What if Japan never attacked the US?

Americans cared astonishingly little for China in this period. We didn't go to war to defend Shanghai, so why would we care about the Dutch?


Faeelin,

Because going to war is the only way to show concern, right? :rolleyes:

The US population of the time was deeply isolationist and firmly convinced that the nation had been suckered into WW1 by arms manufacturers and foreign governments. Nothing short of an attack on the US, which Japan was idiotic enough to provide, would have shook them out of that belief.

While the US government could not declare war over Japan's activities in China, it did do whatever it could short of war. The US repeatedly, forcibly, and diplomatically nagged Japan about events in China throughout the 1920s, 30s, and early 40s. While the embargoes that finally sparked the war were a result of Japan's occupation of Indochina, Japan had been for years operating under a series of lesser US embargoes all of which were put in place over China.

China received loans, weapons, and political support from the US all short of war. The US even allowed American mercenaries operating in China and turned a blind eye to their purchase of equipment from US sources which was technically against US law.

This was all due to a certain popular romantic mindset regarding China that developed in the US over the 1920s and 30s as illustrated by success of authors like Pearl Buck and movies like Oil for the lamps of China. This romanticism so colored US thinking that Mao's victory in 1949 was a shock and loss rather than a foregone conclusion.

I happen to think that if Japan had avoided attacking US territory during the "Lunge to the South", that FDR would have initially found his hands tied. I just as firmly believe that either Germany or Japan would have sooner or later provided the "wake-up call" much of the US population needed. What's more, with each passing month of the war, the bar was being lowered for that "wake-up call". More and more people were coming to the realization that the world had become frightfully dangerous and armed neutrality was a failed policy. An incident involving the Axis in the the western Pacific or Atlantic during 1942 might have been all that was required to bring the US into the war with a fully committed populace.


Bill
 
elt177,

Yeah, Yamamoto was so against the war he threatened to resign if his plan to attack Pearl Harbor wasn't adopted. :rolleyes:


Bill

Umm... I don't think you're being fair. He DIDN'T want to war against the US. He KNEW that Japan was lost in a long war with the US. However, given that the decision was made to go to war, he figured the only possible way to survive was to hit the US hard enough to make them back down, hence Pearl.

The Japanese was wierd. They KNEW they were going to win the war (Japan had never lost a war in her history (- since Nomohan and the early Korean adventure weren't in HER history), so they were obviously going to win.) They couldn't win in a protracted war with the US, so obviously they US was going to fold. So, what was going to make them fold.

I really think that this is the only explanation. I mean mid-size Japan declares war on 1) biggest nation by population 2) biggest nation by economy 3) biggest Empire in the world. All at once, and they can't imagine losing??
 
^Seems the Japanese also left out this.

Japan had sought to control Taiwan since 1592, when Toyotomi Hideyoshi began extending Japanese influence overseas. Several attempts to invade Taiwan were unsuccessful, mainly due to disease and armed resistance by aborigines on the island.
In 1616, Murayama Tōan was directed by the Tokugawa Shogunate to invade Taiwan. This followed a first exploratory mission by Arima Haruno in 1609. The objective was to establish a base for the direct supply of silk from China, instead of having to supply it from Portuguese-controlled Macao or Spanish-controlled Manila.
Murayama had a fleet of 13 ships and around 4,000 men, under the command of one of his sons. They left Nagasaki on May 15, 1616. The invasion attempt ended in failure however. A typhoon dispersed the fleet and put an early end to the invasion effort. The king of Ryu Kyu Sho Nei had warned Ming China of the Japanese intentions to capture the island and to use it as a trading base with China, but in any case only one ship managed to reach the island and it was repelled by local forces. The single ship was ambushed in a Formosan creek, and all her crew committed suicide ("seppuku") to avoid capture. Several ships diverted themselves to plunder the Chinese coast and are reported "to have killed above 1,200 Chinas, and taken all the barkes or junks they met withal, throwing the people overboard
Maybe some in the US never thought Japan would invade the Philippines. Afterall, the US and Japan had an Agreement since 1905. William Howard Taft who was secretary of War of the US agreed to Japan occupying Korea if Japan agreed not to bother the US in the Philippines. The Japanese Prime Minister at the time was Taro Katsura. It was a confidential treaty which Japan signed since they wanted the green light from a major nation before occupying Korea.
The agreement was called the "Taft-Katsura Agreement".

This will take you to the confidential agreement which has parts whited out. Seems the US senate never knew so could not approve this agreement.
http://www.icasinc.org/history/katsura.html
 
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There was nothing inevitable about going to war with Japan sans Pearl Harbor. The big hurdle was Japan deciding to ignore the US. The IJN was convinced that the US would never let Japan steal stolen Anglo-Dutch thefts in the Pacific, hence neutralization of the Philippines was a must. If the Japanese were somehow convinced that the US would not stir, then the Japanese would also take measures to give the trigger-happy FDR administration no cause to start one. Japan would literally take every spits, kicks, pushes, and provocations from the US with a smile, just so that the US wouldn't get the excuse to pull out a 1911. It's far more likely that the US would get involved in Europe soon or later than in Asia, especially since Churchill would want undivided US attention to Europe. What's far more likely is that the US leaves Japan alone for the duration of the war, and then in a Nagasaki analogy vis-a-vis Stalin, drops a nuke in Germany and "gently" tells Japan to give back its ill-gotten territories. The Japanese leadership was pig-headed, but to be fair, they had no idea just how powerful the US could be; Yamamoto knew, only because he had spent time in the US. However, the leadership would be under no illusion after seeing the juggernaut the US would create to crush the Nazis, capped by atomic bombs over Germany. The admirals and generals were frequently stupid, but not THAT stupid.
 
elt177,

Yeah, Yamamoto was so against the war he threatened to resign if his plan to attack Pearl Harbor wasn't adopted. :rolleyes:


Bill

Umm... I don't think you're being fair. He DIDN'T want to war against the US. He KNEW that Japan was lost in a long war with the US. However, given that the decision was made to go to war, he figured the only possible way to survive was to hit the US hard enough to make them back down, hence Pearl.

I think that Bill is being entirely fair. There was a need in Japan after WW2 for a tragic hero and Yamamoto was given the role in "The Relucant Admiral" etc. However, he may have been a contender for the worse admiral ever judging by his plans for Coral Sea, Midway etc. and I believe he was the only senior figure wanting to attack the USA by late 1941.

In the previous thread, I tried to ask about who wanted what in the Japanese Goverment in 1941. I have found a few extra quotations and sources since then.

Here is a long quote from Louis Morton's "Japan's Decision for War", chapter 4, pages 105-6:

"By the middle of August the two services had agreed on a broad line of strategy. The impetus came from a series of studies presented by the Total War Research Institute, a subordinate body of the Planning Board. Forecasting the course of events during the next six months, the Institute called for the invasion of the Netherlands Indies in November, followed the next month by surprise attacks on British and American possessions in the Far East. Anticipating that the United States and Great Britain would utilize Soviet bases in a war against Japan, the Institute's studies dealt with the problems of economic mobilization; military planning, except in the most general sense, was left to the services.
These studies, as well as others, were discussed heatedly during the tense days that followed the embargo. From these discussions emerged four alternative lines of strategy, all of them designed to accomplish the swift destruction of Allied forces in the Far last and the early seizure of the Netherlands Indies. The first was based on the Institute's studies and provided for the seizure of the Indies and then of the Philippines and Malaya. The second called for a step-by-step advance from the Philippines to Borneo, Java, Sumatra, and Malaya. The reverse, from Malaya to the Philippines, constituted a third line of action and one which would have the advantage of delaying attack against American territory. The fourth plan proposed at this time consisted of simultaneous attacks against the Philippines and Malaya followed by a rapid advance along both axes to the Indies. Admiral Yamamoto's plan for an attack against Pearl Harbor, work on which had begun in January, did not enter into the calculations of the planners at this time.
Army and Navy planners agreed that the first plan was too risky for it would leave Japanese forces exposed to attack from the Philippines and Malaya. The Navy preferred the second plan; it was safe, provided for a step-by-step advance, and created no serious problems. The Army objected to it, however, on the ground that by the time the main objectives in the Netherlands Indies and Malaya were reached the Allies would have had time to strengthen their defenses. The third plan, with its early seizure of Malaya and bypassing of the Philippines, appealed greatly to the Army planners who hoped in this way to gain southeast Asia and delay American entry into the war. But this course, as the Navy pointed out, also placed American naval and air forces in the Philippines in a strategic position athwart Japan's line of communication and constituted a risk of the utmost magnitude. The fourth course, simultaneous attacks and advance along two axes, created serious problems of co-ordination and timing and a dangerous dispersion of forces. But because it was the only course which compromised the views of both groups, it was finally adopted."

Thus it was the IJN rather than the IJA that demanded war with the USA. That leaves who in the IJN and why?

I found an article by Scott D. Sagan "The Origins of the Pacific War", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars. (Spring, 1988), pp. 893-922. On page 913 this states:
In the Imperial Navy strong disagreements arose between the leading members of the Navy General Staff and Admiral Yamanoto Isoroku, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, who had created a new operational plan for a surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor fleet. Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake, for example, maintained that Japan should attack Malaya and the Dutch East Indies only, and numerous high-ranking officers opposed the Pearl Harbor plan. ....Yamamoto, who favored concessions to avoid war, nonetheless argued that a surprise attack against the United States in Hawaii and the Philippines was preferable to awaiting American actions because "we cannot rule out the possibility that the enemy could dare to launch an attack upon our homeland to burn down our capital and other cities."

Yamamoto's view seems to go back to a "war game" in November 1940 carried out by the Combined Fleet staff under Yamamoto (Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, page 279) which concluded that an attack on the Netherland East Indies would lead to war with America. I don't understand how or why the Combined Fleet was making that decision rather than the Foreign Ministry, the Navy Ministry or the General Staff. However, it has been noted that as early as February 3rd 1940, Yamamoto had asked Captain Kanji Ogawa of Naval Intelligence to start intelligence gathering on Pearl Harbor.

I had posted that "The Shattered Sword" by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully suggests on page 24 that the Chief of the General Staff, Nagano Osami, did not wish to attack America. Morton also backs Shattered Sword's view of Nagano "There was only enough oil, Admiral Osami Nagano told the Emperor, to maintain the fleet under war conditions for one and a half years and he was doubtful that Japan could win a "sweeping victory" in that time. His advice, therefore, was to drop the Tripartite Pact and reach agreement with the United States."

I found some more quotes in "War Leadership Concept before the Greater East Asia War: Aftermath of the Imperial National Defense Policy" by Taeru Kurono:
1. On July 31, 1941, upon inquiry by the Emperor concerning the possible war against the United States, Osami Nagano, Chief of the Naval General Staff, replied to the throne that it was doubtful whether Japan could win, not to speak of achieving a great victory as won in the Battle of the Sea of Japan, and if it prolonged, he “had no idea about the consequences,” and the Emperor entertained the impression that “how dare we start a war with no prospects of victory.”
2. On November 4 1941, Nagano stated, “I am certain that the Imperial Japanese Navy will be victorious for the first two years, but I cannot foresee what will happen if the war becomes prolonged because the future holds various uncertain factors.”
3. However, on July 21, Nagano announced that Japan should decide to start the war against the United States promptly because the differences in the military strength of Japan and the United States would enlarge as time passed (Sawamoto Yorio's Diary, entry on July 21, 1941).

As mentioned in the previous thread, the Navy Minister, Shimada Shigetaro, is reported by Fukudome Shigeru to have opposed attacking America (The Japanese Navy in World War II, ed. David C. Evans, page 6). I also mentioned that Rear-Adm. Maeda Minoru, head of General Staff Intelligence Bureau, believed that operations in the East Indies would inevitably lead to war with the USA (interview, 19 June 1962, Boeicho Senshibu Archives), with the argument was that the Europeans and Americans were the same race.

I can't name names offhand, & I"m not sure if any were actually named, but that was the conclusion Peattie & Evans came to in Kaigun. It's my suspicion, nothing more really, IJN was using it as a lever on IJA a) for budget reasons, b) to dissuade them from attacking DEI, or c) both.

I think that pacifichistorian was correct in his suspicions for 1940 (alas that he cannot tell us what he has found since :(). However, it was only Yamamoto who wanted the Pearl Harbor attack by late 1941.
 
I have to disagree with Bill here. Yamamoto didn't want war but did indeed push the Pearl Harbor attack as he felt it was the only way Japan could do enough damage to buy the time they desperately needed. It was a gamble, and it failed.

I agree about Yamamoto needing to be held accountable for some of his later plans. The more I read about the Midway Operation the more I wonder what was going on in his mind. A hugely complicated plan requiring far more coordination that one could hope for, hoping the USN would do exactly what the IJN expected them to do.
 
I have to disagree with Bill here.


elt177,

You can disagree with me all you want, I'm just a gray-headed fat man on an internet forum after all.

However, do you want to disagree with Louis Morton in "Japan's Decision for War", Scott D. Sagan in "The Origins of the Pacific War", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, and dozens of other actual historians?

The more I read about the Midway Operation the more I wonder what was going on in his mind. A hugely complicated plan requiring far more coordination that one could hope for, hoping the USN would do exactly what the IJN expected them to do.

Are you seriously suggesting that Yamamoto threw Midway? That he devised those overly complicated plans so that Japan could lose the war more quickly?


Bill
 
elt177,

You can disagree with me all you want, I'm just a gray-headed fat man on an internet forum after all.

However, do you want to disagree with Louis Morton in "Japan's Decision for War", Scott D. Sagan in "The Origins of the Pacific War", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, and dozens of other actual historians?



Are you seriously suggesting that Yamamoto threw Midway? That he devised those overly complicated plans so that Japan could lose the war more quickly?


Bill

I don't think he means that. I think he meant "What was he thinking of by making a complex plan that depends on the enemy doing exactly what you want?"
 
It was certainly the IJN that realized that any attack on Borneo, NEI etc could be cut off at the knees by American forces based out of the PI, therefore IF you are going to go to war for the purpose of securing resources (oil etc) in Borneo/Malaya/NEI then the PI and by extension American naval power in the pacific has to be dealt with. The reason these resources were needed was to continue the Japanese war in China, which was pretty much an IJA affair from the Manchukuo "incident" onwards. When the US and UK & Netherlands enbargoed Japan, especially with oil, the IJA was in a situation where with 12-18 months at most they would have to stop fighting in China due to lack of oil both for the army & home industries.

The Japanese had the choice of accepting something less than full control of China (they could have kept Manchukuo and other bits) and having some sort of accomodation with Chiang or having the war for eventual full control of whatever bits of China they wanted. Because of a belief in Japanese "destiny" and a complex about being treated poorly by the white/western powers (exclusionary laws on immigration, not getting everything they wanted after WWI, lack of parity with US/UK at Washington Naval Treaty & so forth), the Japanese chose what was behind door #2 - war.

Yamamoto had a good idea of US industrial capacity, and was less sanguine than other Japanese military and civilian leaders about how "weak" the Americans were. His choices were to do the best he could to design the strongest blow against the US (Pearl Harbor) or to protest the decision to go to war with the US in order to be able to continue the war in China - given his position in the military and Japanese culture, protest would take the form of resignation followed by seppuku.

BTW almost all Japanese plans were way too intricate - Midway only being one of them, look at how the ultiple forces not in contact woth each other were supposed to work in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
 
elt177,

You can disagree with me all you want, I'm just a gray-headed fat man on an internet forum after all.

However, do you want to disagree with Louis Morton in "Japan's Decision for War", Scott D. Sagan in "The Origins of the Pacific War", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, and dozens of other actual historians?


Are you seriously suggesting that Yamamoto threw Midway? That he devised those overly complicated plans so that Japan could lose the war more quickly?


Bill

Never read any of this, sounds like I need to.

Certainly not, but his plan violated two military maxums:

1) No plan survives contact with the enemy
2) KISS (Keep it simple, stupid)

It was just so overly complex and heavily depended on the US doing what the Japanese expected them to do.

And W.P. Willmont brought out the fact that, even if they had taken Midway, the troops would have to be withdrawn quickly as there wouldn't be enough supplies to keep them there long. Also, I don't see the airstrip there being taken intact, which was planned on.

It was important for the IJN to bring the USN into battle quickly, but under circumstances that favored them (which wasn't likely).
 
It was certainly the IJN that realized that any attack on Borneo, NEI etc could be cut off at the knees by American forces based out of the PI, therefore IF you are going to go to war for the purpose of securing resources (oil etc) in Borneo/Malaya/NEI then the PI and by extension American naval power in the pacific has to be dealt with. The reason these resources were needed was to continue the Japanese war in China, which was pretty much an IJA affair from the Manchukuo "incident" onwards. When the US and UK & Netherlands enbargoed Japan, especially with oil, the IJA was in a situation where with 12-18 months at most they would have to stop fighting in China due to lack of oil both for the army & home industries.

The Japanese had the choice of accepting something less than full control of China (they could have kept Manchukuo and other bits) and having some sort of accomodation with Chiang or having the war for eventual full control of whatever bits of China they wanted. Because of a belief in Japanese "destiny" and a complex about being treated poorly by the white/western powers (exclusionary laws on immigration, not getting everything they wanted after WWI, lack of parity with US/UK at Washington Naval Treaty & so forth), the Japanese chose what was behind door #2 - war.

Yamamoto had a good idea of US industrial capacity, and was less sanguine than other Japanese military and civilian leaders about how "weak" the Americans were. His choices were to do the best he could to design the strongest blow against the US (Pearl Harbor) or to protest the decision to go to war with the US in order to be able to continue the war in China - given his position in the military and Japanese culture, protest would take the form of resignation followed by seppuku.

BTW almost all Japanese plans were way too intricate - Midway only being one of them, look at how the ultiple forces not in contact woth each other were supposed to work in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

It may be ironic, but the intricate Japanese plan for Leyte Gulf actually worked. Kurita's Center Force had its straight shot at the Leyte beachhead as the other prongs of the Japanese offensive had pulled away the covering forces. Little known is that the Sho plan called for Kurita to exit Leyte Gulf through Surigao Strait. Also Nishimura's and Shima's fleets weren't part of the original Sho plan.

Anthony Tully has a new book out about the battle of Surigao Strait. I'll post the book info later. I think it is in the same vein as Shattered Sword in explaining what was really happening on the Japanese side of the battle.

I also think it ironic that the Japanese considered the Philippines a danger to their offensives in Borneo/NEI/Malaysia, while the Americans had planned to abandon the Philippines until the fleet could be built up and advance bases established.

If the Japanese knew the US plans for a Pacific war and the Philippines, would they have attacked the US?
 
Dilvish, except for the job of the fleet assigned to smash the US landings. That didn't work out as planned.

It's also typical of the mentality of Japan's military leadership. If Japan wins the IJN is crippled while the US is, perhaps, delayed a few months. If Japan loses then the naval war is effectively over, death for an island nation.
 
Certainly not, but his plan violated two military maxums:

1) No plan survives contact with the enemy
2) KISS (Keep it simple, stupid)
So why were IJN plans so complicated?

Aircraft carriers cannot easily be packed as closely as battleships as their aircraft will start to collide. That is why American task forces were divided into three or four carrier groups. Also it is tempting to sail ships with similar speeds together and it might be a bad idea to sail aircraft carriers with transports as submarines may lurk nearby. However, there seems to have been a further IJN bias towards complexity.

Firstly, the IJN seems to have viewed the sacrifice of Shoho at Coral Sea and Ryujo at Eastern Solomons as offering opportunities to destroy the enemy main force after they have committed their aircraft against minor targets http://propnturret.com/tully/viewtopic.php?t=202.

Secondly, many senior officers in WW2 had spent years as more junior officers practising night torpedo attacks. In night actions, especially before radar, both IJN and RN found that victory tends to go to divided forces if they can attack from opposite sides as the united force is clearly visible to the second attack, lit by its own guns and searchlights as well as by the first attackers.

Of course, nothing can excuse the Midway plan!
 
I agree that the US was willing to write off the PI, if the Japanese attacked Borneo/NEI/Malaya the US would be obliged to build up the PI to at least some extent, and even MacArthur would not have ignored the situation meaning the USAAF units would not been erased on day one if the Japanese attacked. Also, by going after the Brit/Dutch possesions the Japanese leave the central Pacific open - thats why Pearl Harbor was first.

Bottom line is that The flow of raw materials from NEI/Borneo/Malaysia was always going to be threatened by the PI, and the risk of having this supply line cut was too great to allow. Even with crap torpedoes and tactics the US began to cut in to shipping fairly quickly, with subs based in the PI & air it would happen faster. The Japanese were for various reasons very poor at convoy ops & ASW, and given the limits of their industry each oil tanker lost was a big hit.
 
China received loans, weapons, and political support from the US all short of war. The US even allowed American mercenaries operating in China and turned a blind eye to their purchase of equipment from US sources which was technically against US law.

I don't dispute this, but I'll note Japanese forces also had American equipment.
 
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