What if Japan invades the Netherlands East Indies only (no Pearl Harbor)

Before reading this and after reading this, I thought it made more sense, in terms of what the Japanese leadership was trying to accomplish, was to go after the Philippines but not do the Pearl Harbor attack. And to forgo surprise on the Philippines.

My argument here is based on the Japanese Navy being momentarily superior to the US Navy in 1941, even before Pearl Harbor. I realize this window would shut by the beginning at 1943 at the latest. But the point is that they didn't need to do something like Pearl Harbor to gain an edge, they already had one. They could defeat US forces if they tried to reinforce the Philippines, or if US forces didn't reinforce the Philippines then you just take the DEI and the Philippines and you are in the same situation as they were IOTL. With naval and air warfare, even a small superiority is enough for big effects, you just need to gain a small superiority. Land warfare works differently.

So why take the operational risk of the Pearl Harbor attack and really piss off the American population if you don't really need to? I wasn't thinking in terms of attacking the DEI only and not dealing with the Philippines, but this concept is compatible with doing that but planning to go to war with the USA and after the Philippines anyway within six months if the USA butts in, either with a DOW after the attack on the DEI or taking the aggressive measures commentators have outlined above. I think after taking the oil they still have a window of several months to take on the USA before the buildup gets overwhelming.
 
So why take the operational risk of the Pearl Harbor attack and really piss off the American population if you don't really need to? I wasn't thinking in terms of attacking the DEI only and not dealing with the Philippines, but this concept is compatible with doing that but planning to go to war with the USA and after the Philippines anyway within six months if the USA butts in, either with a DOW after the attack on the DEI or taking the aggressive measures commentators have outlined above. I think after taking the oil they still have a window of several months to take on the USA before the buildup gets overwhelming.

Seems reasonable enough. Once would think that the Americans would do a Wake relief operation without Pearl Harbor, so the Japanese could commit their carrier striking force to repulse this attempt.
 
This, IMO, would have been the smarter thing to do for the Japanese leadership. Japan effectively ensured that the US would be thrown into a massive rage by Pearl Harbor. If it sticks to the East Indies, even at the cost of potentially opening itself to attack from American territories like the Philippines, it can have the US fire the first shot, then react to that. Trying to wear down the Americans to the point where they'd consider a negotiated peace. Japan is still likely to lose, but an unconditional surrender becomes less likely.
 
FAKE NEWS! :D

My apologies Carl, I should have been more precise in my comment. The battle of Balikpapan was a extraordinary feat from the USN, especially in this period of the war. The MLD (RNLN air service), the submarine service and hell, even the ML-KNIL (Military Airservice Royal Netherlans Indies Army) had some succes.

The surface forces of the RNLN however, didn't sink any Japanese ships whatsoever, let alone the all important troopships. Look at the Battle of the Java Sea, 2 CL and 3 DD sunk and what was there to show for it? Those 2,300 sailors could have been put to better use fighting the Japanese invasion force on Java.

Dutch naval doctrine between 1919 and 1936 was right on the money: a Dutch surface fleet will never be able to do serious damage to a Japanese invasion fleet. Chances of succes are much, much higher if submarine task forces are employed. That is what the RNLN trained for the whole interbellum. It might not have been a war-winning strategy but it sure as hell was better than the pipe-dreams of OTL.
With the RNLN only being the one to fight, they can focus more on their submarine with sea plane spotting doctrine more than when they are forced to operated under the command of the Americans ore British who might want to fight differently.
 
They are more likely to be faced with a heavily reinforced Philippines across their line of communications, which will act more or less like the running sore that was Guadacanal.

And figure Wake's reinforcements and equipment will get there faster. Also figure Midway and some other outposts getting more along with Guam...
 
Before reading this and after reading this, I thought it made more sense, in terms of what the Japanese leadership was trying to accomplish, was to go after the Philippines but not do the Pearl Harbor attack. And to forgo surprise on the Philippines.

My argument here is based on the Japanese Navy being momentarily superior to the US Navy in 1941, even before Pearl Harbor. I realize this window would shut by the beginning at 1943 at the latest. But the point is that they didn't need to do something like Pearl Harbor to gain an edge, they already had one. They could defeat US forces if they tried to reinforce the Philippines, or if US forces didn't reinforce the Philippines then you just take the DEI and the Philippines and you are in the same situation as they were IOTL. With naval and air warfare, even a small superiority is enough for big effects, you just need to gain a small superiority. Land warfare works differently.

So why take the operational risk of the Pearl Harbor attack and really piss off the American population if you don't really need to? I wasn't thinking in terms of attacking the DEI only and not dealing with the Philippines, but this concept is compatible with doing that but planning to go to war with the USA and after the Philippines anyway within six months if the USA butts in, either with a DOW after the attack on the DEI or taking the aggressive measures commentators have outlined above. I think after taking the oil they still have a window of several months to take on the USA before the buildup gets overwhelming.
The Japanese had a history of making surprise attacks at the start of a war, with considerable success.
The Sino-Japanese war of 1894 (arguably) started with a surprise attack on a chines cruiser, gunboats, and transport ship.
The Russian war of 1904 started with a surprise attack on Port Arthur, putting the Russian Pacific fleet out of action.

It was almost standard operating procedure, so anything else would need a point of departure.
 
Regardless of the attack on Pearl Harbor or battles in the Philippines Sea, Coral Sea, Leyte Gulf, on Guadalcanal et cetera, the sticky point for these ATL is still how the Japanese dealt with the Americans, plus or not the British.
 
Stage 5: the US is expecting just such an attack and slaughters it 100 miles off shore while the fully intact and reinforced battle line, which had sortied the night before, closes to gun range under the cover of the American carriers who launch their own attack on the virtually defenseless Kido Butai

I think you meant slaughters it 220 miles off shore....
 

Ian_W

Banned
My argument here is based on the Japanese Navy being momentarily superior to the US Navy in 1941, even before Pearl Harbor.

Maybe, but without striking a blow that reduces the USN, is it superior to the US and Royal Navy ?

Remember, most of the RN is off near the UK, but could be brought to the Pacific without any great issues.
 
It occurs to men that twice in this campaign, at Balikpapan & Sunda Strait, the Japanese escort commander went rushing off in the wrong direction with his cruiser squadron & left the transport squadron poorly protected. Is it possible for this to happen where the Allied fleet can take proper advantage of it?
 
This is an interesting premise. The Imperial Japanese forces grab the Dutch East Indies only. They would not have needed the complete Kido Butai to do this. The Japanese could have moved shortly after the American embargo. In Oct 1941 or thereabouts.

What's interesting is what would occur after. As the OP asserts the American congress won't support a war over a Dutch colony. And the last thing the British are looking for in the fall of 1941 is another war front.

I think rather than aggressive postures and actions by any parties everybody will keep their heads down. For a while.

The Japanese will be busy exploiting their newly acquired resources for the war in China and for the home economy and if they decide it's prudent to send their freighters on slightly more roundabout routes between Indonesia and the Home Islands to avoid provoking the Americans they just might do that for a while.

The Americans, disturbed and alarmed by the rapid collapse of the Dutch and becoming aware of just how weak they are in the Far East will not want to push the Japanese too hard. They may monitor and distantly shadow Japanese naval and commercial shipping near the Phillipines but that's all. Meanwhile they will start quietly and quickly reinforcing the Philippines and other Pacific bases.

The British will also stay watchful but quiet. The border in Borneo will be carefully kept to a minimal non-threatening force level. At the same time any Naval, airforce and army units that can be spared will be heading to Malaya and Burma.

So that would be the situation as I see it. Everybody involved smiling and saying "good doggy" while they gather all the rocks they can get. There would be a great deal of intrigue, quiet preparations and diplomatic maneuvering for months, maybe a year. But like all powder kegs eventually it's going to blow. All parties would know this but it would be in everybody's interest to maintain the peace at least for the near future. What would finally set the whole thing off?
 
This is an interesting premise. The Imperial Japanese forces grab the Dutch East Indies only. They would not have needed the complete Kido Butai to do this. The Japanese could have moved shortly after the American embargo. In Oct 1941 or thereabouts.

What's interesting is what would occur after. As the OP asserts the American congress won't support a war over a Dutch colony. And the last thing the British are looking for in the fall of 1941 is another war front.

I think rather than aggressive postures and actions by any parties everybody will keep their heads down. For a while.

The Japanese will be busy exploiting their newly acquired resources for the war in China and for the home economy and if they decide it's prudent to send their freighters on slightly more roundabout routes between Indonesia and the Home Islands to avoid provoking the Americans they just might do that for a while.

The Americans, disturbed and alarmed by the rapid collapse of the Dutch and becoming aware of just how weak they are in the Far East will not want to push the Japanese too hard. They may monitor and distantly shadow Japanese naval and commercial shipping near the Phillipines but that's all. Meanwhile they will start quietly and quickly reinforcing the Philippines and other Pacific bases.

The British will also stay watchful but quiet. The border in Borneo will be carefully kept to a minimal non-threatening force level. At the same time any Naval, airforce and army units that can be spared will be heading to Malaya and Burma.

So that would be the situation as I see it. Everybody involved smiling and saying "good doggy" while they gather all the rocks they can get. There would be a great deal of intrigue, quiet preparations and diplomatic maneuvering for months, maybe a year. But like all powder kegs eventually it's going to blow. All parties would know this but it would be in everybody's interest to maintain the peace at least for the near future. What would finally set the whole thing off?
Could be a China situation, everybody condemns the Japanese but nobody will go to war over it.
 
This is an interesting premise. The Imperial Japanese forces grab the Dutch East Indies only. They would not have needed the complete Kido Butai to do this. The Japanese could have moved shortly after the American embargo. In Oct 1941 or thereabouts.

What's interesting is what would occur after. As the OP asserts the American congress won't support a war over a Dutch colony. And the last thing the British are looking for in the fall of 1941 is another war front.

Unfortunately the Dutch were a ally, their exile government was in London, with Dutch currency reserves, the Dutch fleet in Europe was was operating with the Brit navy, & more important the bulk of the Dutch merchant marine was as well. If the Brits toss the DEI under the bus they not only lose the oil they were using from the DEI the Dutch are liable to pack up and leave Britain to make a deal with the Germans & Japanese if possible. Why continue hanging out in London if the Brits are going to screw you over? The Brits did not have many allies & letting down the Dutch would not give the remaining allies much confidence, & the fence sitters less.

The Japanese will be busy exploiting their newly acquired resources for the war in China and for the home economy and if they decide it's prudent to send their freighters on slightly more roundabout routes between Indonesia and the Home Islands to avoid provoking the Americans they just might do that for a while.

Unfortunately the resources of DEI are not imeadiately exploitable. The oil of DEI has to be moved in just 60 or fewer tanker ships. OTL that was not enough & both Japanese industry & its navy were petroleum starved in 1942-43 as the reserves stockpiled ran down. After that the cargo fleet as a whole was about half of what Japan needed pre embargo in 1940 Japans ports were serviced by a cargo fleet of over 11,000,000 tons, but Japans cargo fleet of 1940 could only handle between five & six million tons. The balance were foreign hulls, mostly British controlled which were no longer available when the embargo were imposed. As with oil Japans industry was dependent of material stockpiled pre embargo, which was rapidly drawn down in 1942.

There were many other aspects to the embargo. One of the most devastating was the freeze of Japanese assets and bank accounts in the US. Japan had little in currency reserves in 1940 & a economy that could not expand under the weight of the China war. Both Japans business & government were increasingly dependent on short term loans from the US banks. Japans government & the Zaibatsu were headed towards a fiscal problem absent further credit in New York or London.
 
yeah you'd still get the UK declaring war on Japan either way cause its a bit too close to Australia. Meaning the dutch, uk and australia are facing the japanese and lets be honest, that ends one way, japan being defeated unless they go all out on that offensive and potentially risk losing other areas, even then they may not win just due to the fact that they're going against 3 countries in very difficult territory.
 
yeah you'd still get the UK declaring war on Japan either way cause its a bit too close to Australia. Meaning the dutch, uk and australia are facing the japanese and lets be honest, that ends one way, japan being defeated unless they go all out on that offensive and potentially risk losing other areas, even then they may not win just due to the fact that they're going against 3 countries in very difficult territory.
But Japan ignoring the Philippines believing that Germany is in war with them and the United states is not, this war might be the same.
 
It was the United States and Britain that moved to have the Netherlands East Indies stop supplying Japan with oil. Before assuming US neutrality you might want to consider just how badly damaging to American credibility it would be to ask the Netherlands to do that, then betray and throw them under the bus.
 
At the very least, the US would have gotten involved, if at all, on a more limited basis. FDR was primarily concerned with Germany and would not have been inclined to rush into a war with Japan. The UK might have jumped in but in 1941 they had their hands full elsewhere.
As to the need to transport oil, the Japanese had this problem regardless of the strategy they employed. Grabbing the NEI would allow them to move some of their navy down to the source of the oil and eliminate at least some transport issue.
All in all, a very interesting counterfactual. I think history would have developed quite differently if this had played out.
 
yeah you'd still get the UK declaring war on Japan either way cause its a bit too close to Australia. Meaning the dutch, uk and australia are facing the japanese and lets be honest, that ends one way, japan being defeated unless they go all out on that offensive and potentially risk losing other areas, even then they may not win just due to the fact that they're going against 3 countries in very difficult territory.

The Japanese easily defeated a combined British/Dutch/Aussie/American force in the NEI in 1942. The USA made a major contribution in ships and planes and without the USA it would have been quite a bit easier for Japan to roll over the British Dutch and Aussies.
 
If Japan can get a Dunkirk-like scenario, like American troops trapped in an island fighting tge Japs and the Japs offer peace in exchange if allowing them to leave, I could see a peace in favor of the Japs.

Absent that, the Japs lose, but without conquest of the Home Islands and possibly even keeping its Empire.
 
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