What If Japan Wins WW2?

@Genmotty: Yeah, the IJA really sucked. The only strengths they had were high morale and loyalty. Also the probably had to focus on enlisting as many men as possible to hold down China, instead of building a highly trained and well-equipped elite force. If Japan wants to win anything it will have to avoid meeting a western power on land. I think that any Japanese army, because of the inevitability of a IJN bias and lack of resources, would have the above crippling problems.
 
Kome said:
IIRC the IJN was getting like 30% of the national budget while the IJA was getting a mere 10%. Meanwhile Japan was kinda weak economically in general.

So yeah money was a problem. Especially for the army. Meanwhile navies are damn expensive so its not like things are very rosy for the IJN ether.
I don't disagree with that. I do think your budget numbers are skewed, though: IJA was getting a pretty damn big piece, & it grew as the war in China grew. That was one of the reasons IJN wanted to attack Pearl Harbor: senior leadership feared being made irrelevant & getting squeezed out entirely.
Kome said:
Plus military education shifted to a more nationalistic curriculum, leading to a decay in tactical thought (and human rights).
IMO, it went much deeper than that.
Kome said:
Quantity over quality. Japan didnt need better artillery they needed MORE artillery. See the budget issue between IJA and IJN above. Genmotty got it right.
As I read him, he's saying the IJA arty was insufficiently potent, not just insufficiently common. More low-powered guns would not make up IJA's deficiencies, it'd just mask them & absorb resources better used for better weapons.
Kome said:
For Japan to have a weak or small navy was unthinkable.
Agreed. The problem was, Japan didn't know what a blue water navy looked like or how to use it.
 
I could only give the briefest of discourse on a period that lasted almost a century and relate it to the question asked in this thread so of course the points you make are fair and valid given I couldn't hope to cover all the details for such reasoning.


You ask phx1138 "why Imperial Japan between 1916 and circa 1940 changed to such a brutal, suicidal force, & why they stuck to a flawed doctrine."

It's a good question without quick answer. What we must realise is that in the period of 1916 - 1930 Japans government and foreign policy changed from what had been in the 1890s and pre-Great war one of modernisation and looking for international recognition, to being one of believing they had already achieved international recognition (REF: Nine Power talks) and thus they had a 'free hand' in Asia.

The armed forces having already achieved its victory had to give way to economic concessions on the Asian mainland which is where much of the money went, so rather than investing in mainland Japan much investment went overseas to be ploughed into the rail companies and coastal industry in Korea and Southern Manchuria. This meant that rather than buying new equipment and expertise they were preferring to use what they already knew and develop 'home grown' variants.

Overall this reduced the rate of modernisation, but it really meant that the government in Tokyo looked at a paper tiger in their economic power, because while homeland Japan was still developing modern expertise, in Manchuria and Korea this wasn't happening. It still being a mainly agricultural sectors with little precision manufacturing industry.

Thus later in the 1930s when contracts were put out for weapons of war to be built, and these weapons were produced by 1900s (or before) standards in Manchuria they simply functioned poorly. The responsibility of the armaments ministers.

This can be seen with the IJNs steel, a good portion of it came cheaply from Manchuria and was of substandard quality to Japanese production and so several ships and artillery pieces suffered from structural weakness. It didn't help that the Japanese would also tow the treaty lines and shave off weight and strength in the superstructure as well, but that's another issue.


So throughout the 1920s with the Military budget spending growth rate decreased we don't see Japan taking onboard many of the developments that European nations took from the lessons learnt in the Great War...much because Japan didn't fight in the trenches or had fought a major war in Korea or Southern Manchuria.

The key example being them totally 'not getting' the concept of an infantry submachingun when they had example copies and had the expertise to build them. They simply hadn't 'got' the effect it could have on the battlefield, and so they were ignored until much later in the war whent they could see the effect from British and American troops (as well as the czech examples the Chinese had in areas)

In other ways their doctrine was very strong, at least in China, because it functioned well enough. It's shortcomings were clear later when the Soviets, British and Americans who had improved their millitaries throughout the interbellium fought with effectively a WWI force, that was fighting against effectively insurgents and not a comparable enemy.

This is why when the tables turned in '42 the Allies were on a winning streak right back to Japan...the fanaticism of the Japanese leading to horrific casualties notwithstanding.

The regime was brutal at the top because the military got itself into power by political violence. Assassination was the norm for instance. Because the leaders were willing to go to such extremes it's small wonder why the officer class were also willing to use such methods. However the brutality of Japanese soldiers is not all that important in comparison to their doctrine and equipment.





The Advance South policy was not only about resources, it was about the IJN wanting to stay relevant. The resources of the DEI and Indochina were just justification for their position. After all the worst thing the navy feared was that because they couldn't control the Kwangtung theatre commanders and Army branch that they would drag Japan into a war with the Soviets and Chinese, thus threatening all the Manchurian gains made in the last war.

Getting the go ahead for their own policy kept the navy relevant and would hopefully prevent escalation in Manchuria.... and it worked (kind of). Since after the border skirmishes (and 1938 debacle’s after Marco Polo) the army didn't quite have the influence it really wanted. Indeed their are records of meetings where the Emperor was very displeased with the generals in northern China, compared to the navy (at least until towards the end of '42).

Either way, the navy took matters into their hands with the invasion of Hanian island and events in Shanghai, long before the oil supply problems were rising their heads. After all these only came to a head after Germany invaded the Soviet Union and Japan fearing they would miss their opportunity occupying Indochina....and in so doing had their trades embargoed and assets frozen....which led to the nessicity of occupying the DEI for oil and rare resources.

Thus the need to target America for the strategic control of the Philippines. Finally we must recognise that most of the fuel oil went to the IJN, and not the IJA so it was the IJN really pushing for the Southern Advance strategy, not the IJA which was still an unmotorised force for the vast part and relied on supplies from within Manchuria/Korea more than homeland Japan (until the IJN opened a number of coastal fronts that could only be supplied by sea thus requiring extra oil and coal for the convoys).

In many ways it was the IJN that 'sunk' Imperial Japans great power ambitions, even though they were the 'smarter branch' of the Japanese Armed forces.

Bit of a common myth that it was all about resources, but its good enough for a lay interpretation of why the pacific campaign started.
 
Genmotty said:
It's a good question without quick answer....
The armed forces having already achieved its victory had to give way to economic concessions on the Asian mainland...
[Japan was still] a mainly agricultural sectors with little precision manufacturing industry.
That does explain the lack engineering depth, & I agree, Manchuria was an issue. I don't think it was by any means the only issue. I suspect part of the reason is, Japan was trying to make up more than 200yr of industrialization in so short a time.

I will agree, it limited the ability to produce modern weapons, which influenced doctrine; I do think part of the reason for increased emphasis on moral over material was precisely because Japan simply couldn't produce better weapons.
Genmotty said:
So throughout the 1920s with the Military budget spending growth rate decreased we don't see Japan taking onboard many of the developments that European nations took from the lessons learnt in the Great War...much because Japan didn't fight in the trenches or had fought a major war in Korea or Southern Manchuria.

The key example being them totally 'not getting' the concept of an infantry submachingun when they had example copies and had the expertise to build them. They simply hadn't 'got' the effect it could have on the battlefield
That really doesn't address the issue. That's a symptom, not a cause, IMO. The senior officers were poorly trained & educated in both services. Quality of leadership was the worst I've ever heard of.:eek:

IMO, it's because the SOs were so awful the doctrine was so bad: officers trained to blind obedience, & uneducated/untrained in examining other options (as Japan's were), do not produce flexible doctrines or plans. Officers without even the grasp of the difference between tactical & strategic victory:eek::confused: (& Japan's lacked it:eek::confused::confused::rolleyes:) are incapable of developing doctrines & plans to cope with the situation Japan found herself it. And Japan's SOs simply did not understand the enormous degree to which attacking Britain or the U.S. differed from attacking China or tsarist Russia, which is a product of poor education & training. (Contrast the Prussian General Staff model, IMO the best approach.)
Genmotty said:
In other ways their doctrine was very strong, at least in China, because it functioned well enough. It's shortcomings were clear later when the Soviets, British and Americans who had improved their millitaries throughout the interbellium fought with effectively a WWI force, that was fighting against effectively insurgents and not a comparable enemy.
That comes back to my suggestion the education & training was awful. Moreover, it calls in question the proposition doctrine was good, since the idea is for doctrine to be responsive to opposing armies & changing conditions. The German system was the best in the world that way IMO. Japan's was worst.
Genmotty said:
The regime was brutal at the top because the military got itself into power by political violence.
I think that goes deeper. That strikes me as a holdover from the samurai era.
Genmotty said:
the brutality of Japanese soldiers is not all that important in comparison to their doctrine and equipment
I disagree. The change after WW1 was dramatic & was reflected both in treatment of POWs & in the attitude to death in battle. You may be right; the brutality at the top may have "trickled down". IMO, it's not that simple.
Genmotty said:
The Advance South policy was not only about resources, it was about the IJN wanting to stay relevant.
I'd agree with that, generally. (And with the IJN push for it.) I'd also say, tho, IJN's desire not to be marginalized was directly causal of the attack on Pearl Harbor, regardless what the excuses were.
 
Japanese officer training was not good at all. Agreed.


However they weren't all bad, and we do have to understand that Japan throughout the era actually had very good millitary leadership. The hangover from the Samurai era was that very same 'warlord/warror class' were marginalised by the new central government of circa 1870 that more or less forced the warrior class for the next 4 generations into the armed forces.

Thus by the time of WWII we have had at least 8 generation samurai leaders who have dedicated themselves to little other than the 'art of war'. The Meiji Era also brought about a fundermetal change in the attitude to conducting war, and because of that they got many uses of modern arms correct.

1. The incorperation of heavy machinguns in the late 19thC
2. The incorperation of light support machinguns/artillery with the infantry pre-Great War and during the Great War
3. The development of mobile artillery carriage (although they never had the trucks to actually motorise their guns)
4. The development of an airforce as a priority
5. The development of inderdition roles for light bombers and heavy fighters
6. The concept of a 'strategic torpedo/weapon'
7. In the navy the aircraft carrier saw a level of prioritisation


Just to names some examples off the top of my head. My point being that the high command was anything but blind to obedience, & uneducated/untrained. Indeed many were educated abroad and well up to speed with developments in Europe and America.

They were good. This can be seen fairly clearly in the way how various campaigns were fought as the tables turned and in the defense of the islands of the pacific.


What was a major hinderance was 'free lancing' by the lower officer class. Essentially this is the way how many of the lower ranking officers would disregard orders from futher up the chain if they deamed it a 'dishnourable order'.

The clearest examples of this are in the pacific campaigns were the defense plans would call for the Japanese to delay the Americans as long as possible, to dig themselves in and not admit defeat in the face of a superiour force. However the numerous instances of 'Banzai charges' and essentially suicide attacks/events where officers couldn't take the pressure and wanted to go out with a bang rather than a wimper.

Thus even the best laid plans of mice and men... (the saying goes).

In this sense the fighting spirit of the Japanese worked totally against them, because the entire armed forces in chain of command and doctrine was about the attack and the decisive engagement. This meant that the Japanese could not organise defensive battles, either operationally, or tactically at the platoon or company level.

This in principle meant that if the balence of the wars shifted the game was up. This was clearly seen throughout '43 '44 and '45 with the Japanese on the retreat in the pacific.


On the Chinese mainland the conditions weren't so marked. This is partly because of the way the Japanese considered the Chinese inferior, so from the odd frame of mind they came from, that meant that retreat from Chinese forces was 'acceptable', whereas against the Allies it wasn't. Thus the IJA in China had a much better account for itself in being able to fight battles.


However the IJA also lacked control of its mid level commanders. At a strategic level their was no chain of command or ability for the commanders to work together at a theater level. Operationally they could just about conduct some actions, but even there they struggled.

Tactically at division and army level they were much much more effective, yet they never fought a real enemy with a simmilar level of coordination; China was more of a occupation and policing deal against insurgents then to really push and fight battles like the pacific campaign or what we see in Europe.

The Japanese were quite right in some respects to adopt this local level command, since it easied policing actions and because command coordination was impossible in practice. The downside being that commanders never were able to coordinate strategy in China to push inland and crush the Chinese.

However I must state for the record their were massive supply, manpower and logistics issues with this anyhow that precluded this being a real possibility anyhow.


When you say phx1138; "[japans] limited the ability to produce modern weapons, which influenced doctrine; I do think part of the reason for increased emphasis on moral over material was precisely because Japan simply couldn't produce better weapons."

I think you hit the nail on the head, in the sense that Japans armed forces didn't take action to rectify its shortcomings. Hence doctrine became more about using what a commander had, rather than trying to work with other elements in the armed forces/government to actually fight as a nation.

Thus commanders all fought their own wars and thus since Imperial Japan never had a coordinated strategy or millitary industrial complex they failed at war.


I will clarify Japan of 1935-1945 did have the technical expertise for modern weapons, but it did lack a fully industrilised state to produce modern weapons in quantity.



I don't believe we can call the Imperial Japanese high command 'poor' because they certainty showed elements of brillience throughout the entire WWII period, we can say that field officers lacked disipline and we can say that cooperation between units and all levels of command was terrible.



I don't really know enough (objectively) on Japanese Brutality during the war to really comment on where it stems from, but I do believe that it had a lot to do with the effective millitary junta that was Imperial Japan during the late 1930s and 1940s.

Your totally right that Japan as a whole had no idea of the economic muscle of the Allies or Soviets, and that Japan was undergoing crash industrilisation (although we must recognise that she had had a good 70yrs of industrilisation prior to WWII, much better than a large number of European states.)




Imperial Japan is a fascinating topic, I do believe that it would require many topics of discussion to try and get a full overview of Japan of the period...but then much can be said for Germany of the period...or many other nations...
 
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Japanese officer training was not good at all. Agreed.


However they weren't all bad, and we do have to understand that Japan throughout the era actually had very good millitary leadership. The hangover from the Samurai era was that very same 'warlord/warror class' were marginalised by the new central government of circa 1870 that more or less forced the warrior class for the next 4 generations into the armed forces.

Thus by the time of WWII we have had at least 8 generation samurai leaders who have dedicated themselves to little other than the 'art of war'. The Meiji Era also brought about a fundermetal change in the attitude to conducting war, and because of that they got many uses of modern arms correct.

1. The incorperation of heavy machinguns in the late 19thC
2. The incorperation of light support machinguns/artillery with the infantry pre-Great War and during the Great War
3. The development of mobile artillery carriage (although they never had the trucks to actually motorise their guns)
4. The development of an airforce as a priority
5. The development of inderdition roles for light bombers and heavy fighters
6. The concept of a 'strategic torpedo/weapon'
7. In the navy the aircraft carrier saw a level of prioritisation


Just to names some examples off the top of my head. My point being that the high command was anything but blind to obedience, & uneducated/untrained. Indeed many were educated abroad and well up to speed with developments in Europe and America.

They were good. This can be seen fairly clearly in the way how various campaigns were fought as the tables turned and in the defense of the islands of the pacific.


What was a major hinderance was 'free lancing' by the lower officer class. Essentially this is the way how many of the lower ranking officers would disregard orders from futher up the chain if they deamed it a 'dishnourable order'.

The clearest examples of this are in the pacific campaigns were the defense plans would call for the Japanese to delay the Americans as long as possible, to dig themselves in and not admit defeat in the face of a superiour force. However the numerous instances of 'Banzai charges' and essentially suicide attacks/events where officers couldn't take the pressure and wanted to go out with a bang rather than a wimper.

Thus even the best laid plans of mice and men... (the saying goes).

In this sense the fighting spirit of the Japanese worked totally against them, because the entire armed forces in chain of command and doctrine was about the attack and the decisive engagement. This meant that the Japanese could not organise defensive battles, either operationally, or tactically at the platoon or company level.

This in principle meant that if the balence of the wars shifted the game was up. This was clearly seen throughout '43 '44 and '45 with the Japanese on the retreat in the pacific.


On the Chinese mainland the conditions weren't so marked. This is partly because of the way the Japanese considered the Chinese inferior, so from the odd frame of mind they came from, that meant that retreat from Chinese forces was 'acceptable', whereas against the Allies it wasn't. Thus the IJA in China had a much better account for itself in being able to fight battles.


However the IJA also lacked control of its mid level commanders. At a strategic level their was no chain of command or ability for the commanders to work together at a theater level. Operationally they could just about conduct some actions, but even there they struggled.

Tactically at division and army level they were much much more effective, yet they never fought a real enemy with a simmilar level of coordination; China was more of a occupation and policing deal against insurgents then to really push and fight battles like the pacific campaign or what we see in Europe.

The Japanese were quite right in some respects to adopt this local level command, since it easied policing actions and because command coordination was impossible in practice. The downside being that commanders never were able to coordinate strategy in China to push inland and crush the Chinese.

However I must state for the record their were massive supply, manpower and logistics issues with this anyhow that precluded this being a real possibility anyhow.


When you say phx1138; "[japans] limited the ability to produce modern weapons, which influenced doctrine; I do think part of the reason for increased emphasis on moral over material was precisely because Japan simply couldn't produce better weapons."

I think you hit the nail on the head, in the sense that Japans armed forces didn't take action to rectify its shortcomings. Hence doctrine became more about using what a commander had, rather than trying to work with other elements in the armed forces/government to actually fight as a nation.

Thus commanders all fought their own wars and thus since Imperial Japan never had a coordinated strategy or millitary industrial complex they failed at war.


I will clarify Japan of 1935-1945 did have the technical expertise for modern weapons, but it did lack a fully industrilised state to produce modern weapons in quantity.



I don't believe we can call the Imperial Japanese high command 'poor' because they certainty showed elements of brillience throughout the entire WWII period, we can say that field officers lacked disipline and we can say that cooperation between units and all levels of command was terrible.



I don't really know enough (objectively) on Japanese Brutality during the war to really comment on where it stems from, but I do believe that it had a lot to do with the effective millitary junta that was Imperial Japan during the late 1930s and 1940s.

Your totally right that Japan as a whole had no idea of the economic muscle of the Allies or Soviets, and that Japan was undergoing crash industrilisation (although we must recognise that she had had a good 70yrs of industrilisation prior to WWII, much better than a large number of European states.)




Imperial Japan is a fascinating topic, I do believe that it would require many topics of discussion to try and get a full overview of Japan of the period...but then much can be said for Germany of the period...or many other nations...
I'm tempted to answer these points one by one, but that'd hijack the thread.:) You make a good case for the poisonous effect of freelancing & of senior command having little/no rein on the mid-level officers. I do disagree, after reading Kobun & Kaigun, on the quality of Japan's senior officers, but I'll let that go at risk of hijack;) Your conclusion, on how complicated it is, I totally agree with. The more I read, the more I realize how little I know.:eek:
 

burmafrd

Banned
very well thought out.

I too disagree about senior command ability and judgement.

But they were products of the culture and the system. Really no way that could have changed.

What beat Japan was Japan.

Bottom line is that Japan never was going to be able to win WW2 unless they did not fight a major power.

Like in Wargames

The only winning move is not to play.
 
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