What if Hitler did not retire the use of paratroopers?

So a para-drop behind the city and attacking it from the rear would have made the job of the armor divisions much easier and resulted in the breach of a critical defensive position the Soviets held outside the city, which gave them time to build up defenses around the city proper.

I've stayed out of the discussion regarding Leningrad, because I don't know the terrain and the precise circumstances to enable me to add intelligently to the debate. This, however, had me spluttering.

Are you seriously suggesting a drop behind the city and attacking it from the rear? Unsupported paratroopers attacking a defended city from the rear?

That's lightly equipped paratroopers being expected to go swiftly into urban warfare. It's novel, I grant you.

Note for the uninitiated. Urban warfare burns up supplies like it's going out of fashion. From the map you provide, your proposed drop zones are a death trap.
 

Deleted member 1487

I've stayed out of the discussion regarding Leningrad, because I don't know the terrain and the precise circumstances to enable me to add intelligently to the debate. This, however, had me spluttering.

Are you seriously suggesting a drop behind the city and attacking it from the rear? Unsupported paratroopers attacking a defended city from the rear?

That's lightly equipped paratroopers being expected to go swiftly into urban warfare. It's novel, I grant you.

Note for the uninitiated. Urban warfare burns up supplies like it's going out of fashion. From the map you provide, your proposed drop zones are a death trap.
Not attacking the city of Leningrad, rather the city of Krasnogvardeysk. As per the account, the position fell when attacked from behind because defenses were not set up be defend from an attack at the rear. It would be a supported attack, because the divisions mentioned in the linked account, Panzer and infantry, would be attacking at the same time, so it would be squeezing them from both sides. Hardly the first time light infantry attack into a fortified position and won, nor would it be the last. Also the city in question is quite small, really more a large town. Part of the point of a para-drop is vertical envelopment and attack from an unexepected direction. Stalingrad this is not and it would just be adding an additional direction of attack, plus aerial resupply is possible. Keep in mind that Soviet troops in the area were hastily trained reservists in most cases and underequipped after the standing army was largely destroyed near the border, in the Baltic area, or south of the Luga.
 
Not attacking the city of Leningrad, rather the city of Krasnogvardeysk.

The space available for your drop zones. If they drop near Kras., they're sitting ducks as they come down. If they don't drop near Kras., they're coming down into other Soviet held areas.

If I wanted to choose a drop zone to kill off paratroopers, that's it, right there.

There are a number of phases to a paratroop operation: the drop (or the landing if one extends to gliders and/or helicopters); the concentration (because in a drop, you're generally scattered to hell in a handbasket); taking the objective (which can sometimes be done concurrent with concentration if the spread isn't that bad); and the exit (either through departing, or having the cavalry come to your rescue). The most dangerous phase for any airborne operation is the drop, because there is fuck all you can do when people are taking pot shots at you, you've got this huge thing that, on the plus side, is stopping you from hitting the ground at an uncomfortably high speed, and on the negative side is a great big "Here I am" sign.
 

Deleted member 1487

The space available for your drop zones. If they drop near Kras., they're sitting ducks as they come down. If they don't drop near Kras., they're coming down into other Soviet held areas.

If I wanted to choose a drop zone to kill off paratroopers, that's it, right there.

There are a number of phases to a paratroop operation: the drop (or the landing if one extends to gliders and/or helicopters); the concentration (because in a drop, you're generally scattered to hell in a handbasket); taking the objective (which can sometimes be done concurrent with concentration if the spread isn't that bad); and the exit (either through departing, or having the cavalry come to your rescue). The most dangerous phase for any airborne operation is the drop, because there is fuck all you can do when people are taking pot shots at you, you've got this huge thing that, on the plus side, is stopping you from hitting the ground at an uncomfortably high speed, and on the negative side is a great big "Here I am" sign.
There is open ground behind the city. The defense line is based on the city. The presumption is that aerial recon is done and a safe drop zone is selected, so if the area directly near the city is unsuitable it won't be used. Dropping in a suitable space behind the defensive to cut it off from supply and reinforcement is the point, plus the airborne can then help aid the attack from behind. The Soviets were largely in static defensive positions due to the fact that they were reduced to limited combat power by August 1941 in that area.
German parachutes at the time were designed for low level drops, so scattering in the Allied style due to higher level drops didn't really happen prior to adopting Wallied style parachutes. Since the Germans had air superiority and the support of the CAS specialists in the VIII air corps (they dropped over 3 million kgs of ordnance in August-September in support of the attack on Leningrad) having sufficient fire support was guaranteed for the landing parachutists. The initial landings were usually done with gliders to secure the landing zone too.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DFS_230
In addition to the pilot, the DFS-230 glider had room for nine men who sat close together on a narrow bench located in the middle of the fuselage (half facing port, half facing starboard). Entry and exit to the cramped interior was by a single side door. The front passenger could operate its only armament, a machine gun. It was an assault glider, designed to land directly on top of its target, so it was equipped with a parachute brake. This allowed the glider to approach its target in a dive at an angle of eighty degrees and land within 20 metres (60 ft) of its target. It carried a freight cargo of about 1,200 kg.

http://www.fjr2.be/Pagina E-26- German parachutes.htm
A demonstration jump by the Fallschirm-Lehr battalion showed that 13 well trained parachutists could exit a JU-52 in 8 seconds. At an altitude of 330 feet and an aircraft speed of 120 miles per hour their dispersal distance would only be 25 yards between each man. Any jump carried outside of these parameters would result in the wide scattering of the stick of paratroops and more time for ground troops to react. The lowest recorded German airdrop was over Crete when some of the Fallschirmjäger jumped from 250ft. The parachute was designed to fully deploy after only 100ft.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallschirmjäger_(World_War_II)
The Fallschirmjäger captured a critical bridge that crossed the canal in the Isthmus of Corinth so German forces could pursue Allied forces further in the Greek mainland.[30] The operation did not go smoothly due to heavy enemy ground fire.[31] Demolition charges were also accidentally detonated, due to carelessness, leading to damage to the bridge and heavy casualties.[32] One group of paratroopers were accidentally dropped into the sea where they all drowned.[33] The Fallschirmjäger did manage to capture British anti aircraft positions which forced the surrender of the local town.[34] 12,000 Commonwealth and Greek troops were also captured.[35] The Fallschirmjäger suffered 63 killed and 174 wounded.[36]
http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=27776

The standard tactic was to secure the DLZ with glider assault and then drop the paratroopers low so they could rapidly assemble and move out. They did it quite a bit different than the Wallies, who dropped much higher and were thus scattered.
 
Its an interesting premise. How about an Emael style drop on sevastopol followed by naval resupply. That would, like Leningrad later be a true strategic gain.
 

Deleted member 1487

Its an interesting premise. How about an Emael style drop on sevastopol followed by naval resupply. That would, like Leningrad later be a true strategic gain.
Sevastopol was a very different situation than Eben Emael. For one Emael was one relatively small fort with, nominally, a 1200 man garrison that was not mobilized and had been on standby for months with many of it's personnel on leave. Sevastopol was a city, naval base, and fortress complex with tens of thousands of personnel. There was no way to take it by storm. Plus it was too far from any airfield in Axis control to even launch a surprise attack on June 22nd and by the time there was an airfield in range the fortress complex was on guard and well prepared to stave off any assault from any direction or method.
Compare for yourself:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Sevastopol_(1941–42)#Soviet
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Fort_Eben-Emael
 
Sevastopol was a very different situation than Eben Emael. For one Emael was one relatively small fort with, nominally, a 1200 man garrison that was not mobilized and had been on standby for months with many of it's personnel on leave. Sevastopol was a city, naval base, and fortress complex with tens of thousands of personnel. There was no way to take it by storm. Plus it was too far from any airfield in Axis control to even launch a surprise attack on June 22nd and by the time there was an airfield in range the fortress complex was on guard and well prepared to stave off any assault from any direction or method.
Compare for yourself:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Sevastopol_(1941–42)#Soviet
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Fort_Eben-Emael
I do realize this is tricky and surprise is needed. However, the distance from Constanta to sevastopol is 244 miles. It seems within range?
I know I'm stretching it, but I always Wondered. Could the troops be resupplied/reinforced by Sea?
 
As to the main point, I think I can rest my case. It's so evident that anybody will understand it.

I'll only add two minor points, just for the sake of historical accuracy.

1. The wiki description of the engagement involving Kolobanov says that at that time, in that location, there were only 7 (not 5, do read the whole account) KV-1s to stop one attack along one road.
That doesn't mean those 7 KV-1s were all the tanks available in that defense area. Or for that matter on that front. Do look up the data for the 1-y Mekhanizirovannyy Korpus in August 1941. Its 1-ya Tankovaya Diviziya, alone, without its detached regiment, had 80 operational tanks on July 23, when it deployed to Krasnogvardeysk, and 101 (yes, more, not less) on August 1. Of the latter, 24 were KV tanks.

2. No, the Germans did not advance "fine" through Krasnogvardeysk and to the gates of Leningrad. They advanced at the cost of very heavy losses. The 1. Panzerdivision, on August 15, was down to 44 tanks. That's 70% losses. That is not doing "fine".
 

Deleted member 1487

2. No, the Germans did not advance "fine" through Krasnogvardeysk and to the gates of Leningrad. They advanced at the cost of very heavy losses. The 1. Panzerdivision, on August 15, was down to 44 tanks. That's 70% losses. That is not doing "fine".
Can you provide a source corroborating the loss of >40 AFVs on or directly around the claimed date of the attack and have a source about 1st Panzer's operational rating?
Edit:
Found the wikipedia article about 1st Panzer that is your source for that is a snap shot of the operational rating, which doesn't tell us what is under repair, just what is available on one day for combat operations. Also that was before the claimed KV-1 ambush, so that wouldn't have been reflected in the operational rating, assuming that happened.

Edit x2:
https://books.google.com/books?id=kvWeDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA73&lpg=PA73&dq=KV-1+ambush+leningrad&source=bl&ots=j4lAg6G-2S&sig=UtsYoAMuuB3AQ9ttQWpafuTnLrM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwizr8aJwL3UAhWKPj4KHevnDScQ6AEIgQEwEg#v=onepage&q=KV-1 ambush leningrad&f=false
Found this. Apparently the advanced elements of recon battalion of the 8th Panzer division was ambushed and a number of vehicles were damaged and destroyed on August 19th. The Soviets counted every single vehicle hit as an enemy AFV, as destroyed, and seem to have exaggerated the numbers, but the action seems to have occurred in some version. Likely few actual Panzers were destroyed in the engagement if any, but the recon element got a bloody nose. Nevertheless as the book says by the 24th the Soviet Luga position had been encircled and destroyed.

Given the pressure on the Soviets, an airborne assault behind their defensive line in early September would have aided the breakthrough considerably.
 
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As to the main point, I think I can rest my case. It's so evident that anybody will understand it.
.
The basic point Yes. Paratroopers cant hold indefinately and needs to be relieved before that point.
It is a flexible point However. If the rear area is heavily defended and there are reserves, relieve must be Quick, not so fast if there are few reserves.
 
The basic point Yes. Paratroopers cant hold indefinately and needs to be relieved before that point.
It is a flexible point However. If the rear area is heavily defended and there are reserves, relieve must be Quick, not so fast if there are few reserves.
Or if they can build rapidly on the airhead to overwhelm any defences/counters forcing the enemy to withdraw completely.
 
Can you provide a source corroborating the loss of >40 AFVs on or directly around the claimed date of the attack and have a source about 1st Panzer's operational rating?
Edit:
Found the wikipedia article about 1st Panzer that is your source for that is a snap shot of the operational rating, which doesn't tell us what is under repair, just what is available on one day for combat operations. Also that was before the claimed KV-1 ambush, so that wouldn't have been reflected in the operational rating, assuming that happened.

Sigh.
1. I never claimed the Krasnogvardeysk engagement involved the 1. Panzerdivision.

2. The source is not a wikipedia article, but reputable printed sources, which the wiki article then quotes.

3. Yeah, those are runners. 44 runners out of an initial strength of 155 runners still is 30% runners only - not doing "fine" exactly, unless you have a special definition of "fine" that applies only to some of the combatants of WWII. The Germans would have vehicles under repairs - just like the Soviets had. The 101 tanks of the 1-ya Tankovaya Diviziya were runners, and that unit had 81 tanks under repairs and 30 in need of maintenance, while 36 had been recovered - this while the Soviets were losing ground - but were not repairable. Just to say we're comparing apples with apples here.

4. I never said that the abysmal state of the 1. Panzerdivision was due to the battle of Krasnogvardeysk in general, or to one, exemplary engagement within it. I only quoted that data point as pretty much darn obvious evidence that the Germans were advancing, yes, but at a very high cost.

5. I could provide other evidence to this tune. For instance, should we want to talk about 8. instead of 1. Panzerdivision? The former has the unenviable record of being the encircled Panzerdivision of 1941. Yes folks, as the Germans were encircling Soviet troops to the rate of hundreds of thousands of men, 8. Panzerdivision managed to get itself surrounded by the enemy. The Germans beat the Soviet encirclement and counterattacks back, as was the rule that summer - and it's the same old story, yes, the Germans could win but the Soviets could, and did, delay them, and the Soviets could replace their losses faster than the Germans. The other Panzerdivision available was the 6., which the Germans, by the end of August, had to shift to a mobile defense task, having it defend a front of some 20 kms in the vicinity, you guessed it, Krasnogvardeysk. These are the units that were advancing "fine".

I could go on and on, but I think this is enough for open-minded people.
 
Or if they can build rapidly on the airhead to overwhelm any defences/counters forcing the enemy to withdraw completely.

Yes. That's what happened in Crete, and it's the reason why the marginal contribution of surface (i.e., in this case, by sea, not by land) troops was indeed marginal.

You are now requiring that the cargo aircraft fleet remain in operation with this task well beyond the time needed for a plain parachute drop; it also needs substantial fighter escort, all the time.

Crete contained a given, small number of available British and Greek reinforcements.
 

Deleted member 1487

Sigh.
1. I never claimed the Krasnogvardeysk engagement involved the 1. Panzerdivision.
It was implied by grouping the two statements next to one another.

2. The source is not a wikipedia article, but reputable printed sources, which the wiki article then quotes.

3. Yeah, those are runners. 44 runners out of an initial strength of 155 runners still is 30% runners only - not doing "fine" exactly, unless you have a special definition of "fine" that applies only to some of the combatants of WWII. The Germans would have vehicles under repairs - just like the Soviets had. The 101 tanks of the 1-ya Tankovaya Diviziya were runners, and that unit had 81 tanks under repairs and 30 in need of maintenance, while 36 had been recovered - this while the Soviets were losing ground - but were not repairable. Just to say we're comparing apples with apples here.
I never said Wikipedia is automatically irreputable, especially when sourced, it seems to be the source of your claim and doesn't tell us the full picture, as usually these sorts of statements are for one day, usually cherrypicked in books to make a point, rather than an average serviceabililty rate for say a 10 day period or more. For example Rundstedt used the lowest serviceability rating to convince Hitler that the Panzer divisions under Guderian's command were smashed in late May 1940 to justify the Halt Order, when in fact panzer numbers doubled within 1-2 days as maintenance was done.
Actually the 100 or so tanks in the 1st Soviet division weren't necessarily runners, they were what was on hand. German on hand numbers include all non-written off tanks, including those under repair as do Soviet on hand numbers in 1941 AFAIK. I've seen their nominal strength listed as their strength on hand despite that most certainly NOT being their operational numbers. What is your source for 1st Tank Division numbers for the Soviets? Also you have to compare that to the total strength of the Panzer corps they were facing, as that was the only tank unit in the region at the time AFAIK. Plus what was the composition of Soviet AFVs, like were they mostly T-26s and BT-7s?
https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=auto&tl=en&js=y&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&u=https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/1-%D1%8F_%D0%B3%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B8%D1%8F_(1-%D0%B3%D0%BE_%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F)&edit-text=&act=url
On 12.08.1941 the division passed to the defense in the area of Vypolzovo, Kryakovo, Nerevitsa, Lelino, having tank defense ambush. В этот момент дивизия насчитывала 58 исправных танков из них 4 Т-28 и 7 КВ-1 . At that moment the division numbered 58 serviceable tanks of which 4 T-28 and 7 KV-1 .
The losses of the division during this period were: 6 tanks KV-1 , 4 T-28 , 32 BT-7, 6 T-50, 4 T-26 and 7 armored cars [2] . После этого дивизия использовалась в обороне мелкими группами, придаваемыми пехотным подразделениям, и отходила к Красногвардейску . After that, the division was used in defense by small groups attached to infantry divisions, and withdrew to Krasnogvardeysk .

4. I never said that the abysmal state of the 1. Panzerdivision was due to the battle of Krasnogvardeysk in general, or to oneS, exemplary engagement within it. I only quoted that data point as pretty much darn obvious evidence that the Germans were advancing, yes, but at a very high cost.
Again the doesn't mean that the fall out was the result of combat specifically, as in France in 1940 a majority of fall out was due to mechanical repairs being needed after a long period of use. That was largely the case in 1941 as well, especially given the far worse infrastructure of the USSR and it tells us nothing of the repair rate or the average serviceability rating of the division for August or even that week.

5. I could provide other evidence to this tune. For instance, should we want to talk about 8. instead of 1. Panzerdivision? The former has the unenviable record of being the encircled Panzerdivision of 1941. Yes folks, as the Germans were encircling Soviet troops to the rate of hundreds of thousands of men, 8 Panzerdivision managed to get itself surrounded by the enemy. The Germans beat the Soviet encirclement and counterattacks back, as was the rule that summer - and it's the same old story, yes, the Germans could win but the Soviets could, and did, delay them, and the Soviets could replace their losses faster than the Germans. The other Panzerdivision available was the 6., which the Germans, by the end of August, had to shift to a mobile defense task, having it defend a front of some 20 kms in the vicinity, you guessed it, Krasnogvardeysk. These are the units that were advancing "fine".

I could go on and on, but I think this is enough for open-minded people.
Yes I am aware of the 8th Panzer division walking into the Soltsy ambush as part of the entire corps it was in thanks to Manstein being arrogant.; it fought it's way out and survived to go on to fight through to Leningrad and cut off the city. The recon element was ambushed in this situation, hardly an unheard of situation in all armies at all times. 1st, 6th, and 8th Panzer divisions overran the Soviets positions in August-September before being transferred in late September to go attack Moscow and participate in probably the most successful encirclement in history, helping to eliminate up to 1 million Soviet troops at Vyazma and Bryansk. In August-September the Soviets were not replacing losses faster within the matter of weeks, that was over the entire Barbarossa period and the quality of replacements got worse in terms of training and equipment until around Moscow in December.

What are you talking about that the 6th Panzer was defending in late August at Kragnogvardeysk? They were attacking through late August into September to breech the defenses, which they did. I have Erhard Raus's book where they detail the combat operations in this period with maps.
https://www.amazon.com/Panzer-Operations-Eastern-General-1941-1945/dp/0306814099
Even that link I posted about the ambush on 8th Panzer division says the Germans were attacking the fortifications around Kragnogvardeysk in late August into early September and overran it, trapping and wiping out the defenders as they tried to withdraw.

Open minded people will hopefully see that you don't know what you're talking about and are flinging out anything to try and obfusicate.

Yes. That's what happened in Crete, and it's the reason why the marginal contribution of surface (i.e., in this case, by sea, not by land) troops was indeed marginal.

You are now requiring that the cargo aircraft fleet remain in operation with this task well beyond the time needed for a plain parachute drop; it also needs substantial fighter escort, all the time.

Crete contained a given, small number of available British and Greek reinforcements.
The Germans had air superiority around Leningrad in August-September 1941, Soviet mobilized reserves sat in defensive positions as they were mobilized, as they could do little else given their state of training and equipment, and they really didn't have room to deal with a threat to their rear as they were being overrun by frontal attacks throughout August-September.
At Crete the Brits controlled the sea, had AFV superiority on the island (can't fly in tanks on Ju52s, so British armor was the only armor on the island), and outnumbered the attackers, but still lost despite nearly smashing the paratroops landing in an ambush.
 
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Michele, as far as I can tell Wikings proposal is sound, a German first wave drop of 6,000 troops is possible with an additional 14,000+ following on over the next 2-3 days. They had the air assets to do it and given that air superiority was attained it's likely to be unmolested from the air. You're now splitting the Soviet defence not just two ways but in several directions as German tactics were to create several airheads, or oil spots as they were known, over a wide area, typically in a horse shoe, and then expand them until they joined. If it appeared to the Germans that this tactic was failing, as at Crete, they would chose one airhead to concentrate their forces on whilst the others were left to defend their existing positions and draw enemy forces away from the main build up.

It really doesn't matter how either side performed OTL as Wiking is proposing something different I.e. An alternate history of events that makes a lot of your arguments invalid.

I'd just like to point out though that, while the air assets were available, the manpower wasn't and wouldn't be until early to mid 1942.
 
Michele, as far as I can tell Wikings proposal is sound, a German first wave drop of 6,000 troops is possible with an additional 14,000+ following on over the next 2-3 days. They had the air assets to do it and given that air superiority was attained it's likely to be unmolested from the air. You're now splitting the Soviet defence not just two ways but in several directions as German tactics were to create several airheads, or oil spots as they were known, over a wide area, typically in a horse shoe, and then expand them until they joined. If it appeared to the Germans that this tactic was failing, as at Crete, they would chose one airhead to concentrate their forces on whilst the others were left to defend their existing positions and draw enemy forces away from the main build up.

It really doesn't matter how either side performed OTL as Wiking is proposing something different I.e. An alternate history of events that makes a lot of your arguments invalid.

I'd just like to point out though that, while the air assets were available, the manpower wasn't and wouldn't be until early to mid 1942.

And the one thing the Germans would have had to support the para's was the Stuka. By having air superiority the Stuka (or even ME110) gives the para's a heavy weapon capability.
 

Deleted member 1487

I'd just like to point out though that, while the air assets were available, the manpower wasn't and wouldn't be until early to mid 1942.
In terms of the paras? The rebuilt 7th Flieger division deployed to the Leningrad region in late September 1941 IOTL, what was lacking was the opportunity to use them by that point AND the Ju52s to air drop them.
http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=1703
Leningrad Front

7. Fliegerdivision was deployed to the Leningrad front near Neva from September to December 1941. By December they had received over 3000 casualties, a testament to the heavy fighting and harsh weather endured by the Fallschirmjäger. Fighting took place around the Soviet beachhead at Petruschino, where the Soviets had taken advantage of the marshy woodlands that dominated the terrain between Petruschino and the Neva River to established strong positions re-enforced by bunkers and entrenched positions.

With a different strategy for Crete that minimizes losses of men and equipment, but still achieves the objective, a mission in late August-early September is doable.
 
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The 7th wasn't rebuild as such by this point but restructured. They were introduced to front line duties in stages as and when German ground forces needed extra punch. For Crete there were four regiments, the Assault Regiment (gliders) plus FJR1, FJR2, and FJR3. Post Crete only the 4th battalion of the Assault Regiment was left intact and FJR2 effectively ceased to exist for a while. The surviving troops from the Assault Regiment and FJR2 were used to reinforce the other units. The airborne troops available amounted to no more than 4,500. That's not to say they couldn't be used in an airborne operation, just that it would be a weakened force.

After the war a German study on airborne operations was conducted and a report produced by Helminth Reinhardt. Contributors to the study included the likes of Kesselring, Student, Meindl and von den Heydte.

The following extracts are from that report:

Since everything Germany possessed in the way of parachute troops had been committed in the attack on Crete and had been reduced in that campaign to about one-third of their original strength, too few qualified troops remained to carry out large scale airborne operations at the beginning of the Russian campaign...

The lessons based upon German operations may then be summarised as follows: In airborne operations cheap successes cannot be achieved with weak force by mean of surprise and bluff. On the contrary, airborne operations which are to achieve success on a large scale require a great outlay of materiel, outstanding personnel, and time for training and preparation. Such operations are accordingly "expensive". From 1941on Germany, in comparison to its enemies, was "poor".
 
To airlift one regiment of the division something like 500 Ju52s were needed, which is what was used at Crete and they could only move one regiment at a time.

I can't access the page in the link, but 1500 defenders is not going to end well for Britain. The big issue though is that the Ju52 did not have the range to make a round trip with a full load of paras:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_52#Specifications_.28Junkers_Ju_52.2F3m_g7e.29
about 900km range, round trip assuming pure straight lines the entire way, not deviations (which is utterly impossible), is about 1000km:
https://www.distancecalculator.net/
Western Cyprus (e.g. Paphos) is within that range. At worst, each plane leaves a couple of guys on the ground and loads up extra fuel.

1500 defenders is not that hard to overcome. I wouldn't be surprised if they tried to actually land on the Larnaca airfield, maybe after the first wave gets paradropped there via FW-200 Condors or the various Italian aircraft, which definitely had the range.
 
Western Cyprus (e.g. Paphos) is within that range. At worst, each plane leaves a couple of guys on the ground and loads up extra fuel.

1500 defenders is not that hard to overcome. I wouldn't be surprised if they tried to actually land on the Larnaca airfield, maybe after the first wave gets paradropped there via FW-200 Condors or the various Italian aircraft, which definitely had the range.
A couple of points to consider, a German parachute Regiment could be transported by 250 aircraft not 500 and the range of the Ju52 shown on Wiki is for max load. The range when transporting the paras was greatly increased to somewhere in the region of 1200 miles or about 1900 km. Radius of action is therefore about 800 km, allowing for approach circuits and other deviations.
 
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