What if instead of attacking the US in December 1941 Japan attacked the Soviet Union?

Actually, the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union was signed on April 13, 1941, two years after the battle. This was done not as a result of that action but rather because of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, which Japan saw as a betrayal by Germany.

Occurred simultaneously with Khalkin Ghol.

Given the circumstances, the IJA performed quite well at Khalkhin Gol: denied outside support from IGHQ, the green 23rd division and its auxiliaries went up against one of the best generals the Soviets had (with a blank check from Stalin to take anything he needed to drive back the Japanese) and inflicted significantly heavier losses than they received in every category (massively so with regard to equipment), all while being outnumbered 2 to 1.

The IJA was annihilated at Khalkin Ghol. That is not a good performance at all. A good performance involves not losing.

Basically reiterating what I said above, IMO the basic outcome in this scenario (given the more likely course of action on Japan's part) is that the IJA ends up owning everything important in the Soviet Far East with no Soviet ability to offer an immediate response. While the Soviet Union wouldn't collapse and still probably would have defeated Germany, Japan would have essentially won the war.

That is contradictory, because after defeating Germany the Soviets first response would have been to turn around and smash the Japanese off of the Asian continent. Assuming the Japanese don't just up-and-collapse before then because, as it turns out, the Soviet Far East does not have any of the resources they actually need.
 
Occurred simultaneously with Khalkin Ghol.

No, it didn't. The Pact was signed on April 13, 1941. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed August 23, 1939 and had nothing to do with Khalkhin Gol.

The IJA was annihilated at Khalkin Ghol. That is not a good performance at all. A good performance involves not losing.

Given the circumstances there was no way they could not have lost: they were essentially left to their fate by High Command, whereas the Soviets brought whatever they needed to win. And under those circumstances the IJA demonstrated it was superior to the Red Army man for man. It also demonstrated that even under the worst circumstances that it was capable of inflicting enormous human and materiel losses on their enemies.

That is contradictory, because after defeating Germany the Soviets first response would have been to turn around and smash the Japanese off of the Asian continent. Assuming the Japanese don't just up-and-collapse before then because, as it turns out, the Soviet Far East does not have any of the resources they actually need.

With no US embargo (the only way the Japanese would have gone after Russia) resources would not have been a problem. And with the Soviet Far East in Japanese hands the Red Army had no capacity to counterattack. Unless they beat Japan to an atomic bomb, the latter's position was essentially unassailable.
 
No, it didn't. The Pact was signed on April 13, 1941. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed August 23, 1939 and had nothing to do with Khalkhin Gol.

I meant the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact occurred almost simultaneously with Khalkin Ghol. Both happened in August 1939.

Given the circumstances there was no way they could not have lost: they were essentially left to their fate by High Command, whereas the Soviets brought whatever they needed to win. And under those circumstances the IJA demonstrated it was superior to the Red Army man for man. It also demonstrated that even under the worst circumstances that it was capable of inflicting enormous human and materiel losses on their enemies.

Lets look at what actual military analysts have to say:

Japanese staff planners, however, were more realistic, apparently assigning a Soviet division a value of 0.8 as against 1.0 for a Japanese division. Soviet material was expected to be superior in quantity and in some cases quality, but the material actually fielded by the Soviets exceeded Japanese expectations in both respects. The Japanese would have to rely on superior morale and espirit. In this respect, too, they underestimated Soviet-Mongolian Forces.

Also I note that your basis for Japanese casualties are on Japanese figures, which are inconsistent with what the Japanese actually deployed and were trapped. The Soviet figure of 61,000 Japanese men lost is much more realistic.

With no US embargo (the only way the Japanese would have gone after Russia) resources would not have been a problem.

The US embargo comes down anyways, the occupation of French colonies still happens IATL. Even had it not, the embargo was a culmination of US policies in reaction to Japanese actions and would still likely have happened slightly later.

And with the Soviet Far East in Japanese hands the Red Army had no capacity to counterattack.

Nonsense: they have the Trans-Siberian railway to deploy down much like they did IOTL for August Storm along with major bases in eastern Siberia to stage from.
 
I meant the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact occurred almost simultaneously with Khalkin Ghol. Both happened in August 1939.

But it had nothing to do with that battle.

Lets look at what actual military analysts have to say:

That is not in disagreement with what I said: the Japanese were rudely surprised by the Soviet's failure to conform to their stereotypes. However, the Japanese were clearly better man-for-man: They inflicted 1.5 casualties for every one they received, and handled the Red Army very roughly in infantry combat: Zhukov sacked two commanders of his Northern Force for failing to dislodge an 800-man Japanese unit from a hill, and prior to the Soviet offensive in August several probing attempts were repulsed, each resulting in 300-400 Soviet casualties for 15-40 Japanese.

Also I note that your basis for Japanese casualties are on Japanese figures, which are inconsistent with what the Japanese actually deployed and were trapped. The Soviet figure of 61,000 Japanese men lost is much more realistic.

The Japanese figures are from Army medical records and must be regarded as accurate: militaries might put out propaganda, but they do not lie to themselves. The combined Japanese-Manchukuoan forces (the 23rd Division, a regiment of the 7th Division, two tank regiments, and several assorted battalions) numbered roughly 30,000, compared to 65,000 Soviets and Mongolians. Since the 23rd Division suffered roughly 70% casualties, the military figure of 19,714 combined Japanese-Manchukuo losses must be regarded as accurate.

The Soviet claim (61,000) was a colossal overestimate that had little value other than as propaganda. The RKKA 1st Army Group initially estimated a total of 29,085 Japanese casualties (not far off the mark), but once the propagandists got hold of it the figure gradually ballooned to twice that.

The US embargo comes down anyways, the occupation of French colonies still happens IATL. Even had it not, the embargo was a culmination of US policies in reaction to Japanese actions and would still likely have happened slightly later.

With the US embargoes, there is no Japanese invasion of the USSR and the discussion is moot.

Nonsense: they have the Trans-Siberian railway to deploy down much like they did IOTL for August Storm along with major bases in eastern Siberia to stage from.

It took the Soviets 3 months under peacetime conditions with Western support to build up for the Manchurian Offensive IOTL. Even then supply lines became strained just a few days into the offensive, which is why Vasilevsky wanted the operation over quickly (within a few months). Otherwise, the war would have bogged down.

Under total war conditions even this buildup would have been impossible.
 
But it had nothing to do with that battle.

The Japanese neutrality pact disagree. It was a reaction, ultimately, to Khalkin Ghol. One of it's prime advocates was a survivor of Khalkin Ghol who would speak eloquently and at length about Soviet firepower superiority.

The Japanese figures are from Army medical records and must be regarded as accurate: militaries might put out propaganda, but they do not lie to themselves. The combined Japanese-Manchukuoan forces (the 23rd Division, a regiment of the 7th Division, two tank regiments, and several assorted battalions) numbered roughly 30,000, compared to 65,000 Soviets and Mongolians. Since the 23rd Division suffered roughly 70% casualties, the military figure of 19,714 combined Japanese-Manchukuo losses must be regarded as accurate.
Actually, armies do lie to themselves to a limited extent. Company quartermasters and medics undercounting casualties so as to ensure they still get supplies for their men is a practice as old as armies themselves. Still, the margin of error with medical reports are undoubtedly much better then what is proclaimed in the media. I wouldn't be surprised if Japanese casualties approached the 30,000 mark. It also remains more then the Soviet losses of ~18,500 men.

With the US embargoes, there is no Japanese invasion of the USSR and the discussion is moot.
So there is not going to be an Japanese invasion of the USSR. Good to know.

It took the Soviets 3 months under peacetime conditions with Western support to build up for the Manchurian Offensive IOTL. Even then supply lines became strained just a few days into the offensive, which is why Vasilevsky wanted the operation over quickly (within a few months). Otherwise, the war would have bogged down.
Yes, they became so strained that the Japanese armed forces in Manchuria were completely wiped out, Soviet armies surged into it's depths, and the entire region overrun by the end of August. :rolleyes:

The reality is that the Japanese in late-1941 are fundamentally a WW1 light infantry army who in fighting the Red Army will be going up against a competent mechanized force. There are cases of such an imbalance working out, but in mitigating circumstances that do not appear in the SFE in late-1941. None of this is a recipe for Japanese success.
 
The Japanese neutrality pact disagree. It was a reaction, ultimately, to Khalkin Ghol.

Prove it.

Actually, armies do lie to themselves to a limited extent. Company quartermasters and medics undercounting casualties so as to ensure they still get supplies for their men is a practice as old as armies themselves. Still, the margin of error with medical reports are undoubtedly much better then what is proclaimed in the media. I wouldn't be surprised if Japanese casualties approached the 30,000 mark. It also remains more then the Soviet losses of ~18,500 men.

Not in this case. There were several casualty tabulations made by the Japanese after the battle, the most comprehensive being the aforementioned figure provided by the Bureau 6A military hospital. The IJA studied the battle very closely, so they wanted as accurate a count as possible. Consequently, the margin of error for the official losses should have been minimal to nonexistent.

Soviet losses, on the other hand numbered 9,703 dead, 15,952 wounded, and 2,225 sick, with 990 Mongolian losses (28,870 total). Compared with the figure of 19,714 Japanese-Manchukuoan losses (including sick), you get a ratio of 1.46 : 1 in favor of the Japanese.

Yes, they became so strained that the Japanese armed forces in Manchuria were completely wiped out, Soviet armies surged into it's depths, and the entire region overrun by the end of August. :rolleyes:

Not really. The majority of the Kwantung Army never fired a shot before being ordered to surrender. Even in its depleted state, stripped of all experienced units and heavy equipment and caught in the middle of a redeployment, the IJA was still capable of inflicting serious losses. One of the only pitched battles of that campaign, the Battle of Mutanchiang, shows that: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mutanchiang

The reality is that the Japanese in late-1941 are fundamentally a WW1 light infantry army who in fighting the Red Army will be going up against a competent mechanized force. There are cases of such an imbalance working out, but in mitigating circumstances that do not appear in the SFE in late-1941. None of this is a recipe for Japanese success.

If the Japanese were a WWI army fighting in WWII, someone forgot to tell the Allies: by 1939 they had the 4th largest tank force in the world with an overall standard of mechanization equal to the Wehrmacht or the Red Army. Of course, since 80% of the Wehrmacht was horse-drawn I suppose we could call it an anachronism too? :cool:

Japanese doctrine stressed the employment of large groups of tanks in a "mobile mass" meant to punch a hole in an enemy front line through which motorized infantry could follow. Their opening plans for war vs. the USSR demonstrate this clearly:

JapattackplanRussia.png

JapattackplanRussia.png
 

iddt3

Donor
One of two things would need to have happened for the Japanese to have attacked Siberia:

1. The Japanese back out of French Indochina in 1940 so as to remove the US embargoes and the need to "Go South." Seeing as how this would have resulted in a massive loss of military prestige, it was extremely unlikely.

-OR-

2. The German Army captures Moscow in the fall of 1941. It was informally agreed within IGHQ that should Moscow fall early they would make a land-grab in Siberia with the forces on hand. Given the Wehrmacht's inability to capture Moscow in the face of Soviet resistance and the weather, this is even more unlikely.

So, going with the most likely of the two scenarios (evacuation of Indochina), the Japanese attack on the USSR is not a 'come as you are' land-grab but a full-scale war: Hachi-Go no. 8, IGHQ's plan for an all-out war against the Soviet Union, envisioned the initial blow to be struck by up to 43 divisions and numerous smaller formations totalling 1,300,000 men. They would first attempt to cut off Soviet Primorye from the rest of Siberia (while holding a defensive posture in the West), then turn their attention to the Baikal area, halting at roughly the Yablonovy mountain range. If the Japanese had agreed to the attack with Germany in March 1941, the operation would be ready by August.

The Soviet order of battle in the Far East was huge: As of December 1, 1941, the Red Army had a total of 1,343,307 men, 8,777 guns and mortars, 2,124 tanks and SPGs, 3,193 combat aircraft, and 96 ships of various types guarding against the IJA. This constituted a very considerable force, one that looked like it might have been able to handle Hachi-Go...until one realizes that it was spread out over a vast arc from Vladivostok to Mongolia, consisted of largely second-line equipment, and had been stripped of its best officers and men for the war against Germany. Moreover, the Soviets were oriented in a purely defensive posture, incapable of making major advances into Manchuria. Even worse, their forces facing Japan were connected to the rest of Russia by only the single Trans-Siberian Railroad, which was very close to the Manchurian border and could easily be cut by aircraft or ground forces.

The Japanese, on the other hand, would be using their very best and would hold the initiative in a battle started by themselves. They would likely enjoy the element of surprise, with total air and naval superiority. Given the geography and infrastructure of Manchuria, they would also operate with a relatively compact grouping with the advantage of interior lines, and could call on their vast merchant fleet for supplies and reinforcements. It was essentially the exact opposite of the situation the Japanese themselves faced in August 1945: this time it was the Soviets who had the shell of an army.

Given these conditions it's not hard to imagine that the Soviet Far East would end up flying the Rising Sun. Resistance would be very determined and at times surprisingly painful for the IJA, but given the skill and logistics disparity the ultimate outcome would not have been in doubt: the Red Army would be overwhelmed and resistance would be reliant on partisan activity. Following such a disaster the remoteness of the theater would basically mean any serious response from Stavka would be delayed by years given the precarious situation with Germany: Stalin wasn't going to sacrifice Moscow to save Vladivostok.
Unlike most of Japan's OTL early war victories, it's opponent has somewhere to retreat to. Lots of somewhere. If the IJA beats the Red Army on the Frontiers, the Red Army falls back on it's own supply, while the IJA gets drawn into a functional desart from a supply perspective. Manpower is even, Soviet Doctrine is superior, as is Soviet equipment, and Siberia is BIG. Like substantially larger than all the territory Japan managed to take in OTL, against worse opponents, with better logistics. It really isn't a good situation.

While the Soviet Union might be Japan's biggest threat, it is very much not Japan's biggest opportunity. If it's collapsing, sure, sweep in and grab some future real estate. That's what the skirmishes in the 30's were about, testing the water and seeing if the USSR was going to be easy to push around like China was. It wasn't, of course, and so therefore Japan looked elsewhere for easy pickings. Any invasion of the USSR has to give Japan a reason to be extra suicidal in a way they never were OTL; they had nothing to gain (War against another power, on its home territory, which is in fact worthless to you, and distracts you from the *other* gigantic land war you're fighting.) and much to lose (Manchuria, Korea, and their position in China.)
 
Unlike most of Japan's OTL early war victories, it's opponent has somewhere to retreat to. Lots of somewhere. If the IJA beats the Red Army on the Frontiers, the Red Army falls back on it's own supply, while the IJA gets drawn into a functional desart from a supply perspective. Manpower is even, Soviet Doctrine is superior, as is Soviet equipment, and Siberia is BIG. Like substantially larger than all the territory Japan managed to take in OTL, against worse opponents, with better logistics. It really isn't a good situation.

In what way was Soviet doctrine superior? IJA doctrine was basically the same as the Wehrmacht's. Equipment was about even: the Red Army had 'better' tanks (better guns but inferior engines and communication) and better artillery 150mm and up, but that's about it. Infantry equipment was about the same (though the IJA had the excellent Type 89 mortar), while Japanese soldiers were better trained and disciplined, and Japanese planes and pilots were superior.

The supply situation would be horrendously against the Soviets here: their only lifeline was the single Trans-Siberian Railway, which could easily be cut by aircraft or ground forces. The Japanese, meanwhile, would have their enormous merchant fleet to supply their effort. Whatever Soviet forces that escape the initial onslaught would find themselves in the unique (for the Red Army) position of being ground down on the losing end of a war of attrition.

With regard to the sheer area, the total territory the Japanese captured in OTL was a little over 3 million square miles, about the size of the US. The area the Japanese planned to capture was ~1 million square miles.

While the Soviet Union might be Japan's biggest threat, it is very much not Japan's biggest opportunity. If it's collapsing, sure, sweep in and grab some future real estate. That's what the skirmishes in the 30's were about, testing the water and seeing if the USSR was going to be easy to push around like China was. It wasn't, of course, and so therefore Japan looked elsewhere for easy pickings. Any invasion of the USSR has to give Japan a reason to be extra suicidal in a way they never were OTL; they had nothing to gain (War against another power, on its home territory, which is in fact worthless to you, and distracts you from the *other* gigantic land war you're fighting.) and much to lose (Manchuria, Korea, and their position in China.)

The Japanese had a huge incentive for attacking the Soviet Union. For one thing, it would eliminate the most powerful continental military threat on Japan's doorstep and guarantee the safety of their northern empire. In taking Siberia, the Japanese would also absorb the vast natural resources of the region, including Sakhalin's oil, and remove a large source of potential Communist subversion which the fascist leadership was constantly obsessing over. With no US embargoes and a German invasion imminent, it would be the perfect time to attack.
 
In what way was Soviet doctrine superior? IJA doctrine was basically the same as the Wehrmacht's. Equipment was about even: the Red Army had 'better' tanks (better guns but inferior engines and communication) and better artillery 150mm and up, but that's about it. Infantry equipment was about the same (though the IJA had the excellent Type 89 mortar), while Japanese soldiers were better trained and disciplined, and Japanese planes and pilots were superior.

The supply situation would be horrendously against the Soviets here: their only lifeline was the single Trans-Siberian Railway, which could easily be cut by aircraft or ground forces. The Japanese, meanwhile, would have their enormous merchant fleet to supply their effort. Whatever Soviet forces that escape the initial onslaught would find themselves in the unique (for the Red Army) position of being ground down on the losing end of a war of attrition.

With regard to the sheer area, the total territory the Japanese captured in OTL was a little over 3 million square miles, about the size of the US. The area the Japanese planned to capture was ~1 million square miles.



The Japanese had a huge incentive for attacking the Soviet Union. For one thing, it would eliminate the most powerful continental military threat on Japan's doorstep and guarantee the safety of their northern empire. In taking Siberia, the Japanese would also absorb the vast natural resources of the region, including Sakhalin's oil, and remove a large source of potential Communist subversion which the fascist leadership was constantly obsessing over. With no US embargoes and a German invasion imminent, it would be the perfect time to attack.

Then the US cuts it's oil, Japan unable to access any of the resources it needs in Sibera thanks to most of it being nowhere nearby, collapses overextended in China and apparently the USSR.
 
Then the US cuts it's oil, Japan unable to access any of the resources it needs in Sibera thanks to most of it being nowhere nearby, collapses overextended in China and apparently the USSR.

Why would the US cut Japan's oil? The US wasn't exactly friendly towards the USSR, and American companies would have greatly benefited from the sale of raw materials to Japan. The only way America would have done anything is if the Soviets appeared as though they might collapse (and thus free up more Germans to fight Britain), and the loss of the Far East probably wouldn't have been enough to cause that.
 
Why would the US cut Japan's oil? The US wasn't exactly friendly towards the USSR, and American companies would have greatly benefited from the sale of raw materials to Japan. The only way America would have done anything is if the Soviets appeared as though they might collapse (and thus free up more Germans to fight Britain), and the loss of the Far East probably wouldn't have been enough to cause that.

But it sure was a lot less friendly to Japan than it was to the USSR. It seems rather absurd that they would have supported Japan in a war against the USSR, especially as in that scenario Japan would have been an actual ally of Nazi Germany. An embargo of some sort seems almost guaranteed under these circumstances.

Also I am confused as to what kind of Japan you are basing your assumption on. Is this Japan supposed to not be involved in a major ground war in China tieing down it's forces? If so, why not?
 
And under those circumstances the IJA demonstrated it was superior to the Red Army man for man. It also demonstrated that even under the worst circumstances that it was capable of inflicting enormous human and materiel losses on their enemies.

They did no such thing. They utterly failed on the offensive, fell back to defensive positions, allowed an enemy with even worse logistical capabilities to surround them, then, yes, did some trademark stubborn determined defending and inflicting casualties on the advancing Soviet troops, but even with this scenario they only get favourable ratios if you take Japanese reports at face value.

Which you shouldn't. They are by far the most prone of all the major combatants in WW2 to overestimate enemy losses, bar none. Worse than Germans.
 
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