What if Isoroku Yamamoto had lived?

As the titles says, what if Isoroku Yamamoto had lived to the end of the war in the Pacific. What if Operation Vengeance, a secret operation to intercept his bomber transport, had failed?

This is the bare bones background of the operation from Wikipedia:
Operation Vengeance was the name given by the Americans to the military operation to kill Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto on April 18, 1943, during the Solomon Islands campaign in the Pacific Theater of World War II. Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy, was killed on Bougainville Island when his transport bomber aircraft was shot down by U.S. Army fighter aircraft operating from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal.
I doubt the admiral's continued life and involvement in the war would change the outcome, except with how imperial Japan eventually loses. It has been suggested by some posters here, that Yamamoto might later on have backed the dove faction in Japanese politics against the hawks supporting the army.


How might the remainder of the war progress with Yamamoto still alive?
If he survives all other attempts on his life, what might happen to him post war?
 
Last edited:

Geon

Donor
Bigger Battle of Guadalcanal

If Yamamoto had survived then I picture a bigger final battle for Guadalcanal. Yamamoto was a gambler. I believe he would have thrown a much larger naval force at the Allies at Guadalcanal to relieve the Japanese troops there or if Guadalcanal was no longer feasible somewhere else in the Solomons. And by bigger naval force I mean he would have committed every last fleet carrer available as well as the Yamato and the Musashi! The idea would have been just as at Midway, to annihilate USN offensive capability. By now though Yamamoto would be under no illusions as to whether Japan would win the war or not. It would not be matter of how much could Japan win but how much would she lose before she was forced to surrender.

Regardless of whether the sea battle was won or lost Yamamoto would be determined to bring the war to an end soon before the Allies were close enough to bomb Japan. He would likely join the growing peace faction in the Japanese government. Sadly, given the political realities of the time, it is likely I think that the militarists would discretely assassinate Yamamoto themselves and then blame his death on the Allies!

Geon
 
If he survives all other attempts on his life, what might happen to him post war?
I could easily see him getting tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and then hanged. Whilst the Americans did give a large number of senior officials a pass, after Pearl Harbor I think the pressure would just be too great for him to be acquitted or simply receive a lesser sentence.
 
The most interesting scenario would have been Yamamato succeeding Tojo as Prime Minister instead of Koiso. Yamamato undoubtedly would have been more forceful in pushing for peace. Could he have brought the Emperor around before he was killed by the Army?
 
That I think would probably require an intervention by the alien space bats. He'd already seen how dodgy the whole idea of the war was even before it started but loyalty to the Emperor and state made him carry out his duties anyway to the best of his abilities.
 
Yamamoto living has minimal effect on the war. Tactically there may be some differences, that may or may not be in favor of the Japanese. The basic problems with Japan's war was: firstly they simply did nt have the ships/planes/pilots/etc to cause more than local irritation after 1943 at the latest, secondly their industry was starved for raw materials so it could not even produce at its nominal capacity which was inadequate anyways, and finally the folks running the war were totally out of touch with reality. Had Yamamoto tried to inject reality in to the situation - which is basically lets cut the best deal we can as soon as we can - if lucky he'd be retired and sidelined but more likely assassination or seppuku would be in his future.
 
Yamamoto was not so much a political leader, but a military one, which propably would have resulted in a lesser post war trial and sentence. The only serious "crime", he could be accused of was the following of the military (Army) lead government, primarily influenced by General Tojo.

Yamamoto was basically opposed to a war against the USA and therefore he was more likely to be an ally in the trials against fellow Japanese top figures, rather than an enemy. If he had survived the war, he would possibly have been a great asset in the trials against the real leaders of the warfaction, mainly comming form the Army, not the Navy.

US sentiment was in this case irrelevant, as the USA themselves were mostly to blame for the outbreak of the WW2 in the Pacific, as they willingly, or by incompetence led things escalate to war. Japan was not so much willing to go to war with the West, if the USA and the other western states did not sanction the Japanese that heavy for their war in China. A more copperative attitude might have prevented war at all, as the Japanese Navy always had been opposed to war with the USA, knowing it could only win a short term war, before the industrial might of the USA would kick in and turn the tables. The Army was more agressive and lacked the knowledge of the navy in this field.
 
Yamamoto was not so much a political leader, but a military one, which propably would have resulted in a lesser post war trial and sentence. The only serious "crime", he could be accused of was the following of the military (Army) lead government, primarily influenced by General Tojo.

Yamamoto was basically opposed to a war against the USA and therefore he was more likely to be an ally in the trials against fellow Japanese top figures, rather than an enemy. If he had survived the war, he would possibly have been a great asset in the trials against the real leaders of the warfaction, mainly comming form the Army, not the Navy.

US sentiment was in this case irrelevant, as the USA themselves were mostly to blame for the outbreak of the WW2 in the Pacific, as they willingly, or by incompetence led things escalate to war. Japan was not so much willing to go to war with the West, if the USA and the other western states did not sanction the Japanese that heavy for their war in China. A more copperative attitude might have prevented war at all, as the Japanese Navy always had been opposed to war with the USA, knowing it could only win a short term war, before the industrial might of the USA would kick in and turn the tables. The Army was more agressive and lacked the knowledge of the navy in this field.

Easy to say with hindsight, but remember part of the problem was that both parties completely misunderstood one another. Both basically thought the other didn't want want war and would sue for peace quickly at a given opportunity. In the end both were completely stubborn it was just the USA which had the might to crush Japan.
 
US sentiment was in this case irrelevant, as the USA themselves were mostly to blame for the outbreak of the WW2 in the Pacific, as they willingly, or by incompetence led things escalate to war. Japan was not so much willing to go to war with the West, if the USA and the other western states did not sanction the Japanese that heavy for their war in China. A more copperative attitude might have prevented war at all, as the Japanese Navy always had been opposed to war with the USA, knowing it could only win a short term war, before the industrial might of the USA would kick in and turn the tables. The Army was more agressive and lacked the knowledge of the navy in this field.
And that means precisely bugger all in 1945 and afterwards, the Allies won so that makes it all Japan's fault. The occupation of Japan was America's ball game, they simply let the other Allied powers in when they felt like it. I just don't really seem them being all that understanding to the man who was the architech of the sneak attack that started the war for them, but I could be wrong I guess.
 
Easy to say with hindsight, but remember part of the problem was that both parties completely misunderstood one another. Both basically thought the other didn't want want war and would sue for peace quickly at a given opportunity. In the end both were completely stubborn it was just the USA which had the might to crush Japan.


The point was not that the two nations did not understand eachother, as they actually did very well know what the other was up to and what its cultural behavious was. The USA knew the Japanese were a nation with very traditional feelings and long toes, easily insulted and with a long history of very chivilary and noble traditions. If the US State Department had respected this historical base, it might not have gone on a frontal assaulting policy of laying up the will of the West, in this case the USA primarily, but sought for a more diplomatic approach, to which the Japaznese Empire was very likely to listen, before getting angered beyond the point of no return by the Western powers' (specifically the USA again) China Policy of the 30's.

Japan before the early 30's was reasonable and only interested in economical expansion and territorial gains, to house the population of overpopulated Japan. Territorial gain was mostly to be found in Korea and Manchuko Province, while economical expansion was mainly in China at first, as a market for Japanese industrial and other goods. Later the more radicallised miltiary rulers, wanted to occupy China for conquest and territorial expansion again, but that was after the political point of no return in radicalising.

So most of the blame for the whole Japanese radicalisation proces is twofold:
1. The weak political system in japan itself, where the people/parliament had absolutely no controll over the military, while the Emperor was still seen as absolute monarch and spiritual leader, with no form of controll over him. (In fact the system did work partly, before the Army (not the navy) took control over the government in the 30's. The official parliament was elected by a portion of the people, but had only some controll over the non military secretaries. The ministers of the Navy and War department were assigned by their respecitive branches alone, with no part of the parliament at all.
2. The Western Powers, especially the USA, which had conflicting wishes in both China and the Pacific, with Japan. By demanding the impossible to the Japanese, related to their traditional historical background and not willing to back down diplomatically, the attitude of the Western Democracies toward Japan radicalised and angered the Japanese so much, they were radicalising in nationalist extremism because of this "arrogant" attitude of the West.
 
My 2 cents... How is the US supposed to ignore the Rape of Nanking? yes, we did nothing, but at the least we were shipping aid to the Chinese. 1944/45, after Europe is done, expect 2nd hand weapons and American "advisors" to flood the country. And the Japanese would run out of cash by (about) mid 1942; is America supposed to give them free weapons? The poster (I forgot who) said it best: both sides thought the other would back down, no one did, and war resulted.

Nagumo was sent to some island to "aid" in defense, forget the island, but when it fell he committed suicide. I could see that happening to Yamamoto; after multiple naval defeats, promoted to help defend the Philipinnes (sp?) or Okinawa, and dying somehow.
 
Yamamoto living has minimal effect on the war. Tactically there may be some differences, that may or may not be in favor of the Japanese. The basic problems with Japan's war was: firstly they simply did nt have the ships/planes/pilots/etc to cause more than local irritation after 1943 at the latest, secondly their industry was starved for raw materials so it could not even produce at its nominal capacity which was inadequate anyways, and finally the folks running the war were totally out of touch with reality. Had Yamamoto tried to inject reality in to the situation - which is basically lets cut the best deal we can as soon as we can - if lucky he'd be retired and sidelined but more likely assassination or seppuku would be in his future.

That's pretty much what PACIFIC WAR ALTERNATIVES said, you can't fight with what you don't have. By this point it was pretty obvious Japan was just fighting to buy time...
 
Top