What if Enigma had never been broken?

I don't have any grand statements to add to this question posed in the title. However, I would love to hear people's thoughts on the subject.
 
It would have some smaller effect on german performance like them doing better in the atlantic and mounting more ambushes on allied forces here and there but i dont think it would be war winning.
The main problem with the german army was hitler after all and no amount of secrecy could save them from this later war wonder plans.
 

shiftygiant

Gone Fishin'
*in his best English professor voice*
Then Gentlemen, we may have just lost the war.


But seriously, what this will do is delay the Normandy Landings thanks to the continuation of Atlantic Shipping disruption, and extend the war somewhat. Soviet's reach the Elbe in this event, and take some of Austria, whilst the WAllies, when they do eventually land in France, will get slim pickings.
 
I agree with you all that the war would have been prolonged slightly longer, but how about the development of the computer? After all, Alan Turning's 'enigma decoding machine' was the very first computer. If the war was won without ever decoding Enigma, what do you think this would mean for the development of computers?
 
I agree with you all that the war would have been prolonged slightly longer, but how about the development of the computer? After all, Alan Turning's 'enigma decoding machine' was the very first computer. If the war was won without ever decoding Enigma, what do you think this would mean for the development of computers?


Correction: Turing's bombe was not a computer. The first "real" computer was Colossus, which was made to decode the more complex Lorenz cypher in 1943.
Anyway, which version of Enigma remains unbroken? Maybe Germany could adopt a version of the naval Enigma (one of the toughest to break IRRC) for general use?
 
I agree with you all that the war would have been prolonged slightly longer, but how about the development of the computer? After all, Alan Turning's 'enigma decoding machine' was the very first computer. If the war was won without ever decoding Enigma, what do you think this would mean for the development of computers?

Well just because they hadn't broken Enigma does not mean that they would not have tried. And there are other codes that needed breaking.

Bletchly Park would still have existed - those individuals would still have worked together and Computers would still exist.

Also in reply to the OP there were many other sources of Intel for the Allies - for example the British were very good at Aerial Recon and had many advantages in phtography as well as the ability to interperet them.

One process involved 2 cameras creating effectively a 3d Photograph.

Techniques like this coupled with repeated sorties were very effective.

For every secret Enigma Gleaned at least 2 others were gleaned through Aerial Recon.
 
Largest effect is the Allies better develop their other information sources. There are several examples of major Allied setbacks because one senior intel officer or another became too dependent on the ULTRA intel messages and neglected boiler plate items like PoW interrogation, signals analysis, battlefield reconissance, air recon/photo. The USSR was in this position. Not having acess to enigma encrypted messages the Red Army & others had to make more efficient use of other intel methods.
 
Largest effect is the Allies better develop their other information sources. There are several examples of major Allied setbacks because one senior intel officer or another became too dependent on the ULTRA intel messages and neglected boiler plate items like PoW interrogation, signals analysis, battlefield reconissance, air recon/photo. The USSR was in this position. Not having acess to enigma encrypted messages the Red Army & others had to make more efficient use of other intel methods.

Crete was lost despite quite detailed Ultra intercepts (and the bravery of the FJs).

I once heard/read/some ones uncles dog told me that the Commander on Crete went out of his way to not react to events so as to not tip off the Germans that he had Ultra.
 
Crete was lost despite quite detailed Ultra intercepts (and the bravery of the FJs).

I once heard/read/some ones uncles dog told me that the Commander on Crete went out of his way to not react to events so as to not tip off the Germans that he had Ultra.

Yes, just because you have information doesn't mean you can use it or will use it effectively. The war in the Med got the Allies valuable practice in using Enigma (among other things, but that's a thread in itself) on a small scale where the consequences weren't catastrophic, this practice lead to bigger successes later on.
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
Crete was lost despite quite detailed Ultra intercepts (and the bravery of the FJs).

I once heard/read/some ones uncles dog told me that the Commander on Crete went out of his way to not react to events so as to not tip off the Germans that he had Ultra.

Freyberg wasn't told of the source of the intel, but he worked out that it must have been from radio intercepts (due to the timing and detail). The decisions about not being seen reacting to it were taken at a higher level - the WAllies got better at dealing with this aspect later on.

How much of the code-breaking assistance in the Med (e.g. troop convoys avoiding the Italian fleet) was Ultra, and how much Italian codes?
 
I don't have any grand statements to add to this question posed in the title. However, I would love to hear people's thoughts on the subject.

ULTRA (that is, consistent Allied access to German SIGINT) had effects as early as the Battle of France. ULTRA showed the extent of the German victory before the Allies could see it for themselves; it's been said that this convinced Churchill and the British high command to give up on France.

Later on - ULTRA was useful in the Battle of Britain; in effect, the RAF was CC'd on the daily strength reports from the Luftwaffe bases in France. When SEELOWE was cancelled, ULTRA picked it up. ULTRA figured in the Battle of the Beams.

In the Battle of the Atlantic: the "first happy time" for the U-boats ended in mid-1941 when the British cracked naval Enigma. This allowed them to evade U-boat scouting lines and reduced losses in late 1941 by at least a million tons. In early 1942, the Germans adopted a new Enigma for U-boats, and losses jumped to devastating levels. But even in this period, the Allies had had ULTRA from the U-boat training command and the main German navy, so they knew about all new U-boats launched and commissioned, and about all U-boats entering or leaving the Biscay bases.

In intelligence work: ULTRA reported the communications of Abwehr outstations to Berlin. Much of this traffic dealt with the agents in Britain which the British had under control. The British were thus able to adjust their manipulation of the controlled agents for maximum credibility with the Germans, and could be certain no other agents were loose.

In the Mediterranean: ULTRA greatly enhanced the ability of Allied forces to intercept and destroy Axis shipping to North Africa. It also CC'd the Allies on the Axis strength and supply reports.

It is not easy to pin down specific consequences of ULTRA in land warfare. But it is clear that there was an effect, because at any given time, it provided the Allied commanders with an accurate and reliable picture of German strength and readiness. Allied commanders were thus able to plan bold operations in confidence.
 

Deleted member 1487

ULTRA (that is, consistent Allied access to German SIGINT) had effects as early as the Battle of France. ULTRA showed the extent of the German victory before the Allies could see it for themselves; it's been said that this convinced Churchill and the British high command to give up on France.

Later on - ULTRA was useful in the Battle of Britain; in effect, the RAF was CC'd on the daily strength reports from the Luftwaffe bases in France. When SEELOWE was cancelled, ULTRA picked it up. ULTRA figured in the Battle of the Beams.

In the Battle of the Atlantic: the "first happy time" for the U-boats ended in mid-1941 when the British cracked naval Enigma. This allowed them to evade U-boat scouting lines and reduced losses in late 1941 by at least a million tons. In early 1942, the Germans adopted a new Enigma for U-boats, and losses jumped to devastating levels. But even in this period, the Allies had had ULTRA from the U-boat training command and the main German navy, so they knew about all new U-boats launched and commissioned, and about all U-boats entering or leaving the Biscay bases.

In intelligence work: ULTRA reported the communications of Abwehr outstations to Berlin. Much of this traffic dealt with the agents in Britain which the British had under control. The British were thus able to adjust their manipulation of the controlled agents for maximum credibility with the Germans, and could be certain no other agents were loose.

In the Mediterranean: ULTRA greatly enhanced the ability of Allied forces to intercept and destroy Axis shipping to North Africa. It also CC'd the Allies on the Axis strength and supply reports.

It is not easy to pin down specific consequences of ULTRA in land warfare. But it is clear that there was an effect, because at any given time, it provided the Allied commanders with an accurate and reliable picture of German strength and readiness. Allied commanders were thus able to plan bold operations in confidence.

Are you telling us that without ULTRA that the Wallies would be even more cautious than they were IOTL?

Edit:
Also these benefits of ULTRA-
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultra
  • Ultra intelligence considerably aided the British Army's Operation Compass victory over the much larger Italian army in Libya in December 1940 – February 1941.[41]
  • Ultra intelligence greatly aided the Royal Navy's victory over the Italian navy in the Battle of Cape Matapan in March 1941.[42]
Ultra intelligence fully revealed the preparations for Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the USSR. Although this information was passed to the Soviet government, Stalin refused to believe it.[44] The information did, however, help British planning, knowing that substantial German forces were to be deployed to the East.
  • Ultra contributed very significantly to the monitoring of German developments at Peenemünde and the collection of V-1 and V-2 Intelligence from 1942 onwards.[52]
  • Ultra contributed to Montgomery's victory at the Battle of Alam el Halfa by providing warning of Rommel's planned attack.
  • Ultra also contributed to the success of Montgomery's offensive in the Second Battle of El Alamein, by providing him (before the battle) with a complete picture of Axis forces, and (during the battle) with Rommel's own action reports to Germany.
  • Ultra provided evidence that the Allied landings in French North Africa (Operation Torch) were not anticipated.[53]
  • A JN-25 decrypt of 14 April 1943 provided details of Admiral Yamamoto's forthcoming visit to Balalae Island, and on 18 April his aircraft was shot down, killing this man who was regarded as irreplaceable.[54]
  • The part played by Ultra intelligence in the preparation for the Allied invasion of Sicily was of unprecedented importance. It provided information as to where the enemy's forces were strongest and that the elaborate strategic deceptions had convinced Hitler and the German high command.[55]
  • The success of the Battle of North Cape, in which HMS Duke of York sank the German battleship Scharnhorst, was entirely built on prompt deciphering of German naval signals.[56]
  • Both Enigma and Tunny decrypts showed Germany had been taken in by Operation Bodyguard, the deception operation to protect Operation Overlord. They revealed the Germans did not anticipate the Normandy landings and even after D-Day still believed Normandy was only a feint, with the main invasion to be in the Pas de Calais.[57][58]
  • It assisted greatly in Operation Cobra.
  • It warned of the major German counterattack at Mortain, and allowed the Allies to surround the forces at Falaise.
  • During the Allied advance to Germany, Ultra often provided detailed tactical information, and showed how Hitler ignored the advice of his generals and insisted on German troops fighting in place 'to the last man'.[59]
 
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If I do not misremember, it wasn't just the western Allies who made use of intelligence provided by ULTRA. The Soviet Union made use of such intelligence provided to it by the United Kingdom in regard to German dispositions in the lead-up to the Battle of Kursk. (Citation is from Lloyd Clark's Kursk; if someone doubts it, I'll look through and find the exact citation.) I don't claim it would change the outcome of the war, but the Soviets, not just the Americans and British, may also have acted more conservatively, covering more bases at the expense of effectiveness, in the absence of this information.
 
...

How much of the code-breaking assistance in the Med (e.g. troop convoys avoiding the Italian fleet) was Ultra, and how much Italian codes?

Common version is poor Luftwaffe comm security, with & without the Enigma machines was the best source for the Brits. I cant say how accurate that is. Signal analysis even where the Italian messages were unread was still helpful. Plus the Brits made some serious efforts to keep air recon over the Italian ports.
 
Correction: Turing's bombe was not a computer. The first "real" computer was Colossus, which was made to decode the more complex Lorenz cypher in 1943.
Anyway, which version of Enigma remains unbroken? Maybe Germany could adopt a version of the naval Enigma (one of the toughest to break IRRC) for general use?

Excuse me please.

But according to Wikipedia this honor belongs to Konrad Zuse:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konrad_Zuse

His greatest achievement was the world's first programmable computer; the functional program-controlled Turing-complete Z3 became operational in May 1941. Thanks to this machine and its predecessors, Zuse has often been regarded as the inventor of the modern Computer.
 
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