What if Hitler did not retire the use of paratroopers?

Deleted member 1487

The 7th wasn't rebuild as such by this point but restructured. They were introduced to front line duties in stages as and when German ground forces needed extra punch. For Crete there were four regiments, the Assault Regiment (gliders) plus FJR1, FJR2, and FJR3. Post Crete only the 4th battalion of the Assault Regiment was left intact and FJR2 effectively ceased to exist for a while. The surviving troops from the Assault Regiment and FJR2 were used to reinforce the other units. The airborne troops available amounted to no more than 4,500. That's not to say they couldn't be used in an airborne operation, just that it would be a weakened force.

After the war a German study on airborne operations was conducted and a report produced by Helminth Reinhardt. Contributors to the study included the likes of Kesselring, Student, Meindl and von den Heydte.

The following extracts are from that report:

Since everything Germany possessed in the way of parachute troops had been committed in the attack on Crete and had been reduced in that campaign to about one-third of their original strength, too few qualified troops remained to carry out large scale airborne operations at the beginning of the Russian campaign...

The lessons based upon German operations may then be summarised as follows: In airborne operations cheap successes cannot be achieved with weak force by mean of surprise and bluff. On the contrary, airborne operations which are to achieve success on a large scale require a great outlay of materiel, outstanding personnel, and time for training and preparation. Such operations are accordingly "expensive". From 1941on Germany, in comparison to its enemies, was "poor".
Yet they built 6 airborne divisions over the course of the war and helped the Italians build one of their own with the intended use at Malta. They also planned to do a division or at least a major part of a division level drop during the Caucasus campaign, but because it stalled very short of the objective, the drop was cancelled, though a number of small unit commando drops were made to blow up bridges and the like.
 
Yet they built 6 airborne divisions over the course of the war and helped the Italians build one of their own with the intended use at Malta. They also planned to do a division or at least a major part of a division level drop during the Caucasus campaign, but because it stalled very short of the objective, the drop was cancelled, though a number of small unit commando drops were made to blow up bridges and the like.
All correct but not in timeframe you're proposing. Therefore any attack in August or September 1941 would be able to use about half of the full division which could still work.
 

Deleted member 1487

All correct but not in timeframe you're proposing. Therefore any attack in August or September 1941 would be able to use about half of the full division which could still work.
Earlier I thought the POD was that Crete is conducted differently, focusing on one airfield in the center and thus avoiding the mass losses that took place on the west part of the island, so that the division could be used in the USSR as of late August/early September?
 
Earlier I thought the POD was that Crete is conducted differently, focusing on one airfield in the center and thus avoiding the mass losses that took place on the west part of the island, so that the division could be used in the USSR as of late August/early September?
It's not really about the operation being conducted differently it more about the Germans getting their Intel right. The attack was planned on the basis of there being less than 6,000 regular troops on the island. I have a feeling that if they knew the strength of the defenders in the first place the attack would not have taken place at all. So maybe that should be the PoD?
 

Deleted member 1487

For that to happen German Intel would have to be correct. The plan they devised was based on the defending forces being far smaller, the Germans thought there were only somewhere in

It's not really about the operation being conducted differently it more about the Germans getting their Intel right. The attack was planned on the basis of there being less than 6,000 regular troops on the island. I have a feeling that if they knew the strength of the defenders in the first place the attack would not have taken place at all. So maybe that should be the PoD?
There are a ton of butterflies from Crete not being taken, are you sure you want to introduce those? Wouldn't it be easier to say that through better intel they realize that Maleme airfield is too strongly held, but they could mass on the other airfields and trap British forces instead?
 
While a fan of a lot of Wiking's ATLs. Not a fan thread of this Leningrad drop. The 500 or so Ju52s (even with some add back of Ju52s with a different Crete TL) would be doing a lot of regular missions but would be out of action for a week in this TL. I am assuming the Ju52s are mainly keeping Luftwaffe forward fields running and supplied, flying out wounded, flying important personnel like engineers, officers and their staffs to particular places and the occasional missions to keep a panzer spearhead supplied. Essentially the Ju52s are providing force magnifiers everyplace and what your getting here is a few thousand lightly armed soldiers behind the enemy lines instead. Doesn't seem worth it. The extra elite static infantry would be good and doing useful things just attacking regularly from the front as well.

(Perhaps though the Ju52s at this point at time would not be as heavily needed as they would by later before during Smolensk or later during Typhoon so there would be a window of opportunity.)

The best time to do a drop seems to be near the opening day June 22nd when the Ju52s wouldn't really have anything else to do and the element of surprise would be greatest and distances are shorter and good airfields are easier to come by. I like the earlier drop behind Riga idea better although I understand that would be tricky to get the paratroopers recycled from Crete in that time.

Most of the other OTL drops, Holland, Norway, Create, even Sea Lion, the Ju52s wouldn't be doing anything else on those opening days anyway. Surprise is maximized and there is high reward for political effects.

Other ideas for drops (with many of the same limitations though): Kerch strait September 42, east bank of the Volga at Stalingrad August 42, Murmansk railway July 42, Crimea September 1941
 

Deleted member 1487

While a fan of a lot of Wiking's ATLs. Not a fan thread of this Leningrad drop. The 500 or so Ju52s (even with some add back of Ju52s with a different Crete TL) would be doing a lot of regular missions but would be out of action for a week in this TL. I am assuming the Ju52s are mainly keeping Luftwaffe forward fields running and supplied, flying out wounded, flying important personnel like engineers, officers and their staffs to particular places and the occasional missions to keep a panzer spearhead supplied. Essentially the Ju52s are providing force magnifiers everyplace and what your getting here is a few thousand lightly armed soldiers behind the enemy lines instead. Doesn't seem worth it. The extra elite static infantry would be good and doing useful things just attacking regularly from the front as well.

(Perhaps though the Ju52s at this point at time would not be as heavily needed as they would by later before during Smolensk or later during Typhoon so there would be a window of opportunity.)

The best time to do a drop seems to be near the opening day June 22nd when the Ju52s wouldn't really have anything else to do and the element of surprise would be greatest and distances are shorter and good airfields are easier to come by. I like the earlier drop behind Riga idea better although I understand that would be tricky to get the paratroopers recycled from Crete in that time.

Most of the other OTL drops, Holland, Norway, Create, even Sea Lion, the Ju52s wouldn't be doing anything else on those opening days anyway. Surprise is maximized and there is high reward for political effects.

Other ideas for drops (with many of the same limitations though): Kerch strait September 42, east bank of the Volga at Stalingrad August 42, Murmansk railway July 42, Crimea September 1941
The assumption was Crete happens in some fashion so they aren't ready on June 22nd. But if they are due to no Crete, then the ability to drop behind Riga on day 1 of Barbarossa is a major force multiplier, because it then cuts off part of the Soviet border armies from supply, takes out the Front HQ, and traps 8th army from retreating over the major route over the Dvina, as well as knocks out several air bases and opens up those to flying in supplies and reinforcements.
 
There are a ton of butterflies from Crete not being taken, are you sure you want to introduce those? Wouldn't it be easier to say that through better intel they realize that Maleme airfield is too strongly held, but they could mass on the other airfields and trap British forces instead?
In hindsight Kesselring suggests a better approach would be to land the paratroopers in one concentrated group away from the defence concentrations. The paras would then move across country to attack strong points in conjunction with gliderborne troops landing just prior to or during the assault thus achieving some element of surprise. He also states that this would need much better int
 

Deleted member 1487

In hindsight Kesselring suggests a better approach would be to land the paratroopers in one concentrated group away from the defence concentrations. The paras would then move across country to attack strong points in conjunction with gliderborne troops landing just prior to or during the assault thus achieving some element of surprise. He also states that this would need much better int
In a bio I have about Rudolf Witzig of Eben Emael fame and who fought as was wounded at Crete, they discuss the issues of the conduct of the battle and say the same thing. The thing is the intel was there, 12th Army, the German army that invaded Greece, had spies on the island and they reported about the actual state of affairs, but the Luftwaffe relied only on their own intel and dismisses Heer intel. Had they listened they would have had accurate intel. The Germans did use gliders on the island and in Belgium/Holland in 1940. Largely the Crete fiasco came down to the ignoring of intel and not concentrating forces properly according to doctrine.
 
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