What if Hitler did not retire the use of paratroopers?

Suppose the Crete operation went off fairly well with minimal aircraft losses. The paras are ready again say August/September after re-equip/retrain. Could a few regiments of paratroops have helped with the Moscow offensive? Maybe seize bridges or disrupt defensive positions and speed things up?
 

Deleted member 1487

Suppose the Crete operation went off fairly well with minimal aircraft losses. The paras are ready again say August/September after re-equip/retrain. Could a few regiments of paratroops have helped with the Moscow offensive? Maybe seize bridges or disrupt defensive positions and speed things up?
Yeah, a few regiments (i.e. a full division) would have been very helpful for turning the Mozhiask defense line, but getting forward deployed an entire airborne division and it's airlift assets in October 1941 Smolensk seems kind of tough. They also couldn't be used around Leningrad as per OTL. In fact Hitler might try to use them there instead in August-September to take the city if the airlift assets were there. They could base very effectively in Estonia to have a pretty short flight time to drop zones. The only issue is dropping in the swampy, forested areas around Leningrad; that isn't insurmountable, but makes things tougher. They had air superiority in the north, so not an issue, which is not the case necessarily around Moscow in October.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Leningrad#Establishment

Using the paras to seize an as yet undefended river line and turn the existing Soviet line from behind would be pretty damn helpful in August to taking the city.
 

Deleted member 9338

It's not that paras could be used at Stalingrad rather that the planes used to carry paras were hard used supplying Stalingrad and suffered appropriate attrition.

No I ment using the paras. A landing could disrupt the German lines enough for a breakthrough
 
Using the paras to seize an as yet undefended river line and turn the existing Soviet line from behind would be pretty damn helpful in August to taking the city.

wiking, in some other thread you mentioned the Estonian shale industry was completely sabotaged in 1941 but perhaps the paratroopers could take this intact (or Maikop, Krasnodar, etc in 1942).

Otherwise I am sort of skeptical of paradrops on the eastern front in general where at times the Germans had tanks on the ground basically unopposed but stopped out of fuel, that spare transport capability should be bringing fuel or other supplies to the front.
 
Paratroopers are one half of a successful vertical envelopment operation. The other half is mobile, preferably armored troops that have the strength, mobility, range and logistics to reach the paratroopers before they are inevitably chewed. This was the half that didn't work in Market-Garden, and this is the half that would not work in most of the suggestions made here.
 

Deleted member 1487

wiking, in some other thread you mentioned the Estonian shale industry was completely sabotaged in 1941 but perhaps the paratroopers could take this intact (or Maikop, Krasnodar, etc in 1942).

Otherwise I am sort of skeptical of paradrops on the eastern front in general where at times the Germans had tanks on the ground basically unopposed but stopped out of fuel, that spare transport capability should be bringing fuel or other supplies to the front.
Certainly, supposing they were ready again for action quickly enough. Not necessarily sure if they could pull a Crete and then be ready to go again in July after redeploying from the Mediterranean. They could be used to say capture Tallin and cut of the Soviet 8th army as it retreated, aid Estonian guerrillas (they were the most active against the Soviets and deployed as front line combat troops by the Germans in 1941 during the...liberation(?) of Estonia and who then provided the major elements of the police force/home guard in running the country), and aid the 18th army as it advances laborously against the Soviet defenders that dragged the campaign in Estonia out through August. They'd also be helpful taking the Baltic islands, but if the choice is between using them for that or assaulting Leningrad, clearly the latter is more important. Shale oil is secondary to cutting off and destroying the Soviet 8th army and speeding up the capture of Estonia by a month.

Paratroopers are one half of a successful vertical envelopment operation. The other half is mobile, preferably armored troops that have the strength, mobility, range and logistics to reach the paratroopers before they are inevitably chewed. This was the half that didn't work in Market-Garden, and this is the half that would not work in most of the suggestions made here.
Depends on the strength of the foe; the Soviets were very weak in 1941 in the situations suggested, while in Market-Garden the paras dropped on a reforming SS Panzer Corps and were cut to pieces as a result. Market-Garden was a screw up of planning, which largely ignored intelligence that enemy forces were FAR stronger in the region than Monty wanted to believe. I say a thrust on Leningrad in August-September there were no tank forces the Soviets had to counter them, while there was the 4th Panzer ARmy fighting through to support them. During Moscow the tank force would be on the Mozhiask defense line and the German paras dropped behind it, while again 4th Panzer Army would be racing to link up with them, as the paras would have cut off the Soviet defense line at Mozhiask from supply. It is highly risky of course, but there are motorized/armored forces racing up to link up with them.
 

ben0628

Banned
You know, it'd probably result in a suicide mission, but the use of one or two para divisions could potentially help the German assault on the Kursk Salient in 1943 (still probably fail though).
 
Paras were used in their intended role in a number of ops following Crete:

1. Occupation of Tunisia post El Alemain (win)
2. Some obscure raid vs British positions in Tunisia (fail)
3. Gran Sasso raid (win)
4. Dodecanese campaign '43 (win)
5. Battle of the Bulge (Op. Stösser) (fail)
6. reinforcement of Berlin (fail)

As to where they could have been used in division strength after Crete?

My best guess would be at the very start of Barbarossa, helping AGC close off the Smolensk pocket without most of the Soviets trapped there escaping.
 

EMTSATX

Banned
Just to ask and not to disparage any paratroopers (as my own Grandfather was a paratrooper), but in the grand scheme when did they really successfully employ? Look at D-Day and Market Garden they have to get saved. Was it a proper operational concept for use of exceptional troops to do mass jumps?
 

Deleted member 1487

Paras were used in their intended role in a number of ops following Crete:

1. Occupation of Tunisia post El Alemain (win)
2. Some obscure raid vs British positions in Tunisia (fail)
3. Gran Sasso raid (win)
4. Dodecanese campaign '43 (win)
5. Battle of the Bulge (Op. Stösser) (fail)
6. reinforcement of Berlin (fail)

As to where they could have been used in division strength after Crete?

My best guess would be at the very start of Barbarossa, helping AGC close off the Smolensk pocket without most of the Soviets trapped there escaping.
You forgot the raid on the Italian high command after they switched sides in Rome:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Achse#Fall_of_Rome

And the failed raid on Tito in 1944 by the SS parachute unit.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Rösselsprung_(1944)

And the successful Aegean campaign:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dodecanese_campaign#Battle_of_Leros

Just to ask and not to disparage any paratroopers (as my own Grandfather was a paratrooper), but in the grand scheme when did they really successfully employ? Look at D-Day and Market Garden they have to get saved. Was it a proper operational concept for use of exceptional troops to do mass jumps?
In general or by each side? For the German Crete is a prime example of the success of using the entire division strategically, but it was done very poorly, rather than dropping them concentrated on a less well defended part of the island. The Germans theorized that using the paratrooper division to help close the pockets they formed in Russia like at Minsk and especially Smolensk would have been very helpful; the mobile divisions lacked enough infantry to hold things shut on the defensive, so having even the light infantry of the airborne would still have been very helpful, especially if they used captured enemy equipment like artillery to bolster their strength.

I'd argue that despite the losses the use of the airborne at Normandy was worthwhile, while use during Market-Garden was actually worthwhile too conceptually, but was a failure for intelligence/planning reasons. I've read the British paras that survived were very bitter after the war, feeling that they had been sacrificed to a flawed plan and they were probably right.

BTW what unit did your grandfather serve in?
 
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You forgot the raid on the Italian high command after they switched sides in Rome:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Achse#Fall_of_Rome

And the failed raid on Tito in 1944 by the SS parachute unit.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Rösselsprung_(1944)

And the successful Aegean campaign:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dodecanese_campaign#Battle_of_Leros
1. Didn't know about that one
2. Meant to include that, but somehow managed to forget
3. This one I did include :)
 
Depends on the strength of the foe;

I wrote "strength, mobility, range and logistics". The latter two in particular, and mobility, too, are usually affected by distances, terrain, weather and one side's own, well, logistical situation, not by the strength of the foe.

...while in Market-Garden the paras dropped on a reforming SS Panzer Corps and were cut to pieces as a result. Market-Garden was a screw up of planning, which largely ignored intelligence that enemy forces were FAR stronger in the region than Monty wanted to believe.

You are right with the facts and wrong with the relevance of the SS Panzer Corps or of its cutting to pieces the paras. The failure of Market Garden wasn't the paratroopers', even with all the faults in the planning of their part in the play and even with the fact that they lacked the wherewithal to defeat the troops they were facing. The failure was in that the ground forces didn't arrive. At least not in time.

The German armored assets you have mentioned are entirely capable of not arriving in time because of any one (or more than one) of the considerations mentioned above, entirely regardless of whether the Fallschirmjäger defeat anything that comes at them - for as long as their ammunitions last.
 
In the German case, didn't they have to raid Ju52 pilots out of the training schools every time they did one of these major Crete like drops? So the objective would have to be really worth it.
 

Deleted member 1487

I wrote "strength, mobility, range and logistics". The latter two in particular, and mobility, too, are usually affected by distances, terrain, weather and one side's own, well, logistical situation, not by the strength of the foe.
None of those were absent around Leningrad or Moscow provided enemy resistance could be turned from behind, which airborne ops would allow.

You are right with the facts and wrong with the relevance of the SS Panzer Corps or of its cutting to pieces the paras. The failure of Market Garden wasn't the paratroopers', even with all the faults in the planning of their part in the play and even with the fact that they lacked the wherewithal to defeat the troops they were facing. The failure was in that the ground forces didn't arrive. At least not in time.

The German armored assets you have mentioned are entirely capable of not arriving in time because of any one (or more than one) of the considerations mentioned above, entirely regardless of whether the Fallschirmjäger defeat anything that comes at them - for as long as their ammunitions last.
I think you're missing the point of the SS Panzer Corps, it wasn't just their ability to fight the Allied Paras, it was being present on the highway to stop XXX Corps. Which they did and allowed the British paras to be crushed. The American paras a Nijmegen were supposed to take the bridge before XXX corps showed up, but ended up needing armor support from XXX Corps to dislodge the German armor elements holding the bridge. This helped start the series of fatal delays that unraveled the careful timetable of the operation, which did not plan on German armor being in the way.

Plus the way the paras were used allowed the German defenses to be set up and reinforcements to move to the front to block XXX corps:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden#Optimistic_planning
Among the controversial aspects of the plan was the necessity that all the main bridges be taken. The terrain was also ill-suited for the mission of XXX Corps.[73] Brereton had ordered that the bridges along XXX Corps' route should be captured with "thunderclap surprise".[156] It is therefore surprising in retrospect that the plans placed so little emphasis on capturing the important bridges immediately with forces dropped directly on them. In the case of Veghel and Grave where this was done, the bridges were captured with only a few shots being fired.

The decision to drop the 82nd Airborne Division on the Groesbeek Heights, several kilometres from the Nijmegen Bridge, has been questioned because it resulted in a long delay in its capture. Browning and Gavin considered holding a defensive blocking position on the ridge a prerequisite for holding the highway corridor. Gavin generally favoured accepting the higher initial casualties involved in dropping as close to objectives as possible in the belief that distant drop zones would result in lower chances of success. With the 82nd responsible for holding the centre of the salient, he and Browning decided the ridge must take priority. Combined with the 1st Airborne Division's delays within Arnhem, which left the Arnhem bridge open to traffic until 20:00, the Germans were given vital hours to create a defence on the Nijmegen bridge.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden#German_reactions
German reactions
On the German side, it was soon clear what was happening. Field Marshal Walter Model was staying at the Tafelberg Hotel in Oosterbeek, a village to the west of Arnhem, when the British began to land in the countryside to the west of Oosterbeek. He rapidly deduced the likely focus of the attack and after evacuating his headquarters, organised a defence. Wilhelm Bittrich, commanding the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, sent a reconnaissance company of the 9th SS Panzer Division to Nijmegen to reinforce the bridge defences. By midnight, Model had gained a clear picture of the situation and had organised the defence of Arnhem. The confusion usually caused by airborne operations was absent at Arnhem and the advantage of surprise was lost. During the operation, the Germans recovered a copy of the Market-Garden plan from the body of an American officer, who should not have carried it into combat.[120]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Nijmegen#March_halted
A rapid advance from Nijmegen to Arnhem to retake the bridge, was blocked by a combination of factors, including sunset, unfamiliarity with the terrain ahead (the Betuwe), German reinforcements near Ressen coming from Arnhem (3 Tiger tanks and 2 infantry companies), ongoing firefights and chaos in Nijmegen, and continuous logistical problems on "Hell's Highway", due to events such as the German counterattacks near Veghel. The march of the XXX Corps was delayed for another 18 hours after the Waal Bridge's conquest,[32] but eventually it was so worn out after 5 days of combat, that the offensive could not be resumed.

18 September: German reinforcements[edit]
On 18 September, Model sent reinforcements from Arnhem to keep the Waal Bridge out of the American paratroopers' hands. Because the British 1st Airborne Division was still in control of the Arnhem bridge at the time,[20] the 1. Kompagnie SS-Panzer-Pionier-Abteilung commanded by SS-Untersturmführer Werner Baumgärtel and the 2. Bataillon SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 19 under leadership of SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl-Heinz Euling crossed the Rhine at Pannerden as the 500 man strong 'Kampfgruppe Euling', used the still intact Waal Bridge and dug in at the Hunnerpark.[4] These reinforcements enabled the SS to regroup under the command of Sturmbannführer Leo Reinhold, who set up his headquarters on the north Waal bank. Fallschirmjäger oberst Henke prepared the Railway Bridge's defences. The two roundabouts and beltway were reinforced during the next 48 hours. The American parachutists would have to wait for the XXX Corps' help in taking the bridges, even though according to the planning, they should have been captured before the British arrival.[21]

Effectively the presence of the unexpected SS armored units threw the entire plan into disarray, which was made much worse by the refusal to drop on the targets and take them quickly, which let the Germans react. Whatever faults German para-doctrine had, they were not unwilling to risk dropping right on the objective, as the 1940 and 1941 drops demonstrated.

So in both situations what reserves do the Soviets have to deal with a concentrated German para division in 1941 in the Leningrad and Moscow (or Estonian) scenarios? Especially given that the para drop would cut off reinforcments and supplies to the Soviet front, trapping already attenuated defenders.

In the German case, didn't they have to raid Ju52 pilots out of the training schools every time they did one of these major Crete like drops? So the objective would have to be really worth it.
AFAIK after Crete the instructors didn't return to the schools, they fought to stay on at the front, preferring the prestige of their frontline positions to the non-combat training roles. So from Crete on they stayed and new instructors were raided in a few special cases like Stalingrad. By late 1942 though there wasn't enough fuel for full instruction anyway, though the raiding of highly experienced personnel didn't help training matters.
 
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If Turkey is on the AXIS side - the AFRICA KORPS might be better redeployed through the Caucuses to Maikop, Krasnodar etc in 1942. Paratroopers would be ideal for seizing the mountain passes to be traversed.
 

Deleted member 1487

If Turkey is on the AXIS side - the AFRICA KORPS might be better redeployed through the Caucuses to Maikop, Krasnodar etc in 1942. Paratroopers would be ideal for seizing the mountain passes to be traversed.
I'm pretty sure the logistics in East Turkey were not there for power projection. A result of WW1 damage, lack of economic development due to the interwar situation, and a choice to defend against a Soviet invasion by having no infrastructure for them to use. Maykop was also quite far north from the Turkish-Soviet border:
turkey_map_1941.jpg


Caucasus_Eco-Region_Map.jpg
 
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