“What if General Kenney had persuaded General Arnold to deploy B-29s to the Southwest Pacific ?
Herman S. Wolk
The uncertainty of when the force might enter combat operations was not the only question concerning the B-29 that faced General Arnold and the American high command. There was also the issue of where best initially to deploy the bomber. In the summer of 1943, just a few months after the crash of the second prototype, this became a searing issue between Lt. Gen. George Kenney, commander of the Fifth Air Force, and the Allied Forces, in the Southwest Pacific Area, and General Arnold. Arnold, was determined to use the B-29s against the against the Japanese homeland even if initially he had to base them in India and stage them through China. However, what if General Kenney’s plan had been accepted and the B-29s were first used to strike Japan’s oil producing and refining facilities in the Netherlands East Indies? Kennedy was convinced that this “most decisive set of targets for bombing anywhere in the world” would have resulted in delivering a “fatal blow” to Japan…..
….By the fall of 1943, when the B-29 issue erupted between Kenney and Arnold, the allied forces in the southwest Pacific had turned the tide against the Japanese. The early New Guinea campaigns had been completed with the capture of Buna, Lae and Salamaua; the Fifth Air Force was administering a thrashing to the enemy air forces; and in March 1943 the Japanese had suffered enormous losses in the battle of the Bismarck Sea. Kenney’s forces were impressively supporting MacArthur’s drive along the north coast of New Guinea.
Thus, it was in this strategic and operational context that Kenney implored Arnold to send him the B-29s. Kenney’s strategy for employing the big bombers was comprehensive, as might be expected from an air leader of his intellectual and strategic capacity. Kenney informed Arnold that his plan to decimate Japan’s oil capacity (the “one essential commodity which she must have to carry on the war”) would be a “war-winning” strategy. General Kenney’s big problem without the B-29s was simply that his B-24 Liberator bombers were limited in both range and bomb-carrying capacity. They could reach only refineries that accounted for less than one-fifth of the total capacity of the Netherlands East Indies. And over the distance required to strike Sourabaya and Balikpapan the B-24 could only carry a maximum load of 3,000 pounds of bombs.
Japan had no synthetic fuel facilities and Kenney’s plan was to base the B-29s in Australia where they would have the range-and carrying capacity—to attack ninety percent of Japan’s oil producing and refining capacity: “Every single oil field, oil well, and refinery is within range of the B-29 carrying a minimum load of ten thousand pounds of bombs and operating from existing fields along the north coast of Australia between Broome and Darwin.” Sumatra, Singapore, Borneo, Mindanao and Palau were all within the range of the B-29 as was the huge Palembang complex in southern Sumatra, producing half the crude and over half of the refining capacity. And realizing plans were in the making to base the bombers in China, Kenney emphasized to General Arnold that Darwin was closer to the Sarawak and Brunei oil fields in Borneo than was Kunming, China.
Kenney’s strategy contained another dimension. This would be a blockade by the mines laid by B-29s inflicted upon the enemy’s shipping lanes stretching from Singapore to Saigon and Manila to the Marianas and the Marshall Islands. Airdromes would be used not only in northern Australia but also at Dobodura and in the Markham Valley of New Guinea. By October 1943, Kenney already had five aerodromes in northern Australia ready for 25 B-29s. He believed that approval and implementation of his plan could result in the arrival of allied forces in Mindanao in 1944. “Japan”, he informed Arnold, “may easily collapse back to her original empire by that time, due to her oil shortage alone. It is conceivable that she may be forced to sue for peace with certain overwhelming defeat staring her in the face.”
In Washington, there was no question about eventually basing the B-29s in the Marianas. The argument centered on where to operate initially. Kenney’s strategy was supported by Arnold’s own Chief of the Air Staff, Lt. Gen. Barney M. Giles – and also by Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations. Giles had visited Kenney in the southwest Pacific and was impressed with his logic and preparations. King supported striking oil and Japan’s shipping lanes because it would have aided the Navy’s central Pacific thrust.
Arnold however, was firm in his conviction that the B-29s should be directed against the Japanese homeland. He thought that ultimately Japan could be defeated without mounting an invasion with its enormous casualties. He also wanted the Twentieth Air Force bombers to remain under his direction from Washington and not be parceled out to area commanders. Thus, Arnold decided first for the China plan, with the subsequent B-29 offensive from the Marianas.
The B-29 raids from the Marianas began in October 1944, under the command of Brig. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, but it was not long after Maj. Gen. LeMay’s arrival in January 1945, that the B-29s Began to wreck Japan’s cities, and with help from the blockade and the Soviet entry into the war, forced the Japanese to surrender.
What if General Kenney’s plan had been adopted? What might have been the result? There was no doubt that Arnold’s determination to attack Japan’s industrial and population centers paid off, culminating with dropping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is clear that Operation MATTERHORN, the costly B-29 missions flown from China in the summer of 1944, were of little import. In this regard , Kenney’s plan would have been far preferable. Striking the great oil refineries, mining Japan’s sea lanes, and attacking her shipping would have been more effective than the China-based operations. The deployment of B-29s to the southwest Pacific would not have resulted in the “fatal blow” that Kenney had predicted, but it might well have contributed to knocking Japan out of the war earlier.
So Kenney’s concept would have been correct for the June-October 1944 timeframe, but Arnold’s conviction to throw the weight of the B-29 campaign against the Japanese home islands in late 1944 and 1945 was absolutely correct…..”
So, what did Wolk get right and what did he get wrong. What would have been the consequences of having B-29 operations first in Southwest Pacific rather than CBI, and was this even possible?
Herman S. Wolk
The uncertainty of when the force might enter combat operations was not the only question concerning the B-29 that faced General Arnold and the American high command. There was also the issue of where best initially to deploy the bomber. In the summer of 1943, just a few months after the crash of the second prototype, this became a searing issue between Lt. Gen. George Kenney, commander of the Fifth Air Force, and the Allied Forces, in the Southwest Pacific Area, and General Arnold. Arnold, was determined to use the B-29s against the against the Japanese homeland even if initially he had to base them in India and stage them through China. However, what if General Kenney’s plan had been accepted and the B-29s were first used to strike Japan’s oil producing and refining facilities in the Netherlands East Indies? Kennedy was convinced that this “most decisive set of targets for bombing anywhere in the world” would have resulted in delivering a “fatal blow” to Japan…..
….By the fall of 1943, when the B-29 issue erupted between Kenney and Arnold, the allied forces in the southwest Pacific had turned the tide against the Japanese. The early New Guinea campaigns had been completed with the capture of Buna, Lae and Salamaua; the Fifth Air Force was administering a thrashing to the enemy air forces; and in March 1943 the Japanese had suffered enormous losses in the battle of the Bismarck Sea. Kenney’s forces were impressively supporting MacArthur’s drive along the north coast of New Guinea.
Thus, it was in this strategic and operational context that Kenney implored Arnold to send him the B-29s. Kenney’s strategy for employing the big bombers was comprehensive, as might be expected from an air leader of his intellectual and strategic capacity. Kenney informed Arnold that his plan to decimate Japan’s oil capacity (the “one essential commodity which she must have to carry on the war”) would be a “war-winning” strategy. General Kenney’s big problem without the B-29s was simply that his B-24 Liberator bombers were limited in both range and bomb-carrying capacity. They could reach only refineries that accounted for less than one-fifth of the total capacity of the Netherlands East Indies. And over the distance required to strike Sourabaya and Balikpapan the B-24 could only carry a maximum load of 3,000 pounds of bombs.
Japan had no synthetic fuel facilities and Kenney’s plan was to base the B-29s in Australia where they would have the range-and carrying capacity—to attack ninety percent of Japan’s oil producing and refining capacity: “Every single oil field, oil well, and refinery is within range of the B-29 carrying a minimum load of ten thousand pounds of bombs and operating from existing fields along the north coast of Australia between Broome and Darwin.” Sumatra, Singapore, Borneo, Mindanao and Palau were all within the range of the B-29 as was the huge Palembang complex in southern Sumatra, producing half the crude and over half of the refining capacity. And realizing plans were in the making to base the bombers in China, Kenney emphasized to General Arnold that Darwin was closer to the Sarawak and Brunei oil fields in Borneo than was Kunming, China.
Kenney’s strategy contained another dimension. This would be a blockade by the mines laid by B-29s inflicted upon the enemy’s shipping lanes stretching from Singapore to Saigon and Manila to the Marianas and the Marshall Islands. Airdromes would be used not only in northern Australia but also at Dobodura and in the Markham Valley of New Guinea. By October 1943, Kenney already had five aerodromes in northern Australia ready for 25 B-29s. He believed that approval and implementation of his plan could result in the arrival of allied forces in Mindanao in 1944. “Japan”, he informed Arnold, “may easily collapse back to her original empire by that time, due to her oil shortage alone. It is conceivable that she may be forced to sue for peace with certain overwhelming defeat staring her in the face.”
In Washington, there was no question about eventually basing the B-29s in the Marianas. The argument centered on where to operate initially. Kenney’s strategy was supported by Arnold’s own Chief of the Air Staff, Lt. Gen. Barney M. Giles – and also by Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations. Giles had visited Kenney in the southwest Pacific and was impressed with his logic and preparations. King supported striking oil and Japan’s shipping lanes because it would have aided the Navy’s central Pacific thrust.
Arnold however, was firm in his conviction that the B-29s should be directed against the Japanese homeland. He thought that ultimately Japan could be defeated without mounting an invasion with its enormous casualties. He also wanted the Twentieth Air Force bombers to remain under his direction from Washington and not be parceled out to area commanders. Thus, Arnold decided first for the China plan, with the subsequent B-29 offensive from the Marianas.
The B-29 raids from the Marianas began in October 1944, under the command of Brig. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, but it was not long after Maj. Gen. LeMay’s arrival in January 1945, that the B-29s Began to wreck Japan’s cities, and with help from the blockade and the Soviet entry into the war, forced the Japanese to surrender.
What if General Kenney’s plan had been adopted? What might have been the result? There was no doubt that Arnold’s determination to attack Japan’s industrial and population centers paid off, culminating with dropping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is clear that Operation MATTERHORN, the costly B-29 missions flown from China in the summer of 1944, were of little import. In this regard , Kenney’s plan would have been far preferable. Striking the great oil refineries, mining Japan’s sea lanes, and attacking her shipping would have been more effective than the China-based operations. The deployment of B-29s to the southwest Pacific would not have resulted in the “fatal blow” that Kenney had predicted, but it might well have contributed to knocking Japan out of the war earlier.
So Kenney’s concept would have been correct for the June-October 1944 timeframe, but Arnold’s conviction to throw the weight of the B-29 campaign against the Japanese home islands in late 1944 and 1945 was absolutely correct…..”
So, what did Wolk get right and what did he get wrong. What would have been the consequences of having B-29 operations first in Southwest Pacific rather than CBI, and was this even possible?