What if Hitler doesn't overexpand the German army?

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
  • Start date

Deleted member 1487

Historically starting with the preparations for Barbarossa Hitler ordered mass expansion of the German army that actually continued during the Barbarossa invasion and throughout the rest of the war. Before Barbarossa the number of Panzer divisions were doubled to 20 and during Barbarossa an expansion to 30 was underway that meant existing divisions got virtually no replacement parts or whole AFVs. The same expansion in infantry divisions and various smaller units happened, even going so far as the Luftwaffe to start fielding infantry and armor divisions. This depleted existing divisions horribly and created a bunch of inexperienced units that were then throw into combat with the expectation that their latest equipment would offset that experience to disastrous results (see what happened to the Panzer Brigades in 1944 as an example).

So what if that over-expansion doesn't happen? By that I mean starting with Barbarossa replacements to existing units are favored before creating new units. Some new divisions are still formed, but only after all requests for replacements have been fulfilled with the existing divisions. So the Barbarossa invasion force is kept topped up and expansion heavily restricted. When the Luftwaffe is ordered to comb out personnel to serve in army roles Hitler does not let Goering build up infantry and panzer units and keeps the number of airborne divisions at 2. All that manpower and the latest equipment goes to existing divisions in the army. The Waffen-SS is limited to forming new divisions with foreign manpower and only gets to make 2 divisions into armored ones, though their motorized divisions are upgraded to mechanized units. How does that impact the war, as the German army is kept much smaller, but existing divisions are always kept up to strength when practical. There are less divisions to move around, but all existing divisions aren't short of manpower and equipment chronically. There are some expansion in number of army divisions and in the Waffen-SS, but that is heavily limited by the requirement to make sure the existing divisions are serviced first; when existing divisions are destroyed replacement ones are built from their survivors and allotment of replacements.
 
Speculating about the effects of not expanding the number of divisions of the German Army in World War II in order to postulate how this may be conducive to increased success is like wondering whether rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic might have helped the passengers escape to the life boats quicker.
 

Deleted member 1487

Speculating about the effects of not expanding the number of divisions of the German Army in World War II in order to postulate how this may be conducive to increased success is like wondering whether rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic might have helped the passengers escape to the life boats quicker.
So we can't discuss any changes at all because it isn't a war winning POD?
 
I imagine there would be better coordination on army level operations. The Heer commanders don't have to go through politics with the SS as much. Being all foreign units, they would probably be relegated to secondary fronts.
The Russian advance might be delayed a little, but I doubt the final occupation zones would change much since the effects would mostly be post Yalta.
Maybe the Wallies snag a few more scientists after VE Day.
 
So we can't discuss any changes at all because it isn't a war winning POD?
War ends slightly sooner, as the spreading of divisions acted as a force multiplier and in reality, Panzer divisions were more effective watered down, as they made good use of more support vehicles.
 
Lets check the numbers, in September 1939 the Army had 86 Divisions, in 1945 there were:

306 Heer Divisions.
41 SS Divisions.
And 12 Luftwaffe Divisions.

(There is some dispute over the totals due to units often existing only on paper, ad-hoc battlegroups built out of divisions, Divisions having only names then numbers then names, and several cases of there being different Divisions being given the same name or number).

Which comes to 359 Divisions, probably. Realistically given the available Manpower, even including the SS and Parachute Divisions, should there have been more than 255?
(Assuming that we use the pre-war Divisional Slice)
 

Deleted member 1487

I imagine there would be better coordination on army level operations. The Heer commanders don't have to go through politics with the SS as much. Being all foreign units, they would probably be relegated to secondary fronts.
The Russian advance might be delayed a little, but I doubt the final occupation zones would change much since the effects would mostly be post Yalta.
Maybe the Wallies snag a few more scientists after VE Day.
You don't think the ability to match recruits with veterans and keep them alive longer vs. sticking the in Green divisions and having to relearn the lessons that experienced divisions already learned at the cost of casualties with much higher casualties?


War ends slightly sooner, as the spreading of divisions acted as a force multiplier and in reality, Panzer divisions were more effective watered down, as they made good use of more support vehicles.
Not necessarily. In fact what would be a 'force multiplier' is having experienced units taking fresh recruits without experience and turn them into effective soldiers, something a newly built division without experienced cadres cannot do and in fact has to learn all the same lessons the very hard way at much higher losses. Panzer divisions were most effective when they were elite and had a concentration of all the equipment they needed and mixing recruits with veterans to bring up their experience. Green divisions with the best equipment failed more often than not in combat, while experienced divisions put it to good use.

does this envision more mobile army? (more trucks, less horses ... nothing against horses)
Fewer divisions means more equipment per division and allows truck supply to focus on fewer divisions.
 
You don't think the ability to match recruits with veterans and keep them alive longer vs. sticking the in Green divisions and having to relearn the lessons that experienced divisions already learned at the cost of casualties with much higher casualties?

Yes. More effective divisions = Delaying the Russian advance = More Russian casualties and lower German casualties.
I just don't think the overall effect will mean more than a week or two difference from OTL.
 

Deleted member 1487

One interesting idea I did see on another forum was that the Germans should have demotorized some infantry divisions in 1941, which had a surprising number of vehicles per divisions, some 900 for foot infantry, mostly motorcycles I think, specifically the ones expected to travel the shortest distance to participate in the pocket battles at the start of the campaign, so as to free up vehicles to motorize more infantry divisions to help close the pocket on the back end. Thoughts about that?

There was also the idea to break up some infantry divisions into rifle brigades like the Soviets and concentrate them into rifle corps to allow for better concentration of artillery assets at a higher level and allow for such formations to hold more ground. Say have 3 infantry divisions break up into three infantry regiments each with an attached artillery battalion (two batteries of 105s) and various sustainment assets and each becomes a brigade like a modern infantry brigade combat team and then have 4 such bridges concentrated into one rifle corps with all the 150mm batteries from the dissolved infantry divisions, plus their division AT companies and perhaps corps recon elements and such, plus have the better part of the division supply elements concentrated in the corps, rather than with the brigades. So each rifle corps then would have 12 battalions and control over concentrated 150mm artillery batteries and an AT company. It would then in some ways be a recreation of the square division structure with a different name, but more firepower per brigade combat team without needing as many individual supply or support elements as they would with having a bunch of triangular divisions. Is that going backwards to the WW1 1914 structure? It seems the Soviets were able to make the rifle brigade/rifle corps structure work in WW2.

Yes. More effective divisions = Delaying the Russian advance = More Russian casualties and lower German casualties.
I just don't think the overall effect will mean more than a week or two difference from OTL.
Delayed Soviet advance has a ton of knock on effects. They drew something like 4-4.5 million recruits from liberated territories for their armies in 1943-45, so delays in access not due to that manpower base, but also the resources of Ukraine will cause a vicious cycle of delays and weakness to the Soviet war effort. More Soviet losses in 1941-42 coupled with less German losses as they can more effectively make recruits combat effective by placing them in experienced, skilled combat divisions instead of Green ones could have serious impacts come 1943 when losses are accumulating and getting access to manpower in occupied territories is delayed. Granted of course that doesn't change the impact of the strategic bombing offensive against oil, transport, the chemical industry, etc., but it does have impact on the ground war in all theaters. That could well have a lot more impact than just 1-2 weeks, plus of course the fate of territories that aren't conquered/liberated by the Soviets in 1945 and the Soviet ability to recover post-WW2.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
One interesting idea I did see on another forum was that the Germans should have demotorized some infantry divisions in 1941, which had a surprising number of vehicles per divisions, some 900 for foot infantry, mostly motorcycles I think, specifically the ones expected to travel the shortest distance to participate in the pocket battles at the start of the campaign, so as to free up vehicles to motorize more infantry divisions to help close the pocket on the back end. Thoughts about that?

I think I prefer your notion of fewer but better supported divisions.

I have often wondered what would have happened if instead of fifty extra infantry divisions the Germans had instead fully motorised just ten and foregone the rest. While Germany did at times find itself in need of sheer numbers of of troops to hold space I really don't think it needed one hundred and twenty plus infantry divisions most of the time. All too often all the extra infantry divisions did was put a strain on the supply lines but were too slow to arrive at the point of decision to have an effect on any of the important battles. Motorised infantry even if not with integral armour/assault guns on the panzer grenadier model would probably have a 'march' of thirty to forty miles per day compared with at best twenty for the foot slogging infantry.

Further not only do you have the greater pool of human reserves as mentioned above but also there are now some quarter of million more horses available to cover losses. In addition the Heer would either be able to throw the resources of some forty panzerjager battalions into the reserve pool or use them to reinforce units anticipating or responding to an enemy offensive.

There are trade offs and it would not do whole lot to cover the gulf in resources between Germany and her foes but it does seem to offer a more effective allocation of scarce materials.
 

Deleted member 1487

I think I prefer your notion of fewer but better supported divisions.

I have often wondered what would have happened if instead of fifty extra infantry divisions the Germans had instead fully motorised just ten and foregone the rest. While Germany did at times find itself in need of sheer numbers of of troops to hold space I really don't think it needed one hundred and twenty plus infantry divisions most of the time. All too often all the extra infantry divisions did was put a strain on the supply lines but were too slow to arrive at the point of decision to have an effect on any of the important battles. Motorised infantry even if not with integral armour/assault guns on the panzer grenadier model would probably have a 'march' of thirty to forty miles per day compared with at best twenty for the foot slogging infantry.

Further not only do you have the greater pool of human reserves as mentioned above but also there are now some quarter of million more horses available to cover losses. In addition the Heer would either be able to throw the resources of some forty panzerjager battalions into the reserve pool or use them to reinforce units anticipating or responding to an enemy offensive.

There are trade offs and it would not do whole lot to cover the gulf in resources between Germany and her foes but it does seem to offer a more effective allocation of scarce materials.
That is a good point, if they didn't try and build extra infantry and panzer divisions in 1941 after Barbarossa started would they have had enough vehicles to motorize more infantry divisions during Barbarossa? If anyone has a chart of when Germany formed divisions that would be helpful to know when material was available.
In terms of sheer numbers of divisions they generally needed those extra ones because existing ones weren't up to strength and were unable to hold what was even assigned. If replacements had been brought in in 1941, would the Green divisions of the 300 series really have been needed in 1942 when they finally were made available? Their combat performance wasn't that great when they initially fought, same with the brand new panzer divisions; the 22nd Panzer was assigned to Crimea in Spring 1942 with outdated equipment and suffered 40% losses in it's first engagement. Having put that equipment and manpower to bring up existing Panzer divisions to strength would have mean that yes there wouldn't have been a Panzer division for Crimea...but it wouldn't have tosses away 40% of divisional strength in one engagement either out of sheer inexperience.

One interesting point that supports what you're saying about having extra anti-tank units to reinforce existing forces is that in WW2 Germany and the US had about the same number of 150mm and up heavy artillery batteries, but since Germany had over 3x as many divisions that firepower was diluted and often misused, while the smaller US army could be heavily reinforced at decisive sectors by independent artillery units or even armor and anti-tank units, like how the Germans moved their Sturmgeschütz brigades around. Having more firepower per man on the line would in a smaller sense do what the Soviets were doing in 1944-45 with their smaller 'divisions' that were at most brigade strength; they had limited infantry manpower, but were able to structurally support them very heavily with firepower in their divisions, plus then add in a bunch of independent firepower elements that were attached for missions as needed.

I think you're right that it would go quite far to better use the resources that existed, especially in the years when there was greater parity in strength and it would have been effective, like in 1941-42. To a degree the Germans did keep units understrength in 'quiet' sectors in 1942 to resource up the attacking units for Case Blue, but that probably wouldn't have been necessary had they just not formed new divisions and kept existing units up to strength. Especially in the East the benefits weren't will having more, lower quality troops, but rather fewer, well supported full strength experienced units that could inflict hugely disproportionate damage in maneuver warfare, while keeping their relative casualties low. Holding a contiguous line except in a few important places was a rather wasteful proposition for the Germans, especially when the Soviets could then leverage their artillery and set piece battle doctrine more effectively by hitting a static line without the ability to maneuver.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Another thing which would help would be to not reorient priorities towards the air force and navy until/if the SU is defeated. From Ostkrieg page 90 "Although these evaluations were based on incorrect assumptions... they nonetheless resulted in a series of far-reaching decisions whose significance for the shape and outcome of the war cannot be overstated... On 14 July, he (Hitler) ordered a reorientation of armaments production to favor the Luftwaffe and navy, a clear indication that he expected the imminent end of the war in the east, and... aimed to be prepared for the next showdown, that with the Anglo-American powers." This was one of the big reasons equipment losses were so hard to replace for the Axis in 1941.
 

Deleted member 1487

Another thing which would help would be to not reorient priorities towards the air force and navy until/if the SU is defeated. From Ostkrieg page 90 "Although these evaluations were based on incorrect assumptions... they nonetheless resulted in a series of far-reaching decisions whose significance for the shape and outcome of the war cannot be overstated... On 14 July, he (Hitler) ordered a reorientation of armaments production to favor the Luftwaffe and navy, a clear indication that he expected the imminent end of the war in the east, and... aimed to be prepared for the next showdown, that with the Anglo-American powers." This was one of the big reasons equipment losses were so hard to replace for the Axis in 1941.
Yeah, really the navy should have had much lower priority by the start of Barbarossa. The Luftwaffe needed a bunch of resources in 1941-42 for the East though, so it needed what it got IOTL, perhaps just focused differently. Not only that, but the army had it's replacement equipment held back by Hitler during the invasion due to planned priorities for after defeating the USSR, because it was planned to be over in 2 months.
 

Deleted member 1487

Found an article about the German 'wave' system of mobilization:
http://www.axishistory.com/axis-nat...-mobilization-and-welle-wave-system-1939-1945
http://www.axishistory.com/axis-nat...er-unsorted/3422-the-german-mobilization-1941
In 1941 there were a lot of coastal and security divisions mobilized for occupation duty, so those probably couldn't be done away with. That least arguably 3-4 Panzer divisions formed in 1941 that could be prevented and 4 infantry divisions formed in Berlin for the original operation valkyrie (a plan to stop a forced labor uprising in the city). The SS motorized division Nord was useful and probably not worth preventing. The Spanish Blue division shouldn't be prevented either. So in 1941 there is actually not a lot to be stopped to supply the East, just the 4x 300s divisions, which would actually be pretty helpful for rebuilding divisions in Russia, same for freeing up the manpower and equipment used for the 22nd-25th Panzer 'divisions', which included the 1st Cavalry being upgraded; frankly they'd probably be more useful as a cavalry division given the situation in the East and later creation of SS cavalry units.

http://www.axishistory.com/axis-nat...er-unsorted/3423-the-german-mobilization-1942
It looks like most of the new creations were started in 1942, like the Luftwaffe field divisions in late Autumn 1942. The army had several new divisions formed in early 1942 that could have been better used as replacements for existing divisions in the East, all 300s divisions. Preventing more expansion of SS divisions that year would have helped too, as would combing out the navy for manpower for the army instead of forming Marine infantry divisions.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Would it have been better for the excess Luftwaffe personnel to be trained and sent as reinforcement/replacement soldiers to those units on the field instead of creating those Luftwaffe Infantry units?

I keep read somewhere that they were weak in staying power and lack sufficient experience cadre to keep them from breaking...
 

Deleted member 1487

Would it have been better for the excess Luftwaffe personnel to be trained and sent as reinforcement/replacement soldiers to those units on the field instead of creating those Luftwaffe Infantry units?
Yes, which is why I mentioned that in the OP ;)
 
Top