Sigh.
1. I never claimed the Krasnogvardeysk engagement involved the 1. Panzerdivision.
It was implied by grouping the two statements next to one another.
2. The source is not a wikipedia article, but reputable printed sources, which the wiki article then quotes.
3. Yeah, those are runners. 44 runners out of an initial strength of 155 runners still is 30% runners only - not doing "fine" exactly, unless you have a special definition of "fine" that applies only to some of the combatants of WWII. The Germans would have vehicles under repairs - just like the Soviets had. The 101 tanks of the 1-ya Tankovaya Diviziya were runners, and that unit had 81 tanks under repairs and 30 in need of maintenance, while 36 had been recovered - this while the Soviets were losing ground - but were not repairable. Just to say we're comparing apples with apples here.
I never said Wikipedia is automatically irreputable, especially when sourced, it seems to be the source of your claim and doesn't tell us the full picture, as usually these sorts of statements are for one day, usually cherrypicked in books to make a point, rather than an average serviceabililty rate for say a 10 day period or more. For example Rundstedt used the lowest serviceability rating to convince Hitler that the Panzer divisions under Guderian's command were smashed in late May 1940 to justify the Halt Order, when in fact panzer numbers doubled within 1-2 days as maintenance was done.
Actually the 100 or so tanks in the 1st Soviet division weren't necessarily runners, they were what was on hand. German on hand numbers include all non-written off tanks, including those under repair as do Soviet on hand numbers in 1941 AFAIK. I've seen their nominal strength listed as their strength on hand despite that most certainly NOT being their operational numbers. What is your source for 1st Tank Division numbers for the Soviets? Also you have to compare that to the total strength of the Panzer corps they were facing, as that was the only tank unit in the region at the time AFAIK. Plus what was the composition of Soviet AFVs, like were they mostly T-26s and BT-7s?
https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=auto&tl=en&js=y&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&u=https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/1-%D1%8F_%D0%B3%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B8%D1%8F_(1-%D0%B3%D0%BE_%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F)&edit-text=&act=url
On 12.08.1941 the division passed to the defense in the area of Vypolzovo, Kryakovo, Nerevitsa, Lelino, having tank defense ambush. В этот момент дивизия насчитывала 58 исправных танков из них 4
Т-28 и 7
КВ-1 . At that moment the division numbered 58 serviceable tanks of which 4
T-28 and 7
KV-1 .
The losses of the division during this period were: 6 tanks
KV-1 , 4
T-28 , 32 BT-7, 6 T-50, 4 T-26 and 7 armored cars
[2] . После этого дивизия использовалась в обороне мелкими группами, придаваемыми пехотным подразделениям, и отходила к
Красногвардейску . After that, the division was used in defense by small groups attached to infantry divisions, and
withdrew to
Krasnogvardeysk .
4. I never said that the abysmal state of the 1. Panzerdivision was due to the battle of Krasnogvardeysk in general, or to oneS, exemplary engagement within it. I only quoted that data point as pretty much darn obvious evidence that the Germans were advancing, yes, but at a very high cost.
Again the doesn't mean that the fall out was the result of combat specifically, as in France in 1940 a majority of fall out was due to mechanical repairs being needed after a long period of use. That was largely the case in 1941 as well, especially given the far worse infrastructure of the USSR and it tells us nothing of the repair rate or the average serviceability rating of the division for August or even that week.
5. I could provide other evidence to this tune. For instance, should we want to talk about 8. instead of 1. Panzerdivision? The former has the unenviable record of being the encircled Panzerdivision of 1941. Yes folks, as the Germans were encircling Soviet troops to the rate of hundreds of thousands of men, 8 Panzerdivision managed to get itself surrounded by the enemy. The Germans beat the Soviet encirclement and counterattacks back, as was the rule that summer - and it's the same old story, yes, the Germans could win but the Soviets could, and did, delay them, and the Soviets could replace their losses faster than the Germans. The other Panzerdivision available was the 6., which the Germans, by the end of August, had to shift to a mobile defense task, having it defend a front of some 20 kms in the vicinity, you guessed it, Krasnogvardeysk. These are the units that were advancing "fine".
I could go on and on, but I think this is enough for open-minded people.
Yes I am aware of the 8th Panzer division walking into the Soltsy ambush as part of the entire corps it was in thanks to Manstein being arrogant.; it fought it's way out and survived to go on to fight through to Leningrad and cut off the city. The recon element was ambushed in this situation, hardly an unheard of situation in all armies at all times. 1st, 6th, and 8th Panzer divisions overran the Soviets positions in August-September before being transferred in late September to go attack Moscow and participate in probably the most successful encirclement in history, helping to eliminate up to 1 million Soviet troops at Vyazma and Bryansk. In August-September the Soviets were not replacing losses faster within the matter of weeks, that was over the entire Barbarossa period and the quality of replacements got worse in terms of training and equipment until around Moscow in December.
What are you talking about that the 6th Panzer was defending in late August at Kragnogvardeysk? They were attacking through late August into September to breech the defenses, which they did. I have Erhard Raus's book where they detail the combat operations in this period with maps.
https://www.amazon.com/Panzer-Operations-Eastern-General-1941-1945/dp/0306814099
Even that link I posted about the ambush on 8th Panzer division says the Germans were attacking the fortifications around Kragnogvardeysk in late August into early September and overran it, trapping and wiping out the defenders as they tried to withdraw.
Open minded people will hopefully see that you don't know what you're talking about and are flinging out anything to try and obfusicate.
Yes. That's what happened in Crete, and it's the reason why the marginal contribution of surface (i.e., in this case, by sea, not by land) troops was indeed marginal.
You are now requiring that the cargo aircraft fleet remain in operation with this task well beyond the time needed for a plain parachute drop; it also needs substantial fighter escort, all the time.
Crete contained a given, small number of available British and Greek reinforcements.
The Germans had air superiority around Leningrad in August-September 1941, Soviet mobilized reserves sat in defensive positions as they were mobilized, as they could do little else given their state of training and equipment, and they really didn't have room to deal with a threat to their rear as they were being overrun by frontal attacks throughout August-September.
At Crete the Brits controlled the sea, had AFV superiority on the island (can't fly in tanks on Ju52s, so British armor was the only armor on the island), and outnumbered the attackers, but still lost despite nearly smashing the paratroops landing in an ambush.