AG-North? I said Army Group Center. In any case, it's stated by Stephen Fritz in Ostkrieg. He's generally very favorable to the Germans so...
I'll take a look at what he says when I can find my copy. I must have mistyped and said north when I meant center. What page is that on?
Edit:
on page 185 all I'm seeing is AG-Center suffering 87k casualties from September 30th-November 10th, which is nowhere near a 30% or more drop in strength. Also Fritz says they had to transfer 4 divisions out there control, which would account for a drop in strength by those sorts of margins. They had suffered some 317k casualties between June 22nd-November 10th 1941 according to Fritz, 87k of which from September 30th-November 10th.
On page 160 he mentions 50k losses in the first two weeks of Taifun and then says total losses were 270k by mid-October (the same date effectively)...he means total losses since the start of Barbarossa, not since the start of Taifun, which is something you should understand in the context of how he says it and presents numbers for AG-Center throughout the chapter "Whirlwind".
By December 5th AG-Center had taken 350k casualties since the start of Barbarossa in June, so an additional 33k between mid-November and early December. Fritz does say on page 192 that most of the remaining divisions were at 50% of strength, which would mean combat strength given that he was quoting von Bock in the context of combat power. That doesn't mean AG-Center was at 50% strength or 50% combat power compared to the start of Typhoon or even Barbarossa.
Again with the statistical bullshit, is that the only way you can try and win internet discussions about history?
1 million? Nobody actually states the Soviets lost 1 million in the pocket battles. The Germans claim 673,000 while the Soviets admit 499,000. Post-1990 research into both sides archives comes out to ~514K And in any case, since your claim rests on the bizarre idea that the Germans were still slaughtering the Soviets beyond the pocket battles, then the debate is specifically about losses suffered outside and thus not only can I leave them out, I have to leave them out. And so do you.
I've seen it in print several times, including with Zetterling, Glantz, and Stahel. Yes the Soviets were still getting killed beyond the pocket battles, though clearly not at the same rate.
Edit: Looked through Glantz's Operation Barbarossa and in the chapter on Vyazma-Bryansk and the October 1941 period in the conclusion section he specifically states the Soviets lost 'well over 1 million men in a month'. Granted he was talking about the entire front, but there were minor casualties inflicted on the Soviet forces during the Tikhvin Operation and the Rostov one in October, 90% of the losses the Soviets were taking were in front of Moscow and Glantz is saying well over 1 million Soviet losses had been suffered, which is in line with 1 million casualties at Vyazma-Bryansk area.
On the Vyazma section specifically Glantz in "Barbarossa" states that 250k Soviet soldiers escaped the pockets out of 1.25 million and that the Germans took 688k POWs, which leads him to state that around 1 million Soviet casualties had been suffered in the pocket battles, the 688k PoWs plus battle casualties.
I did see in When Titan's Clashed he quoted Krivosheev for Soviet casualties matching your numbers (actually specifically what you say the Germans claimed), but in other works of his Glantz even says that Krivosheev's casualty counts for the Soviets is too low and he think it was well over 10 million dead instead of the ~8.6 million Kirvosheev claims. That means at some point Krivosheev's numbers are under counts, which would mean it is likely that his 'official' numbers for 1941 are probably severe under counts.
The creation and liquidation of the pocket in it's entirety cost the Germans approximately 50,000 losses, compared to the 150,000 suffered beyond it.
Again your numbers there are highly suspect, as fighting in the pocket area to liquidate the last hold outs went on beyond the first 2 weeks of October.
David Glantz gives the total casualties for the defensive phase of the fighting (September 30-December 5th) as 658,279 and for the counter-offensive (December 6th-January 7th) as 370,955. I went with the latter number, rounded and approximated to account for possible errors, and subtracted the Vyazma-Bryansk losses.
I'll look through his stuff and see what I can find. I think he is quoting Kriovsheev, who has been called out by several Russian historians for severely undercounting Soviet casualties throughout the war, especially in the initial period when command and control broke down and records are incomplete. The Germans claimed something like 600k POWs plus over 300k casualties inflicted during the pocket battles.
The claim is accurate. What is inaccurate is your claim that there were other tank brigades. There was not. From October to mid-November the 4th Tank Brigade was it for Soviet armored reserves in that sector. The reality there is that Katukov halted Guderian's advance a week before the weather closed in and inflicted many more casualties on the Germans than he took in return, a fact which even Guderian grudgingly admitted. And that Katukov was able to gain such success because the Germans had overreached themselves hardly takes away from the achievement. Striking at the point where and when the enemy is most vulnerable is part of good generalship. Rommel's ability as a field commander isn't dismissed because the British had stripped the forces facing him to send troops to Greece after all.
I'll let Per70 handle that one, you were proven wrong on that and still cling to your mistake.
WI: The Germans halt their advance to Moscow
WI: The Germans halt their advance to Moscow
No it was not. Had the Soviets not put up tremendous resistance, then the Germans would have strolled into Moscow irrespective of their logistical problems and the weather. And the logistical problems were really a function of the German's own inability to recognize their culminating point. And even without the mud, the German logistical network was collapsing from the sheer strain of having to support a ferocious battle (a function of, you guessed it, Soviet resistance) over such distances. What's really bullshit is your continuing to try and absolve the Germans of the responsibility for their defeat and the Soviets of the credit for their victory.
Strolled is not correct at all, the mud and weather conditions would have made it a horrible slog. Yes without any resistance they would have captured Moscow, but even minimal resistance dramatically changes the situation, because now the supply of ammo to overcome even minimal resistance puts a huge burden on the already hampered logistics element. So in such weather conditions even defending with militia is worthwhile because it dramatically changes the ability of an enemy force to advance. Nevertheless the Germans advanced regardless to within some 20-30 miles of Moscow via the Smolensk-Moscow highway, but logistics and weather meant they couldn't overcome what resistance was left by late October and they had to stop fighting until mid-November. Yes even distance played a role in the logistics situation, but that alone wasn't stopping them, it took the mud to seize up the system and then the cold to effectively collapse it when trains stopped working. Weather, mud, and distance did more to stop the Germans in front of Moscow by late October-December than Soviet resistance did; without the weather or distance issues Soviet resistance would have been demolished like near the border. It was the combination of the last Soviet reserves, weather/mud, and distance plus attrition on German supply lines that collectively prevented the defeat of the USSR in late 1941.
Certainly the German command deserves incredible blame for their shit planning and silly dispersal of force right before Moscow (especially for the Kalinin diversion), while the Soviets certainly deserve credit for the bravery of their forces and ruthless commitment of forces to the last defenses before the capital, but the victory really doesn't belong to the Soviets forces as much as German mistakes, logistics, weather, and distance did.
Edit:
Stephen Fritz in Ostkrieg even specifically mentions how the Soviets used the Rasputisa as part of their defensive plan, because they knew that movement off of main roads was impossible, so they set up defenses on the highway; without the mud their positions could have been flanked because they were so sparse, but the mud bad it impossible, so they only way to advance was head on. Again that is less the function of the strength of the defenders and more of the impact of the weather.
Except the Germans did move. Even after the mud set in they were moving. Slowly, and painfully, and costing themselves buckets of blood. But they were moving. Without adequate Soviet resistance, the movement wouldn't be painful, slow, and costly. The reality is that offensives in WW2, even the unsuccessful ones always managed to move. What mattered was how fast, how far, and how costly the movement was. And the foremost determinant in those costs was the condition of ones own forces compared to that of the enemies.
Actually yes the move would be painful, slow, and costly, as wet weather and Rasputisa level mud is extremely wearing. There is a limit to how far you can go even without having to fight. Fighting adds an extra layer of hell into it.
Go to the Belorussian/Polish border and march to Smolensk on foot the whole way. Give yourself no rest days. Take a heavy pack. Carry a heavy rifle. Strap on grenades and load your pockets up with supplies. Take away all decent food and force yourself to sleep the nights, out in the fields and rains. Remember not to change your underpants. Forget about having a wash. Infest your self with lice. To be true to the period, don't take any of the paved roads. Bring some dice and roll at some point to see if you should hire some Belorussian/Russian hunters or airsoft enthusiasts or re-enactors or whatever to come after you at on the trip to simulate potential partisan activity. Then come back and tell me how much you feel up to doing something like fighting a battle after that and for how long.
Yeah the German army did that in much worse conditions from June 22nd through July 23rd and fought the entire way in major combat. Taking 15 days to march to Smolensk will not be fun, but it is reasonablly doable without terribly wearing down replacements, especially if the roads are not clogged with advancing armies and supply units, as those had long since moved out of Belarus by and large and relied on rail. Lice and not washing is simply part of combat in WW2 once you arrive in the field.
Oh it improved. But it was never adequate to the task and problems persisted throughout the entire war in the east. Operation Blau was also repeatedly plagued by supply problems. Citadel, not so much. But then there was copious amounts of time to build up for it and it never got anywhere to begin with. After Citadel, the Germans were always falling back on their supply sources so it became a moot point.
Operation Blau was faced with supply problems because it was advancing into territory with different rail gauge; on the attack they were once again forced into the same situation of having to convert rail yet again, just like in 1941, plus it was deeper than they had made it even in 1941. At Citadel they didn't have as many problems because they had long previous converted the rail needed for the campaign, same with 3rd Kharkov. Which is interesting because Soviet partisans made a concerted effort in Summer 1943 to sabotage German rail supply. Until the advance into the depths of the USSR in 1942 the rail situation for AG-South and the other AGs were adequate. Not great, but sufficient to keep them going. The not great part was demonstrated by trying to move 5 divisions from 11th Army North in Summer.
Yes it was. The bumpy conditions found on most Soviet roads generally saw German equipment often get literally shaken to pieces just in the process of movement. And the dirt roads kicked up copious amounts of dust that clogged engines, exhausted men and animals, clogged up various mechanisms and so-on. To single out the obvious example of trucks: the Germans lost 25 percent of their motor pool to all causes in the first 19 days. Army Group Center lost
You might want to come back and finish the thought. The Germans lost their motor pool due to the combat too, as well as using civilian trucks in military operations, which meant they were the first to fall out in the poor roads situation, a problem the Soviets also had, as they forced the civilian GAZ trucks onto the same roads.
I was referring to the post-Barbarossa expansion. The decisions related to that expansion pre-date Barbarossa kicking off as forming divisions isn't something you can do on the fly. The plans and preparations require months. The Soviets were able to do it during Barbarossa by the fact their mobilization apparatus contained all of the planning and had set up much of the preparation. The Germans had no such luxury.
Can you provide a source when the decision was made order the December-March infantry division creation? You're making the claim that it was ordered pre-Barbarossa, I have yet to see any evidence of that. Not only that, but even if it did take months prior to make the decision they had several months from July-November before the official formations started in December. The Soviets did it on the fly by not having extensive planning, they ordered reservists to mobilize and slapped them together with whatever equipment they had on hand; if you actually read Glantz most of the formations formed post-Barbarossa by the Soviets were very ad hoc units with vast deficiencies in equipment and organization, very different from the new divisions formed by the Germans in this period.
The OKH report is suspect because it doesn't at all match up with the casualty reports submitted by divisional commands and below. Unfortunately, I haven't found anyone who put all those reports together yet.
I'm assuming you got this from wikipedia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Moscow#Casualties
The estimate of 400,000 German casualties by January 1942 reported in the
Great Soviet Encyclopedia was published in 1973–78.
[77] On the other hand, official Wehrmacht daily casualty reports show 35,757 killed in action, 128,716 wounded, and 9,721 missing in action for the entire Army Group Center between 1 October 1941 and 10 January 1942.
[91] However, this official report does not match unofficial reports from individual battalion and divisional officers and commanders at the front, who record suffering far higher casualties than was officially reported.[92]
That is sourced from this book:
https://www.amazon.com/Retreat-Hitlers-First-Defeat/dp/0312628196
The next two months were the stuff of nightmares for the soldiers on both sides, whose letters and memoirs have been exhaustively used to paint a horrifying picture of starvation, cold weather, nonexistent medical care, and a complete lack of compassion for opponents.
Michael Jones draws upon a wealth of new eyewitness testimonies from both sides of the conflict to vividly chronicle this pivotal chapter in the Second World War as he takes us from the German invasion of the Soviet Union on the morning of June 22 through the counteroffensive that carried into the spring of 1942.
The author uses numerous first-hand accounts throughout the book, taken from German and Russian soldiers and Russian civilians.
The book is easy to read and offers a nice overview of this period but nothing too technical or in-depth, more of a general or popular historical narrative.
However, unlike his book on Stalingrad, this book will not be very useful to serious students of history. It is mostly a well-written, "fun" read for the military buff in the sense of an impressionistic account. As an earlier reviewer has noted, there is far too little operational detail for the reader to actually understand the military actions described in the book, and the maps are too few and too bad. This is why I say that the book is essentially impressionistic, because the nuts and bolts of the military operations are sadly lacking.
For the casual reader, what will be the most interesting is Jones's use of German language unit histories and "second-tier" military memoirs (ones by figures not deemed important enough to warrant a translation into English, essentially). These provide details that would add to other entry-level accounts of the counteroffensive before Moscow. There are some Soviet sources in the book, too, which are still always welcome.
I found the most irritating thing about the book to be its lazy and neglectful citing of source material. There are no footnotes or endnotes, merely some partial references for each chapter at the end of the book. I soon discovered that whenever I flipped to the back to try to find the source for an assertion or fact that I was bound to be disappointed. This serious lack is also one of the things that makes it far less useful for serious readers and students. I really don't understand why the author couldn't be bothered to do standard citations.
As an entry level book for the casual reader of military history, The Retreat might be a good christmas gift. Unfortunately, I believe that Jones is capable of much more than he actually delivered here.
Near as I can tell without reading the book the claim the author is making is entirely based on anecdotal accounts, not actual research in the archives going through reports from battalions and divisions and comparing that to army reports to make the claim he does. He reads some memoirs and makes claims based on the 'feel' of the situation. I call bullshit, because the plural of anecdote is not data; choosing the most dramatic personal accounts that include heavy losses doesn't mean that situation applied across the front.
It seems to be built on secondary literature rather than any archive work, so is in NO position to be claiming that German official casualty reports are incomplete.