What If: Japan doesn't invade China

Guys, you are talking about something that's not within the reach of Chiang given his capabilities.

Even restoring this border would be extremely tough.

I think ultimately, Chiang would seek to restore the old Qing borders. Korea was not within that border.

Part of Chiang's obsession was to be a leader of the oppressed nations... That's why he funded the Korean Independence Movement.

Well, that is basically what I said...
 
Having said that, Qing was always on defensive however ruthless their actions may seem. Japanese-sponsored reformers of Korea earned the world's sympathy when reactionary coups ousted them, but few noticed that their reforms threatened to fundamentally destabilize Korea's old system.

If China was always on the defensive what was the Nagasaki Incident?
And yep, Japan's reforms were fully intended to destablize Korea's old system. Korea's old system was a problem, it was completely standing against modernisation which looked set to result in a China, Russia or someone else potentially hostile to Japan fully moving in.

Even the unequal China–Korea Treaty of 1882 was between China and Korea only. It did not, for instance, overrule the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1876, nor to harm Japan in any other way.
It greatly threatened their strategic situation.

In contrast, the 'underdog' Japan has been expansionist since the first Japaneses Invasion of Taiwan (1874), which resulted in a Japanese withdrawal from Taiwan, in exchange for Qing recognition of Japanese occupation of Ryukyu.
Invasion?
It was a brief landing against the natives in revenge for the murder of some Okinawans. The entire reason the Japanese launched the expedition was that the Chinese claimed the natives were out of their jurisdition and were thus fair game.

Whether Japan actually was the underdog given all the problems in China is up for debate. At the time however things were definitely regarded that way.

Quick question: How many Chinese invasions of Japan were there over these two milleniums?

2 iirc?
China believed Japan was already part of their empire so there wasn't really much call for invading.
 
If China was always on the defensive what was the Nagasaki Incident?

I did some cursory wikipediaing on it, and to me it just seems like another incident in the long tradition of Chinese mass hissy-fits that continue to this day. It just happened to be done by sailors in a foreign port.

Brawling in brothels and pissing on police boxes is hardly tantamount to invasion, despite the casualties on both sides.
 
I did some cursory wikipediaing on it, and to me it just seems like another incident in the long tradition of Chinese mass hissy-fits that continue to this day. It just happened to be done by sailors in a foreign port.

Brawling in brothels and pissing on police boxes is hardly tantamount to invasion, despite the casualties on both sides.

Read deeper.
There was little material impact but it was a perfect example of China's ongoing general policy towards Japan.
Really a prime example of why Japan ended up going down the path it did.
 
I did some cursory wikipediaing on it, and to me it just seems like another incident in the long tradition of Chinese mass hissy-fits that continue to this day. It just happened to be done by sailors in a foreign port.

Brawling in brothels and pissing on police boxes is hardly tantamount to invasion, despite the casualties on both sides.
You should read a historical account from something other than wikipedia.
It's clearly not an invasion, no. However, after the riots, various Nagasaki officials asked for compensation, for Qing sailors to be escorted by their officers when ashore, and for a end to the riots. Despite some promises, none of this happened. Instead, local Japanese leaders were forced to exempt Chinese from the laws of Japan prohibiting the carrying of swords. This "agreement" was reached only after the Qing naval officers pointed otu (quite pointedly :p) their naval superiority, and threatened to shell the city. It was quite clearly an example of gunboat diplomacy, and was recognized as such in every (non-wikipedia) account of the incident I've ever read.
 
You should read a historical account from something other than wikipedia.
It's clearly not an invasion, no. However, after the riots, various Nagasaki officials asked for compensation, for Qing sailors to be escorted by their officers when ashore, and for a end to the riots. Despite some promises, none of this happened. Instead, local Japanese leaders were forced to exempt Chinese from the laws of Japan prohibiting the carrying of swords. This "agreement" was reached only after the Qing naval officers pointed otu (quite pointedly :p) their naval superiority, and threatened to shell the city. It was quite clearly an example of gunboat diplomacy, and was recognized as such in every (non-wikipedia) account of the incident I've ever read.

Fair enough, but since this is more imperial Chinese, pre-Sino-Japanese War, pre-Boxer Rebellion stuff, it doesn't really affect GMD policies towards Japan, does it?
 
If China was always on the defensive what was the Nagasaki Incident?
And yep, Japan's reforms were fully intended to destablize Korea's old system. Korea's old system was a problem, it was completely standing against modernisation which looked set to result in a China, Russia or someone else potentially hostile to Japan fully moving in.


It greatly threatened their strategic situation.

While Korea was being ruled for much of this time by a bunch of corrupt reactionaries, I honestly don't think this excuses what frankly was little more than naked imperialism. The Japanese were willing to destabilize a Korea undergoing reform, as said reforms impeded Japanese influence over Korea.

2 iirc?
China believed Japan was already part of their empire so there wasn't really much call for invading.
After the Imjin war, I should think that any pretense of that would have flown straight out the window.
 
While Korea was being ruled for much of this time by a bunch of corrupt reactionaries, I honestly don't think this excuses what frankly was little more than naked imperialism. The Japanese were willing to destabilize a Korea undergoing reform, as said reforms impeded Japanese influence over Korea.
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In the 19th century it was quite the opposite .
The Japanese were heavy supporters of reform in Korea as reform impeded Chinese influence/naked imperialism and warded off Russian (and other western countries) influence in Korea. In the 19th century a strong independent Korea really was what Japan wanted. As a strong independent Korea was one that would be able to avoid being taken over by a foreign power. And would of course never be strong enough on its own to threaten Japan.
It wasn't really until the 20th century when Japan quite soundly beat all its competition in Korea and the British started watching their back that that idea of actually taking over the place emerged.

Really, the whole point of this tangent isn't to say the Japanese are somehow the good guys in the 30s (which would be a borderline kickable offence I would hope.).
It's simply to say that Japan's situation in the 20th century was an outgrowth of its situation in the 19th century when from the Japanese perspective it was China that was the big powerful beast of east asia throwing its weight around and threatening to crush everyone.
Yet the most common view of history you see is one of perpetually helpless and not even thinking of reforming China and Japan miraculously 'pulling a meiji' then immediately launching into full scale 1930sesque kicking other countries around and empire building.
It all has to be understood in context. Japan wasn't simply empire building (though of course in later times that was a major factor), the original motivation was fear of the obviously bigger, more important and more powerful China.
 
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In the 19th century it was quite the opposite .
The Japanese were heavy supporters of reform in Korea as reform impeded Chinese influence/naked imperialism and warded off Russian (and other western countries) influence in Korea. In the 19th century a strong independent Korea really was what Japan wanted. As a strong independent Korea was one that would be able to avoid being taken over by a foreign power. And would of course never be strong enough on its own to threaten Japan.
It wasn't really until the 20th century when Japan quite soundly beat all its competition in Korea and the British started watching their back that that idea of actually taking over the place emerged.

Really, the whole point of this tangent isn't to say the Japanese are somehow the good guys in the 30s (which would be a borderline kickable offence I would hope.).
It's simply to say that Japan's situation in the 20th century was an outgrowth of its situation in the 19th century when from the Japanese perspective it was China that was the big powerful beast of east asia throwing its weight around and threatening to crush everyone.
Yet the most common view of history you see is one of perpetually helpless and not even thinking of reforming China and Japan miraculously 'pulling a meiji' then immediately launching into full scale 1930sesque kicking other countries around and empire building.
It all has to be understood in context. Japan wasn't simply empire building (though of course in later times that was a major factor), the original motivation was fear of the obviously bigger, more important and more powerful China.

Although Qing was soon to reveal itself as a paper tiger it really was, admittedly Japan did have reasons to fear it.

Let's amen on the 19th century issues, because the thread has gone wildly off-topic.
 
So one question, is KMT had chance to exist in mainland China till today?
Also what brought Nanjing Decade to common peasants, any stability and development?

The Nanking Decade had not brought many direct benefits to the peasants by the time the war began in 1937. Chiang did have plans for limited land reform, agricultural improvements, new infrastructure, and increased schooling, but they were very limited in implementation before the war.

Chiang's priorities were to 1) establish central government control (taxation) over the provinces, 2) establish a paramount military force before removing the warlords, 3) exterminating the Communists, and 4) develop a strong industrial base.

If the Japanese never invade (especially if they never even take over Manchuria), Chiang achieves all of these goals by the early 1940s.

IOTL by 1937, Chiang had already expanded central government control over the Yangtze Delta, Fujian, all provinces along the Yangtze into Sichuan, and had just achieved some level of control over Guangdong. ITTL, he could probably add much of northern China as well.

As a previous poster stated, Chiang was on the way to having 80 trained and equipped elite divisions which were very modern by Chinese standards. Once that happens, even if all the other warlords team up against him, he can defeat him. Most likely, they'll accept the inevitable and cooperate with Chiang.

Once Chiang has a monopoly of force in China, he'll begin all the reforms he hesitated to do because of fear of rebellion. He'll centralize the payroll and eliminate most corruption in the military while reducing the expenditure on the army.

That in turn will allow him to invest more money in the various civilian projects.

The 1937 war disrupted the Three Year Sino-German Plan that was investing heavily in Chinese industry. No war means by 1939 China has automotive factories, tungsten steel refining, central copper works, central electrical works, vast expansion of its rail network, and many other projects. This would make China self-sufficient in many critical war industries. When combined with all the industries in Manchuria, China would be very well placed by 1940.

The KMT and Chiang had problems, but they were much better than the warlords and had made substantial progress. By 1936, much of the intellectual criticism of Chiang had actually stopped as the benefits of the KMT's rule was obvious - and this was before the Xi'an Incident.

Much of the progress was lost when the Sino-Japanese War began as it caused China to lose much of its customs revenues and placed heavy burdens of the government. Even then, Chiang seemed to be keeping most of his influence and prestige. It was only after 1942 when the Burma disaster destroyed most of his elite divisions and cut off the Burma Road that the KMT government took a nose dive. I believe that had the disaster in Burma been averted, that the KMT still had a very good chance of staying in power after the war.

Much of the problem of the KMT was a result of Chiang needing to pacify the warlords while he built up his own forces. He had learned during the Central Plains War that premature reform meant open rebellion. He therefore hesitated to reform until he could be assured it was safe to do so. He therefore tolerated a lot of corruption, but he always wanted to do something about it.

After the KMT collapsed in mainland China, Chiang made sure that anyone who came to Taiwan was either loyal to him or had no independent power base. His rule was completely secure. Very early he implemented almost all the reforms he wanted to do on the mainland precisely because there was no one who could rebel against him.
 
Let's amen on the 19th century issues, because the thread has gone wildly off-topic.
Fair enough. In that spirit, I give my thoughts on how to prevent the Militarist takeover in Japan.

First of all, let me say that I believe only the Militarists would have committed the full-scale invasion of China. Any other Japanese government would have continued with its normal policy of trying to maintain the concessions only, much like the other imperial powers. In fact, during Shidehara's turn as FM, Japan's policy was much more conciliatory towards China than the European powers and the US. Absent the Militarists, there is a remote chance that sort of policy would continue.

Anyway, let's look at the factors that brought the Militarists to power:


Economic:

It's no secret that economic privation lead to destabilization in Europe, and that this helped lead to the rise of dictatorships. Desperation makes radical solutions seem more acceptable. Of course, Japan was no different. The post-World-War-One economic boom was part of what allowed the growth of Taisho Democracy in the 1920s. (The other major part was the fact that most of the Genro had died by then.)

The good times ended in 1927, when the Showa Financial Crisis began. In my view, there were two main causes for this: Europe had recovered from WW1, leading to greatly increased competition for Japanese exports, and many major Japanese banks were insufficiently capitalized and had over-extended themselves by loaning to these same exporters. The first cause is rather hard to butterfly, but the second is easy enough. Japanese banks didn't need to overextend themselves; in fact, I don't believe they wanted to. However, in this period (much like in modern-day China, and for many of the same developmentalist reasons) Japanese banks lent not just to companies that were expected to be profitable, but also to further state aims. A stronger split between the banks and the government, then, will make this financial crisis less severe, and therefore remove one of the factors that lead to the Militarist takeover.

In the grand scheme of things, the Showa Financial Crisis was relatively minor. Japan had suffered through banking crises before, and would again. The Great Depression was a larger hurdle. People have mentioned that Japan suffered less from the GD than did many other countries, and this is true. As they noted, the industrialization of Manchuria (Manchukuo) helped the Empire through the crisis. But of course, that invasion is one of those things we need to butterfly, as the seeming economic success of that move helped legitimize Militarist rule. Also, real rural incomes declined by over 50% during this period. While it wasn't as bad as in some other nations, it was still quite bad, and lead to much instability. A world that does not experience a Great Depression will be much less likely to see a Militarist Japan, or a Nazi Germany.

The last, and most important (in my view) factor, is the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. The first few months of the Great Depression in the US actually saw an increase in Japanese exports to that nation, as newly budget-conscious buyers started buying cheaper Japanese goods in preference to more expensive (though often better quality) domestic goods. Fear of just this sort of trend is part of what lead to the extremely high tariff passing in 1930. That tariff, and the retaliatory tariffs that followed it, lead to a decline in world trade of nearly two-thirds. For a nation that survived on exporting, this was devastating. Japan had to import (now much more expensive) raw materials, transform them into manufactured goods, and then sell those abroad, to pay to import (now more expensive) food. It was an existential threat. At this time Japanese goods usually competed because they were inexpensive, so these tarrifs usually priced them right out of the market.

Zmflavius wrote on the front page about how the support of the zaibatsu families was crucial to the success of the Militarists. He is absolutely correct about that. However, I will (kindly) disagree with his dissertation that the zaibatsu power bloc usually supported an aggressive foreign policy. In my view, the opposite was usually the case. This power bloc advocated for a small foreign policy. Of course the concessions were a vital part of their business strategy, and they favored a strong defense of them. But overall they favored good relations with as many nations as possible.

As a newly-industrializing nation, Japan occupied a strange niche in the world market. Her balance-of-trade with the industrialized nations, especially Europe, were perpetually in the red. This was because Japanese companies were usually importing expensive manufacturing equipment to develop their own factories. Her trade with East Asia, in contrast, was usually quite profitable, as it exported manufactured goods and received primary goods (foodstuffs, raw materials, etc) in return. Japan needed to maintain good relations with Europe, so that it could continue to import machinery and develop. But she also needed strong relations with East Asia, so people would agree to buy her goods. The industrialists had seen the effect that Chinese boycotts could have on their goods, and they feared such an effect.

Lastly, the zaibatsu families were the hereditary enemies of the military. Even before the Militarists took over, it wasn't uncommon for military expenses to take up over 30% of the national budget. Naturally, these kinds of expenditures required relatively higher levels of taxation, which the zaibatsu hated with a passion. The zaibatsu flexed their muscles to bring the military home from Siberia in 1922, and many in the military held a grudge. If you actually read any of what the Militarists wrote, if you read their propoganda, most of it is really just hatred against the business leaders. The rich elite were not loyal to Japan, and would compromise national interest in favor of profit. The rich elite had foreign business ties that made them "impure" and "not Japanese". They corrupted the true nature of the nation, which was spiritual at heart. It goes on and on.

So how did the zaibatsu come to favor the Militarists? It's simple, really: they felt like they had no other choice. Before the HS Tariff, they hated them. But after that passed, many felt like exports were simply not an option. At the very least, the Militarists could bring big (and profitable) military supply contracts. At least the factories would stay open. Further, if Japan was going to make things, it needed raw materials. If it could not pay for them, then perhaps the Militarists could simply seize them. Was that not better than going without? Military action would enrage the Chinese, and make them less likely to buy Japanese goods. But people weren't buying Japanese goods anyway. Maybe if the Militarists could turn China into a captive market, the way India was for the British, then Chinese people would have no choice but to buy from Japan. If that huge market was in Japanese hands, then the zaibatsu would never be such a position again.

Really, the alliance between the zaibatsu leaders and the Militarists is a case of politics making strange bedfellows. It was an alliance of desperation, one that never should have happened. It should be easy enough to butterfly...

I have two more sections for this mini-essay planned: Social factors, and government factors. However, I fear this is getting a bit long as it is. I will add in the other two latter. Sorry...:)
 
Jesus, mcdo, the rate you're going I won't have to do any research of my own.

I kid, but seriously, that's a pretty damn expansive description of the situation in Japan. Thank you.
 
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