What if France invaded Belgium in WW1

BooNZ

Banned
No they really aren't- the Kaiser saw it, Moltke saw it, Falkenhagen saw it. In fact the whole German military saw it. And not only them, but the General staffs of France, Russia and even Britain saw it. Finally, even Conrad understood the need for the Germans to concentrate in the West. No one with any military training at all considered a move east because any move East with enough troops to even stand a chance in the East would leave the West open to collapse.

That's why the Kaiser didn't care about British or Belgian neutrality. He would rather fight both of them than strike East the idea is so bad. He only, briefly considered it, when he thought that both Britain and France would stay neutral- and even then he was only willing to do it if Britain guaranteed French neutrality.

No. What the Germans feared, along with every other major continental power was a long total war. Traditional thought was the strategic depth offered by Russia meant the Germans were not confident the Russians would yield quickly. In the event, all the major economies proved to be quite resilient, least of all Russia.

Even with your perfect 20/20 hindsight you can't come up with a plan that stands a realistic chance.

No plan is even required. If Belgium neutrality is respected, the Western front is kept short (with or without the Ardennes), the Germans are able to deploy and maintain stronger defenses than OTL in the West and have significant spare forces are available for service in the East.

Stand on the defensive in entrenched positions, the Germans suffer too many casualties and lose their iron mines. Go into Luxembourg and play out the Battle of the Ardennes against twice the force where they will be outflanked, encircled and destroyed with the German Reich

Lord Kalvert, could you remind us all how far the Anglo-French forces got against German defenses over four years, over an extended Western front, with superior Entente resources/numbers, with less defensible terrain and after the Anglo-French deficiencies in doctrine and heavy artillery had been substantially remedied?

If 4 German armies head East (instead of OTL circa 1.5 armies) then 60% of the OTL German Western forces will be defending 30-40% of the OTL Western front. In relative terms, the Germans defenders and artillery will be more numerous in the West than OTL. Unlike OTL, the majority of the front will be on defensible terrain. The condensed nature of the front, coupled with close proximity to a purpose built transport infrastructure results in Germans deploying artillery or reserves faster than OTL. On balance, the combined German losses being on the defensive on the Western front and routing the Russians on the East are likely to be far less than OTL. Within six months the CP will be swimming in manpower!

Conversely, the French had a doctrine focused entirely on the offensive, without undue emphasis on intelligence or artillery support. With serious shortages of heavy artillery and brightly coloured French tunics and trousers, if the French waste six months on offensives against fortified German positions, there will be hundreds of thousands of dead Frenchmen and vast numbers of maimed and wounded. Within six months the French will be facing a crisis of manpower and morale.

No matter how many times you try to make this work it takes bizarre assumptions (like the Russians missing a million men massing on their border and/or ignoring them and launching an offensive even though their plans called for otherwise) and then the Germans still have to thrash them about in Poland better than they did OTL- and by OTL, its the Battles up until the Spring of 1915 which is the time period we're talking about

Where the fcuk do you get a million men from? The accepted scenario is up to four German armies heading East, not six! Further, due to limitations of Eastern rail infrastructure only 2-3 would be able to be deployed initially. Therefore you are looking at somewhat less than half a million Germans deploying in the East in the first 2-3 weeks. This is entirely consistent with Russian expectations of up to 25 German divisions in the East, so it is unlikely Russians would abandon their mobilisation plan, established military doctrine and commitments to French allies as you suggest. It is absurd to think they would.

It is also reasonable to expect 4 armies to be able to do better than 1-2 did OTL. Actually, to think otherwise is quite absurd.

Citing examples from after the Russians had repeatedly broken their armies in offensives, subject to the blockade for eight months, had their shells supplies used up and hit with massive gas attacks (which the Germans can't launch in August 1914) doesn't cut it.

Generally speaking, any Russian-German battle that did not feature over-whelming Russian numbers resulted in serious Russian losses, with very few exceptions. It is not a matter of being selective with examples, the Russian Army were just really shit compared to the Heer.

The only plan they had that even had a smidgen of a chance was the one that Moltke devised. With French errors it almost worked

No matter if you break the Germans down into forty armies, it still doesn't change the troop levels. If they attack in the East with 16 corps, they will accomplish nothing. The Russians move to the defensive, swing the 4th army north and wait at their fortresses. The Germans arer repelled like they are OTL at the Battle of the Vistula and that was after the Russians had lost in East Prussia

OTL 5-6 German corps messed up the Russians badly. Most would suspect an additional 10+ corps could cause the Russians serious harm. In the battle of Vistula the Russians outnumbered a German and A-H forces, were on the defensive, but incurred twice the casualties as their CP counterparts - with victories like that, who needs defeats.

Now, if someone can find a German plan East put together by a competent General (reservists in the Medical corps don't count), it might be worth discussing. But everyone in the entire military staffs of Europe wrong?

As outlined above, no plan required. If more than two German armies turn up in the East, the Russians are in for a world of hurt
 

Deleted member 94680

I also think the argument that the Germans would "sit in trenches" kind of misses the point.

If the Germans follow the Schlieffen Plan (as opposed to the Moltke Plan) then the 60% of the Army in the West, although on the Strategic defensive would not be on the Tactical defensive. On the contrary, the German Plans called for agressive defensive manouevers, counterattacking swiftly to encircle and defeat the French attacks once they've left their fortifications.

If the French attacks flounder, or are destroyed by Germans, then the chance that further French offensives would move through Belgium comes into play. But prior to WWI, the French government had denied the French Army the opportunity to move through Belgium pre-emptively, although Joffre had requested it - instead authorising move through Belgium once it had been confirmed German troops had entered first.
 
No plan is even required. If Belgium neutrality is respected, the Western front is kept short (with or without the Ardennes), the Germans are able to deploy and maintain stronger defenses than OTL in the West and have significant spare forces are available for service in the East.
IF.
So France never dares to do what Germany was happy to do: Invade Belgium.
And even if she tries, she will fail completely and miserably, while Germans went through it like knife through butter.
~*Belgium is Magic!*~ - it lets Germans pass through, but stops French dead cold!

I also think the argument that the Germans would "sit in trenches" kind of misses the point.

If the Germans follow the Schlieffen Plan (as opposed to the Moltke Plan) then the 60% of the Army in the West, although on the Strategic defensive would not be on the Tactical defensive. On the contrary, the German Plans called for agressive defensive manouevers, counterattacking swiftly to encircle and defeat the French attacks once they've left their fortifications.

If the French attacks flounder, or are destroyed by Germans, then the chance that further French offensives would move through Belgium comes into play. But prior to WWI, the French government had denied the French Army the opportunity to move through Belgium pre-emptively, although Joffre had requested it - instead authorising move through Belgium once it had been confirmed German troops had entered first.
Agree. Germans can't just sit tight with very few men. They need to have reserve to effectively counter-attack, or French will break through.
 

Deleted member 94680

IF.
So France never dares to do what Germany was happy to do: Invade Belgium.
And even if she tries, she will fail completely and miserably, while Germans went through it like knife through butter.
~*Belgium is Magic!*~ - it lets Germans pass through, but stops French dead cold!

Don't know if it's a case of never "daring to do" but more that the French government of the time was more respectful of Belgian neutrality.

History (battle of the Frontiers) shows us that early on in the War French attacks on prepared opposition were not as effective as German ones, so there's a chance they would struggle.

Later, if the French were still in the War and the sitiuation had devolved to Trench Warfare, they might move through Belguim to open a new front?
 
Don't know if it's a case of never "daring to do" but more that the French government of the time was more respectful of Belgian neutrality.

History (battle of the Frontiers) shows us that early on in the War French attacks on prepared opposition were not as effective as German ones, so there's a chance they would struggle.

Later, if the French were still in the War and the sitiuation had devolved to Trench Warfare, they might move through Belguim to open a new front?

Reasonable. If French fail to advance through Alsace, they'll try to open new front to properly make use of their numerical superiority, especially if UK already joined war, or made it clear it'll stay neutral, in which case its pointless to worry about looking as aggressor, since UK is already in, or won't ever go in.
 

Deleted member 94680

Now, if someone can find a German plan East put together by a competent General (reservists in the Medical corps don't count), it might be worth discussing.

Out of interest, is that referencing anyone in particular (Zuber etc) or just denigrating the idea?
 
Reasonable. If French fail to advance through Alsace, they'll try to open new front to properly make use of their numerical superiority, especially if UK already joined war, or made it clear it'll stay neutral, in which case its pointless to worry about looking as aggressor, since UK is already in, or won't ever go in.
Problem is, there's few good ways to get to Germany from France.

Assuming Alsace-Lorraine is out, either they try Luxembourg, which is neutral and carries the same issue as going through Belgium internationally, go through Belgium, try to pass through Switzerland (Hahahah, no), or Italy, who won't risk it, as it gets them little in return save Germany and France using it as their new battleground.
 
But everyone in the entire military staffs of Europe wrong?

1914 proved virtually everyone in the military staffs of Europe wrong about a number of things. Were you unaware of this?

The rest of your post is scarcely worth a detailed response. In it you make unsupported assertions, magically read the mind of the Kaiser, misrepresent the statements of others, portray thrice-refuted arguments as fact, contradict the observed battlefield reality of WW1, and wrap it all up with an apparent ad hominem.

Incidentally, your very first paragraph contains serious folly. You wrote "Any move east with enough troops to even stand a chance in the East would leave the West open to collapse". The Germans clearly sent enough troops Eastward to "stand a chance", since they defeated the Russians again and again, driving Russia to disaster; yet the West never collapsed.

I'm finding it hard to justify even bothering to view your posts anymore.
 
Having a hard time with France doing well in this POD. Less germans on the western front but the below also seem to apply
No BEF supporting the french Army
No belgium support and possibly help to germany
Other neutrals not looking favourably on france with knock on effects ( price/availability of goods/resources )
and rather a big one, no RN blockade on germany and I was always told tactics win battles , strategy wins campaigns but its logistics that end up winning wars.
 
Having a hard time with France doing well in this POD. Less germans on the western front but the below also seem to apply
No BEF supporting the french Army
No belgium support and possibly help to germany
Other neutrals not looking favourably on france with knock on effects ( price/availability of goods/resources )
and rather a big one, no RN blockade on germany and I was always told tactics win battles , strategy wins campaigns but its logistics that end up winning wars.

Being fair to the French, the British leadership will probably eventually find a reason to declare war on the Central Powers - for sheer balance of power issues if nothing else, since the Central Powers become dominant in this scenario:

1) With British manpower, the Entente held a stalemate on the western front; without it, the French can hold a stalemate over a shorter line, or try to extend the lines further (IE, invade Belgium and/or Luxembourg) and falter. This might remove pressure on Russia, since Germany would have to ship troops back west, but it certainly doesn't go well for France!

2) Without the threat of the Royal Navy wrecking their business, Italy has no real motive to swap sides and join the Entente; they might uphold their alliance with Germany, or they might remain neutral, but that's favorable to the Central Powers either way.

3) With one fewer front for Austria, they can dedicate more into beating up on Russia.

4) Without the British backing Arab revolts, the Ottomans can dedicate more into beating up on Russia.

5) With a shorter western front, Germany can dedicate more into beating up on Russia, OR the French are overextended, and Germany takes advantage of Russia being tied down more heavily on other fronts to dedicate more into beating up on France.

6) The moment Russia falls, if Britain isn't yet involved in the war, the Central Powers just effectively won. Without British involvement, there will be no unrestricted submarine warfare, and without that provocation, the United States isn't going to rescue France's bacon.
 

LordKalvert

Banned
Don't know if it's a case of never "daring to do" but more that the French government of the time was more respectful of Belgian neutrality.

History (battle of the Frontiers) shows us that early on in the War French attacks on prepared opposition were not as effective as German ones, so there's a chance they would struggle.

Later, if the French were still in the War and the sitiuation had devolved to Trench Warfare, they might move through Belguim to open a new front?

The French government was more inclined to respect Belgium because there was no reason not. The military gains by crossing first in a German strike west are minimal while the potential political gains by waiting enormous

However, look at where French troops mobilize- they are clearly intending a move into Belgium because that's the only place they can go. Joffre und
1914 proved virtually everyone in the military staffs of Europe wrong about a number of things. Were you unaware of this?

The rest of your post is scarcely worth a detailed response. In it you make unsupported assertions, magically read the mind of the Kaiser, misrepresent the statements of others, portray thrice-refuted arguments as fact, contradict the observed battlefield reality of WW1, and wrap it all up with an apparent ad hominem.

Incidentally, your very first paragraph contains serious folly. You wrote "Any move east with enough troops to even stand a chance in the East would leave the West open to collapse". The Germans clearly sent enough troops Eastward to "stand a chance", since they defeated the Russians again and again, driving Russia to disaster; yet the West never collapsed.

I'm finding it hard to justify even bothering to view your posts anymore.

Really, this is bad

First, history teaches no such lesson. The Germans are on the defensive in East Prussia and the Russians aree launching a premature offensive to savethe French. By going East, the Germans have solved all of Russia's problems for them. The Russians don't have to stick their necks out, can rely on their fortresses and delay while their reinforcements arrive.

Sorry to remind you, but the East is not a German romp until 1915- after the Russians had repeatedly broken their armies in offensives to save the French, run out of ammunitions, been blockaded for 9 months and are subjected to massive gas attacks (which the Germans didn't have in 1914)

As for your western theories- the Battles of the Frontiers shows exactly what I said. The Germans do defeat the French both in Alsace and Belgium. However, by going East, the French get to face half the Germans they do OTL. You have never accounted for the freed up French forces. Which get to run around the open flanks or spread the Germans thin. By taking half the German army East, you really do improve the French chances. The Marne shows what the French can do when they outnumber the Germans

Finally, whether you want to deal with it or not- France and Germany mined about 60 million tons of iron and 50 million of them come from a triangle roughly from Metz to Leige to Verdun. Who controls it, controls the industrial heart of Europe. Go East, and it belongs to the French even using the most optimistic assumptions of your posts

If you want an ASB German wank, go for it. But every general of the era agrees with me

P.S. Go back and read Stone, read the first chapter real carefully and see what he really says because the Russians don't spend anywhere what you think on the fortresses let alone the "Polish" fortresses.
 

LordKalvert

Banned
Out of interest, is that referencing anyone in particular (Zuber etc) or just denigrating the idea?

In particular, no. I was thinking more along the lines of the British who kept coming up with idiotic Russian invasion of India plans

That said, when someone is promoting an idea that every professional of the age thinks won't work, its most likely that the professionals know what they were talking about

The most interesting AH is when we take a reasonable idea that wasn't pursued (like Alexeseyev's plans to ignore East Prussia and strike for Silesia) rather than take an idea that was uniformly rejected

A go East idea might work in some political scenarios (British neutrality and Romania, Bulgaria, the Ottomans and Sweden making it a condition of their joining the war would be one) but there is nothing to suggest that any such political situation was developing but rather the contrary that British intervention was nearly inevitable.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Really, this is bad

This is a rather honest appraisal of and introduction to your work!

First, history teaches no such lesson. The Germans are on the defensive in East Prussia and the Russians aree launching a premature offensive to savethe French. By going East, the Germans have solved all of Russia's problems for them. The Russians don't have to stick their necks out, can rely on their fortresses and delay while their reinforcements arrive.

Almost every general of that era believed in gaining and maintaining the initiative, usually through the offensive. OTL with three armies marching through Belgium, the French believed the way to maintain the initiative (and abide by its commitments to Russia) was to launch ill conceived offensives along the frontier. I understand the Russians were already expecting up to 25 German divisions in the East, which is more than the German rail network in the East could deploy initially. Therefore, no matter how good the Russian intelligence network was, the initial deployment would be entirely consistent with Russian expectations. You have not provided any rationale as to why Russia would suddenly change its mobilisation plans, established doctrine and alliance commitment to France, which OTL launched ill conceived offensives despite being the focus of German attentions.

Last time you mentioned a million men - where do you get that number?

Sorry to remind you, but the East is not a German romp until 1915- after the Russians had repeatedly broken their armies in offensives to save the French, run out of ammunitions, been blockaded for 9 months and are subjected to massive gas attacks (which the Germans didn't have in 1914)

It is difficult to have a romp with a single army, when you dance partner (A-H) is close to unconscious - as was the case OTL 1914. Despite this lonely scenario, the Germans consistently prevailed against vastly superior Russian numbers. In the alternative scenario you have 3-4 German armies and in all probability, a revived dance partner. More than enough ingredients for the CP powers to romp and stomp all over whatever the Russians had in 1914.

What massive gas attacks are you referring to? The only mention of gas in commentary of the Gorlice–Tarnow offensive was its use in the West to conceal the transfer of forces for an Eastern offensive.

As for your western theories- the Battles of the Frontiers shows exactly what I said. The Germans do defeat the French both in Alsace and Belgium. However, by going East, the French get to face half the Germans they do OTL. You have never accounted for the freed up French forces. Which get to run around the open flanks or spread the Germans thin. By taking half the German army East, you really do improve the French chances. The Marne shows what the French can do when they outnumber the Germans

As previously advised, in this scenario circa two thirds of the OTL German Western forces will be defending circa one third of the OTL Western front. That shortened front has generally far more defensible terrain and far superior logistics. There are more than enough German forces to actively defend between the Swiss border and the Ardennes (or the Belgium fortress line). This means that in order to engage the Germans, the French will (per OTL) need to mount frontal assaults on established German positions with predictable results.

Total German losses from being on the defensive in the West and offensive in the East are likely to be less than the French in absolute terms i.e. the French will lose a battle of attrition

Finally, whether you want to deal with it or not- France and Germany mined about 60 million tons of iron and 50 million of them come from a triangle roughly from Metz to Leige to Verdun. Who controls it, controls the industrial heart of Europe. Go East, and it belongs to the French even using the most optimistic assumptions of your posts

OTL in four years with an extended front, superior numbers, superior resources, sufficient heavy artillery, rectified offensive doctrines, less colourful uniforms, steel helmets and more offensive friendly terrain - the Entente failed to achieve a meaningful strategic breach of the German lines. In the ASB forum, a 1916 French army may have breached 1914 German defenses (subject to manpower), but the deficiencies in the 1914 French army were simply too great.

If you want an ASB German wank, go for it. But every general of the era agrees with me

I think those supposed 'generals ' have been misleading you - I can assure you none of the generals of that era are currently alive. If they were, I suspect they would find your 'he who hesitates, wins' concept fascinating. I suspect the 'generals' with whom you speak are just lonely old men that enjoy your company...
 
Really, this is bad

First, history teaches no such lesson. The Germans are on the defensive in East Prussia...

Snip.

I'll take your points one by one over the next couple of days (I'm kinda busy with work and have limited time for research).

Yes, the Germans are on the defensive in East Prussia -- a region eminently suited for defense, which forces an invader to separate his forces, has a decent rail and road network to allow defenders to concentrate rapidly against isolated groups of attackers and thereby defeat them in detail, and which was regarded by Joffre as one big "ambush" -- of which the Russians were aware (Dobrorolski, Sbornik, pp.27ff; Valentinov, Snosheniya, pp.22-23; both cited by Stone).

This is why Danilov originally intended to send four armies against E. Prussia. By Aug1914, however, overconfidence, competition between the two Fronts, and Stavka's impotence to enforce compliance on the Fronts, resulted in only two armies being sent. This was a recipe for catastrophe that the Russians inflicted on themselves (Stone).

The Russian commanders, knowing that they were lacking the flank support of the two missing armies, then compounded the risk. 1st Army had 12.5 infantry divisions; 6 of them were deliberately left out of the advance, to "garrison" Grodno and Kovno; so Rennenkampf deliberately advanced into "ambush" terrain at only half strength (Vatsetis, p.29); cited by Stone). 2nd Army did likewise: assigned 14.5 infantry divisions, Samsonov advanced with just 9.5; he spread these out too far for mutual support (Stone, Buttar) and coordinated them miserably (Stone). Finally, the Russian plan had the two armies advancing separated both by time (not simultaneous) and by distance (7-8 days march).

So the excuse that the defeat is somehow not the fault of the Russians because the Germans were defending, simply doesn't hold up: the Russians knew the risks of attacking here, yet they first cut their forces down by half, then sent only 60% of the remainder forward, then set themselves up for defeat in detail.

It was Russian incompetence that gave the defending Germans the chance to defeat 1st and 2nd Armies -- they knew the risks but lacked the good judgement to implement wise control measures. This incompetence will also be manifested in any TL in which the Germans have larger forces in theater.

Incidentally, both Stone and Buttar provide numerous instances in which German reserve and even Landwehr troops beat Russian active duty units during this battle...


(To be continued)
 
Snip.

...the Russians aree launching a premature offensive...

The "premature offensive" thing was invented later by Russian apologists to excuse Russian blundering.

In fact, the Russians had agreed of their own free will, at the Franco-Russian staff talks of 1912, to launch the offensive no later than the 15th day of mobilization (Strachan, Stone). Now, it is true that the French pressured them, and that they dangled big loans as an incentive for Russian agreement (Strachan). But if the Russian Army was incapable of mounting such an offensive properly, the Russians owed it to their . This is simply bad Russian decision-making.

Further, the "unreadiness" of NW Front is a hindsight claim based on hindsight standards. On 10Aug, Zhilinsky reported that 1st and 2nd Armies would be ready by the 12th mobilization day (Ushakov, Podgotovka, p.106; cited by Stone). On 11Aug, 1st Army had 785 shells per gun and 2nd Army had 737; the Russians themselves considered this sufficient (Generalny Shtab RKKA: Sbornik dokumentov, Manevrenni period 1914, pp. 525–7, Barsukov: Podgotovka, pp. 134–5; both cited by Stone).

In fact, the wartime inquiry by General Panteleyev found that "materially, everything was complete" (Sbornik, Document No. 804; cited by Stone).

The problem, as Stone points out, is that the Russian concept of "ready" was ludicrously insufficient for the needs of modern war. It didn't help that when the Russians conducted war games in Apr 1914 that featured this very sort of advance on both sides of the Lakes into East Prussia, they deliberately left logistics completely out of the game (Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets: the Imperial Russian Army, pp. 251–54). This was probably done, as Prit Buttar notes, to spare Russian commanders from embarrassment due to their notoriously bad grasp of logistical matters (also see Zuber, The Real German War Plan, for his notes on German intelligence assessments of the Russian Army).

Plus, as we have already seen, the Russians denuded NW Front of the other two armies it was supposed to have, in a foolish effort to do too many things at once.

NW Front's "unreadiness" is not a result of desperate haste, but rather a result of the Russian Army's systemic shortcomings, and lousy judgement. These systemic shortcomings and lousy judgement will become more crucial if greater German forces put greater pressure on the Russians.
 
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Snip.

...after the Russians had repeatedly broken their armies in offensives to save the French...

The idea that the Russians "broke their armies to save the French" is also demonstrably not true.

The Russians certainly launched their East Prussian offensive to suit their ill-judged promises to the French. But they "only" suffered perhaps 250,000-300,000 casualties in the Tannenberg/Masurian Lakes campaign (Buttar, Stone, Strachan, Showalter).

Meanwhile, the Russians lost some 225,000 in Galicia against the Austrians (Buttar, Stone).
They lost another 100,000 unsuccessfully defending Lodz from German attack (Stone).
They lost another 60,000-100,000 when the Germans attacked and crushed Sievers' Tenth Army (Stone, Buttar).
Another 100,000 were lost in the siege of Przemysl.
The biggest single loss, though were the 500-700,000 Russian troops lost in the pointless Carpathians campaign during the winter of 1914-15 (Buttar, Tunstall).

Note that ONLY ONE of these disasters was the result of a Russian attack against the Germans (the only foe whose defeat would take pressure off the French). The others were defensive battles, or offensives against the Austrians, which the French specifically opposed as not being directed against the primary enemy (text of the Franco-Russian Military Convention of 1913, Article 1; Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, p.18)
At least 0.95 million (73%) of Russia's 1.3-1.4 million losses in 1914 were experienced either on a front that didn't directly affect the French and should have been a conservation-of-force defense, or in efforts to merely save their own imperial possessions from German attack.

The Russian Army was not wrecked in attempts to attack to save the French in 1914, but in trying to defend themselves, and in trying to beat the Austrians in pursuit of their own goals.
 
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