What if France spend resourse on build tanks in longer numbers before World war 2

petain minister of war

Petain you are joking right? Petain was not in charge of anything and was brought back in 1940 far to late to change anything.

Petain is minister of war from the 9 february 1934 to november 1934. He choose the B1bis and the D2 tanks as minister. He is against the maginot line and he believe in tanks to pierce front-line. He planed to buy 60 heavy, 300 medium and 600 light tanks in 1935 but his government fell. He protected DG for a long time and shared the same idea from 1934 but he didn't want a professional army. He has much fame and prestige and he is seen as a true republican before 1940 by the right and the left. After 1934, he is member of the council superior of war until 1939.
He is not against reform. He is against Offensive operations.
 
Would the aplication of de Gaulle idea make a difference?

De Gaulle reached a suficient seniority too late to have an effect in time.

Here's one possible way to get French armour reorganised in time.

Early 1930's Britain doesn't abolish the Experimental Mechanised Force and side line Hobart to save money.

1931 - 35 The force is expanded into a full division with organic Infantry and Artillary support (MG Carriers and Birch Guns) and trains with the RAF Army Co-Operation force.

1935 - 36. Serious rearmament begins as well as joint exercises with the French. These exercises embarass the French Army and up and coming
officers are attatched to British Armoured units for upto a year at a time.
Joint specifications for new armour are issued, though each nation will produce it's own designs.

1937 Testing of new designs begins, and contracts given for the winners. Reliability issues arrise and production is delayed untill problems solved, meenwhile improved versions of existing tanks purchased as stop gaps. Amongst the French modifications are radios for all tanks.

1938 - 39 Large scale production of new designs begin and the French Army begins forming New Armoured divisions. Once war is declared BEF moves to France along with 80% of Army Co Operation command and begins intensive training with their French opposite numbers.

1940 Germans attack and after bloody and confused fighting is held near the Somme. Army Units trapped in Callais Dunkirk pocket evacuated with a significant amount of their equipment to rest and refit in Britain before deploying along the Somme line for the counter attack.
 
De Gaulle reached a suficient seniority too late to have an effect in time.

Here's one possible way to get French armour reorganised in time.

Early 1930's Britain doesn't abolish the Experimental Mechanised Force and side line Hobart to save money.

1931 - 35 The force is expanded into a full division with organic Infantry and Artillary support (MG Carriers and Birch Guns) and trains with the RAF Army Co-Operation force.

1935 - 36. Serious rearmament begins as well as joint exercises with the French. These exercises embarass the French Army and up and coming
officers are attatched to British Armoured units for upto a year at a time.
Joint specifications for new armour are issued, though each nation will produce it's own designs.

1937 Testing of new designs begins, and contracts given for the winners. Reliability issues arrise and production is delayed untill problems solved, meenwhile improved versions of existing tanks purchased as stop gaps. Amongst the French modifications are radios for all tanks.

1938 - 39 Large scale production of new designs begin and the French Army begins forming New Armoured divisions. Once war is declared BEF moves to France along with 80% of Army Co Operation command and begins intensive training with their French opposite numbers.

1940 Germans attack and after bloody and confused fighting is held near the Somme. Army Units trapped in Callais Dunkirk pocket evacuated with a significant amount of their equipment to rest and refit in Britain before deploying along the Somme line for the counter attack.

OTL february 1934. The 1rst DLM is organised on paper.
I add a second POD :
April 1934. Petain is angry. Cavalry men and tank men asked to buy the same amount of tanks with the same caracteristics but different names. Cavalry men want to call their tank armoured cars of combat (AMC) as OTL. After six months of fight, he fell to pass his tank command but succeed in the creation of the arnoured branch. Tank men and Cavalry men quarelled and fought each other for two years.

1936. After some failure in front of The english, Tank men and Cavalry men start at least to work together. Blum scared by the growing german power and the spain civil war command a great number of S35 with some modifications. SOMUA, Hotchkiss are charged to produce the tanks. He also start the reorganisation of the industry.
 
eration command and begins intensive training with their French opposite numbers.

1940 Germans attack and after bloody and confused fighting is held near the Somme. Army Units trapped in Callais Dunkirk pocket evacuated with a significant amount of their equipment to rest and refit in Britain before deploying along the Somme line for the counter attack.

I agree to all your Idea. If the dunkerque pocket exists, you have the Battle of Arras. A succes is possible if the french High command start to use radio after the french-english training. A stalemate on the somme but with some forces who escaped from Dunkerque by lamd and not sea.
 
Sadly because ADA and the english squadrons of the BEF shoot 1300 german aircraft. No lack of fighting spirit.

that doesn't tell the story through... 1300 aircraft certainly represented the better part of 1/4 of total german aircraft committed to the western campaign starting may 10, and had the campaign continued, the LW would have began to stumble due to worn out aircrew, worn out machines and attrition

however, what can't be ignored is that the LW flew something on the order of 80,000 sorties between may 10 and june 17 meaning only 1.6 percent of sorties resulted in the loss of a german aircraft... also fully 270 ish of those losses were unarmed transports lost in the boondoggle of the holland drops... if you subtact those out and just look at the actual tactical aircraft the loss rate is only 1.2ish percent
those 80k sorties outnumbered french and british sorties in the same period by something close to 4 to 1; which acted as a gigantic force multiplier to the LW allowing them to suppress forces in front of the army, and screen it's flanks

whilst there was certainly no lack of courage amongst the allied air forces, particularly the bomber squadrons having to attack into the teeth of german aa guns at lower than safe altitudes; their losses per sortie were horrifically unsustainable (particularly in the British expeditionary airfrorce which had most of it's tactical bombers lost in a week)
 
Fact is the French had "enough" tanks if you only count numbers.

They had a faulty "tank" doctrine (infantry support).

If they HAD changed doctrine, they had the wrong tanks.

For use as a breakthrough instrument they would have needed faster tanks with Radio in each tank.

So IMHO to beat Germany in an armored war tehy would have needed

better doctrine
other tanks that are built to execute the doctrine


More of the same (Char, R-35 S-35 or H-35/39) would not have made any difference.

The brits had a better doctrine, but not the tanks for this doctrine (the Armored div of the BEF was butchered by 88s IIRC)
 
Fact is the French had "enough" tanks if you only count numbers.

They had a faulty "tank" doctrine (infantry support).

If they HAD changed doctrine, they had the wrong tanks.

For use as a breakthrough instrument they would have needed faster tanks with Radio in each tank.

So IMHO to beat Germany in an armored war tehy would have needed

better doctrine
other tanks that are built to execute the doctrine


More of the same (Char, R-35 S-35 or H-35/39) would not have made any difference.

The brits had a better doctrine, but not the tanks for this doctrine (the Armored div of the BEF was butchered by 88s IIRC)


France had 6 armored divisions; and they had so many tanks that they could also parcel them out to the infantry divisions in attached battalions as well

The Americans employed the same strategy in 1944 and 45 without it being a huge deal; hell the US army employs a modified version of a similar TOE today as does Russia

It was more doctrine at the theater level about not concentrating the divisions into mobile corps and leaving them in reserve to counter breakthroughs or act as a mailed fist

If one looks at the tank battle at Gembloux, there is no indication that battalion for battalion the french couldn't hold their own versus a panzer division, the problem was they couldn't be bombed 8x a day by stukas whilst having their rear areas overun and being outflanked and still hold their own
 

BlondieBC

Banned
It was more doctrine at the theater level about not concentrating the divisions into mobile corps and leaving them in reserve to counter breakthroughs or act as a mailed fist

If one looks at the tank battle at Gembloux, there is no indication that battalion for battalion the french couldn't hold their own versus a panzer division, the problem was they couldn't be bombed 8x a day by stukas whilst having their rear areas overun and being outflanked and still hold their own

Agreed. Doctrine. Lack of training in doctrine. Loss of control of the skies.

At one point the French order a division size counter attack, but due to poor communications, training, and leadership, it was a bunch of battalion size attacks instead of one division size attack. The French needed to have trained in large scale attacks with armor before the war to have a chance of it working. It takes more than writing up an armor unit on paper, it takes training all levels of soldiers to operate as a single unit.


however, what can't be ignored is that the LW flew something on the order of 80,000 sorties between may 10 and june 17 meaning only 1.6 percent of sorties resulted in the loss of a german aircraft... also fully 270 ish of those losses were unarmed transports lost in the boondoggle of the holland drops... if you subtact those out and just look at the actual tactical aircraft the loss rate is only 1.2ish percent
those 80k sorties outnumbered french and british sorties in the same period by something close to 4 to 1; which acted as a gigantic force multiplier to the LW allowing them to suppress forces in front of the army, and screen it's flanks

Agreed.

Also, in the critical 3 day period where the Germans broke through, the Allies did try to stop the Germans with air power on a max effort on Day 2. The Allies lost 60% of the planes sent out that day. Now some would have been lost after the first sortie, but it is clear the Luftwaffe ruled France in May 1940. It is more than the tanks, the UK would also have needed to commit its fighters held in reserve in England to France, and they needed better use of their armor. If they would have done this, they might have won. But they also could have left England exceptionally vulnerable if they failed.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Early 1930's Britain doesn't abolish the Experimental Mechanised Force and side line Hobart to save money.

1931 - 35 The force is expanded into a full division with organic Infantry and Artillary support (MG Carriers and Birch Guns) and trains with the RAF Army Co-Operation force.

Are you adding to the size of the UK land forces, or which unit does the armor division replace?
 
DG supports Charles Maurras and the Action Francaise until the treaty of Munich. Paul Reynaud wrote about it in his POW memories from some dialogue with the sister of DG. Christian Pineau said that DG recognised to be part of the Action Francaise before 1938.
His experience of the war and of the french governement in 1940 will change everything. F.Mitterand made the same change from Vichy In 40-42 to the resistance in 44.
But how reliable is Reynaud as a source?

(And did Mitterand actually change sides for ideological reasons, or was it just because he'd reassessed which side was going to win?)
 
Are you adding to the size of the UK land forces, or which unit does the armor division replace?

Cavalry units de-horsed sooner and infantry battalions mechanised. All this was planned for but as ever the treasury put its foot down. Britain has an advantage over the French in this as being an all volunteer force it's smaller and better trained than continental conscipt armies. As I see it the Experimental force could and should have been made perminant and expanded into a full division. When later in the 30s war clouds start to form and the rearmament starts the Army would have both a model to copy and a body of experienced men to build the new divisions around.

As it is in 1940 the BEF was fully mechanised while most of the German army was dependant on horses and shoe leather. Some of the choices in equipment for the Britsh army in the 30s were treasury driven mistakes but unit for unit they were the best equiped in Europe.

Mistakes made.

Machine gun armed light tanks instead of the far better Vickers 6 ton.
No self propelled guns.
The Matilda 1 two man infantry tank.
Powering the Matilda 2 infantry tank with low powered bus engines.
Use of machine gun armed light tanks as battle tanks.
Not changing over to rimless rifle ammunition.
Not giving the close support versions of tanks high explosive shells.
Not insisting on more modern tank engines than the liberty.
Not training for mobile warfare.
 
Cavalry units de-horsed sooner and infantry battalions mechanised. All this was planned for but as ever the treasury put its foot down. Britain has an advantage over the French in this as being an all volunteer force it's smaller and better trained than continental conscipt armies. As I see it the Experimental force could and should have been made perminant and expanded into a full division. When later in the 30s war clouds start to form and the rearmament starts the Army would have both a model to copy and a body of experienced men to build the new divisions around.

As it is in 1940 the BEF was fully mechanised while most of the German army was dependant on horses and shoe leather. Some of the choices in equipment for the Britsh army in the 30s were treasury driven mistakes but unit for unit they were the best equiped in Europe.

Mistakes made.

Machine gun armed light tanks instead of the far better Vickers 6 ton.
No self propelled guns.
The Matilda 1 two man infantry tank.
Powering the Matilda 2 infantry tank with low powered bus engines.
Use of machine gun armed light tanks as battle tanks.
Not changing over to rimless rifle ammunition.
Not giving the close support versions of tanks high explosive shells.
Not insisting on more modern tank engines than the liberty.
Not training for mobile warfare.

Don't forget not training forces for shit in modern warfare nor developing any kind of mobilization premating/expansion plan of any use; the whole not taking advantage of France's production was stunningly short sighted

The British would have been 130948109248012 times better off placing their orders with French factories for their field army and confining their own production to air and navy; or if national pride doesn't allow out and out production, at least securing licenses to fill in gaps... imagine how effective British field divisions of 1940-41 could have been if all their two pounders were replaced by the french 47mm high velocity gun, and if all their cruiser tanks were Suoma's or H39's
 

sharlin

Banned
The French tanks still had design issues, 2 man turrets are horrific for a commander who has to not only command and direct the tank but aim and fire the gun. The british tanks got it right in terms of turret size but they were generally poorly armoured, the 2lber was perfectly fine for the battle of France, it was a very high velocity anti-tank weapon that could punch through Panzer IIIs fairly easily. Only a lack of a HE shell was its let down.

If the Matilda II had been available in larger numbers and not the utterly worthless Matilda I and if the Brits had taken Liddel and Hearts doctrines to heart then on the ground we may have done better. But the LW still also dominated the air.
 
But how reliable is Reynaud as a source?

(And did Mitterand actually change sides for ideological reasons, or was it just because he'd reassessed which side was going to win?)

P.Reynaud is reliable because his "carnets de captivite" sort of diary of his years as POW were never published during his life but in the 1990s. In fact, they revealed his thought about the fall of France, about Petain and De Gaulle. It revealed also the Reynaud's incapacity to unite the government of 1940 behind his will to continue the war. He was interned by Petain in late 1940 and in Germany after november 1942. His POW diaries are not self-justificated as his memories published in 1955 and 1976.

His relations with DG are very closed.
P.Reynaud is an independent moderate right politician in the 3rd Republic. He is specialised in defence affairs and finances. He and DG shared the same ideas about the army : unprepared, untrained...etc. P.Reynaud offered to DG the chair of general secretary of War the 6 june 1940. After the war, they staid in contact and Reynaud support DG until 1962.

For Mitterand. http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/François_Mitterrand
He made false identities in june 1942 and had some meeting with resistants before november 1942. He is usually classified as Vichysto-Resistant. He is pro-petain but doesn't look like a collabo as Laval. Most of the French had the same behavior from 1940 to 1942.
 
Thats not the whole picture though. Britain had worked out the organisation and tactics of armoured warfare in the late twenties and early thirties using the experimental armoured force. This force dominated exercises on Salisbury plain even when they were riged to favour the opposing forces. Unfortuately this was during the Great Depression and the traditionalists and treasury were able to have the force disbanded and it's conclussions buried.
Not really! I am sorry to say that despite the fact that the original thinkers of armoured warfare were British,the one to pay attention and study the writings of B.H.Liddel-Heart and general Fuller was Heinz Guderian who applied the theories as he only knew how,with the effect of changing the course of a war for its first two years to such an extent as to be considered as one of the great Captains of History.An English general,after the Salisbury plain trials and the discussions, endless conferences that followed and deliberations,disgusted said:"there are two conservative powers under the sun,the Catholic Church and the British Army".
France had more tanks and heavier models overall(B1bis with a 47mm gun)
but they were dispersed among the infantry divisions and they could not act in armour units with the versatility and fire power of a tank division or an armoured corps.
 
Mistakes made.

Machine gun armed light tanks instead of the far better Vickers 6 ton.
No self propelled guns.
The Matilda 1 two man infantry tank.
Powering the Matilda 2 infantry tank with low powered bus engines.
Use of machine gun armed light tanks as battle tanks.
Not changing over to rimless rifle ammunition.
Not giving the close support versions of tanks high explosive shells.
Not insisting on more modern tank engines than the liberty.
Not training for mobile warfare.

+ Relying on the Boys Rifle as the infantry's main AT weapon.
 
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