What if German naval construction not slowed down?

AFAIU it was Tirpitz.

Prior to even the first Naval Law of 1898 Wilhelm II was rather fond of the "Jeune Ecole" of cruiser warfare and favored cruisers for the thought/dreamed of expansion of the navy.
But Tirpitz "convinced" him of his interpretation of Alfred Thayer Mahan, that the rank and prestige of a nation - and its ruler - depends on its number of Battleships, unfortunatly (?) forgot to care about the geographic prerequisites for such Mahanian politics : bases.

But what do you need oversea bases for, if you also induce an operational doctrin - or rather religious mantra - of "THE ONE DECISIVE" battle, may it be at day or night, that will "fix" ... paralyse your assumed main opponent in world politics - GB and the RN in the waters of the North Sea. ...

Tirpitz does not seem to have read or understood the part Mahan wrote about shaping the battlefield, atttritioning & dispersing the enemy, ect...

A large part of the remarks here are aimed at the question of a long war. But, few of the leaders in question here understood there could be a long war. Their thinking was all in terms of a brief 6-12 month war. A long 'total war' was outside their lifetime experience & had not been seen since the age of Napoleon.

How much overseas fleet do you need for a few islands and jungle swamps? The naval war is going to be won or lost in the North Sea. Even without Mahan it is obvious. A bigger overseas fleet is more to wither on the vine.

Tisingtao China was not a desert island nor a jungle swamp. That & the dry semi tropical colonies like Namibia were seen as future profit centers.

The purpose of the over seas colonial fleet is to force some uncomfortable decisions of nations like Britian who have multiple & important sea routes. Its correct that a long term sea raiding campaign usually does not work, but in the short run in the first months or year of a war it can play havoc with the enemies thinking. Politics enters into when the business leaders start taking action when a few of their cargo ships are casualties of war, or personalities like Churchill are at the top.

One of the top problems Spee was faced with in 1914 was the lack of options. He ran out in the Pacific, and had very few in the Atlantic, which led to him being trapped while nosing around the Falklands in search of coal. Adding a few more German control naval stations at the start increases flexibility & compounds the problem for the enemy. The Brits had bases & options, Spee had fewer leading to a easier task for the Brits quicker end for the problem of Spee.
 

Deleted member 94680

Tirpitz’s “Risk Fleet” had nothing to do with Mahan’s teachings. It was in and of itself an admission that Germany couldn’t build to parity with Britain. The First, Second and Third Navy Laws would have given Germany a Battle Fleet 40% the size of the Royal Navy - the Tirpitz Plan acknowledged that and developed the idea of the battle to remove Britain’s naval dominance. Tirpitz hoped and expected Britain to blockade Germany from the North Sea, as opposed to the Channel and the Shetlands. When Britain used the entrances to the North Sea, the HSF was bottled up.

Overseas Stations in any strength would be swept up by the RN in short order in a War, regardless of their number. Japan, with token British aid, captured Tsingtao in three months.
 
Really part of me wants to see a AH where the Royal Navy built a fleet of small units to control the North Sea and a fleet of battle cruisers to manage the rest of the world. Put the theory to the test vs the German battleships.

it happened in reverse at a lower level all the time, German TBs from Flanders would happily fight detachments of British destroyers but once a cruiser from the Harwich force arrived on scene the German destroyers would be overmatched and have to disengage. The only option the Germans would have would be to match the British cruisers or one-up them with a bigger and more powerful ship, which they didn't do.
 
Because I keep banging one about it, here's a précis about the German Navy command shit-fight. http://www.naval-history.net/XGW-GermanNavy1914-1918.htm

Highest Level of Leadership and Organisation - Kaiser Wilhelm II was the Commander-in-Chief of the Kaiserliche Marine. All power and authority was in his hands. All decisions and orders were made and issued by him and not just in his name. There was no single senior component of the KM to either advise or challenge his authority.

The administration of the KM was not a coherent unified body capable of either advising or carrying out his orders. The KM was divided in to a number of components, all of which were in a direct line of command to the Kaiser. There was no admiral in overall command of the KM. There was no equivalent of the First Sea Lord or the US Chief of Naval Operations. This was a recipe for bureaucratic rivalry, and confusion in the implementation of policies.

These bodies were:

1. The Naval Cabinet
2. The Admiralty Staff
3. The Imperial Naval Administration
4. The Inspector-General of the Navy
5. The Baltic Naval Station
6. The North Sea Naval Station
7. The High Seas Fleet
8. The Overseas Squadrons

The Naval Cabinet was an integral part of the Imperial Household whose principal tasks were promotions and appointments of officers, and the drafting and issuing of the Kaiser's orders.

The Admiralty Staff was created 14.3.1899 when the Kaiser ordered the disbandment of the Navy High Command. He took over personal command of the Navy and left a small staff to gather intelligence, and prepare plans for operations. It was a purely advisory body with no executive powers. It was similar to the Royal Navy War Staff 1912-1917 but never became the equivalent of the RN's Naval Staff of 1917-1918.

In August 1918, a Supreme Naval Command was created to give clearer direction. The Head of the new command-Admiral Scheer - was co-located with the Kaiser and Army Headquarters in Spa. Scheer's deputy remained in Berlin to administer the domestic affairs of the service.

The Imperial Naval Administration [Reichsmarineamt] was the equivalent of the Admiralty in Britain or the Navy Department in the USA. It was a government ministry subject to the overall direction of the Chancellor. The head of the Imperial Naval Administration [the State Secretary] was the equivalent of the First Lord of the Admiralty, or the Secretary of the Navy. His range of powers were more limited but he was in charge of budgets, relations with the Reichstag in terms of legal authority for his particular areas of interest which were the ship-building programmes.

The Inspector-General of the Navy was responsible for the efficiency of various components of the navy.

The Inspector General from 1.01.09 to 10.8.19 was Prince Henry of Prussia [the Kaiser's brother]. The prince was also supreme commander in the Baltic and therefore superior to the commander Baltic Naval Station.

The Baltic Naval Station was one of two commands which reflected the geographic division of the German coastline. It combined administration, support and operations in its headquarters at Kiel. Major subordinate units were:

1st Seaman Division at Kiel
1st Marine Artillery Division at Friedrichsort
1st Torpedo Division at Kiel
1st Battalion of Marines.

The dockyards and bases at Kiel and Danzig were the most visible components. For coast defence it was sub-divided into three inspectorates:

for East and West Prussia at Neufahrwasser;
for Pomerania and Mecklenburg at Stettin, and
for Schleswig-Holstein at Husum.

It hosted several organisations and staffs who were responsible to the authorities in Berlin. It had naval forces for local operations.

The North Sea Naval Station had similar responsibilities as the Baltic Naval Station. Headquarters were located at Wilhelmshaven. In addition, it was the 'host' for the High Seas Fleet. Major subordinate units included:

2nd Seaman Division
2nd, 3rd, 4th Marine Artillery Divisions
2nd Torpedo Division
2nd Battalion of Marines.

Its prime facility was the dockyard and base at Wilhelmshaven. Coast defence was divided between three inspectorates:

for Elbe and Weser at Bremerhaven;
for the Jade at Wilhelmshaven; and
Heligoland.

It had naval forces for local operations .
 
Could be. I'm unclear why a larger overseas fleet was not built, and better naval statins in the colonies. The bickering?
Dunno, but I wouldn't be surprised given the way the different fleets and naval stations successfully worked to deny the Flanders station resources of all kinds. To give an overseas station more ships or other resources would mean pulling them from other commands of equal rank and status, requiring a decision from the Kaiser himself.
How much overseas fleet do you need for a few islands and jungle swamps? The naval war is going to be won or lost in the North Sea. Even without Mahan it is obvious. A bigger overseas fleet is more to wither on the vine.
For what it's worth the 1898 Naval Law included an overseas force of 3 armoured (total 12) and 10 light cruisers (total 30).

The 1900 Naval Law as proposed included an overseas force 8 armoured (total 20) and 15 light cruisers (total 45)

The 1900 Naval Law as enacted included an overseas force of 3 armoured (total 14) and 10 light cruisers (total 38)

The 1906 revision included an overseas force of 8 armoured (total 20) and 10 light cruisers (total 38). There was no change in the 1908 revision.

The 1912 revision did not change the number of cruisers overseas, but the total number of light cruisers was increased from 38 to 40.

The actual overseas force in August 1914 was 3 armoured/battle cruisers (Goeben, Gneisenau and Scharnhorst) and 7 light cruisers (Emden, Leipzig, Nurnberg, Konigsberg, Dresden, Karlsure and Breslau).
 
Wouldn't having the Germans base ships in Norway just move the blockade patrol line back to the GIUK gap?

Sure, it would give the Germans more sea room, but it would only mean a Jutland-esque battle would be in the Norwegian Sea rather than the North Sea.

Also, unless it meant sending the entire HSF to this base in Norway the likes of Ingehol and Pohl won't allow their command to be reduced by sending any of their ships away to Norway. They wouldn't even let the MKF have a handful of uboats, destroyers or obsolete coastal defence ships.
 
What if German naval construction not slowed down? The Derfflinger enters service in 1915 not 1916. The Bayern is ready in time for Jutland and Baden shortly afterward. The 2 Sachsen class battleships, 4 Mackensen class battlecruisers and the 1 of the "Ersatz Yorck' enter service in 1917. What will the German navy do? would the battle of Jutland be any different? Will she try again in 1917 with the additional ships? Will Britain stop construction of the Admiral class battlecruisers? Post-war will there now be 4 Hoods?
I'm not sure what this proves, but the the British didn't just build more ships than the Germans, they could build them faster.

50 dreadnoughts and battle cruisers were commissioned into the Royal Navy between 1906 and 1917. Each ship took an average of 2 years and 6 months to build from laying the keel to commissioning.

19 dreadnoughts were commissioned into the German Navy between 1910 and 1917. Each ship took an average of 3 years 0 months to build from laying the keel to commissioning. Bayern was the fastest at 2 years 6 months so it's unlikely that she could be made ready to take part at Jutland. OTOH Baden was laid down a fortnight before Bayern, but too 3 years 1 month to build.

8 battle cruisers (including the Blucher) were commissioned in to the German Navy between 1910 and 1917. Each ship took an average of 3 years 3 months to build. If Hindenburg, which took 4 years 4 months to build is taken out the average for the 7 remaining ships reduces to 3 years 1 month. If Hindenburg had been built in the average of 3 years that would have advanced her completion from October 1917 to June 1916 so she still misses Jutland.
 
Just as a matter of interest in September 1914 the fleet that Prince Henry was supreme commander of was:
2 Pre-dreads: Elsass, Braunschweig
1 CA: Blucher
7 CL: Amazone, Augsburg, Lubeck, Madgeburg, Undine, Thetis, Gazelle
14 DD: S126-31, S120-24 & 125, V 25-6

The shore forces were:
1st Seaman Division at Kiel
1st Marine Artillery Division at Friedrichsort
1st Torpedo Division at Kiel
1st Battalion of Marines
 
Top