What if Germany attacked France in 1905?

If there really was an unresolved conflict, Schlieffen wouldn't retire in the middle of it, especially if war was just about to start. That would disorganize the general staff too much in the middle of a crisis.

:rolleyes: :confused:
IOTL von Schlieffen retired on January 1st, 1906. Germany had called up reserve units December 30th, 1905 and France began amassing troops along the border January 3rd, 1906. Obviously von Schlieffen would and did retire, regardless of any 'unresolved conflict.'

As for the rest, you can't merely set the Schlieffen Plan aside, as it is the primary component of contention in this debate. von Schlieffen's memorandum was a critique of the current German war plans and a suggestion of what should be done. If the Germans are using a 'Verdun Sweep' than von Schlieffen's critiques come into play, primarily being that the Germans don't have enough, and heavy enough, siege howitzers to take out the borders fortifications they will encounter (either in France or the Low Countries), and even by taking such a route they gain little as there are not enough parallel roads through that terrain that would be available to the Germans to facilitate the necessary rapid transfer of men and material needed to quickly close on the French flank before their opposite has time to properly react. As well, though the Germans had an enormous population lead over the French, according to von Schlieffen they didn't have enough troops to make the necessary actions required for the sweep while simultaneously keeping the French busy along the border.

Care to provide sources?

Your own source! Even Zuber explicitly states in Inventing the Schlieffen plan: German war planning, 1871-1914 that prior to the adaption of Plan XVbis in late spring 1906 the French plan dictated to hold a strong defensive line along the border, with reservist waiting to counter-attack once the German advance had been halted. Jeez, you've quoted these two sources enough I would have expected you to pick up on that right away.

Also what were the mistakes of the Franco-Prussia war? That the French allowed themselves to be tied to their forts and trapped. So your described plan has them cleaving to their forts again, something tried in 1870 with disastrous results. Though warfare had changed, do you really think French generals would try to do the same thing again?

The problem France faced in the Franco-Prussian War is the opposite of what will happen in this TL's Second Franco-Prussian War; numerical superiority. In 1870 the French had a professional, regular standing army of ~400,000 troops. Opposite them the Prussians and her German allies (satellite states) relied on conscripted armies, allowing for them to raise a force of some 1.2 million for the war. Here though, the French have a large standing army of universal conscription, and the Germans only use partial conscription, making up for the lack due to the population difference. The Germans won't be able to simply walk around the French and encircle them like they did in 1870, nor will they be able to effectively 'zerg-rush' them, nor will the war last long enough for them to suddenly install full conscription and draft, equip and train every able body they could use due to the earlier raised issue of the nitrates.

20 Machine guns or 2000 makes a massive difference. If just some light infantry had it or every regiment in the active army, we have a completely different debate. Now as far as the Germans bayonet charging forts, minus the one instance of trying to take Liege by surprise in 1914, the Germans and just about anyone else with combat experience ever in the history of warfare knows not to throw infantry against forts. That is PRECISELY the reason Germany invested so heavily in howitzers prewar. In fact they have more howitzers than any other army on the planet even at this time, for which they intend to use against French forts and field works (if they have any, French doctrine never called for them after the 1890's). If anything the Germans would approach the French fortifications and use the howitzers to blast a path forward. I'm not saying it wouldn't be bloody, but bayonet charges against forts was not doctrine...infantry on the other hand, yes.

:confused: I'm not, and never have, suggested 'bayonet charges;' I'm saying the Germans will do exactly as you say. They will use infantry rushed in conjuncture with whatever field artillery pieces they can move in place. The issue is that they don't have enough, or big enough siege howitzers to break open all of, or even a plurality of, the French forts. I cannot stress this enough, and it seems to be one of if not the biggest point of contention between us in this debate. A dozen nigh-immobile 350mm pieces does not a siege train make, not when the Germans will have to be cracking down forts left and right up and down the entire French field if they wish to press forward. Even if, IF, the Germans do execute some sort of proto-Schlieffen Plan they will still need the heavy siege guns to break down the Belgian forts.


From what we have been arguing. :rolleyes: :(
Ugh, now you're simply confusing me, I feel like your arguments are beginning to track in circles.
 

Deleted member 1487

:rolleyes: :confused:
IOTL von Schlieffen retired on January 1st, 1906. Germany had called up reserve units December 30th, 1905 and France began amassing troops along the border January 3rd, 1906. Obviously von Schlieffen would and did retire, regardless of any 'unresolved conflict.'
Now I thought we were going from the OP that the war started in 1905? OTL the German politicians were planning to back down from any violence if the matter truly came to a head, so I assume Schlieffen wasn't to worried about the situation. Still he did choose an odd time to retire.

As for the rest, you can't merely set the Schlieffen Plan aside, as it is the primary component of contention in this debate. von Schlieffen's memorandum was a critique of the current German war plans and a suggestion of what should be done. If the Germans are using a 'Verdun Sweep' than von Schlieffen's critiques come into play, primarily being that the Germans don't have enough, and heavy enough, siege howitzers to take out the borders fortifications they will encounter (either in France or the Low Countries), and even by taking such a route they gain little as there are not enough parallel roads through that terrain that would be available to the Germans to facilitate the necessary rapid transfer of men and material needed to quickly close on the French flank before their opposite has time to properly react. As well, though the Germans had an enormous population lead over the French, according to von Schlieffen they didn't have enough troops to make the necessary actions required for the sweep while simultaneously keeping the French busy along the border.
You're the one that said we must set the Schlieffen plan aside because it came after the OP! :confused:
The 'Schlieffen Plan' and the German war plan of 1905 were two different things, though they shared some elements. The 'Verdun Sweep' existed in both, though Schlieffen had a stronger version of it in his notes. As to the siege artillery at the border...Schlieffen's Plan tackled Liege, the 1905 pre-Schlieffen Plan did not IIRC. That is going from Herrmann's book. Schlieffen's claim about German strength was a gambit for more funding and universal conscription, not fact. Much like Conrad's claim that the Italians were overtaking the Austro-Hungarians after 1907 was complete fantasy.

Your own source! Even Zuber explicitly states in Inventing the Schlieffen plan: German war planning, 1871-1914 that prior to the adaption of Plan XVbis in late spring 1906 the French plan dictated to hold a strong defensive line along the border, with reservist waiting to counter-attack once the German advance had been halted. Jeez, you've quoted these two sources enough I would have expected you to pick up on that right away.
I do not own a copy of Zuber's book and right now google books is limiting the pages I can look at. But note that holding a line along the border is forward of the French forts, many of which were several miles to the rear. There seems to be a bit of a problem here with Zuber, as Herrmann says something different. I am inclined to believe Herrmann, because he did more research with French primary documents than Zuber, who nearly exclusively focuses on the German side in his research. Though I don't have any major problems with Zuber about German topics, his claims about the French do require a bit of caution.

Note too that I was only quoting Zuber about German planning, not French plans. What were your other sources? You claimed that:
Everything I've ever read on the subject, ever, points to a France that is intensely focused on defeating their German foes properly and not making the same mistakes of the past.
So I assume you've read something else about French at this period?

The problem France faced in the Franco-Prussian War is the opposite of what will happen in this TL's Second Franco-Prussian War; numerical superiority. In 1870 the French had a professional, regular standing army of ~400,000 troops. Opposite them the Prussians and her German allies (satellite states) relied on conscripted armies, allowing for them to raise a force of some 1.2 million for the war. Here though, the French have a large standing army of universal conscription, and the Germans only use partial conscription, making up for the lack due to the population difference. The Germans won't be able to simply walk around the French and encircle them like they did in 1870, nor will they be able to effectively 'zerg-rush' them, nor will the war last long enough for them to suddenly install full conscription and draft, equip and train every able body they could use due to the earlier raised issue of the nitrates.
The German army outnumbered the French by a wide margin in 1905
http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1914m/schlieffen.html. I can't find a link with the size of the French forces, but with the reserves the Germans outnumbered them by several corps (around 6 IIRC).

:confused: I'm not, and never have, suggested 'bayonet charges;' I'm saying the Germans will do exactly as you say. They will use infantry rushed in conjuncture with whatever field artillery pieces they can move in place. The issue is that they don't have enough, or big enough siege howitzers to break open all of, or even a plurality of, the French forts. I cannot stress this enough, and it seems to be one of if not the biggest point of contention between us in this debate. A dozen nigh-immobile 350mm pieces does not a siege train make, not when the Germans will have to be cracking down forts left and right up and down the entire French field if they wish to press forward. Even if, IF, the Germans do execute some sort of proto-Schlieffen Plan they will still need the heavy siege guns to break down the Belgian forts.
Previous comments made it sound like you were suggesting that infantry would launch human wave assaults on French defenses and walk into fire like lemmings. The Germans had several tens of howitzer brigades (of calibers over 210mm) that would support such attacks by lying down covering fire to allow the infantry to try and move in by short rushes, which in turn would allow the artillery to inch its way forward. Depending on how the French deployed this may not even happen, as sapping and regular siege plans were run by the engineers rather than the infantry. While it would be correct to say that in an open maneuver battle that both sides would go after each other with bayonets, when attacking forts the Germans had learned from the Russo-Japanese war. It was cited as an exampled earlier of German doctrine, but from what I've read the Germans were appalled by the gross distortion of their teachings as wave after wave of Japanese infantry sacrificed themselves for the emperor. The Germans of 1905 were not the Japanese, nor were they expected to do things like that. Siege warfare doctrine and maneuver warfare against mobile infantry are two different things.
 
Now I thought we were going from the OP that the war started in 1905? OTL the German politicians were planning to back down from any violence if the matter truly came to a head, so I assume Schlieffen wasn't to worried about the situation. Still he did choose an odd time to retire.

I've been working under the assumption of first Moroccan Crisis from the get-go, as that has been the casus belli the board decided to be most likely and still fit the OP. Germany isn't going to, and can't, just up and declare war on France simply 'for the lulz' after all.

You're the one that said we must set the Schlieffen plan aside because it came after the OP! :confused:

No. This is an enormous misconstruction of what I have been saying this entire time ITT. I've never stated that we must set the Schlieffen Plan aside for the terms of the debate; I've said that ITTL (and IOTL) there is no Schlieffen 'Plan' until von Moltke the Younger largely creates it out of von Schlieffen's memorandum in late 1906 and early 1907. We can, and must, still look the many flaws von Schlieffen critiques in the German War plan during the first Moroccan Crisis. This will apply to both a proto-Schlieffen Plan and the 'Verdun Sweep.'

As to the siege artillery at the border...Schlieffen's Plan tackled Liege, the 1905 pre-Schlieffen Plan did not IIRC

The comment above would seek to imply that though their neutrality has been molested and their country invaded, if/when the Germans by-pass Liege onto attacking the French flank the Belgians will just completely ignore the Germans within (and without) their boarders, especially the all-important and all-but-irreplaceable heavy siege guns, and the critical German supply lines.

Schlieffen's claim about German strength was a gambit for more funding and universal conscription, not fact

Citation needed. An actual citation, showing that Germany had the required resources to over-run the French in 1905/06, not the obviously flavored opinion of any one historian.

You can't say;
The German army outnumbered the French by a wide margin in 1905
and then claim;
I can't find a link with the size of the French forces

If you don't know the sizes of both sides, how can you ever think to say one side is larger than the other?

Previous comments made it sound like you were suggesting that infantry would launch human wave assaults on French defenses and walk into fire like lemmings.

Even with artillery support, this is essentially what it will come down to. The Germans will not blindly surge forward with bayonets fixed against fortified installations, but they will still have to attempt to launch offensive waves of assault with their infantry to try and take the forts. The 210mm howitzers simply won't be big enough to crack the forts on their own, and the 350mm siege guns will be far and few between, and very slow in coming up to each fortification.
 
Alsace-Lorraine

So if let's say late 1907 early 1908 Germany sue for peace what will be the outcome of the negotiation? Would France regain Alsace-Lorraine?
 
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