What If: Japan doesn't invade China

What if the Japanese military do not rise to the prominent position in government that they did IOTL and don't go about with their unauthorised invasion of Manchuria, and later the rest of China?

Will Zhang Zuolin remain the virtual ruler of Manchuria? How will the Chinese Civil War work out? What about Sino-German cooperation? Are the Euro-Japano-American concessions and colonies around for longer than IOTL?

Depending on the ideas generated I might write a TL
 
Japan doesn't get a foothold in Manchuria, and Russia will still have a protectorate in Manchuria. Also, Japan doesn't get Taiwan.

Qing China, without its humiliating defeat against Japan, might survive a bit longer.
 
Japan doesn't get a foothold in Manchuria, and Russia will still have a protectorate in Manchuria. Also, Japan doesn't get Taiwan.

Qing China, without its humiliating defeat against Japan, might survive a bit longer.

I think he means butterflying away events from the Manchuria incident onwards, which would mean the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War probably still occur. Taiwan is much harder to butterfly away without radically altering Japan; while the First Sino-Japanese War was essentially a war for suzerainty over Korea (which is pretty much impossible to butterfly away, Korea has everything Japan wants, from strategic depth to natural resources), Japan also has ambitions for Taiwan, which is essentially the gateway to the south. If Japan defeats Qing China, there likewise is no reason not to take it.
 
Alright, let's get this straight: I specifically want to stop the growing influence of the armed forces in Japanese politics in the 1920s. Everything before this period happens as per OTL. The invasion of Manchuria I'm referring to is the actual invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese Kwantung army in 1931, not any of the incursions of the Russo-Japanese or First Sino-Japanese War.
 
The obvious one is no incentive for a Pacific war 1941-45. This would ov course leave the Allies able to concentrate fully vs the European Axis nations. A lesser point is that Japan is in a position with incentives to support the Allied cause. In WWI we saw a Japanese destroyer squadron operating in the Mediterranean. It is not impossible Japanese soldiers might be seen fighiting the Italians of Germans in places like Ethiopia, or the Mediteranean. probablly not a lot, but some. Even if Japan does not join in combat it is certain the Allies will purchase whatever suitable items they can from Japans small industry.

After 1945 japoan with its industry intact and banks flush with allied cash will enjoy better the economic rise of the 1950s and scare the Americans sooner with the economic power.
 
First of all, stopping expansionism was highly improbable as Japan's had fought four wars (1895, 1900, 1905, 1914) for interests and privileges in China, and won each single one of them. In addition, Japan had also intervened in China for a number of times to defend those interests they've won in the wars.

Japan's past victories was like a slippery slope leading to further expansions in China. Unless the Japanese politicians able to see what's at the end of this slope (Western fear for a Japan dominated China > Conflict between Japan and the West > Japan's Doom), which would require extreme far-sight.

But if Japan could leash on its officers:

Gloomy fate for the communist movement.
If resources used to fight Japan in Northern China and Shanghai were diverted to eliminate the communists instead, there is high chance for a total wipe-out of the red army, which was trapped in Shaanxi after the long March IOTL and was on the brink of being exterminated before Xi'an Incident saved them.

KMT Integration of China(and gradual decolonization). Which would be very slow, but since the KMT has pretty much tamed the warlords, nothing stood on its way.Such integration would also lead to the Chinese government gradually taking back land and interest lost to foreign powers during Qing and Early Republican Era. (Which was already under way: Custom tax was taken back after the Central Plain War, Hankou Concession in 1926)

Rising Manchuria.
Manchuria may be the most stable and well-managed region in China at that time. It had heavy industries, which the rest of the country lacked. If Zhang Zuolin lived, and the 1929 Sino-Soviet conflict avoided, the Grand Marchall will certainly rise as a major partner of the KMT (Or even the head of the KMT given that Chiang was far from uncontested in the Party).

Japan Ventures Somewhere Else.
With a nationalistic China trying to take back, or at least trying to hold back, Japan's interests, Japan may be forced to seek colonies elsewhere (seen as a necessity back then). Maybe French Indochina. As Japan challenges one western powers for its colonies, the others may permit this as they had no reasons to see Japan as a threat if it was not riding the dragon (i.e. classical yellow peril scenario).

Sino-German cooperation.
Seeing no reason this would stop. Hitler would not miss out a stern anti-communist ally. We may even see a Sino-Japano-German alliance against Russia.

Sino-Japanese Coorperation? No problem on the Chinese side. KMT shared Japan's hostility towards communism and western (especially Russian and British) colonialism. However:
Fable of the Scopion and the Frog said:
A scorpion asking a frog to carry him across a river. The frog is afraid of being stung during the trip, but the scorpion argues that if it stung the frog, the frog would sink and the scorpion would drown. The frog agrees and begins carrying the scorpion, but midway across the river the scorpion does indeed sting the frog, dooming them both. When asked why, the scorpion explains that this is simply its nature.

Corporations are only possible if Japan could hold itself back from stinging China, which was hard considering that it has spend the previous 30 years doing so.
 
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First of all, stopping expansionism was highly improbable as Japan's had fought four wars (1895, 1900, 1905, 1914) for interests and privileges in China, and won each single one of them. In addition, Japan had also intervened in China for a number of times to defend those interests they've won in the wars.

This is a bit of a strange way to look at the situation. These wars are like the wars that the Western powers had with China in the mid-to-late 19th century, not necessarily the obvious precursors to inevitable invasion. Everyone else was also intervening in China in little incidents. By the 20s, Japan was one of the largest investors in China and IMO had the military not set about adventuring, the Japanese could have benefited much more economically. It all boils down to the aggressive Japanese military.

Other than that, good ideas
 
It might also butterfly American military involvement as well. No matter how much Roosevelt wanted to go to war, it would have been much more difficult without Pearl Harbor

Yes it would have been for Roosevelt. Tho Hitler had half the vote here. The US and Germany were fighting a naval war though 1941, the US had landed Marines and naval air units in Iceland; the US was rehearsing invasions of the Azores, Canaries, and French territories in the western hemisphere. The US ambassador to France was busy conducting "Secret" conversations with Petain, and Darlan over US aid and the French colonies going over to the Allies. massive amounts of US aid was on its way to Britain and the USSR. The US was busy with plans to build a massive military logisitcs base in the Persian Gulf. Hitler was aware of all this and it is likely that sooner rather than later in 1942 he would become fed up and decide to punish the US with more direct action.
 
Japan doesn't get a foothold in Manchuria, and Russia will still have a protectorate in Manchuria. Also, Japan doesn't get Taiwan.
They got Taiwan in 1895.

Qing China, without its humiliating defeat against Japan, might survive a bit longer.[/QUOTE
This is a mega butterfly thread. tThere is no Pacific War. gGerman submarine attacks bring the US into the war in Europe in 1942.
 
This is a bit of a strange way to look at the situation. These wars are like the wars that the Western powers had with China in the mid-to-late 19th century, not necessarily the obvious precursors to inevitable invasion. Everyone else was also intervening in China in little incidents. By the 20s, Japan was one of the largest investors in China and IMO had the military not set about adventuring, the Japanese could have benefited much more economically. It all boils down to the aggressive Japanese military.

Other than that, good ideas

It's not strange at all, for Japan, it was the natural course to follow; after all, what else are you going to do with the gigantic, resource-rich nation next door that everyone else is already carving slices out of? By the 20th century Japan's foreign policy was economic in nature; the 1910 annexation of Korea basically boiled down to the culmination of an extended attempt to gain Korea's land and wealth, which included the military interventions, economic investments, establishments of spheres of influence, and eventual attempts to totally usurp control over domestic and foreign policy. As a matter of fact, following the Russo-Japanese War, there was a fair argument to be made that no Western power had nearly as many fingers in the Chinese pie as Japan. What for Western powers was merely an attempt to gain prestige concessions was a central part of Japanese foreign policy.

While you can speak of trying to rein in the military, the same corporations who powered most of the Japanese investment in China were the same ones who were lobbying for further military intervention and aggrandization. The reason for this was because the corporations were being powered by economic concessions from China which made their investments there more profitable, and also gave them access to more of China's wealth. Like with Korea, they envisioned Japan's relationship with China eventually reaching one of pure resource extraction, with the intent that eventually, as in Korea, Japan would have total control over Chinese resources. Preventing the Manchuria incident is key to preventing this mindset, because the massive economic benefits Japan derived from it (in the middle of the Great Depression, no less) essentially justified all the lobbying the corporations had made for intervention in the first place.

So really, while preventing the transition to a militarist dictatorship is a good place to start, what you really need is to convince the Japanese elite that for whatever reason, a relationship with China that isn't all take and no give is to their interest.
 
The easy (and unauthorized) seizure of Manchuria by local Japanese army units did a lot to weaken civilian control of the military, and started Japan down a dark road. To make this scenario work, you would need to abort that easy takeover of Manchuria.

How do you do that? Mainly by curbing Zhang Zuolin (the Old Marshall)'s ambitions. He was doing very well as the ruler of a de facto independent Manchuria, with a thriving economy and a good military as warlord militaries go, but then he tried to take over northern China and essentially bankrupted himself in the effort. At that point the Japanese assassinated him, leaving his playboy/dope addict son in charge. The Young Marshall eventually turned out to be a pretty good leader as warlords go, but initially the Old Marshall's death, on top of military defeats in China and economic chaos in Manchuria left Manchuria as easy pickings for the Japanese.

The struggle for northern China, and the whole warlord era is extremely complex, with a lot of major factions that most non-Chinese have never heard of. I'm not sure how that struggle would have played out if the Old Marshall had stayed out of it.

In 1924, before Zhang and his Manchurians moved in, the Zhili clique controlled much of Northern China, including Beijing and the Chinese bureaucracy there. They were arguably as close to a national government as China had at the time, with a reasonably powerful army and one of the better Chinese generals at the head of their army. Unfortunately for them, Zhang, with Japanese help, bribed a key general out from under them. The general seized Beijing while most of the Zhili cliques forces were trying to stop Zhang's invasion, and formed his own clique, which ruled large parts of Northern China jointly with Zhang and his Manchurians for a short time before they had a falling out that led to a confused series of wars that eventually caused Zhang and his Manchurians to bankrupt themselves. All of this fighting in the north was extremely destructive, and it delegitimized all of the participants in the eyes of a lot of Chinese. It also made the Nationalists task of taking over Northern China much easier when they made their move a few years later.

To some extent this was a proxy war, with, ironically, Zhang and his Manchurians supported by the Japanese who later assassinated him and the Zhili clique supported to some extent by local British interests.

So if Zhang decides to stay home and build up Manchuria instead of meddling in China proper, his rather formidable army remains intact and deters the local Japanese troops from their unauthorized takeover of Manchuria. That also leaves the Zhili clique intact though, and makes it more difficult for the Nationalists to take Northern China. It's possible that we would see a prolonged period of maneuvering between the Zhili clique and the Nationalists.

The Great Depression, assuming it happens on schedule, would add urgency to Japanese efforts to expand. All of the European empires went protectionists, and Japan needed raw materials and export markets. Manchuria would have still been the logical way to expand, but the Japanese might have tried indirect economic control rather than military expansion, assuming that Manchuria remained stable and with a powerful military.

As happened historically, German would meddle in China, as would the Soviets. I suspect that the Nationalists would be forced to endure Russian meddling for much longer under these circumstanced, because they would need Soviet training and arms to deal with a more formidable set of opponents in Northern China.

Germany would probably not ally with a non-militaristic Japan. They would probably ally with whatever Chinese faction would give them access to vital raw materials, especially tungsten. Historically they allied with the Nationalists for several years in the 1930s, arming and training the Nationalists' elite divisions, in exchange for access to vital raw material. Historically, they broke that alliance when full-scale war broke out between China and Japan in 1937.

Losing Chinese raw materials was a major blow to the German arms build-up, so figure that the Germans become stronger faster in this scenario. On the other hand, as somebody mentioned, the Brits don't have to worry about Japan as much, so they may take a firmer hand in Europe earlier.
 
It's not strange at all, for Japan, it was the natural course to follow; after all, what else are you going to do with the gigantic, resource-rich nation next door that everyone else is already carving slices out of? By the 20th century Japan's foreign policy was economic in nature; the 1910 annexation of Korea basically boiled down to the culmination of an extended attempt to gain Korea's land and wealth, which included the military interventions, economic investments, establishments of spheres of influence, and eventual attempts to totally usurp control over domestic and foreign policy. As a matter of fact, following the Russo-Japanese War, there was a fair argument to be made that no Western power had nearly as many fingers in the Chinese pie as Japan. What for Western powers was merely an attempt to gain prestige concessions was a central part of Japanese foreign policy.

I agree with you.
1. Fundamental challenge of Japan is resource to feed its economy and food to feed its population. All World powers solved this problem through colonization in late 19th century and early 20th century. So to prevent Japanese expansion requires reversal of this trend, other words de-colonization. From Japanese point of view it was unfair when Europeans and US having colonies while Japan which was most resource poor nation with over-population having any. So gaining resources and market for its export was core of Japanese national interest.
2. Also one factor is Great Depression. Great Depression had a lot impact. It allowed far right movement gain power in Europe. Japan was lucky that it didn't experience harsh economic recession. I think Manchurian conquest had very good effect to negate economic slow down, because of war economy and heavy industry production. Without Manchurian conquest there must be more severe economic recession in Japan which could lead to militarism again. After all during Great Depression all countries where more protectionism, which will convince Japanese gaining colony is essential.

So IMO, Manchurian invasion was almost assured because of Great Depression. After that, only Soviet-Sino alliance could prevent Japanese to attack China heartland.
 
No Japanese campaign in China, does Japan have the rescources to expand it's Navy the way it did. No US Nippon tension. No Pearl Harbour. No declaration of war by Hitler on America?.
Russia defeats Nazi germany occupying the whole of Germany, maybe France as well.
A very different cold war.
 
Sino-German cooperation during the 1930s was in the long term a threat to Manchukuo and Japan in general. Delay the Marco Polo Bridge incident by a few more years, and Chiang will have had 80 German-trained divisions and an industrial base to match.

Once that happens, Chiang will engineer a breakdown in relations with Hitler to allow western powers to acquiesce to his desire to retake Manchuria.

Given Manchuria's flatness, it could well be China which first employs blitzkrieg tactics.
 
Sino-German cooperation during the 1930s was in the long term a threat to Manchukuo and Japan in general. Delay the Marco Polo Bridge incident by a few more years, and Chiang will have had 80 German-trained divisions and an industrial base to match.

Once that happens, Chiang will engineer a breakdown in relations with Hitler to allow western powers to acquiesce to his desire to retake Manchuria.

Given Manchuria's flatness, it could well be China which first employs blitzkrieg tactics.

But problem is as I understand from you and others that Chiang Government was doomed. He was seen as evil in eyes of common Chinese.

Manchuria is not open like Northern Europe. Shanghai pass is mountainous with very defensive terrian. That is not good recipe for Blitzkrieg.
 
But problem is as I understand from you and others that Chiang Government was doomed. He was seen as evil in eyes of common Chinese.

Manchuria is not open like Northern Europe. Shanghai pass is mountainous with very defensive terrian. That is not good recipe for Blitzkrieg.

it was doomed after the second sino-japanese war. before it it could succeed to reform and appease.
 
it was doomed after the second sino-japanese war. before it it could succeed to reform and appease.

What I understand is not only he was incompetent and also KMT was very corrupted. It is not good recipe for modernization and industrialization. Also he was not close to tame all the war lords.
 
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