What if Japan avoided attacking Pearl Harbour?

7.398.000 metric tons in the DEI, 907.000 metric tons in British Borneo.

For comparison Romania produced 6.603.000 metric tons.

thanks for posting these figures! have never seen the figures for British territory broken out

have you run across figures for wartime production after sabotage? (gather they overran the British before everything was destroyed? but as your figures show, that was only one-eighth of Dutch production anyways, and they were expending a lot of fuel with naval operations)
 

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thanks for posting these figures! have never seen the figures for British territory broken out

have you run across figures for wartime production after sabotage? (gather they overran the British before everything was destroyed? but as your figures show, that was only one-eighth of Dutch production anyways, and they were expending a lot of fuel with naval operations)
No, don't know, the numbers are for crude oil I have no numbers of refined oil.
 
... but given Kimmel's thinking about a grand battle ....

I'm confused here. Kimmels WP-46 published March 1941 specifically avoided a "grand battle" & made clear why. Are you saying avoiding a major battle early on in a Pacific war would be a mistake? Or are you saying Kimmel actually wanted a grand battle early on? Are there documents between March & Kimmels relief in December 1941 that contradict WP-46? As far as I can see his order was still in effect as of Dec 1941.

Appreciate any clarification.
 
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have you run across figures for wartime production after sabotage? (gather they overran the British before everything was destroyed? but as your figures show, that was only one-eighth of Dutch production anyways, and they were expending a lot of fuel with naval operations)

John Ellis analysis of war production 'Brute Force' has some general numbers on this, and refrences for possible detailed numbers. I'd highly recommend finding a used copy just for the 54 tables on key production/consumption/destruction of stratigic items. The references are golden as well for research.
 
That's the challenge then, if the USPACFLT isn't at PH, what do they attack?

Nagumos orders were flexible enough he could make a quick look around and try for a attack on what he could find at sea. There was guidance on the amount of risk allowed & the fuel restricted how long he could stay, but he did have the option of searching and attacking if circumstances were favorable. Otherwise he would be stuck with making a stratigically insigfnificant attack on the harbor facilities & air fields.
 
Nagumos orders were flexible enough he could make a quick look around and try for a attack on what he could find at sea.
No, I don't mean he missed the USPACFLT, but that it was never forward deployed there. Surely Nagumo wouldn't be ordered to attack an empty base? Unless the plan is to invade, but that's getting into ASB.
 
If it were known not to be at PH Nagumo would never have been ordered to attack the place. His orders also included a turn around contingent had he received definative confirmation the US fleet was absent from the harbor. I cant remember if that cut off was on the 5th or 6th Dec Hawaiian time.
 
If it were known not to be at PH Nagumo would never have been ordered to attack the place. His orders also included a turn around contingent had he received definative confirmation the US fleet was absent from the harbor. I cant remember if that cut off was on the 5th or 6th Dec Hawaiian time.
So, FDR's decision to move the PacFleet from San Diego to Hawaii never occurs. Now what?
 
What Now?

I suspect, from bits about previous Japanese war plans, the alternative would be to consolidate the fleet enmass when the US fleet rushed across the Pacific to save the Phillipines. That is the key fleet elements would break off offensive operations and regroup at Truk or some other suitable location and wait to ambush the US fleet when far from its home base and low on fuel. That worked against the Russian fleet 36 years earlier & was the basis for a number of IJN fleet exercises 1907 - 1940. It also suggests Japanese intelligence never figured out the basis for War Plan Orange, or when it was rolled into the Rainbow plans or Richardsons fleet war plan or Kimmels WP-46. That is the US strategy was to only raid and spar at arms length for 12-24 months until its strength was overwhelming & it had a mobile fleet base ready.

OTL the raid and spar strategy was implemented in January 1942. This confused Yamamoto & his staff, who flailed about for a year looking for the big decisive fight. The failed to understand until the end of 1942 the 'Decisive Battle' had already occured, but had been split up into dozens of smaller naval actions that attrited away the key strengths of the fleet.

Were the US fleet not at PH then the same occurs as OTL with the IJN frittering away its key advantages in small actions through 1942.
 
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Were the US fleet not at PH then the same occurs as OTL with the IJN frittering away its key advantages in small actions through 1942.
Would they have considered not declaring on the USA until after Malaya and DEI were in the bag? By end of Feb 1942 SEA is all Japanese, while FDR has been fighting Congress to act. Then, Japan, now with oil and rubber aplenty, attacks the USA? But why bother now? The question is, will FDR sit back while Japan takes SEA?
 

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Would they have considered not declaring on the USA until after Malaya and DEI were in the bag? By end of Feb 1942 SEA is all Japanese, while FDR has been fighting Congress to act. Then, Japan, now with oil and rubber aplenty, attacks the USA? But why bother now? The question is, will FDR sit back while Japan takes SEA?
Again, they HAD to honor the threat the U.S. presented.

The PI was perfectly positioned to interdict all movement from the Southern Resource Areas back to Japan as well as base to strike at Japanese positions in the Palaus. Guam was 100 miles from Saipan, while Wake allowed the U.S. a location to strike the Marshalls.

Japan's plan was to establish a defensive perimeter that would make any attempt to retake their Southern acquisitions too costly. As long as the U.S. held Wake, Guam and the PI, there was no perimeter, even of the U.S. didn't actively engage its positions would have allowed another enemy (i.e. the UK) the ability to move forces into attack position due to gaps in the defesnive perimeter.
 
Again, they HAD to honor the threat the U.S. presented.

The PI was perfectly positioned to interdict all movement from the Southern Resource Areas back to Japan as well as base to strike at Japanese positions in the Palaus. Guam was 100 miles from Saipan, while Wake allowed the U.S. a location to strike the Marshalls.
I am not suggesting Japan would not honour the threat the US posed. However I'm asking is there a possibility that Japan would hold off on attacking the United States until they secured Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, because the United States Navy is too far away if not at Pearl Harbour to attack.
 
What Now?

I suspect, from bits about previous Japanese war plans, the alternative would be to consolidate the fleet enmass when the US fleet rushed across the Pacific to save the Phillipines. That is the key fleet elements would break off offensive operations and regroup at Truk or some other suitable location and wait to ambush the US fleet when far from its home base and low on fuel.

Of alternative scenarios, something like this might have been plausible. Rather that treat the PI as a yes/no option, approaching it as a now/little later one. Attack the French/British/Dutch but leave US possessions alone. Take the gamble that the US has nothing based (especially in the PI) that can do any serious damage at the moment, nor that the US will initiate such actions, at least without several months preparation. Once the F/B/D territories are secured, use the fleet to blockade US military reinforcements. The USN is placed on a dilemma of advancing forces forward to an insecure base. If Japan allows civilian supplies (and yes, that can be problematic) but blocks/restricts military supplies that may lessen the US/PI's immediate worries. A Japanese pledge to respect America's sovereignty-and promised PI independence-may leave the administration without enough support for initiating hostilities. Pledging to allow US flagged ships to sail Lend-Lease to Vladivostok might help. Presenting the situation as an "Eastern Hemisphere Security Zone" from which the European conflict is quarantined (to co-opt FDR's rhetoric/policies) may also slow the US response.

The best that Japan could hope for is that the US declines/delays assembling a trans-Pacific strike force to send into an intact IJN, which will be fighting close to home/bases and a defensive battle (the Decisive Battle doctrine that everyone was raised on and practiced for). Perhaps some butterflies from the ETO diverts the US to the point that the "Germany First" plan pushed back plan for a DoW until after Germany is as good as defeated. Maybe an ASB then help the US public decide that one war was enough and, since Japan never broke her word and attacked us, just let the PI go in 1946 as planned and accept the Co-Prosperity Sphere as our Pacific trade partner.

And, as soon as the IJA decides to renege on the deal and attack US possessions because "They're too deeply involved in Europe, what can they do now?", OTL picks up all over again.
 

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The Japanese Army didn't want to go South at all.
Sure, but you're thinking of the earlier decision wheter or not to go to war. After the decision had been made to acquire the European colonies the army wanted to attack Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and then the Phillippines, in that order. The Navy on the other hand argued that Malaya and the Phillippines had to be attacked simultaneously.
The Navy won that argument.
 
There is a idea here that Congress will not vote for a declaration of war if Japan only attacks the Common wealth & DEI. But consider...When France collapsed in June Congress passed the War Powers Acts which mobilized the Army & Navy reserves, Federalized the National Guard, allocated a military expansion budget that ran counter to the fiscal policy of 75% of the Congressional members (deficit spending).

When Japan occupied French Indo China Congress authorized the Embargo Acts, which froze all Japanese finical assets in the US banks, denying Japan access to credit & crippling its ability to conduct international trade, denied Japan the use of foreign flagged cargo ships (40-50% of cargos passing through Japans ports were carried in foreign flagged hulls). These two actions alone were more crippling to Japans economy than the damage a few hundred B17s might have done in 1941-42. They also hurt US business, nevertheless Congress acquiesced to this very risky embargo plan.

As tensions rose the War Dept was able to move ahead with a large scale plan to reinforce the US Army (not just the PI Army) in the Phillipines. Advanced bases on Wake & Midway were established and fortification construction started, the Pacific fleet rebased to Oahu. Intelligence sharing was established between the Dutch, Commonwealth, and US commands in the Pacific. War planning also occurred between these commands. Admiral Phillps visited the PI & conferred with MacArthur 6th December.

All this occurred with declining opposition from Congress. The multiple polls taken show the US voters had in the autumn of 1941 accepted the idea the US would soon be at war with Japan, that the US would be increasing its aid to the British/Dutch.

Aside from US naval & air patrols across the Japanese lines of communications, US cargo ships were present in Dutch East Indies and Commonwealth ports. Its unrealistic to think there will be some incident or other involving a US war or cargo ship. There are likely to be a dozen such in the opening weeks as the Japanese attack ports and ships at sea.
 
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The Japanese will be at War with the Americans sooner or later if they follow through on attempting to dominate the Pacific.

Given the option sooner is always better.


Turns out it was lose/lose for the Japanese, but unless they don't bother going south at all, military logic means they have to attack Pearl.
 
I am not suggesting Japan would not honour the threat the US posed. However I'm asking is there a possibility that Japan would hold off on attacking the United States until they secured Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, because the United States Navy is too far away if not at Pearl Harbour to attack.

Assuming they do, Japan benefits from being able to deploy slightly more against the Dutch and British (though with hindsight those were quick campaigns that went well. Logistics probably limits how much more they could have done, maybe one additional landing somewhere?

But every month the war the US is delayed is a problem. It means one - two extra convoys to the Philippines (more aircraft, tanks and artillery to face later), significant improvements in the training of the Philippine army, Wake Island goes from lightly held to potentially too tough to take and the US provides additional help the British and Australians. Meanwhile Pearl harbour goes on a war footing and Radar probably becomes functional in the Phillipines and Pearl Harbour. The war with the US - arguably the main event in the minds of the Japanese planners becomes materially harder.

I think Japan would reasonably assume that the US would view invading Malaya and the DEI as crossing various diplomatic red lines with the US. Which would mean they would have to leave forces capable of countering any US aggression, this might well have tied up significant parts of the Japanese fleet. There would also be an assumption that the clock was ticking with regards to the US entering the war, which would mean there was still the need to start preparations for that, which again would absorb a portion of the Japanese military.

Overall I think Japan would have been worse off by attempting to start with Britain and the DEI. Losing the element of surprise against the US would offset the benefit of being able to target the weakest opponents first.
 
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