What if Hitler doesn't overexpand the German army?

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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The US would even throw recovered wounded back into a general pool of manpower so they'd end up with whatever unit needed replacements, rather than the one they came from

More than a few would try to 'escape' from a Repple-Depple and get back to their old units
 

Deleted member 1487

But the only difference between Civilian and Military production in US truck production were tires, bumpers with a winch, a MG mount, and OD paint.
There wasn't much difference between a Studebaker M5 of 1940 and a US6 of 1941
US WW2 trucks were of a much more recent and sturdy design than the 1920s design of Soviet trucks, which is why the American LL Studebakers were heavily preferred to Soviet domestic production models and held up better under the strain of combat operations in the East. The Soviet GAZ MM and Zis-5 were not Studebaker standards especially considering WW2 'simplifications' they made to the designs to speed production.
 
US WW2 trucks were of a much more recent and sturdy design than the 1920s design of Soviet trucks, which is why the American LL Studebakers were heavily preferred to Soviet domestic production models and held up better under the strain of combat operations in the East. The Soviet GAZ MM and Zis-5 were not Studebaker standards especially considering WW2 'simplifications' they made to the designs to speed production.

But a older design based off of a US design typically was far more durable than European trucks of the 1930s.
They were just not build for poor roads, as was found in the USA and USSR.

Not saying the AA was as good as a Stude US6 or GMC CCKW, no one on the planet were making trucks as good as that, except the USA.

But that the AA was far better than what the Wehrmacht rounded up from around Europe, even the Opel Blitz or Ford of Germany's V3000, that were also based off of lighter duty US trucks-- for use on dirt paths that passed for roads in much of the USSR
 

Deleted member 1487

But a older design based off of a US design typically was far more durable than European trucks of the 1930s.
They were just not build for poor roads, as was found in the USA and USSR.

Not saying the AA was as good as a Stude US6 or GMC CCKW, no one on the planet were making trucks as good as that, except the USA.

But that the AA was far better than what the Wehrmacht rounded up from around Europe, even the Opel Blitz or Ford of Germany's V3000, that were also based off of lighter duty US trucks-- for use on dirt paths that passed for roads in much of the USSR
Compare the LL trucks with the standard of the 1920s:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Studebaker_US6
It was a heavier truck, had six wheels, was a 6x4, had bigger wheels, etc. It was a totally different category of vehicle and was better than anything the Soviets had in 1941. Not only that, but the Germans military trucks like the Opel Blitz (a GM design) were more able to handle the conditions than the 1920s Ford design. The trucks that broke down were the civilian ones (on both sides) whose suspensions and general mechanics were not meant for heavy military cross country use.

Do you honestly think the Ford AA was better than the Blitz??? The Blitz was an even more recent GM design!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford_Model_AA
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opel_Blitz

The AA was a civilian model with a really rudimentary suspension system, the Blitz was a militarized design with a one designed for heavy military use in cross country conditions. The Blitz was so similar to US military trucks that captured ones were repaired with US parts and used by US military units in France and Germany in 1944-45.

The Mercedes Benz L3000 though was the best truck the Germans fielded in WW2:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercedes-Benz_L3000
The Mercedes-Benz L3000 was a 4x2 3-ton rear axle drive truck used by Germany in World War II, powered by a Daimler-Benz OM 65/4 75 hp 4-cylinder diesel engine. It was used alongside the Opel Blitz, and proved even more reliable in rough terrain; and was used in all fronts and extensively by the Afrika Korps
 
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Again, not saying that they didn't have some good ones in there, but they didn't standardize on them.
Look on my post #51 again.

The AA and ZiS were not top tier, but were set for the environment, and were standardized.

That huge list I posted shows the real trouble, as not even tires were standardized, let alone all the other spare parts.
 

Deleted member 1487

Again, not saying that they didn't have some good ones in there, but they didn't standardize on them.
Look on my post #51 again.

The AA and ZiS were not top tier, but were set for the environment, and were standardized.

That huge list I posted shows the real trouble, as not even tires were standardized, let alone all the other spare parts.
That was the issue for 1941 when they grabbed everything, they still did have a majority of a few models, but padded that out with a variety of civilian models, as they campaign went on the ones without parts were the first to break down and be dumped. Later in 1941 the process attrition actually limited the Germans to a few types that they had in the largest amounts, had parts for, and were able to hold up to the conditions. So while overall the Germans had been whittled down in terms of trucks and other vehicles that whittling process simplified the supply situation in terms of types of trucks left, while combat losses and lack of replacements actually eased supply demands as the campaign went on. Meanwhile the transfer of divisions and 2nd Air Fleet back home (along with a variety of smaller Luftwaffe units) eased demands on supply...which was promptly made worse by winter destroying locomotives and freezing truck and panzer engines.
 
In the American Civil War this was a major factor. Confederate units tended to have replacements sifted in, where the Union tended to form new units whole-cloth. ....../QUOTE]

................................................................................. This (reinforcement scheme) reflected Union Army recruitment policy. Most Union regiments were recruited from a single county and many recruits swore to fight for only a year (or two?). After completing their initial enlistment, most recruits wanted to go home ...... entire regiments at a time.
For example, just before the Battle of Gettysburg, the 20th Maine Infantry Regiment absorbed ( some accounts say press-ganged) "malingering" men who had completed their initial enlistment with other regiments raised in Maine. The extra man-power enabled 20th Maine to hold Little Round Top despite fierce fighting.
 
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The 160K were probably stragglers from the Vyazma-Bryansk battles getting rounded up and thus belong in that category. I'm aware of no major encirclements post-Vyazma-Bryansk that would make such numbers otherwise credible.

Any Soviet soldier captured before 18.10, whether inside or outside the encirclements, were counted against the oft cited 673k POW haul the Germans claimed for the battle.
Any soldier captured on 19.10 and afterwards, whether inside or outside the encirclements, were not.
So we certainly have to deal with some uncertainties if we want to look at the battle outside the pockets in isolation.

But we can do the same excercise as before, but this time limit ourselves to only looking at the second half of the period in question (10.11 - 30.11). The number of stragglers should be much smaller in this period.

In that case we get the following: 6 187 KIA, 23 851 WIA and 1 320 MIA for a total of 31 358 KIA/WIA/MIA vs about 54k POW captured by the above mentioned formations (which excludes PzGr3 and PzGr4).

It still doesn't seem as if the casualty exchange ratio were favoring the Soviets.

The biggest POW haul came in 4th Army area between 20.11-30.11 when they got almost 18k POW's - which coincides with the botched Soviet counterattack in that area.

Otherwise, the German army sized formations seemed to take in a few hundred prisoners on a normal day, and about a thousand on days with heavy combat. You don't need major encirclements to get numbers like that (see Smolensk for another example) - advancing about 100km against a large number of green troops would suffice.

The OKH report is suspect because it doesn't at all match up with the casualty reports submitted by divisional commands and below. Unfortunately, I haven't found anyone who put all those reports together yet.

(1) The OKH reports sums up to a total of 830k German KIA/WIA/MIA on the eastern front in 1941. That seems to be close to the generally accepted figure for the year. Do you believe it was significantly higher?

(2) The OKH reports provides figures for KIA/WIA/MIA. It does not provide figures for non-combat casualties, which rose a bit at the end of the year. As a footnote, Askey does provide those figures, although he doesn't break them down into 10-day periods or army groups.

(3) If you are referring to the source wiking referred to - Jones, Michael (2009). The Retreat. New York: Thomas Dunne Books. pp. 107, 126–7, 292, I looked up the reference.

It does not claim what the wikipedia article claims. In fact, in the paragraph before page 292, he presents a figure for total German casualties from the start of the campaign to 31.01.42 which exactly matches the OKH 10-day casualty report. He does however provide a couple of anecdotal histories of units being low on combat strength. But then again, that isn't inconsistent with the OKH reports.


1 million? Nobody actually states the Soviets lost 1 million in the pocket battles. The Germans claim 673,000 while the Soviets admit 499,000. Post-1990 research into both sides archives comes out to ~514K

Actually, there is a lot of sources providing figures close to 1 million for the month of October.
Lopukhovsky in 'The Via'zma Catastrophe' spends a lot of time arguing about that. Zetterling does the same in 'The Drive on Moscow'.

The gist of the argument is that the numbers simply don't add up. One would assume that a simple equation like the following would hold true:

strength at the start of the battle + reinforcements during the battle - losses = strength at the end of the battle
Yet, that equation is off be close to half a million - meaning one of the above must be wrong.

Lopukhovsky goes on about the inadequacies in the Soviet casualty reporting system in 1941 and believes Krivosheevs methodology failed to properly account for that.
I seem to remember he has a quote like: "The only people believing the official casualty reports are people completely unaware of the Soviet reporting mechanisms".


Finally, they wonder about were all the Soviet troops went (if the offical figures are correct).
The southern front was defended by 4th Tank Brigade (poor 11th Tank Brigade gets no credit) and not much else according to some.
Meanwhile 90k troops were standing between Moscow and the Germans in the central sector, while Charles Sharp in his excellent The Northern Flank show that there weren't all that many Soviet troops on PzGr3 eastern flank in its strike towards Kalinin.

Yet, there should be about 600k (iirc) Soviet troops in the area (outside the pockets) if we are to believe the offical version.
 
More than a few would try to 'escape' from a Repple-Depple and get back to their old units
.....................................................................................
Canadian soldiers suffered the same problems during WW2, because they often snuck back to their regiments before wounds fully healed. ..... rather than languish in dreaded "replacement depots" that might send them to any depleted regiment.
Motivations were psychological. Read Sabastien Junger's book "Tribe" to better understand tight bonds soldiers formed with their trench-mates. Those psychological bonds helped them survive miserable battles. Regimental traditions and comaradery ingrained fierce loyalty to other members of their regiment. However, they felt vulnerable away from their regiments.
Returning veterans tend to suffer Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, alcoholism and suicide when they lose tribal/regimental affiliations after retirement.
 

Deleted member 1487

.....................................................................................
Canadian soldiers suffered the same problems during WW2, because they often snuck back to their regiments before wounds fully healed. ..... rather than languish in dreaded "replacement depots" that might send them to any depleted regiment.
Motivations were psychological. Read Sabastien Junger's book "Tribe" to better understand tight bonds soldiers formed with their trench-mates. Those psychological bonds helped them survive miserable battles. Regimental traditions and comaradery ingrained fierce loyalty to other members of their regiment. However, they felt vulnerable away from their regiments.
Returning veterans tend to suffer Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, alcoholism and suicide when they lose tribal/regimental affiliations after retirement.
Sure, the reasons are pretty obvious. The point is the German replacement system was much more effective than the US or even Canadian one it would seem, so simply putting recruits into existing veteran German divisions is not going to result in the situation US divisions experienced with FNG syndrome; rotating divisions out to rebuild make sense if the division is so shattered that it is combat ineffective, but it not involved in major operations even one reduced to half of combat strength would be able to take in large amounts of new recruits and impart veteran wisdom by mixing them in with veterans, much more effectively, efficiently, and quickly than forming new divisions with only 15% veteran cadres. It probably will involved having to mix up personnel and move veterans around to make sure an equal number are available in all units, but that is a small price to pay to bring up anywhere from 30-50% (sometimes more depending on how hard hit the division is) green recruits up to combat readiness.
 
With regards to the question on additional divisions or additional replacement troops, I seem to recall that the German army at the end of '41 seriously discussed disbanding a few infantry divisions.
The argument being that they had a number of very unbalanced divisions, were the ratio between combat and non-combat troops were heavily skewed towards the latter - rendering the divisions weaker than their manpower would indicate. This move was dropped because of propaganda effect.

But it does highlight an advantage of fewer, but stronger divisions. Not only would they be closer to their TOE, but they would also be closer to the proper balance between combat and non-combat units.
 

Deleted member 1487

With regards to the question on additional divisions or additional replacement troops, I seem to recall that the German army at the end of '41 seriously discussed disbanding a few infantry divisions.
The argument being that they had a number of very unbalanced divisions, were the ratio between combat and non-combat troops were heavily skewed towards the latter - rendering the divisions weaker than their manpower would indicate. This move was dropped because of propaganda effect.

But it does highlight an advantage of fewer, but stronger divisions. Not only would they be closer to their TOE, but they would also be closer to the proper balance between combat and non-combat units.
Indeed. Plus then they could focus on training more infantry replacements, where the need was greatest, rather than building all arms within new divisions, because as you mention there was already a surplus of non-combat arms service personnel without combat troops to service. So they were made into 'Alarmeinheiten' or alarm units that would be tossed into the line as infantry rather than doing their service jobs whenever combat occurred. This was a practice that pretty much was formalized later in the war as combat replacements were not forth coming, so there was no point of having service personnel sit around doing jobs for combat personnel that didn't exist. As a result most personnel without combat training became combat personnel on demand, which further increased losses as non-combat trained personnel were expected to do the job of skilled infantry. It was extremely wasteful of manpower when they could have just trained combat replacements and integrated them with veterans to teach them the realities of combat that training can't.

The point is rather than duplicating effort by training up a full new division, why not train all replacement personnel as combat infantrymen (or other positions with heavy losses) and actually let trained and experienced service personnel do their jobs rather than be used as ersatz infantry on demand despite lack of training for the job?
 

Deleted member 1487

Okay, got some more relevant info from Forczyk's "Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front", the decision to make two new Panzer divisions I said would not be formed ITTL, the 22nd and 23rd, was reached in September 1941 and they took 6 months to build from scratch before starting out for the Eastern Front in March 1942. The 25th Panzer division (ITTL the 22nd) could have been built up prior to that and ready to ship East by December 1941 if needed as it started forming in May 1941. The personnel and equipment from the OTL 22nd and 23rd Panzer could have been sent as early as September 1941 to the Eastern Front to keep strength up for Panzer divisions and allowed for damaged/long term maintenance equipment to be shipped home for service instead. The 24th Panzer, which was converted from the 1st Cavalry division, started conversion in November 1941 and was shipped east in May 1942, perhaps it could have been pulled out of the line sooner than IOTL with more replacements for existing Panzer divisions to keep them up to strength, which means they'd form TTL's 23rd Panzer before May 1942. Historically the 6th, 7th, and 10th Panzer, the most depleted of Panzer divisions, were pulled out of the East in early 1942 to be rebuilt. Historically the Panzer divisions of AG-South were given 3 Panzer Battalions each, which was done by stripping the remaining Panzer divisions in the East in 'quiet' sectors down to 1 battalion each. Perhaps some of that could have been avoided if the OTL 22nd and 23rd Panzer divisions aren't built and the replacement system is more oriented in getting existing units back up to strength...but given that starting in Spring 1942 3 Panzer divisions were being rebuilt back in Germany that might not be possible. Forczyk does suggest that the creation of the 3 Battalion Panzer regiments for AG-South in 1942 was a mistake and made them overly Panzer heavy compared to the 1941 divisions and overburdened supply. Plus it left AG-Center short of necessary Panzers in divisions forced to fight in that sector. Interestingly he does suggest that the push to create the Panther and Tiger hindered Panzer IV production with the 'long' 75 (L43), which left German Panzer divisions badly undergunned in 1942, forced to rely on the inadequate Pz IIIJ with 50mm L60 gun.

If the metric above for the Panzer divisions holds true for the infantry divisions then there is no indication that the formation of the December 1941-March 1942 new infantry divisions came before September 1941 and in fact might have even come later. So the decision CAN be made after Barbarossa starts not to make new infantry divisions and instead focus on keeping existing ones up to strength.

Also the mishandling of the OTL 22nd Panzer division in Crimea by both Manstein and the division's commander was probably the worst of the war in the East, which led to the division taking 40% losses in it's first engagement and needing them to spend time refitting for most of Spring to be ready for the May 'Trappenjagd' offensive. That goes to show how using a Green unit by itself was extremely wasteful of resources (and how little Manstein understood tactics or armor employment).
 
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Per70,
OTL More support troops reflects the increased expense of fighting farther and farther from their homeland. The farther a regiment travels outside its homeland, the more support troops it needs. Eventually, the tail gets so long that it consumes all the petrol and rations. With no petrol, front-line troops lose battles and are forced to retreat.

With every technological advance, the tail gets longer to include: cooks, blanket-stackers, pay-masters, mechanics, armourers, medics, signallers, linesmen, radio repairmen, etc. Since all those trades require 2 or 3 years to learn and need to be practiced - on a regular basis - to retain skills, they cannot be rapidly re-rolled to infantry, because it takes 2 or 3 years to train an infantryman.

OTL During the last year of WW2 (D Day to VE Day) Canadian Army infantry and tank regiments suffered massive casualties. Given the pitifully few fresh soldiers arriving from Canada, they were forced to gut support staff (cooks, truck drivers, admin writers, etc.) to re-fill depleted ranks. Sadly, replacements arrived a half-dozen at a time and were immediately rushed into the front lines. FNGs rarely lasted more than 2 or 3 days.

Ideally, replacements are best integrated when a regiment pulls out of the line to rest and refit for 2 or 3 weeks. Seasoned soldiers explain the latest weapons and tactics to NG and run them through a few (blank ammo) practices before returning to the front line.
 
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