What if German-Polish War of 1933

What if German-Polish War of 1933

In 1933, Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Germany. Since he had openly declared his desire to repudiate the Versailles Treaty, rearm Germany, and seize land necessary for German “living space,” it was not unreasonable to assume that the Nazi regime was intent on military conquest. Yet as soon as he gained power, Hitler began preaching peace. At international forums, the Germans proclaimed they were only seeking equality with fellow nations, and that as soon as their legitimate grievances were adjudicated, they would live peacefully with their neighbors.

Although Hitler had made numerous statements to the contrary, the Great Powers (Britain and France) were fearful of provoking Germany. Rather than point out contradictions and blatant treaty violations, they preferred to be officially ignorant of obvious facts. Instead of collective resolve, Hitler was treated to appeasement, a policy that allowed him to advance preparations for what would be the greatest tragedy in history.

However, one prominent European statesman not only recognized the Nazi threat, but was also determined to do something about it. Józef Piłsudski, the leader of the Polish state, had ample experience with the aggressive tendencies of his neighbors. Germany and Russia had conspired to partition Poland in 1795, leading to over a century of enslavement before the country was liberated in the aftermath of WWI. For well over a decade, Piłsudski had seen Europe’s collective security system erode, and noticed that his ostensive allies were becoming increasingly willing to abandon Poland to avoid conflict with Germany.

Having observed countless international conferences where German demands were satisfied, only to be met with new delays and grievances, he recognized that the Nazi’s regime was not acting in good faith. He knew Germany was bent on regaining her “lost” Polish lands. Piłsudski believed Hitler was pursuing what appeared to be peaceful policies as a means of advancing his revisionist agenda only because he lacked, for the time being, the military means to accomplish his goals. Ultimately, the Nazi threat could only be stopped by force, or at least the credible threat of force. Piłsudski was not opposed to peaceful resolutions; he just doubted they were possible in this case, and viewed an attack on Germany as a justifiable defense of the Polish state.

Recognizing that Hitler was immune to normal diplomacy, Piłsudski began preparations for a preventive war. Unlike the situation in 1939, in March 1933, Poland was in a position to carry out this threat. As Hitler knew, the Polish army possessed more than 250,000 highly trained and well-equipped soldiers. Although in the initial stages of secretly rearming, in 1933 the German military had no modern weapons, namely airplanes, tanks, or armored cars, and according to the terms of the Versailles Treaty its army was limited to 100,000 men. Piłsudski was prepared to send Polish troops to occupy Danzig, East Prussia, and possibly Upper Silesia, while France would march through the Rhineland into the Ruhr. The move would expose the weakness of the boisterous young Nazi regime, humiliate Hitler, and possibly remove him from power. The occupying troops would then refuse to evacuate German territory until the Reich made assurances to honor the peace treaty.

While the details are murky due to his preference for secret diplomacy, according to some reports Piłsudski made this proposal on several occasions to the French, but was repeatedly rebuffed. France would not act without Britain, and the British not only refused to participate, but intimated they might support Germany if Poland was determined the aggressor.

In the end, the preventive war against Germany never materialized. But Piłsudski, who had defeated the Red Army without Western assistance in 1920, was apparently prepared to ignore international consensus and order unilateral action to defend the Polish state. Significantly, Hitler — who understood Piłsudski was not prone to issue empty threats — believed this to be true. Poland used the threat of preventive war to maneuver Germany into a series of agreements designed to buy time to prepare for the inevitable war Piłsudski saw coming.

Unfortunately, the Polish leader died in 1935. Poland, which had lost its brief military superiority, was attacked and overwhelmed by Germany in 1939. It will never be known if Piłsudski’s preventive war could have eliminated the Nazi threat. What is known is that without it, millions of Poles were killed and the survivors condemned to another half century of enslavement.
 
To recycle a post of mine from a couple of months ago:

***

I am skeptical of the notion that Pilsudski proposed a preventive war in 1933, though clearly some people at the time believed there was some such proposal. Jan Karski discusses this in some detail in *The Great Powers and Poland: From Versailles to Yalta*: "There is no evidence that he contemplated a preventive war, nor is there any direct documentary evidence of specific proposals forwarded to Paris or London. Nevertheless, many of his contemporaries believed that Pilsudski suggested some concerted international action. Others thought his initiative was nothing but a myth created by his admirers..." http://books.google.com/books?id=1zelAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA114

"..Pilsudski's alleged proposals were not corroborated by the French statesmen in office at that time. When General Maxime Weygand, head of the French army, was asked for comment in 1953, he observed curtly that he 'never heard of such an initiative by Pilsudski.' Foreign minister Joseph Paul-Boncour; prime minister Édouard Daladier; and General d'Arbonneau, military attaché in Warsaw, also stated years later that they were unaware of any Polish proposals for military action..." http://books.google.com/books?id=1zelAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA117

Unfortunately, this is a situation where there is no direct evidence and where both sides have a motive to deceive. For Pilsudski's friends, to claim that there was such an initiative and that the French turned it down helps to justify the 1934 Non-Aggression Pact and subsequent conciliatory Polish moves toward Nazi Germany. OTOH, the French political and military leaders obviously had every motive to later deny there was any such initiative, and thus to escape blame for not stopping Hitler at an early stage. The fact that there were undoubtedly *rumors* of such an initiative in 1933 proves very little, because such rumors might have been part of a strategy by Pilsudski to pressure Hitler into relaxing his terms for a German-Polish pact. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Polish_Non-Aggression_Pact

The one thing that seems certain to me is that if there had been such a proposal, France would have turned it down. Occupying the Rhineland had been burdensome for France; how much more difficult would it be to try to occupy all of Germany!

As for the UK--forget it. Most British Conservatives, while not particularly sympathizing with National Socialism, regarded Bolshevism as the greater menace.
 
To recycle a post of mine from a couple of months ago:

***

I am skeptical of the notion that Pilsudski proposed a preventive war in 1933, though clearly some people at the time believed there was some such proposal. Jan Karski discusses this in some detail in *The Great Powers and Poland: From Versailles to Yalta*: "There is no evidence that he contemplated a preventive war, nor is there any direct documentary evidence of specific proposals forwarded to Paris or London. Nevertheless, many of his contemporaries believed that Pilsudski suggested some concerted international action. Others thought his initiative was nothing but a myth created by his admirers..." http://books.google.com/books?id=1zelAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA114

"..Pilsudski's alleged proposals were not corroborated by the French statesmen in office at that time. When General Maxime Weygand, head of the French army, was asked for comment in 1953, he observed curtly that he 'never heard of such an initiative by Pilsudski.' Foreign minister Joseph Paul-Boncour; prime minister Édouard Daladier; and General d'Arbonneau, military attaché in Warsaw, also stated years later that they were unaware of any Polish proposals for military action..." http://books.google.com/books?id=1zelAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA117

Unfortunately, this is a situation where there is no direct evidence and where both sides have a motive to deceive. For Pilsudski's friends, to claim that there was such an initiative and that the French turned it down helps to justify the 1934 Non-Aggression Pact and subsequent conciliatory Polish moves toward Nazi Germany. OTOH, the French political and military leaders obviously had every motive to later deny there was any such initiative, and thus to escape blame for not stopping Hitler at an early stage. The fact that there were undoubtedly *rumors* of such an initiative in 1933 proves very little, because such rumors might have been part of a strategy by Pilsudski to pressure Hitler into relaxing his terms for a German-Polish pact. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Polish_Non-Aggression_Pact

The one thing that seems certain to me is that if there had been such a proposal, France would have turned it down. Occupying the Rhineland had been burdensome for France; how much more difficult would it be to try to occupy all of Germany!

As for the UK--forget it. Most British Conservatives, while not particularly sympathizing with National Socialism, regarded Bolshevism as the greater menace.
But Poland of 1933 is stronger than Germany of 1933, ore am i wrong.
 
If Poland did this I could see the British blockading Poland to end the conflict quickly and Germany able to play the victim EVEN MORE than our timeline (creating a legitimate reason for the Germans to rebuild their military, ie to protect against further unprovoked aggression). There may even be sympathy to return Danzig to Germany in TTL. Even if the Poles succeeded, trying to occupy Germany would be a nightmare for them (the Freikorps is alive and well) and would also make them a pariah state.

The aftermath of this debacle could see Poland struggle to make the Little Entente more relevant (unilateral action proved a failure) or be more receptive to Soviet support which would only increase British support for the Germans.
 
Last edited:
If Poland did this I could see the British blockading Poland to end the conflict quickly and Germany able to play the victim EVEN MORE than our timeline (creating a legitimate reason for the Germans to rebuild their military, ie to protect against further unprovoked aggression). There may even be sympathy to return Danzig to Germany in TTL. Even if the Poles succeeded, trying to occupy Germany would be a nightmare for them (the Freikorps is alive and well) and would also make them a pariah state.

The aftermath of this debacle could see Poland struggle to make the Little Entente more relevant (unilateral action proved a failure) or be more receptive to Soviet support which would only increase British support for the Germans.
Never have toughed of this, Hitler making Germany the victim of a Polish attack on them, nice idea.
 
But Poland of 1933 is stronger than Germany of 1933, ore am i wrong.

All sorts of countries in 1933 were militarily stronger than Germany. But that's different from saying that as a practical matter they could invade Germany and occupy it indefinitely, especially against the opposition of most other European countries. Even France in the 1920's found that even a *limited* occupation was politically untenable.
 
All sorts of countries in 1933 were militarily stronger than Germany. But that's different from saying that as a practical matter they could invade Germany and occupy it indefinitely, especially against the opposition of most other European countries. Even France in the 1920's found that even a *limited* occupation was politically untenable.
So what would Poland aim than in a war with Germany.
 
Well Danzig as a free city would cause an international incident. East Prussia is probably the easiest although Konigsberg could be a nasty siege.

The war would be won or lost in Silesia. Although Poland would probably lose the peace settlement but gain its political objectives - Adolf would be toast as a leader of Germany. He just won't have the resources to beat Poland and a second armistice in 15 years is going to be the end of his career
 
Honestly I suspect the model for this war would be the Iran-Iraq War with Poland playing the role of Iraq.
 
And who would support who in this war.

Honestly Poland randomly deciding to attack one of their neighbours, I suspect the Poles would have very few friends, France likely say some supportive words, but I don't think they're willing to go to war over Poland deciding invading Germany was a good idea.

The good news even through Germany likely will win, the war will likely take several years and the territories Germany will gain from Poland include some of the main war goal of the non-insane German elite. So if the Nazi Regime survives the war, they will likely have a hard time to make the population and elite "okaying" a new war. Also this war happens before Hitler have purged the state structures, which makes a post-War purge much harder. So ironic this may serve to moderate the Nazi, because they will be forced to unite German society and compromise with the groups they purged in OTL. Still going to suck to be Jewish in Germany.
 
Honestly Poland randomly deciding to attack one of their neighbours, I suspect the Poles would have very few friends, France likely say some supportive words, but I don't think they're willing to go to war over Poland deciding invading Germany was a good idea.

The good news even through Germany likely will win, the war will likely take several years and the territories Germany will gain from Poland include some of the main war goal of the non-insane German elite. So if the Nazi Regime survives the war, they will likely have a hard time to make the population and elite "okaying" a new war. Also this war happens before Hitler have purged the state structures, which makes a post-War purge much harder. So ironic this may serve to moderate the Nazi, because they will be forced to unite German society and compromise with the groups they purged in OTL. Still going to suck to be Jewish in Germany.
Do not think Poland wants ore will get Soviet backing, the Polish government remembers all to well what happen 13 years ago.
 
Honestly Poland randomly deciding to attack one of their neighbours, I suspect the Poles would have very few friends, France likely say some supportive words, but I don't think they're willing to go to war over Poland deciding invading Germany was a good idea.

The good news even through Germany likely will win, the war will likely take several years and the territories Germany will gain from Poland include some of the main war goal of the non-insane German elite. So if the Nazi Regime survives the war, they will likely have a hard time to make the population and elite "okaying" a new war. Also this war happens before Hitler have purged the state structures, which makes a post-War purge much harder. So ironic this may serve to moderate the Nazi, because they will be forced to unite German society and compromise with the groups they purged in OTL. Still going to suck to be Jewish in Germany.
In '33? Germany is quickly defeated, or rather cuts its losses and gives Poland what she wants as long as it is not Berlin. Polish army after mobilization is good enough to defeat Reichswehr and whatever paramilitary Germans can raise. Now, what happens five to ten years later is another matter...
 
Honestly Poland randomly deciding to attack one of their neighbours, I suspect the Poles would have very few friends, France likely say some supportive words, but I don't think they're willing to go to war over Poland deciding invading Germany was a good idea.

The good news even through Germany likely will win, the war will likely take several years and the territories Germany will gain from Poland include some of the main war goal of the non-insane German elite. So if the Nazi Regime survives the war, they will likely have a hard time to make the population and elite "okaying" a new war. Also this war happens before Hitler have purged the state structures, which makes a post-War purge much harder. So ironic this may serve to moderate the Nazi, because they will be forced to unite German society and compromise with the groups they purged in OTL. Still going to suck to be Jewish in Germany.
Well Czechoslovakia could be friendly. Shortly after Hitler got into power first conflicts started. Sudetenland German politicians were for time parts of Czechoslovak governments byt with Hitler getting into power Sudeten German version of NSDAP startrd to gain members. They eere protesting against taking German political emigrants etc.

I can imagine Czechoslovakia to give Poland some support. I believe in early 30-ties reletion were relatively good and there was also some limited military cooperation. But I do not think Czechoslovakia would be bold enough to join without France going in too.
 
To recycle a post of mine from a couple of months ago:

***

I am skeptical of the notion that Pilsudski proposed a preventive war in 1933, though clearly some people at the time believed there was some such proposal. Jan Karski discusses this in some detail in *The Great Powers and Poland: From Versailles to Yalta*: "There is no evidence that he contemplated a preventive war, nor is there any direct documentary evidence of specific proposals forwarded to Paris or London. Nevertheless, many of his contemporaries believed that Pilsudski suggested some concerted international action. Others thought his initiative was nothing but a myth created by his admirers..." http://books.google.com/books?id=1zelAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA114

"..Pilsudski's alleged proposals were not corroborated by the French statesmen in office at that time. When General Maxime Weygand, head of the French army, was asked for comment in 1953, he observed curtly that he 'never heard of such an initiative by Pilsudski.' Foreign minister Joseph Paul-Boncour; prime minister Édouard Daladier; and General d'Arbonneau, military attaché in Warsaw, also stated years later that they were unaware of any Polish proposals for military action..." http://books.google.com/books?id=1zelAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA117

Unfortunately, this is a situation where there is no direct evidence and where both sides have a motive to deceive. For Pilsudski's friends, to claim that there was such an initiative and that the French turned it down helps to justify the 1934 Non-Aggression Pact and subsequent conciliatory Polish moves toward Nazi Germany. OTOH, the French political and military leaders obviously had every motive to later deny there was any such initiative, and thus to escape blame for not stopping Hitler at an early stage. The fact that there were undoubtedly *rumors* of such an initiative in 1933 proves very little, because such rumors might have been part of a strategy by Pilsudski to pressure Hitler into relaxing his terms for a German-Polish pact. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Polish_Non-Aggression_Pact

The one thing that seems certain to me is that if there had been such a proposal, France would have turned it down. Occupying the Rhineland had been burdensome for France; how much more difficult would it be to try to occupy all of Germany!

As for the UK--forget it. Most British Conservatives, while not particularly sympathizing with National Socialism, regarded Bolshevism as the greater menace.

Also, David E. Kaiser writes in *Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France, and Eastern Europe 1930-1939* (Princeton UP 1981)

"Hitler's accession to power on January 20 led quickly to a new crisis in German-Polish relations. Pilsudski's well-known military measures in early March-—the reinforcement of the Polish army garrison at the Westerplatte, the entrance to Danzig harbor, and the movement of several Polish divisions to the environs of Danzig-—may have been designed merely to guard against a possible Nazi coup in Danzig. They may also have been designed to intimidate the Germans by threatening a preventive war. Whether Pilsudski, as numerous rumors would have it, actually discussed a preventive war with the French remains highly questionable. No evidence for such discussions has emerged from Polish or French archives. We shall see that Pilsudski apparently frightened Hitler into an accommodation with Poland, and this may have been his aim all along..." https://books.google.com/books?id=lhbWCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA105
 
Top