The 160K were probably stragglers from the Vyazma-Bryansk battles getting rounded up and thus belong in that category. I'm aware of no major encirclements post-Vyazma-Bryansk that would make such numbers otherwise credible.
Any Soviet soldier captured before 18.10, whether inside or outside the encirclements, were counted against the oft cited 673k POW haul the Germans claimed for the battle.
Any soldier captured on 19.10 and afterwards, whether inside or outside the encirclements, were not.
So we certainly have to deal with some uncertainties if we want to look at the battle outside the pockets in isolation.
But we can do the same excercise as before, but this time limit ourselves to only looking at the second half of the period in question (10.11 - 30.11). The number of stragglers should be much smaller in this period.
In that case we get the following: 6 187 KIA, 23 851 WIA and 1 320 MIA for a total of 31 358 KIA/WIA/MIA vs about 54k POW captured by the above mentioned formations (which excludes PzGr3 and PzGr4).
It still doesn't seem as if the casualty exchange ratio were favoring the Soviets.
The biggest POW haul came in 4th Army area between 20.11-30.11 when they got almost 18k POW's - which coincides with the botched Soviet counterattack in that area.
Otherwise, the German army sized formations seemed to take in a few hundred prisoners on a normal day, and about a thousand on days with heavy combat. You don't need major encirclements to get numbers like that (see Smolensk for another example) - advancing about 100km against a large number of green troops would suffice.
The OKH report is suspect because it doesn't at all match up with the casualty reports submitted by divisional commands and below. Unfortunately, I haven't found anyone who put all those reports together yet.
(1) The OKH reports sums up to a total of 830k German KIA/WIA/MIA on the eastern front in 1941. That seems to be close to the generally accepted figure for the year. Do you believe it was significantly higher?
(2) The OKH reports provides figures for KIA/WIA/MIA. It does not provide figures for non-combat casualties, which rose a bit at the end of the year. As a footnote, Askey does provide those figures, although he doesn't break them down into 10-day periods or army groups.
(3) If you are referring to the source wiking referred to -
Jones, Michael (2009). The Retreat. New York: Thomas Dunne Books. pp. 107, 126–7, 292, I looked up the reference.
It does not claim what the wikipedia article claims. In fact, in the paragraph before page 292, he presents a figure for total German casualties from the start of the campaign to 31.01.42 which exactly matches the OKH 10-day casualty report. He does however provide a couple of anecdotal histories of units being low on combat strength. But then again, that isn't inconsistent with the OKH reports.
1 million? Nobody actually states the Soviets lost 1 million in the pocket battles. The Germans claim 673,000 while the Soviets admit 499,000. Post-1990 research into both sides archives comes out to ~514K
Actually, there is a lot of sources providing figures close to 1 million for the month of October.
Lopukhovsky in 'The Via'zma Catastrophe' spends a lot of time arguing about that. Zetterling does the same in 'The Drive on Moscow'.
The gist of the argument is that the numbers simply don't add up. One would assume that a simple equation like the following would hold true:
strength at the start of the battle + reinforcements during the battle - losses = strength at the end of the battle
Yet, that equation is off be close to half a million - meaning one of the above must be wrong.
Lopukhovsky goes on about the inadequacies in the Soviet casualty reporting system in 1941 and believes Krivosheevs methodology failed to properly account for that.
I seem to remember he has a quote like: "The only people believing the official casualty reports are people completely unaware of the Soviet reporting mechanisms".
Finally, they wonder about were all the Soviet troops went (if the offical figures are correct).
The southern front was defended by 4th Tank Brigade (poor 11th Tank Brigade gets no credit) and not much else according to some.
Meanwhile 90k troops were standing between Moscow and the Germans in the central sector, while Charles Sharp in his excellent The Northern Flank show that there weren't all that many Soviet troops on PzGr3 eastern flank in its strike towards Kalinin.
Yet, there should be about 600k (iirc) Soviet troops in the area (outside the pockets) if we are to believe the offical version.