raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Inspired by both the recent thread on a greater India opposing the Chinese occupation of Tibet, and an article I just read:
But what if the Indian's decided differently?
The PoD can be getting Nehru out of the way by accident or assassination
Patel would not last long, but if he were in office before August 1950, he would be in at the right time, and given his suspicion of China, communism, overall conservatism, and more transactional, "Tammany Hall" approach to politics, could have been far more inclined to embrace the opportunities of an American suggestion like this to promote India's interests. And doing this via the Security Council wouldn't have the physical costs or difficulties of actual military intervention in Tibet.
So let's say the Indians are receptive to the American idea, and the Americans quickly rally their allies in the UN behind it? What are the knock-on consequences?
Patel is dead soon, and may resign for ill health right after this diplomatic triumph. Who is next in line to lead India?
Two Chinese regimes, Mao's and Jiang's, will be very pissed. What will they do differently from OTL in the short-run? Mao was rather busy and focused on the Korean War reaching his borders, but also preparing to occupy Tibet in the fall. Jiang was just trying to survive.
Longer-term, being on the Security Council will provide India with some leverage all its own, and set a positive precedent for US-Indian cooperation in this instance.
It won't sit well with Pakistan and will weaken its diplomatic leverage.
How are US, USSR, Indian, Chinese, and Pakistani policies altered in the near term? In the long-term, are either of the South Asian power's attitudes toward nuclear proliferation affected?
The author of the Wilson Center piece suggests although Nehru's non-aligned and conciliatory towards the PRC policies failed to prevent conflict them, without them, (and with insults such as getting "his" country's US security council seat poached) Mao's 1960s radicalization might have been accelerated:
If Mao is more enraged and radicalized in the the 1950s by this experience, what can he do with that?
Intervene a few weeks earlier in Korea?
Never quit the Korean War?
Take a harder line with the Geneva negotiations on Indochina?
Be more aggressive on Sino-Indian border claims earlier? -- For this last one, does Mao have the infrastructure to do this. Would India even notice if Himalayan territory is stolen? (In OTL they didn't know about the road through Ladakh until the Chinese announced its completion in 1959).
Does this slap to the prestige of Chiang Kai-shek undermine morale so badly that the stability of his rule or regime is at risk? What's the fate of Taiwan in that case?
Will India-US relations still sour, or the US still be so keen to get a committed ally, and Pakistan be so desperate, the US and Pakistan will join in CENTO and SEATO in the 1950s while India stands aloof?
If Pakistan is pissed at the US and seeks Soviet and Chinese ties in the 1950s, do the latter two consider Pakistani overtures worth reciprocating, and can they deliver practical help of any sort?
In CWIHP Working Paper #76, "Not at the Cost of China: New Evidence Regarding US Proposals to Nehru for Joining the United Nations Security Council," author Anton Harder examines the controversy surrounding India's role in the United Nations Security Council in the 1950s. Using Indian archival material from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, this paper shows that America's interest in seeing India join the Security Council was motivated by the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a regional power, and that this episode was an early example of the United States attempting to use the United Nations to further its own Cold War interests.
Basically, the US made an approach to Nehru in August 1950 to grant China's permanent UN Security Council Seat and veto to India, both ousting the ROC representative from the council and denying that level of representation to the PRC. Nehru turned down the offer, not wanting to mess with the Security Council Charter, compromise the utility or neutrality of the UN between Cold War blocs, and not wanting to blatantly profit at the PRC's expense causing bilateral problems with China.But what if the Indian's decided differently?
The PoD can be getting Nehru out of the way by accident or assassination
Patel would not last long, but if he were in office before August 1950, he would be in at the right time, and given his suspicion of China, communism, overall conservatism, and more transactional, "Tammany Hall" approach to politics, could have been far more inclined to embrace the opportunities of an American suggestion like this to promote India's interests. And doing this via the Security Council wouldn't have the physical costs or difficulties of actual military intervention in Tibet.
So let's say the Indians are receptive to the American idea, and the Americans quickly rally their allies in the UN behind it? What are the knock-on consequences?
Patel is dead soon, and may resign for ill health right after this diplomatic triumph. Who is next in line to lead India?
Two Chinese regimes, Mao's and Jiang's, will be very pissed. What will they do differently from OTL in the short-run? Mao was rather busy and focused on the Korean War reaching his borders, but also preparing to occupy Tibet in the fall. Jiang was just trying to survive.
Longer-term, being on the Security Council will provide India with some leverage all its own, and set a positive precedent for US-Indian cooperation in this instance.
It won't sit well with Pakistan and will weaken its diplomatic leverage.
How are US, USSR, Indian, Chinese, and Pakistani policies altered in the near term? In the long-term, are either of the South Asian power's attitudes toward nuclear proliferation affected?
The author of the Wilson Center piece suggests although Nehru's non-aligned and conciliatory towards the PRC policies failed to prevent conflict them, without them, (and with insults such as getting "his" country's US security council seat poached) Mao's 1960s radicalization might have been accelerated:
The ultimate isolation of the PRC from the world, India, and even its closest ally, the USSR, by the time of Nehru’s death in 1964 suggests his policy of engagement and socialization had failed. Indeed, it has been said that the 1962 war with China “killed” Nehru. However, to argue that Nehru’s reputation must be assessed in light of this failure it to ignore that he was powerless to hold significant influence over Beijing, where the leadership was under the sway of a powerfully radical ideology. The PRC’s continued distance from the West and the growing disputes with India in the late 1950s, followed by the Sino-Indian War in 1962, all seemed to prefigure the eventual split with Moscow, an event riddled with the esoteric imperatives of the socialist bloc’s competitive interpretations of ideology. On the contrary, Nehru must take some credit for the earlier period when Beijing pursued a broad engagement with the world, despite the US’s attitude. It is quite possible that, without Nehru’s accommodating approach to the PRC, Beijing might have turned its back on a suspicious world far earlier than it did in the end.
If Mao is more enraged and radicalized in the the 1950s by this experience, what can he do with that?
Intervene a few weeks earlier in Korea?
Never quit the Korean War?
Take a harder line with the Geneva negotiations on Indochina?
Be more aggressive on Sino-Indian border claims earlier? -- For this last one, does Mao have the infrastructure to do this. Would India even notice if Himalayan territory is stolen? (In OTL they didn't know about the road through Ladakh until the Chinese announced its completion in 1959).
Does this slap to the prestige of Chiang Kai-shek undermine morale so badly that the stability of his rule or regime is at risk? What's the fate of Taiwan in that case?
Will India-US relations still sour, or the US still be so keen to get a committed ally, and Pakistan be so desperate, the US and Pakistan will join in CENTO and SEATO in the 1950s while India stands aloof?
If Pakistan is pissed at the US and seeks Soviet and Chinese ties in the 1950s, do the latter two consider Pakistani overtures worth reciprocating, and can they deliver practical help of any sort?
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