What if Germany did not invade Poland in 1939

If Germany do not take over Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and gain access to its raw materials, industry and especially gold reserve, the German economy promptly collapses. They could not afford the re-armament they were doing. It was the same thing in August 1939 - Germany had to go to war, or face economical collapse. One should remember that Germany entered the war with the same level of debt as a percentage of GDP as the Americans LEFT it with. . . . Thus Germany collapses, unable to pay for imports (oil, bauxite, copper, nickel, chrome, led, iron) they need to feed their industry, while France and Britain continues to build up.
Do you know who the debt was too?
I thought a majority of the imports into Germany came from the Soviet Union, were they only accepting gold at the time?
 
Everyone has made some very interesting points but you’re forgetting the original premise–Since Germany did not go to war in 1939, and Hitler cleverly drew in Chamberlain into his new eastern European policy, making the western nations believe he wants to settle the issue of redrawing the Versailles boundaries through peaceful means, Germany could have constructed its Zollverein and expand it to include all of eastern Europe and most of the Balkans. Thus Germany would have become the master of eastern Europe and have access to its raw materials, industry and especially gold reserve. The German economy would not have collapsed. Germany would have access to all the raw materials it needed, including oil from the Middle East. By not occupying the Czechs and convincing Poland to join his Axis, the British would have worked closer with Hitler. They did not have the stomach for war and those voices calling for war (led by Churchill) would have been isolated and ignored.
Without Britain backing up France, the French would not have the will to oppose Germany and the Little Entente would have collapsed after the Czechs and the Poles are brought within Germany’s sphere of influence. At the same time the French nation was undergoing internal divisions and if the war had not broke out in 1939, it is possible that France would have been so politically divided that they would have become impotent, and there is a 25% chance that France could have descended into a civil war. If this happened, Mussolini and Hitler would have supported the French military and nationalists as they did in the Spanish civil war. Hitler had already stated over and over that Germany was not interested in regaining the territories it lost to France and Belgium after the First World War. Hitler had greater game to hunt–Russia! He wrote in Mein Kampf that Germany should not make the same mistake of expansion in the west and south and concentration on acquiring living space in the east. Even if France did not collapse into civil war the French would have been isolated, surrounded by Spain, Italy and Germany with an unsympathetic Britain. Her only hope would have been to seek an alliance with Stalin. But this possibility would have only helped Hitler to increase his domination over all eastern Europe and the Balkans. Greece, which had a Fascist government that was sympathetic to Germany (it was Mussolini’s foolish attempt to invade Greece that drove the Greeks into the Allied camp in our time line) and Turkey would have moved closer to Germany since the British would not have objected. Even Yugoslavia would have joined Hitler’s “New Order” in eastern Europe, since in our time line they did join the Axis, and backed out due to the British supporting a rebellion that toppled the pro-Axis king.
A. J. P. Taylor wrote in his book: The origins of the Second World War, that Hitler did not want to re-fight the first world war. He wanted an alliance with Britain and Italy. With such an alliance he believed he could isolate France and neutralize her, freeing him to prepare for his war against the Soviet Union. He also believed that if war did break out with France, Germany could win quickly if France stood alone. If France does seek an alliance with Stalin, there is little France could do if war broke out between Germany and the Soviet Union. The British in this new time line would not oppose such a war and would be sympathetic to the Germans. Remember, Hitler becomes the ruler of most of Europe through peaceful means. And with Germans armies invading the Soviets, most of the French would probably be happy that the panzers were rolling eastward and not across France. They would have remained behind their Maginot line. This would probably happen between 1941 and 1943, that is if Stalin does not invade this German dominated Europe first.

A war for resources is not over. The US and France produce most of the world Bauxite.

A news paper report from April 25th 1935, Bauxite Trade plan to Hamper Berlin

A French decision to forbid exports of Bauxite raw material from which aluminum is made, served today to emphasize difficulties the Nazis are having in their efforts for military self sufficiency, determined to bring Germany back to the level of Europe’s great powers, Adolph Hitler aggressive administration is finding the marshaling of war materials, more trouble than the mobilization of men, France’s ban on Bauxite shipments, newspapers, and experts pointed out must seriously hamper the self sufficiency program since Germany producing no Bauxite herself, has been buying half her supply from France.
 
If Hitler had not been bent on occupying Bohemia and Moravia and asked the British to join him in agreeing to the Czech proposal, he would have gotten everything he wanted, plus not panicking either the Poles nor the British in signing an alliance aimed at Germany.

The Polish concerns began with the German demands around the corridor and an alliance, the German invasion of Czechia merely alerted the west to the immediate danger. Beck had walked a relatively pro-German line in his foreign policy but he had his limits.

The possibility of Hitler convincing the Poles to sign an alliance with Germany (against the Soviet Union), which included the annexation of the "Free" city of Danzig, (which was 95% Germany and had voted into power it own Nazi government in 1938) and the construction of a railway and highway across the Polish corridor, was quite possible.

A few hunting trips aren't going to convince the Poles to subjugate their economy and foreign policy to Germany. As always with these scenarios, it's important to note that the Polish government would struggle to sign any alliance with anyone, such was the divided nature of the ruling clique by the end of the thirties.
 
You fail to consider all changes. Move one goal post, moves many!

They are de-facto allied with Germany, and Poland now allied is not a threat.

Poland is under German influence, 38% are German and pro-Germany are pushed into positions controlling the country.

Germany now HAS the Polish Gold! (Some now, the rest later. Better than nearly nothing in OTL).

If Poland doesn't like it, let France protect them from the Reds. Germany or Russia, your choice. France only re-new the alliance at the last minute in OTL and didn't ratify it because war HAD already started.

Germany gets the whole of Poland, not half. And the Baltic two years earlier, without the cost of war (money, lives and machines).

The ledger shows lower costs, greater earnings (short and long term), and a expanded market, without hostile take overs :)

Instead of the Polish Officer Corps shot in the back of the head, they are more likely to fight for anti-communist forces. Similar for other Baltic states. The upper and middle classes wealth is not lost to the communist "redistribution".

The war on France and GB, can start at AH choosing. Earlier or later. And they don't have the advantage of others Gold to help

The 1931 census lists 740 000 German-speakers, or 2,3% in Poland 1931, where on earth do you get that 38% number? Is it everyone who is capable of speaking a few German words?
 
Do you know who the debt was too?
I thought a majority of the imports into Germany came from the Soviet Union, were they only accepting gold at the time?

40,7 million dollars, 51,5 million pounds and 2 775,2 million French Francs were the largest three debts to institutions in USA, Britain and France that the Germans defaulted on in 1939.

The Soviets really only started to supply the Germans (mostly on credit, which the Germans laughed about in 1941) winter 1939-40.

And Germany suddenly creating some strange anti-Soviet block and not getting into a Molotov-Ribbentrop pact means no Soviet raw materials.
 
How bad would the German recession in 1942 be in such a scenario?

We're probably talking a complete meltdown of the economy. The sheer amount of MEFOs and reichsmarks printed over-saturated the economy with currency, and the inability to import to keep consumer goods production up would mean more money and less goods to buy it with. We're probably talking 1923 level inflation again.
 

Deleted member 1487

If Germany do not take over Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and gain access to its raw materials, industry and especially gold reserve, the German economy promptly collapses. They could not afford the re-armament they were doing. It was the same thing in August 1939 - Germany had to go to war, or face economical collapse. One should remember that Germany entered the war with the same level of debt as a percentage of GDP as the Americans LEFT it with.

If Germany does not invade the rump Czechoslovakia or Poland, they must either restrict re-armament by 30% or collapse economically. As Hitler had already sacked Schacht for even suggesting a limit to re-armament, the former is unlikely. Thus Germany collapses, unable to pay for imports (oil, bauxite, copper, nickel, chrome, led, iron) they need to feed their industry, while France and Britain continues to build up.
I've not seen anything that indicates that was true; Germany had a number of suppliers via the barter system Schacht set up and Goering elaborated, especially in the Balkans, but increasingly again the USSR. Poland too was a major supplier as were the Baltic states, though the former started dropping off after the occupation of Bohemia, as Hitler started looking for a new foreign policy crisis to stimulate. Not having the Czech gold, but more importantly their industry and coal, as well as military stockpiles, would certainly hamper Hitler's foreign policy plans a lot (enough equipment was captured in March 1939 to equip or finish equipping 22 division), but the economy wouldn't implode. Things could potentially slow down economically as gold has to be horded a bit, but that is not the same as an economic implosion.
 
I've not seen anything that indicates that was true; Germany had a number of suppliers via the barter system Schacht set up and Goering elaborated, especially in the Balkans, but increasingly again the USSR. Poland too was a major supplier as were the Baltic states, though the former started dropping off after the occupation of Bohemia, as Hitler started looking for a new foreign policy crisis to stimulate. Not having the Czech gold, but more importantly their industry and coal, as well as military stockpiles, would certainly hamper Hitler's foreign policy plans a lot (enough equipment was captured in March 1939 to equip or finish equipping 22 division), but the economy wouldn't implode. Things could potentially slow down economically as gold has to be horded a bit, but that is not the same as an economic implosion.

The problem is that even through the barter system, the Germans were draining their gold and foreign currency reserves very quickly. They need to start exporting more, which means either cutting military re-armament or consumer production - and cutting consumer production means that there are massive amounts of MEFOs and reichsmarks in circulation but less and less goods to buy, which means a rapid inflation spiral, which means an economic implosion like in 1923.

Schacht warned Hitler this was about to happen in December 1938 and was sacked for even remotely suggesting re-armament be limited, in January 1939. By March the Germans were on their last legs. The Czechoslovak gold reserve bailed them out, but by September they were in the same situation again.
 

Deleted member 1487

The problem is that even through the barter system, the Germans were draining their gold and foreign currency reserves very quickly. They need to start exporting more, which means either cutting military re-armament or consumer production - and cutting consumer production means that there are massive amounts of MEFOs and reichsmarks in circulation but less and less goods to buy, which means a rapid inflation spiral, which means an economic implosion like in 1923.

Schacht warned Hitler this was about to happen in December 1938 and was sacked for even remotely suggesting re-armament be limited, in January 1939. By March the Germans were on their last legs. The Czechoslovak gold reserve bailed them out, but by September they were in the same situation again.
All Schact was saying was that rearmament couldn't continue at the current pace without more foreign exchange, not that the economy would implode; it would mean being forced to reduce armament to export more to raise money, so as Richard Overy noted in the 1970s about the 'flight to war' thesis that Hitler needed war with Poland in 1939 to prevent the economy from imploding, it wasn't an issue of the economy actually imploding, it was just that rearmament couldn't continue at the same pace; the economy would continue on just fine with lower rearmament and more exports (including military exports), but Hitler was more interested doing anything to ensure rearmament didn't drop off because he planned on war and couldn't fall behind in the arms race he touched off.
 
All Schact was saying was that rearmament couldn't continue at the current pace without more foreign exchange, not that the economy would implode; it would mean being forced to reduce armament to export more to raise money, so as Richard Overy noted in the 1970s about the 'flight to war' thesis that Hitler needed war with Poland in 1939 to prevent the economy from imploding, it wasn't an issue of the economy actually imploding, it was just that rearmament couldn't continue at the same pace; the economy would continue on just fine with lower rearmament and more exports (including military exports), but Hitler was more interested doing anything to ensure rearmament didn't drop off because he planned on war and couldn't fall behind in the arms race he touched off.

Yes, and Schacht was sacked for even hinting at reducing re-armament. It is pretty much evident that the nazis, who were not especially good at economics, would continue the re-armament until the economy imploded or there were war. With no invasion of Poland, the economy will implode.

Or the nazis do what Schacht told them, and reduced re-armament, which means they fall behind France and Britain in military power.
 

Deleted member 1487

Yes, and Schacht was sacked for even hinting at reducing re-armament. It is pretty much evident that the nazis, who were not especially good at economics, would continue the re-armament until the economy imploded or there were war. With no invasion of Poland, the economy will implode.

Or the nazis do what Schacht told them, and reduced re-armament, which means they fall behind France and Britain in military power.
Depends on what you mean by 'good at economics'. They (really just Hitler) viewed the end goal as total war, so was pushing the economy to the brink to ready the country for it, so in that sense 'good economics' in the sense of maintaining a balanced budget and stable economy was the opposite of the goal they were seeking, which was making sure the country was ready for all out war for continental domination. With that in mind their economic choices make total sense, though the execution of the 'plan' such as it existed, was flawed due to the Nazi political system and the virus of it having first to infect all aspects of the German government and bureacracy so they could go to war. They got a bonus for their 'vampire economics' that hollowed out the treasury by achieving full employment based on military spending in the meantime. In terms of 'no invasion means implosion', strictly speaking that isn't true. The economy was quite dynamic due to the style of production systems that German industry was based on, so they had the ability to shift to exports if they needed to in case of war not happening for some reason, its just a matter of the treasury being empty and having to go hand to mouth in terms of exporting to raise capital for raw material imports or barter deals they'd have to honor. The sticking point is slowing the bleeding of rearmament. So yes implosion would be theoretically possible if they refused to slow the pace of rearming, but just by lack of raw materials rearmament would cease and exports would rise, so unless there was complete and utter insanity and lack of acknowledgement of reality, the economy would adjust almost automatically due to weapons factories shutting down for lack of raw materials.
 
Depends on what you mean by 'good at economics'. They (really just Hitler) viewed the end goal as total war, so was pushing the economy to the brink to ready the country for it, so in that sense 'good economics' in the sense of maintaining a balanced budget and stable economy was the opposite of the goal they were seeking, which was making sure the country was ready for all out war for continental domination. With that in mind their economic choices make total sense, though the execution of the 'plan' such as it existed, was flawed due to the Nazi political system and the virus of it having first to infect all aspects of the German government and bureacracy so they could go to war. They got a bonus for their 'vampire economics' that hollowed out the treasury by achieving full employment based on military spending in the meantime. In terms of 'no invasion means implosion', strictly speaking that isn't true. The economy was quite dynamic due to the style of production systems that German industry was based on, so they had the ability to shift to exports if they needed to in case of war not happening for some reason, its just a matter of the treasury being empty and having to go hand to mouth in terms of exporting to raise capital for raw material imports or barter deals they'd have to honor. The sticking point is slowing the bleeding of rearmament. So yes implosion would be theoretically possible if they refused to slow the pace of rearming, but just by lack of raw materials rearmament would cease and exports would rise, so unless there was complete and utter insanity and lack of acknowledgement of reality, the economy would adjust almost automatically due to weapons factories shutting down for lack of raw materials.

Shift to export means less consumer goods for the same (already massively inflated) amount of currency, which will set off a massive inflation spiral and result in economical implosion, just like it did 1923.

Reduced re-armament means they fall behind France and Britain.

It is either war, reduced re-armament or economical implosion due to nazi economical inability. And the nazis sacked Schacht when he even suggested reduced re-armament.

The nazis were during the war involved in an economical war in Portugal and Spain over tungsten. Tungsten was needed as tips for drilling, lathing and cutting steel and was thus absolutely vital for the German war production. The prince of a ton of tungsten ore went from $75 to $18 500 in Spain during the war. The Allies were buying all they could to deny it to the Germans. Germany desperately needed all the gold they could get in this fight.

They still spent lots of gold to buy millions of cubic meters of Swedish granite to built monuments and prestige buildings at the same time.

It is beyond economical stupidity.
 
The 1931 census lists 740 000 German-speakers, or 2,3% in Poland 1931, where on earth do you get that 38% number? Is it everyone who is capable of speaking a few German words?

Looking for the original reference of 38% in 1938. That appears to be Danzig not whole of Poland.

However other figures bounces all over. Depends if include which areas, treaty half, etc. 2.3% is as much a gross underestimate

0AC05017-32C1-4B38-BC9E-79F142F3DE74-605-000000CE80A1F87E.png




After Nazi Germany's invasion of the Second Polish Republic in 1939, many members of the German minority (around 25%[14]) joined the ethnic German paramilitary organisation Volksdeutscher Selbstschutz. When the German occupation of Poland began, the Selbstschutz took an active part in Nazi crimes against ethnic Poles. Due to their pre-war interactions with the Polish majority, they were able to prepare lists of Polish intellectuals and civil servants whom the Nazis selected for extermination. The organisation actively participated and was responsible for the deaths of about 50,000 Poles.[15]


In 1931, the population of Poland was 31,916,000, including 15,428,000 males and 16,488,000 females. By January 1939, the population of Poland increased to 35,100,000. This total included 240,000 in Zaolzie which was under Polish control from October 1938 until August 1939.[28]

The '31 census is very dodgy. "mother tongue" is the question.

The classification of the ethnic groups in Poland during the Second Polish Republic is a disputed topic, Tadeusz Piotrowski maintains that the 1931 Polish census "involved questionable methodology, especially the use of mother tongue as an indicator of nationality", noting that it had underestimated the number of non-Poles. The official figures for nationality from the 1931 Polish census based on the mother tongue put the percentage of ethnic Poles at 68.9%, Jews 8.6% and other minority groups 22.5%., Piotrowski cited a study by the Polish historian Jerzy Tomaszewski that puts that the adjusted census figures(taking religious affiliation into account) of ethnic Poles at 64.7%, Jews 9.8% and other minority groups 25.5% of Poland's population.[30] Polish demographer Piotr Eberhardt maintains that it is commonly agreed that the criterion of declared language to classify ethnic groups led to an overestimation of the number of Poles in pre-war Poland. He notes that in general, the numbers declaring a particular language do not mesh with the numbers declaring the corresponding nationality. Members of ethnic minority groups believe that the language criterion led to an overestimation of Poles.[31]

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There is a big problem when talking Germans in Poland. The Germans considered anyone capable of speaking German and living within the 1914 German borders as a German, regardless of wether they spoke Polish as their main language and considered themselves Polish. Plenty of others that spoke German registered as Volksdeutsche during the war due to the bigger rations and better job prospects they had as such.

In fact, the Polish II. Corps in Italy and the 1. Armoured Division in France replaced casualties by going to the PoW camps and speaking Polish to the German soldiers. Those that could reply and carry a conversation were often Poles that had either voluntarily or forcibly been registered as Germans or Volksdeutsche and drafted. They were offered to switch sides and many did.

Your list includes less than 600 000 Germans, which is even less than the 740 000 of the 1931 census.

Even if the number of Poles is exhaggerated, Poland was not 38% German. At max, it was 5% German. There's Jews, Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Russians and Byelorussians as well.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Even if the number of Poles is exhaggerated, Poland was not 38% German. At max, it was 5% German. There's Jews, Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Russians and Byelorussians as well.

They probably are also counting Yiddish as a German Dialect, and so Jews were German. I have seen this a lot in the pre - 1923 stuff. Not sure if Nazi also did this sleight of hand.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
To answer the question of: What would have happened if Hitler did not ordered the invasion of Poland in September 1939, we have to first alter the events that lead up to the invasion of Poland. The first event was in 1936 when Hitler named von Ribbentrop foreign minister instead of Goering. Goering covered the post of Germany's foreign minister and Hitler was inclined to appoint him to that post. What changed his mind was Ribbentrop's success as foreign minister to Great Britain, when in 1935 he convinced the British to sign an Anglo-German naval treaty in which Germany agreed to limit its navy to 35% of the British navy. Hitler was convinced that this was the first step in his dream of an Anglo-German alliance and convinced himself Ribbentrop was "another Bismarck." (Hitler's words, not mine.) Ribbentrop's appointment to Foreign minister turned out to be a disaster for Hitler when it came time for Hitler to try and sign an alliance with Poland in 1939. Ribbentrop was arrogant and insulting to the Polish leaders (who lead a "fascist-military dictatorship). Goering on the other hand, had cultivated a friendship with the Polish leaders for several years. He had invaded them to go hunting on his estate in northern Germany and on several occasions he was invited to join the Polish leader on their hunting excursion in Poland. They trusted Goering. The second mistake Hitler made was the occupation of the rump state of "Czechia" (as the region of Bohemia and Moravia were referred to at the time) after the partition of Czechoslovakia in 1938. The Slovaks (with the encouragement of the Nazi government) wanted to separate from the Czechs and create an independent Slovakia. Hitler used this crisis as an excuse to invade the Czech portion of the Czecho-Slovakia. This panicked the Poles into signing a treaty with Britain in which Britain "had" to come to their aid if Germany (or any other power) violated Poland's boarder. But Hitler did not have to invade Bohemia and Moravia because the Czech president had already agreed to give the Slovaks their independence and was willing to join an independent Czech state with Germany in an economic custom union and agree not to sign any agreement with any foreign power, literally transforming a Czech state into Germany's sphere of influence with only one provision by Germany--not to occupy the new Czech state with German troops. If Hitler had not been bent on occupying Bohemia and Moravia and asked the British to join him in agreeing to the Czech proposal, he would have gotten everything he wanted, plus not panicking either the Poles nor the British in signing an alliance aimed at Germany. The possibility of Hitler convincing the Poles to sign an alliance with Germany (against the Soviet Union), which included the annexation of the "Free" city of Danzig, (which was 95% Germany and had voted into power it own Nazi government in 1938) and the construction of a railway and highway across the Polish corridor, was quite possible. Hitler would probably have signed agreements with the three Baltic states (Lithuania had rushed to sign an agreement with German in 1939 and returned the former German city of Memel to Germany), incorporating them into Germany's sphere of influence and the formation of an extended German-Soviet boarder that he wanted in a future invasion of the Soviet Union.

We have had long discussions about how flexible Hitler was mentally, but to run with your idea. What happens is that German is never strong enough to take on either France/UK or Russia. You get a German state of prewar Germany, Austria, and Sudetenland. The Nazi probably badly manage the tradeoff between arms and civilian production, but the party survives. Hitler will die before 1955, IMO, due to drugs given to him by his doctor. Over time, the new German state will grow to be seen as the natural, stable outcome of WW1. And world attention will shift elsewhere. Once the German naval construction falls a half decade or so behind schedule, the UK will find other things to keep their attention. Stalin will misbehave somewhere. Japan is messing around in China. Mussolini is likely to cause a couple more diplomatic crisis, possibly of a colonial nature. Over time, Germany and possibly some allies (client states?) will be needed in someone coalition.

Or Hitler starts a war anyway in the early 1940's, and it is a very short war ending in a German loss.
 
There is a big problem when talking Germans in Poland. The Germans considered anyone capable of speaking German and living within the 1914 German borders as a German, regardless of wether they spoke Polish as their main language and considered themselves Polish. Plenty of others that spoke German registered as Volksdeutsche during the war due to the bigger rations and better job prospects they had as such.

In fact, the Polish II. Corps in Italy and the 1. Armoured Division in France replaced casualties by going to the PoW camps and speaking Polish to the German soldiers. Those that could reply and carry a conversation were often Poles that had either voluntarily or forcibly been registered as Germans or Volksdeutsche and drafted. They were offered to switch sides and many did.

Your list includes less than 600 000 Germans, which is even less than the 740 000 of the 1931 census.

Even if the number of Poles is exhaggerated, Poland was not 38% German. At max, it was 5% German. There's Jews, Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Russians and Byelorussians as well.

Fair cop.

The 600k is only in the western half, pre-war, so expect a lot less than the 740k. That said the map shows the western border is German dominated, and reflects the artificial nature of Poland's borders.

The regions that the Nazis (and Reds) want is coastal strip and cities. Regardless of percentages, Germans had many positions in industry / power, in Poland and Baltic.

For the Poles, it's not a great position. They have fought the Reds, by the late '30s, the minorites know of Satlin's terror and collectives, the Roman Catholic Church know of religious destruction.

There was a joke going round Poland in the '80s with "Solidarity", when it feared invasion by the Soviets sums up Poland.

"If the Warsaw Pact invaded Poland, who would you shoot first, the East German or a Russian...?

The German,...
business before pleasure."
 
Fair cop.

The 600k is only in the western half, pre-war, so expect a lot less than the 740k. That said the map shows the western border is German dominated, and reflects the artificial nature of Poland's borders.

The regions that the Nazis (and Reds) want is coastal strip and cities. Regardless of percentages, Germans had many positions in industry / power, in Poland and Baltic.

For the Poles, it's not a great position. They have fought the Reds, by the late '30s, the minorites know of Satlin's terror and collectives, the Roman Catholic Church know of religious destruction.

There was a joke going round Poland in the '80s with "Solidarity", when it feared invasion by the Soviets sums up Poland.

"If the Warsaw Pact invaded Poland, who would you shoot first, the East German or a Russian...?

The German,...
business before pleasure."

Yes, but western Poland is where the German minority in Poland lived, there were very few Germans in Congress Poland and the parts of 1939 Poland that is today part of Byelorussia and Ukraine.

The German minority in Estonia and Latvia had lost their position of power after the land reforms of the 1920s, and neither country had any serious industry to speak of. The German minority in either country was also very unpopular with the locals, which is why the Heim ins Reich movement was so successful there - the Baltic Germans were moving to Germany during the 30s.

I don't argue about the Poles hating and fearing the Soviets - however, in 1939 the Poles had actually defeated the Soviets on their own 18 years earlier and had no real reason to fear the Soviets were coming back anytime soon. Stalin may have been a bloody butchering bastard, but on the international scene he was a cautious oppurtunist. He only went after Eastern Europe after making the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and Germany and the Western Allies being at war with each other. And even so, Eastern Europe did not turn to Germany for protection and help until after France had fallen and Germany was the undisputed hegemon of continental Europe and it looked like Britain would sue for peace at any time.

If Germany does not invade Poland and is not at war with France, the Soviets will not invade the Baltic countries and Finland, which means that Eastern Europe will not turn to Germany for protection, which again means that Germany will not get the "administer" the Slovak, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Romanian gold reserves and buy Romanian oil on credit. They will also not capture Yugoslavia's $69 000 000 gold reserve.

One also needs to remember that the nearly doubled size of the Heer that the Germans armed 1940-41 were funded by plundering France, the Netherlands and Belgium as well as Poland. And without going to war with Poland, the OTL re-armament 1939-40 will also be seriously stunted, or Germany faced economical collapse.

Germany will look a LOT weaker than OTL and the Soviets far less threatening. There's no reason for the Eastern European states to align with Germany.
 
If Germany does not invade Poland and is not at war with France, the Soviets will not invade the Baltic countries and Finland, which means that Eastern Europe will not turn to Germany for protection, which again means that Germany will not get the "administer" the Slovak, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Romanian gold reserves and buy Romanian oil on credit. They will also not capture Yugoslavia's $69 000 000 gold reserve.

I wouldn't bet on this.

There was no certainty for Finland and the Baltics. Germany sat on its hands with Finland, to not upset the Pact.

The "barrier" nations had no choice. Neutrality didn't protect anyone, on the invasion routes.


The Soviet Union is a very different nation to the one 18 years earlier. Not a mess, no civil war / post revolution, and no Satlin.

Ukraine and Georgia and co, know this to their displeasure.
 
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