With regard to the question, "If Canada had remained French, would there have been an American Revolution?" two historians have expressed differing views:
(1) Lawrence Henry Gipson in "The American Revolution as an Aftermath of the Great War for the Empire, 1754-1763"
https://books.google.com/books?id=-w_xPy-S3aEC&pg=PA101 says No:
"In accounting for the radical change in attitude of many leading colonials between the years 1754 and 1774 respecting the nature of the constitution of the empire, surely among the factors that must be weighed was the truly overwhelming victory achieved in the Great War for the Empire. This victory not only freed colonials for the first time in the history of the English-speaking people in the New World from the dread of the French, their Indian allies, and the Spaniards, but, which is of equal significance, opened up to them the prospect, if given freedom of action, of a vast growth of power and wealth with an amazing westward expansion. Indeed, it is abundantly clear that a continued subordination of the colonies to the government of Great Britain was no longer considered an asset in the eyes of the Americans by 1774, as it had been so judged by them in 1754, but rather an onerous liability. . . . If many Americans thought they had a perfect right to profit personally by trading with the enemy in time of war, how much more deeply must they have resented in time of peace the serious efforts made by the home government to enforce the elaborate restrictions on commercial intercourse? . . .
. . . At this point the question must be frankly faced: If France had won the war decisively and thereby consolidated her position and perfected her claims in Nova Scotia, as well as to the southward of the St. Lawrence, in the Great Lakes region, and in the Ohio and Mississippi valleys, is it at all likely that colonials would have made so fundamental a constitutional issue of the extension to them of the principle of the British stamp tax? Would they have resisted such a tax had Parliament imposed it in order to provide on an equitable basis the maximum resources for guaranteeing their safety, at a time when they were faced on their highly restricted borders by a militant, victorious enemy having at its command thousands of ferocious redskins? Again, accepting the fact of Britain's victory, is it not reasonable to believe that, had Great Britain at the close of the triumphant war left Canada, to France and carefully limited her territorial demands in North America to those comparatively modest objectives that she had in mind at its beginning, there would have been no very powerful movement within the foreseeable future for complete colonial autonomy—not to mention American independence? Would not Americans have continued to feel the need as in the past to rely for their safety and welfare upon British sea power and British land power, as well as upon British forces generally? . . .
In conclusion, it may be said that it would be idle to deny that most colonials in the eighteenth century at one time or another felt strongly the desire for freedom of action in a wider variety of ways than was legally permitted before 1754. Indeed, one can readily uncover these strong impulses even in the early part of the seventeenth century. Yet Americans were, by and large, realists, as were the British, and under the functioning of the imperial system from, let us say, 1650 to 1750 great mutual advantages were enjoyed, with a fair division, taking everything into consideration, of the financial burdens necessary to support the system. However, the mounting Anglo-French rivalry in North America from 1750 onward, the outbreak of hostilities in 1754, and the subsequent nine years of fighting destroyed the old equilibrium, leaving the colonials after 1760 in a highly favored position in comparison with the taxpayers of Great Britain. Attempts on the part of the Crown and Parliament to restore by statute the old balance led directly to the American constitutional crisis, out of which came the Revolutionary War and the establishment of American independence. Such, ironically, was the aftermath of the Great War for Empire. . . ."
(2) For a rebuttal of Gipson, see John M. Murrin, "'The French and Indian War, the American Revolution, and the Counterfactual Hypothesis: Reflections on Lawrence Henry Gipson and John Shy."
http://www.vonsteuben.org/ourpages/auto/2009/10/9/47132166/John%20Murrin-Counterfactual%20Hypotheses%20and%20the%20American%20Revolution.pdf Murrin argues that the "French menace" had never produced harmony between the American colonists and the British:
"Gipson's argument assumes that the "Gallic Peril"' had to discourage colonial resistance to Britain. Its removal would thus stimulate opposition. If so, we ought to learn something from the earlier political behavior of colonies exposed to this danger or isolated from it. The outbreak of Queen Anne's War did not prevent the Massachusetts assembly from embarking upon a bitter quarrel with its governor in 1702-04, nor did it deflect the assembly of vulnerable New York from a path of remarkable radicalism a few years later. King George's War generated a similar response in New York, where the governor found himself pathetically impotent by 1748. The aftermath of that war is also instructive. Although Britain returned Louisbourg to France, thus strengthening the Gallic Peril, and although French expansion assumed alarming dimensions shortly after the peace, this threat did not forestall the eruption or continuation of serious political crises in New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina. To be sure, these controversies remained local, not intercolonial, but the will to redress perceived grievances was quite apparent in them all. Unlike the situation after 1763, no common target emerged against which all the colonies could direct their energies at the same time. On the other hand, Virginia provides a stunning example of a province all but immune to the French threat until after 1750. Instead of stimulating demands for independence, this security reinforced what must have been the most harmonious political system in the Empire.."
Moreover, Murrin notes,
"The French government may have left North America by 1763, but the French *Canadiens* remained behind, very much alive and still dangerous. Colonists did not protest Britain's decision to garrison North America with regulars after the war because the need seemed obvious. If the Canadiens rebelled, the cycle of war could begin anew. Indeed, the Quebec Act of 1774 alarmed the northern colonies precisely because, in their view, it did revive the Gallic Peril. The Loyalist Daniel Leonard grimly stoked their smoldering fears. If we challenge Britain to war, he observed in December 1774: 'Inconceivably shocking the scene; if we turn our views to the wilderness, our back settlements a prey to our ancient enemy, the Canadians, whose wounds received from us in the late war, will bleed afresh at the prospect of revenge, and to the numerous tribes of savages, whose tender mercies are cruelties. Thus with the British navy in the front, Canadians and savages in the rear, a regular army in the midst, we must be certain that whenever the sword of civil war is unsheathed, devastation will pass through our land like a whirlwind.20' As Leonard realized, Britain in 1775 possessed the maritime dominance she had used to crush the French in the previous conflict *plus* all the geographical assets of New France as of 1754. The colonies could avoid conflict with Canada only by preserving peace with Britain. In other words, the Revolution erupted *despite* general recognition that it would almost certainly produce another Canadian war..."
Murrin acknowledges, however, that "important links can indeed be established between [Gipson's] 'Great War for the Empire' and the American Revolution." But this connection was more ironic than inevitable: the problem was that the British policy makers refused to draw the lessons from their own success in the later years of the French and Indian Wars, and insisted on addressing problems from the earlier years that no longer required solution. "The war provided a catalyst for all kinds of change, but evidently it could not alter the habitual way that politicians looked at old problems.... Britain may actually have lost her colonies because, in the last analysis, the English simply did not know how to think triumphantly."