Thanks for the great list of ASW ships, but you left out one important type, the CVE. I think the British built 34, and the Americans over 100, before the end of the war. Almost half of them served in the Atlantic Theater on ASW duty. The power of the ASW forces from 1943, and their technological capabilities made it all but impossible for the Axis submarine fleet to make much headway. Even the new electro boats the Germans, and Japanese were building in 1945, with all their capabilities couldn't have overcome the opposition. There was never going to be another Happy Time.
What if Germany followed Donitz's proposals to build a force of 300 U-boats?
- Thread starter Vitalian
- Start date
Thank you for explaining. I’d be interested to read more, is this your personal analysis or is there a book I could get to learn more?
McPherson
Banned
See next comment.
I gave a list of starter books upthread.
As for how it works, you might try reading "Those Marvelous Tin Fish". Look for USS Moondragon.
given the need to replace older ships the RN's heavy ship program would probably be roughly the same as otl if not greater and earlier due to having a larger budget earlier than otl and the 2nd London naval treaty probably not being a thing. The number of sloops and destroyers and other escorts they would build on the other hand yeah that would have gone up a lot
RN Spending and Orders 1933-39:
1933, 53.6m 3 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 1 patrol vessel, 2 minesweepers
1934, 56.6m, 1 aircraft carrier, 4 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 2 patrol vessels, 2 minesweepers.
1935, 60m, 3 6in cruisers, 16 destroyers, 3 submarines, 1 sloops, 2 patrol vessel, 3 minesweepers
1936, 70m, 2 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 6in cruisers, 5 5.25in cruisers, 18 destroyers, 8 submarines, 2 sloops, 1 patrol vessel, 3 minesweepers
1937, 78.1m, 3 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 5 6in cruisers, 2 5.25in cruisers, 15 destroyers, 7 submarines, 3 sloops, 3 patrol vessels, 4 minesweepers.
1938, 93.7m, 2 battleships, 1 carrier, 4 6in cruisers, 3 5.25in cruisers, 3 fast minelayers, 3 submarines, 1 aircraft maintenance ship
1939 69.4m, 2 battleships, 1 carrier, 2 6in cruisers, 1 fast minelayer, 16 destroyers, 20 Hunts, 2 sloops, 56 corvettes, 20 minesweepers
Just off the top, there are a lot of spare slips for escorts, even from 1936 onwards.
1933, 53.6m 3 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 1 patrol vessel, 2 minesweepers
1934, 56.6m, 1 aircraft carrier, 4 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 2 patrol vessels, 2 minesweepers.
1935, 60m, 3 6in cruisers, 16 destroyers, 3 submarines, 1 sloops, 2 patrol vessel, 3 minesweepers
1936, 70m, 2 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 6in cruisers, 5 5.25in cruisers, 18 destroyers, 8 submarines, 2 sloops, 1 patrol vessel, 3 minesweepers
1937, 78.1m, 3 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 5 6in cruisers, 2 5.25in cruisers, 15 destroyers, 7 submarines, 3 sloops, 3 patrol vessels, 4 minesweepers.
1938, 93.7m, 2 battleships, 1 carrier, 4 6in cruisers, 3 5.25in cruisers, 3 fast minelayers, 3 submarines, 1 aircraft maintenance ship
1939 69.4m, 2 battleships, 1 carrier, 2 6in cruisers, 1 fast minelayer, 16 destroyers, 20 Hunts, 2 sloops, 56 corvettes, 20 minesweepers
Just off the top, there are a lot of spare slips for escorts, even from 1936 onwards.
thaddeus
Donor
just IMO working torpedoes are more important than an arbitrary increase in KM u-boats numbers, however they could have continued building and developing smaller u-boats (in addition to the larger boats), after war is declared some fair number of those could have been build quickly.
better coordination with Italy could see a huge "combined" fleet.
better coordination with Italy could see a huge "combined" fleet.
An Axis 'Combined Chiefs of Staff' would pay far greater dividends than 300 uboats.
How are they going to combine their fleet with the Italian fleet in the med and the German fleet in the Atlantic?
Even further off topic. Your Polish advert reminded me of this British commercial from the 1980s.
The sound quality isn't very good.
The voiceover sounds like Roy Kinnear.
thaddeus
Donor
combined was in quotes, meant a more coordinated campaign, the best example of which would be Operation Neuland https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Neuland in the Caribbean
"Neuland and Paukenschlag were opened with similar numbers of U-boats; but the effectiveness of Neuland was enhanced by coordination with Italian submarines. The level of success by Italian submarines against a concentration of undefended ships sailing independently was seldom repeated and marked a high point of effective Axis cooperation in the battle of the Atlantic."
mentioned "smaller" u-boats also, which would be some enhanced Type II initially and something akin to the Type XXIII eventually, which could have been sent to the Med overland instead of Type XII.
there was also at least a chance to expand the u-boat campaign(s) into the Indian Ocean from Italian East Africa.
McPherson
Banned
This would be simple for Italy Germany IF the Germans had only acknowledged the RM as being the senior naval service in the alliance, while the Esercito had done the same for the Herr. The Japanese are half a world away and not easy to integrate, akin as the Russians were to the Wallies.
This is the problem with a Landlubber Marine-Oberkommando. Japanese and Italians would understand the Indian Ocean Nutcracker.
There were a LOT of escorts purpose built for open ocean work before/during the war, plus repurposed Trawlers etc.
Flower Class Corvette:
- 225 (Original)
- 69 (Modified)
Castle Class Corvette:
- 44 completed
River Class Frigate:
- 151 Completed
Loch Class Frigate:
- 28 (Some completed post-war)
Bridgewater class Sloop
- 2 prewar
Hastings class sloop
- 5 prewar
Shoreham class sloops
- 8 prewar
Grimsby class sloop
- 13 prewar (RN, RAN, RIN)
Kingfisher class sloop
- 9 prewar
Bittern class sloop
- 3 prewar
Egret class sloop
- 3 prewar
Black Swan class
- 12 original
- 25 modified (some post war)
Bathurst class corvette (RAN)
- 60
That is 657 ships of commonwealth production only, it does not count ships converted, ships built in the US or ships like the Hunt Class (86 built).
Flower Class Corvette:
- 225 (Original)
- 69 (Modified)
Castle Class Corvette:
- 44 completed
River Class Frigate:
- 151 Completed
Loch Class Frigate:
- 28 (Some completed post-war)
Bridgewater class Sloop
- 2 prewar
Hastings class sloop
- 5 prewar
Shoreham class sloops
- 8 prewar
Grimsby class sloop
- 13 prewar (RN, RAN, RIN)
Kingfisher class sloop
- 9 prewar
Bittern class sloop
- 3 prewar
Egret class sloop
- 3 prewar
Black Swan class
- 12 original
- 25 modified (some post war)
Bathurst class corvette (RAN)
- 60
That is 657 ships of commonwealth production only, it does not count ships converted, ships built in the US or ships like the Hunt Class (86 built).
That's the only interpretation of the OP that's plausible.
However, I think the nine months of increased U-boat construction would make a difference. I think this because the the Royal Navy began ordering ASW vessels in bulk from the Spring of 1939 but the Kriegsmarine didn't order any U-boats between January 1939 and August 1939 which IMHO gave the Royal Navy a head start of 6 months in the building race.
As far as I've been able to work out the Germans ordered 111 U-boats with an aggregate standard displacement of 53,969 tons between 20th July 1934 and 6th June 1938.
The next batch wasn't ordered until 17th January 1939 when the 4 Type XI U-cruisers were ordered, but they were suspended on 15th September 1939 and cancelled on 1st May 1940.
Three Type XB minelaying submarines with an aggregate standard displacement of 2,220 tons were ordered on 31st January 1939. That brought the total to 114 U-boats with an aggregate standard displacement of 56,189 tons (not including the U-cruisers because they weren't built).
More than six months elapsed before the next batch which was for 16 boats of 10,725 tons ordered on 7th August 1939. That brought the total to 130 U-boats of 66,914 tons ordered since 20th July 1934 (again not including the U-cruisers). The state of play at the end of August 1939 was.
For the purpose of comparison the Royal Navy had 57 submarines with an aggregate standard displacement of 59,529 tons with another 16 boats of 17,440 tons under construction, on order or projected.
The outbreak of World War II led to the ordering of 167 U-boats of 88,223 tons between 23rd September 1939 and 30th October 1939. That includes the 2 Type IIs that were ordered by China but not UA which was building for Turkey. Another 100 boats with an aggregate standard displacement of 64,858 tons were ordered between 23rd December 1939 and 22nd May 1940. The next batch wasn't ordered until 15th August 1940.
The standard displacements are those quoted for Types IA, II, VII and IX from Jane's Fighting Ships 1938 and 1939. (They didn't have a standard displacement for the Type XB and I have used the standard displacement for the Type IX for them.) They were the displacements that the Kriegsmarine would use to work out the number of submarines could be built while the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was in force i.e. from 18th June 1935 to 28th April 1939.
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Agreed. At best I can see them like, maybe delaying a KGV or two by a year or something similar. Realistically canceling one or two would be better for the RN if they built big, upgradable carriers in their place, but at the time no one knows battleships are going to be utterly obsolete for anything besides NGS in less then a decade.
Garrison
Donor
Yeah those Italian warships were not built for the altogether more hostile conditions of the Atlantic. Not to mention the Nazi's better have done the near impossible and won the war in North Africa before the RM tries to leave the Med.
The British Commonwealth was allowed 52,700 tons of submarines under the First London Naval Treaty which meant that Germany was allowed 23,715 tons of submarines under the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 18th June 1935.
AFAIK the Germans had ordered 36 U-boats with an aggregate standard displacement of 12,424 tons by that date.
The First London Naval Treaty's tonnage quotas expired on 31st December 1936. The Royal Navy's submarine strength at that date was 52 boats of 52,959 tons (so they were exceeding the Treaty by 259 tons) plus 14 boats of 14,495 tons under construction, on order or projected. Meanwhile, the Germans had increase their total to 55 U-boats of 24,031 tons which was 316 tons more than the AGNA allowed.
The Royal Navy had 58 submarines of 55,909 tons at the end of 1937 plus 18 boats of 18,415 tons under construction, on order or projected. Germany's running total had increased to 72 U-boats of 31,799 tons which is well in excess of the 25,159 tons that they were allowed under the AGNA, i.e. 45% of Britain's 55,909 tons. The Germans might have been including the British submarines that were under construction, building or projected in their calculations, which would have increased their allowance to 33,446 tons, i.e. 45% of 74,324 tons.
The reason why the Germans might have done that is that the Admiralty was planning to increase its submarine fleet to 82 boats by the early 1940s as part of the new Two Power Standard Fleet that it thought was needed to fight Germany and Japan at the same time.
The situation at the end of 1938 was Royal Navy 56 submarines of 57,434 tons plus 15 boats of 16,780 tons building, on order or projected for a grand total of 71 boats of 74,214 tons. That translated into an allowance of 24,845 tons or 33,396 tons under the AGNA depending upon whether it was calculated on the tonnage of submarines that had been completed or the tonnages of the boats that were building, on order or projected were included. Both totals were considerably exceeded by the 111 U-boats of 53,969 tons completed, building or on order (and had been since 9th June 1938). All I can think of is that they knew that the British wanted a force of 82 submarines and calculated that it would have an aggregate displacement of around 120,000 tons. That's not implausible as the British O, P, R, Porpoise and Thames class submarines that made up the bulk of the existing force displaced 1,500 tons or more and 80 x 1,500 tons = 120,000 tons.
However, Germany invoked the clause of the Agreement that allowed it to have 100% of the British Commonwealth's submarines strength on 9th December 1938 so that point had been moot for 22 days.
The AGNA was abrogated on 28th April 1939. At that time Germany's running total (not including the U-Cruisers) had increased to 114 U-boats of 56,189 tons. I don't know the total for the Royal Navy by this date. However, the total at the outbreak of World War II was 57 boats of 59,529 tons, plus 16 of 17,440 tons building, on order or projected which made a grand total of 73 submarines of 76,969 tons. Germany's running total at this date was 130 U-boats of 66,914 tons.
AFAIK the Germans had ordered 36 U-boats with an aggregate standard displacement of 12,424 tons by that date.
The First London Naval Treaty's tonnage quotas expired on 31st December 1936. The Royal Navy's submarine strength at that date was 52 boats of 52,959 tons (so they were exceeding the Treaty by 259 tons) plus 14 boats of 14,495 tons under construction, on order or projected. Meanwhile, the Germans had increase their total to 55 U-boats of 24,031 tons which was 316 tons more than the AGNA allowed.
The Royal Navy had 58 submarines of 55,909 tons at the end of 1937 plus 18 boats of 18,415 tons under construction, on order or projected. Germany's running total had increased to 72 U-boats of 31,799 tons which is well in excess of the 25,159 tons that they were allowed under the AGNA, i.e. 45% of Britain's 55,909 tons. The Germans might have been including the British submarines that were under construction, building or projected in their calculations, which would have increased their allowance to 33,446 tons, i.e. 45% of 74,324 tons.
The reason why the Germans might have done that is that the Admiralty was planning to increase its submarine fleet to 82 boats by the early 1940s as part of the new Two Power Standard Fleet that it thought was needed to fight Germany and Japan at the same time.
The situation at the end of 1938 was Royal Navy 56 submarines of 57,434 tons plus 15 boats of 16,780 tons building, on order or projected for a grand total of 71 boats of 74,214 tons. That translated into an allowance of 24,845 tons or 33,396 tons under the AGNA depending upon whether it was calculated on the tonnage of submarines that had been completed or the tonnages of the boats that were building, on order or projected were included. Both totals were considerably exceeded by the 111 U-boats of 53,969 tons completed, building or on order (and had been since 9th June 1938). All I can think of is that they knew that the British wanted a force of 82 submarines and calculated that it would have an aggregate displacement of around 120,000 tons. That's not implausible as the British O, P, R, Porpoise and Thames class submarines that made up the bulk of the existing force displaced 1,500 tons or more and 80 x 1,500 tons = 120,000 tons.
However, Germany invoked the clause of the Agreement that allowed it to have 100% of the British Commonwealth's submarines strength on 9th December 1938 so that point had been moot for 22 days.
The AGNA was abrogated on 28th April 1939. At that time Germany's running total (not including the U-Cruisers) had increased to 114 U-boats of 56,189 tons. I don't know the total for the Royal Navy by this date. However, the total at the outbreak of World War II was 57 boats of 59,529 tons, plus 16 of 17,440 tons building, on order or projected which made a grand total of 73 submarines of 76,969 tons. Germany's running total at this date was 130 U-boats of 66,914 tons.
New rule.
Henceforth the OP of a thread about the Kriegsmarine in general or U-boats in particular must include a link to this piece of music.
The second S-word... Spain.
Franco does a Mussolini and declares war on Britain and France in June 1940 in the mistaken belief that the war's over bar negotiating the peace treaty.
Francisco (in common with his friend Benito) soon discovers that he's made a mistake of pavarottic proportions. Said mistake is that he's joined a war that's going to continue for years instead of the expected weeks (or at worst months) and not only that he's fighting a country whose substantial navy is between his country and a large part of his food supply, not to mention some other important odds and ends.
However, every cloud has a silver lining which is that Gibraltar instantly becomes untenable as an air and naval base due to its vulnerability to bombardment by Spanish artillery and will be starved into surrendering in a few months which will allow German surface warships to enter the Mediterranean and Italian surface warships to enter the Atlantic.
It's implausible but not impossible.
thaddeus
Donor
the KM was also lacking escorts, torpedo boats, and destroyers? so the rather slow British corvettes are not confronted by other ships, kinda leaving them to their ASW unbothered?
my suggestion(s) would be somewhat larger S-boats that could have been more effective minelayers, more M-boats armed with torpedoes, and scrap the "super-destroyer" concept in favor of TBs.