What if Goering assassinated in 1939?

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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Probably not quite that good, but if they went to the Blitz right away, but focused on ports and such they'd suffer a lot less losses and do more damage.

didn't the city bombing idea originate from goering?
and wasn't it goering who pressed ahead the bombing of rotterdam, even though the netherlands had already capitulated?

so the LW continuing to do directed strikes against strategic targets instead of of city bombing, seems likely.

aren't there occasions where goering could have died during some plane crash?
 
This was basically what the pre-war wargaming for war with Britain returned as the most effective strategy and the one that the LW intelligence department was pushing before, during, and after the BoB. So its not like I came up with this, in fact I stumbled on to it during my research for a TL. They developed specialized night bombing forces pre-war and developed night bombing aids too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Beams#Background

Yeah sure they looked into night bombing like everyone else, but was anyone planning a concerted night-bombing campaign against Britain? The way I see it, OTL there wasn't really a strategy on how to deal with Britain at all. Hitler assumed they wouldn't fight, and when they did Göring tried the next best thing, which to him was a massive air battle.

Just removing Göring doesn't suddenly give you a plan for a limited night-bombing campaign against british ports, even if there was technology available to help with that.

didn't the city bombing idea originate from goering?
and wasn't it goering who pressed ahead the bombing of rotterdam, even though the netherlands had already capitulated?

so the LW continuing to do directed strikes against strategic targets instead of of city bombing, seems likely.

aren't there occasions where goering could have died during some plane crash?

The idea of city bombing certainly did not "originate" from Göring, the concept was very popular during the 1930s. I don't think the change in strategy during the BoB can be attributed to Göring, either. I am not sure how it went down exactly, but from what I remember it was a combination of British attacks on german cities and the fact that the BoB didn't seem to go anywhere.
 
The political imperative is to get Britain out of the war ASAP. Bombing ports in summer 1940 won't do that - it's too slow and too distant from the politicians in London. There will be some sort of Battle of Britain which, with the deficiencies in intelligence, will still be almost certainly unwinnable. The daytime attacks on London are logical parts of that political strategy anyway.

It's during the late autumn and winter that hitting the ports makes sense. At this point the attempt to force Britain to the table has failed, and the Luftwaffe needs to fight a prolonged campaign aimed at restricting British offensive power. That gets ruined by Barbarossa though.
 

Deleted member 1487

didn't the city bombing idea originate from goering?
and wasn't it goering who pressed ahead the bombing of rotterdam, even though the netherlands had already capitulated?

so the LW continuing to do directed strikes against strategic targets instead of of city bombing, seems likely.

aren't there occasions where goering could have died during some plane crash?
Not that I am aware of; Rotterdam was bombed after a miscommunication meant the raid couldn't be called off:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rotterdam_Blitz#Bombing

Goering, like most figures, could have died all sorts of times, so it really comes down to when you want to create the POD. The Bugsy Siegel one is just a pretty perfect way for him and Goebbels to go to me.
 

Deleted member 1487

Yeah sure they looked into night bombing like everyone else, but was anyone planning a concerted night-bombing campaign against Britain? The way I see it, OTL there wasn't really a strategy on how to deal with Britain at all. Hitler assumed they wouldn't fight, and when they did Göring tried the next best thing, which to him was a massive air battle.

Just removing Göring doesn't suddenly give you a plan for a limited night-bombing campaign against british ports, even if there was technology available to help with that.

The Luftwaffe's planning and Goering/Hitler's is different. The LW had a plan to fight Britain developed from wargaming it starting in 1938; the problem was that Goering and Hitler ended up rejecting that as too long term and went for the direct route, because Beppo Schmid in charge of air intelligence and a crony of Goering, told them that the RAF was not producing many fighters and after the losses in France had been cut down to a slim reserve; Goering then thought that defeating that last reserve would be enough to force them to negotiate peace before Sea Lion would even need to be an option, so he ordered the BoB on faulty intelligence, and to please Hitler who wanted a quick solution.

Without Goering Schmid is not the head of LW intelligence and Milch was not likely to be as ill informed as Goering. So all the efforts put into night bombing pre-war, plus all the war planning then likely does not go out the window in July 1940.
 

Deleted member 1487

The political imperative is to get Britain out of the war ASAP. Bombing ports in summer 1940 won't do that - it's too slow and too distant from the politicians in London. There will be some sort of Battle of Britain which, with the deficiencies in intelligence, will still be almost certainly unwinnable. The daytime attacks on London are logical parts of that political strategy anyway.

It's during the late autumn and winter that hitting the ports makes sense. At this point the attempt to force Britain to the table has failed, and the Luftwaffe needs to fight a prolonged campaign aimed at restricting British offensive power. That gets ruined by Barbarossa though.

That is a valid point, but day bombing London is no more effective at getting Britain out of the war as night bombing; it was done IOTL to bring the last fighter reserves of Britain to battle (except they weren't the last). LW intelligence was faulty for a number of reasons, many of which won't be fixed by this late POD, but a big one, Beppo Schmid, Goering's crony who headed up the department, would be gone with Goering. Same with Udet.

The losses of the BoB many not happen without Goering and the messed up production that Udet caused would be resolved by Milch as he did IOTL from late 1941 on, but just in 1939 instead, while several major production failures probably won't happen ITTL (Ju288, Me210, He177).
 
Not that I am aware of; Rotterdam was bombed after a miscommunication meant the raid couldn't be called off:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rotterdam_Blitz#Bombing

Goering, like most figures, could have died all sorts of times, so it really comes down to when you want to create the POD. The Bugsy Siegel one is just a pretty perfect way for him and Goebbels to go to me.

and a pretty great pod for a movie

what i understand is that calling off the raid in progress could even done by shooting the right colour of flares (something that was done)
 

Deleted member 1487

and a pretty great pod for a movie

what i understand is that calling off the raid in progress could even done by shooting the right colour of flares (something that was done)
right, but the smoke from existing fires and combat obscured the flares; some of the raid was called off before they bombed though.
 

Deleted member 1487

With Goering out of the way the overall economy would run a lot better as Fritz Todt would be the only man with the stature and position to run the 4 Year Program due to his work on the Autobahn and organizing labor, plus his engineer training and high standing in the party/with the public. When the war starts he effectively then runs the economy lock, stock, and barrel, minus some interference from Robert Ley, Darre, and various Gauleiter, which could all be dealt with by Todt's deputy, Speer, as per OTL, just earlier. It would be a lot of rationalization of the economy especially in the critical early years, but would still have to deal with Hitler's whims like Plan Z. It would be interesting to know if the OTL rationalizations would make create significant production increase earlier.


Milch then can fix aircraft production that Udet screwed up by 1940 and avoid the problems with the Me210, Ju288, and He177, while allowing the Jumo 222 to develop and be ready in 1942 as planned at original power rating. The V-1 might well be ready earlier:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-1_flying_bomb#Design_and_development
On 9 November 1939, a proposal for a remote-controlled aircraft carrying a payload of 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) over a distance of 500 km (310 mi) was forwarded to the RLM (German Air Ministry). Argus worked in cooperation with Lorentz AG and Arado Flugzeugwerke to develop the project as a private venture, and in April 1940, Gosslau presented an improved study of Project "Fernfeuer" to the RLM, as Project P 35 "Erfurt".

On 31 May, Rudolf Bree of the RLM commented that he saw no chance that the projectile could be deployed in combat conditions, as the proposed remote-control system was seen as a design weakness. Heinrich Koppenberg, the director of Argus, met with Ernst Udet on 6 January 1941 to try to convince him that the development should be continued, but Udet decided to cancel it.

Despite this, Gosslau was convinced that the basic idea was sound and proceeded to simplify the design. As an aircraft engine manufacturer, Argus lacked the capability to produce a fuselage for the project and Koppenberg sought the assistance of Robert Lusser, chief designer and technical director at Heinkel. On 22 January 1942, Lusser took up a position with the Fieseler aircraft company. He met with Koppenberg on 27 February and was informed of Gosslau's project. Gosslau's design used two pulsejet engines; Lusser improved the design to use a single engine.
A final proposal for the project was submitted to the Technical Office of the RLM on 5 June and the project was renamed Fi 103, as Fieseler was to be the chief contractor. On 19 June, Generalfeldmarschall Erhard Milch gave Fi 103 production high priority, and development was undertaken at the Luftwaffe's Erprobungsstelle coastal test centre at Karlshagen, part of the Peenemünde-West facility.

So overall production of aircraft would be significantly higher in 1939-42 than IOTL and then higher in 1942-44 because of the groundwork of improvements earlier.

Not sure if having a different commander would prevent the BoB if Hitler orders it. Having a commander present an alternative would certainly help, as Goering did not offer one IOTL despite recommendations from the Luftwaffe general staff, but it wouldn't necessarily stop Hitler's desire for a quick go at victory even with better intelligence (not sure if that's really possible). So you might well get a version of the BoB, but with better leadership at all levels, rotation of pilots, high replacement aircraft and pilot production, perhaps and earlier end to it, and a more coherent strategy during the Blitz. I'm not sure if that makes a difference to the outcome of both the BoB and Blitz.

The big changes would probably start accruing as the war continued and the next generation of Luftwaffe aircraft is not bungled as badly and the transition to new aircraft in 1941 and on happens smoothly. By 1941-42 you'd start to see Ju188s and Do217s, upengined versions of the He111, perhaps even a working He177 in 1942. During 1942 Jumo 222 engined aircraft appear (probably first the Do217, then Ju188, and maybe later an He177B and by 1944 an He111 version). More rationalization and output mean the LW remains competitive while Milch doesn't develop his own private army, probably keeping the FJ to 1 division and a special operations group (Ramcke brigade and HG regiment), not LW divisions. That save a lot of manpower for more rational use and lower losses:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luftwaffe_Field_Division
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Airborne_units_and_formations_of_Germany
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falls...1_Hermann_Göring#Regiment_General_G.C3.B6ring
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramcke_Parachute_Brigade

It probably wouldn't win the war unless Milch managed to somehow get the British to quit the war in 1940-41. You'd probably need an earlier POD for that like Goering dying in 1936 before Wever and butterflies keeping Wever alive to run the Luftwaffe and have Todt take over the 4 Year Program from the beginning, instead of letting Goering wreck the economy between 1936-39 ITTL. In the meantime the better leadership at the top trickles down and probably prevents all the bad leaders put in place under Goering, so the entire organization performs better as a result for the duration; a major issue that might be solved would be who actually gets to run the night fighter effort if the British continue in the war; IOTL neither Milch nor Kammhuber would take full responsibility, especially over radar development, which let things fall into the cracks and stagnate badly until 1943 when someone was forced to. With Milch in undisputed charge over everything he'd either assign it to one person or take it over himself. Either way would be far better than what happened IOTL. You'd probably also avoid the duplication of efforts like the He219 when the Ju88G (ITTL with Jumo 222 engine) would do the same with less industrial disruption. There might not be a Ta-154 then if Goering isn't demanding his own wooden wonder. Especially if Milch favors to Ju88G as per OTL then they'd not even bother with these other aircraft, saving a lot of resources, developing even greater economies of scale, and not disrupting production with all the tooling/change over contradictions that piled up due to the program failures. So the war may well change pretty significantly with the LW being a far better led organization even if Hitler undermines the war effort with his demands.
 
If an alternate Battle of Britain lite happens in this TL (night bombing, port bombing). Wouldn't perhaps the British figure out that this was a long term economic campaign and no immediate invasion is coming and send another division or more hurricanes early to Egypt , Sudan or Dakar.

OTL BofB was an obvious direct attempt to secure air superiority before an invasion so the British would have to hold back to see how that played out.
 

Deleted member 1487

If an alternate Battle of Britain lite happens in this TL (night bombing, port bombing). Wouldn't perhaps the British figure out that this was a long term economic campaign and no immediate invasion is coming and send another division or more hurricanes early to Egypt , Sudan or Dakar.

OTL BofB was an obvious direct attempt to secure air superiority before an invasion so the British would have to hold back to see how that played out.
I don't think they can publicly send anything significant abroad for public morale reasons. Even if the government suspects that the Germans aren't serious about an invasion attempt they have to assuage the panic in the public, sending more troops abroad would only heighten that. Now also just because they opt for a night blitz doesn't meant they have to stop daylight bombing to pin down British defenses and confuse them as to intention; IOTL they conducted a limited night campaign at the same time as the BoB, but basically they could reverse that and do a major night campaign and a lite daylight one that is well escorted (IOTL a major problem was the lack of sufficient escorts, so using limited numbers of fast bombers like the Ju88 for daylight raids and having all well escorted by the limited fighter assets would be very damaging to the British). There are all sorts of tricks to pull, such as dawn raids with Bf110s, as Michele explored in his TL about a more successful BoB.

Otherwise fighters are sitting still during the day. The necessary bomber forces for daylight ops then would be limited. They could use the slower Do17s and He111s for night ops, with some Ju88s too, while keeping 2 wings of Ju88s for daylight ops well escorted by Me109s and some Bf110 top cover. As they hit on fighter-bomber raids as an idea as they did by October, then they could perhaps transition away from using medium bombers for daylight operations entirely, because the bluff would be up by then due to the lateness of the season making invasion obviously impossible.

We also should consider what if any extra damage is done to the BEF at Dunkirk with Milch not making Goering's boast.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dunkirk#Halt_order
Despite his pilots' need to rest after two weeks of nonstop combat, Luftwaffe commander Hermann Göring asked for the chance to destroy the forces in Dunkirk.

The true reason for the decision to halt the German armour on 24 May is still a matter of debate. One theory states that Von Rundstedt and Hitler agreed to conserve the armour for Fall Rot, an operation to the south. It is possible that the air force's closer ties than the army's to the Nazi Party contributed to Hitler's approval of Göring's request.

Quotes on the halt order
During the following days... it became known that Hitler's decision was mainly influenced by Goering. To the dictator the rapid movement of the Army, whose risks and prospects of success he did not understand because of his lack of military schooling, became almost sinister. He was constantly oppressed by a feeling of anxiety that a reversal loomed...
—Halder, in a letter of July 1957.[5]
 
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