (basically impossible) then it would result in heads rolling at the navy, but the US is not going to suddenly get weak at the knees and ask for peace.

You're also massively imitating the IJNs way of thinking "We'll do the thing and the US will most CERTINALLY do this and this and conform EXACTLY to our plans!" IE wishful thinking, which the IJN did all through the war. They always did plans and then expected the USN to conform to how they thought their plans would play out and how they wargamed.
 
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Starman I think you're giving far too much credit to the IJN at this point. With the USN reading their mail and having pretty much dominance of the air where they chose to deploy their carriers, with lots of recon and the like. You seem to think that the IJN will just skip up to the landing ships (the empty landing ships) somehow whilst not being spotted at all. Or if they are, brush aside the USN screen and oldendorfs forces with ease before sinking everything in the region. And then skip out again with little more than a fare-thee-well.

Against oldendorfs ships unless the IJN keeps both Yamato and Musashi in fighting trim, the old BB's actually outgun them.

USN Forces

2 x Colorado class battleships - Equal to the Nagato, well protected too.
4 x 12 x 14-inch gunned Standards
4 x CA 3 with 9 x 8-inch guns, one with 8 x 8-inch guns
4 x Cleaveland class CLs with 12 x 6-inch guns
28 x DD

IJN forces (assuming no losses beforehand which is basically impossible but here we are)

Yamato and Musashi - both exceptionally potent combattants but not super-godship invincible.
Nagato - Roughly equal to a 16-inch gunned Colorado class BB (faster, weaker protection).
Kongo and Haruna - 8 x 14-inch gunned battlecruisers who are very vulnerable to 14-inch and 16-inch shells.
10 x CA with 8-inch guns
15 x DD

The USN BB's are all pretty uniform, being evolutions of one another (they were called the Standards for a very good reason) and all are uniformly well protected and have up to date fire control systems and radars, as well as extensive gunnery practice. The IJN lacked the USN's gunnery systems and had suffered a noticable decay in the quality of their gunnery training from the Guadacanal standards at the start of the Pacific portion of the War. Whilst the USN battle line is slower giving up 4 knots to the IJN one, their ships are superior to basically all but two of them. And have better fire control, radar and gunners than ALL of them.

If you was in a Kongo you will know your 8-inch belt WILL be penetrated by a 14-inch shell and these ships simply can't go into a slugging match with a Standard type ship. The Colorado's are equal to the Nagato's and their 16-inch shells can still hurt a Yamato type ship. Same as the 14-inch guns who could help mission kill the IJN mega-ships (please don't believe everything you see on Discovery). And if you go "Okay preserve the Kongo's let them do their job of going after the cruisers." grats, you've just turned a 5 v 6 fight into a 3 v 6 and even a Yamato will not like being slapped again and again by 14 and 16-inch shells if you don't have the Kongo's taking part in the battle line.

And assuming that the USN sinks the Musashi on the way in then its now a 2 vs 6 fight.

The cruisers are a bit of a toss up, the IJN cruisers are all very good but they never had a great success rate with long lances and those torps didn't take well to getting hit. Also the USN's CL's are all VERY good, by any standard they are heavy cruisers, if but for their gun caliber with them having heavier protection than the IJN CAs and a large 6-inch gun battery.

The USN also has nearly double the DD strength and these are not 4-stackers but Fletchers up the yazoo which are easily equal to IJN DDs. And this isn't counting any of the 80 odd DDs and DE's that were shielding the landing zone getting involved. If they come along en-mass then the IJN ships will simply be swamped with a torpedo attack on the scale not seen since Jutland.

If by some Kame induced miracle the IJN gets close to the landing ships, then they are not going home, simple as.

You're also misjudging the USA's view towards the Japanese on a scale like Imperial Japan did. Cause enough casualties and they will suddenly go "PEACE!". No, the US wanted to see Imperial Japan torn down, thrown into a muddy puddle and then kicked in the ribs and teeth until it stopped being funny. Even if an absolute disaster took place where somehow ALL of Oldendorfs ships were sunk for minimal losses by the IJN (basically impossible) then it would result in heads rolling at the navy, but the US is not going to suddenly get weak at the knees and ask for peace.

You're also massively imitating the IJNs way of thinking "We'll do the thing and the US will most CERTINALLY do this and this and conform EXACTLY to our plans!" IE wishful thinking, which the IJN did all through the war. They always did plans and then expected the USN to conform to how they thought their plans would play out and how they wargamed.



Well, Not realy as the old USN gunboats of Oldendorff were not that well ballanced, since especially USS Pensylvannia and USS Maryland were not upgraded with state of the art equipment and firecontrol, leaving only Tennessee, California and West Virginia effective against a surface threat and Mississippi doubdtfull. The Penn and Mary were only good for shooting at fixed targets. Besides that, their loadout was for shorbombardment, with more HE than normally shippes, relatively poor weapons against ships. Only the DD's were potent to stop any surfacethreat, as even the cruisers were addapted to shell beaches mainly, with few AP rounds in their magazines. (and no torpedoes as the USN for some questionable reason did not use torpedoes in most of the cruisers.)

That leaves Kurrita with five against three actually, as some underestimate the power of the older, but fully modernized IJN BB's. Nagato was actually much more potent than any of the older USN BB's, with far better protection actually, if engaging at longer ranges, as the belt was simmilar to the USN ships. The same is tru for the Kongo's, which were equally fully modernized and had thicker decks than most of the US line of Oldendorff. Kongo after refit had 5.5 inch deckarmor over magazines, compared to the refitted Pennsylvannia and the Tennessee classses just 5 inch and Maryland a non upgraded 3.5 inch only. Nagato even had 6.7 inch over her magazines so a tough nut to crack for the US Line of Oldendorff, combined with his shortage of AP rounds.

The real gamechanger was the larger number of USN DD's. In the OTL Oldendorff had 28 DD's to Kurita 15. If added Nishiruma's 4 and Shima's 7, that is 26 IJN DD's vs 28 USN ones. In cruisers Kurita was by far stronger, especailly when added one from Nishiruma and three form Shima.

That makes a very tough confrontation possible, with the DD's bringing the decission, not the BB's as these were either too old and too slow (USN) to operate against an enemy surfaceforce in open sea. IJN BB's were not very much better, as they were of too differrent model, wit too many differences between them (Kongo's could perhaps better operate wit cruisers, while the Yamato's and Nagato coud combine forces as well, but the Fuso's were obsolete, as much as the USN BB's were.) All would depend on where the confrontation was to take place and under what circumstances. At night the USN radar was a serious advantage and in daylight the IJN might have the advantage, if there was not that much threat from the air. Problem for the IJN would be the poor quality of training due to lack of fuel for the ships to have trainingcruises possible before the battle. The IJN in late 1944 was much less well trained than in early 1942.
 
why didn't the US negotiate after the battle of Okinawa which resulted in over 25k deaths and over 50k wounded? These OTL casualties would be greater than what would be caused in your proposed battle.


But that was different. By the time of Okinawa the war was practically won anyway. Japan hardly had any fleet left and had lost the Philippines. Furthermore a big naval defeat would've seemed more spectacular than a campaign with losses spread out over several weeks.
 
But that was different. By the time of Okinawa the war was practically won anyway. Japan hardly had any fleet left and had lost the Philippines. Furthermore a big naval defeat would've seemed more spectacular than a campaign with losses spread out over several weeks.

The war already had a point of no return long before 1944, as Pearl Harbor itself is often seen as such, but the real thing was the political cjoice of the Allies to demand unconditional surrender of the Axis powers, after the 1942 Cassablanca meetings. Leyte was not going to change that possition and neither did Okinawa. (Even with 100% losses by the Allies in one, or both, they were not going to make any deal, as they knew their potential was far outreaching the ones of the Japanese, so they could more easily take losses and compensate these later, than the Japanese could.)
 
The war already had a point of no return long before 1944, as Pearl Harbor itself is often seen as such, but the real thing was the political cjoice of the Allies to demand unconditional surrender of the Axis powers, after the 1942 Cassablanca meetings. Leyte was not going to change that possition and neither did Okinawa. (Even with 100% losses by the Allies in one, or both, they were not going to make any deal, as they knew their potential was far outreaching the ones of the Japanese, so they could more easily take losses and compensate these later, than the Japanese could.)

But as Vietnam demonstrated later, the domestic situation can stymie a mission despite material advantages. By the time the toll at Okinawa was added up and known, the war was practically over anyway. A disaster at sea, involving several thousand dead, could have had a bearing on the '44 elections and US policy. No doubt the US would've retained the potential to win no matter what happened. But political will was another matter.
 
I'd argue it was a different time, Vietman was unpopular from the get-go. The US got involved thanks to a sneak attack and then a national humiliation in the Phillipines. Public support for the war was huge, unlike Vietnam. As far more learned folks here have said, that there was even support to have Japan crushed by the US in the populace and the public was not getting war weary (unlike the UK).
 
But as Vietnam demonstrated later, the domestic situation can stymie a mission despite material advantages. By the time the toll at Okinawa was added up and known, the war was practically over anyway. A disaster at sea, involving several thousand dead, could have had a bearing on the '44 elections and US policy. No doubt the US would've retained the potential to win no matter what happened. But political will was another matter.

There is a very lot of difference between the USA going to war on its own against someone else, or after being attacked first. The attacke first doctrine makes the USA much more sympathetic to the war than when the USA invades another country, without being attacked first by that state. Public opponion corresponds with that, just as the "War on Terror" of the period after 9-11 corresponded withn this cry for action against the ones blamed for the attack, while there was more opposition for actions against more questionable opponents, like Iraq. The sympathy for the actions against Al-Quada were popular and well supported, but the War in Iraq was not.

That being something to keep in mind. WW2 demanded a total defeat of Japan, no matter how. The Public oppinion in the USA was that no one could get away with such a thing as Pearl Harbor and likewise sort of actions. Americans are a people that want to live peacefully with eachother and are generally not going to wage war on their own behalf, unless, you somehow make them angry, like the attack on Pearl Harbor and the 9-11 attacks did. Japan simply had crossed that border on dec-7-1941 and had to bear the consequences of that. No matter how many defeats the USA were going to have after Pearl Harbor, they would still use their superior Industrial, technological- and human numbers supeririority to fight on, until the job was done. A single naval batlte lost somehow was not going to change that.
 
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But as Vietnam demonstrated later, the domestic situation can stymie a mission despite material advantages. By the time the toll at Okinawa was added up and known, the war was practically over anyway. A disaster at sea, involving several thousand dead, could have had a bearing on the '44 elections and US policy. No doubt the US would've retained the potential to win no matter what happened. But political will was another matter.

Bolding mine. It is very important to remember that the Tet Offensive was early in 1968, but the US only left about 1973 (too tired to look up the date). So despite growing protests (although many still supported the war, even in 1972), the US stayed another ~5 years. Americans can get tired of war- just in terms of 5 years, not a single battle. Great if you are a local insurgency, like Vietnam, not so great if you are a nation with fleets, islands, and factories to bomb.
 
Bolding mine. It is very important to remember that the Tet Offensive was early in 1968, but the US only left about 1973 (too tired to look up the date).

IIRC the US had already had a policy of "Vietnamization" by 1970, when it was withdrawing troops. To provide support for the ARVN but minimize its own casualties the US relied on bombing. By early 1971 when there was an incursion into Laos, ARVN troops were on the ground supported by US airstrikes.

So despite growing protests (although many still supported the war, even in 1972), the US stayed another ~5 years.

But its ground combat role may have essentially ended in just two.

Americans can get tired of war- just in terms of 5 years, not a single battle.

Tet was actually a victory, but it was still a watershed.
 
Vietnam can in no way be compared to WW2. The US were completely mobilized in a two front war fighting alongside allies in both theatres. The Japanese had attacked US soil.

Vietnam was a sideshow in a greater "Cold War"

You can pull out of Vietnam and not impact the greater conflict. Pull out of WW2 and the US reputation is sunk for decades.
 

Geon

Donor
Even assuming a major IJN victory in the Battle of Leyte Gulf the U.S. would not have been willing to change its war aims regarding Japan.

Rethinking what I posted above I have to say there is no way the U.S. would have accepted anything short of unconditional surrender as far as Japan was concerned. Not as indicated by other posters without serious political and international repercussions.

The Japanese militarists from the time they bombed Pearl Harbor until the very end of the war were operating from a misconception of the American psyche. They believed that the American culture was so decadent and hedonistic that Americans would have no stomach for a long war that would require sacrifices on the part of every American. If they could only make the casualty counts higher then the Americans would be demanding that their government come to terms with Japan.

Racism was working here on both sides of the equation. The Japanese militarists saw a decadent weak American culture which was no match for the bushido spirit of Japan's armed forces and its people. The Americans saw a polite pretentious group of funny little men who actually thought they could take on the world. Both sides would pay for their preconceived notions in blood unfortunately.

But the Japanese militarists refused to accept the reality of the situation before them - to the point that they were willing to try suicidal tactics to "up the ante". They simply could not conceive that any enemy could be as determined as they were to win.

The U.S. as demonstrated in the excellent TL "Decisive Darkness" would be ruthless and do whatever it was going to take to win. It was not going to back down under any circumstances regardless of whatever losses it took.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto warned his fellow countrymen about this in an oft misquoted statement.

Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it would not be enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians (who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war) have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.[12] (from Wikipedia)
Yamamoto knew the Americans and knew we would never settle for anything short of unconditional surrender by Japan. He knew a decisive naval battle would only delay what was inevitable - Japan's defeat.
 
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