What if Chiang Kaishek hired French advisors instead of German?

raharris1973

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Apparently this was an option under consideration in Chiang’s Nanjing government. What difference does it make to Nationalist China’s military and diplomatic development?

I think it changes the hardware and uniforms and training manuals of the KMT central army divisions.

Now in OTL Chiang’s German trained and equipped divisions were credited with successful anticommunist encirclement campaigns and with making a valiant stand at Shanghai against the Japanese, despite eventual defeat.

We are accustomed to regarded French equipment and especially methods of warfare in mid century as lower quality than Germanso theoretically the Chinese could perform worse across the board.

On the other hand, I am not so sure those differences are bad for China or affect it in any negative way. The KMT’s 5the encirclement offensive against the Chinese Communists in the south was a deliberate, methodical offensive, emphasizing blockhouses and superior firepower.

There does not seem to be anything particularly “un-French” about those methods, in fact they seem very French in approach.

Perhaps there still might be a negative impact on China’s performance against Japan. By then again, maybe not. At Shanghai the Chinese took advantage of urban conditions in mounting their defense. I do not think French advisors would steer them wrong for an urban fight.
I am also skeptical how much of the German auftragstaktik and initiative for lower officers really transmitted over to Chinese practice. So, those finer points of the German way of war might not be missed.

I wonder if the French Communist Party would make any meaningful trouble over French advisory support for Chiang’s anticommunist extermination campaigns.

Other than differences in The weapons and training other effects include Germany needing to find an alternate way to pay for Chinese tungsten.

Your thoughts?
 
Interestingly enough, most of the Japanese generals and marshals that were members of the Imperial family had a French military education. The Japanese military had a lot of French-designed (Hotchkiss and Schneider) equipment as well.
 
Might increased ties with the French lead to better equipment for the Chinese Airforce? IIRC Chiang didn't want to have one country provide all the advisors for the Chinese military. Perhaps in TTL the Germans end up providing aid to the Chinese Airforce instead of the Soviets? While the aircraft provided by the Germans won't be significantly better than what the Soviets, provided, the doctrine and training could have positive ramifications further down the line.
 
Interestingly enough, most of the Japanese generals and marshals that were members of the Imperial family had a French military education. The Japanese military had a lot of French-designed (Hotchkiss and Schneider) equipment as well.

Good point. Back in the glory days of French military reputation the modernizing Japanese had favored France as a source of European military advisors, weapons, and operating methods. This connection stuck at least to the 1920s as evidenced by some of the weapons Japan selected. Logically enough the British RN was emulated and Japan purchased a fair number of ships from Britain through 1914.

The Chinese would have died with elan.

The French doctrine of Elan reached far back into the 19th Century. Given the connection between Japans army and the French the parallel between Japanese infantry shock and 'Bamboo Spear' tactics French ideas about Elan and rapid action, seems logical.
 
one thing is that France had their adjacent colony with Indochina, one of the putative reasons for Japanese invasion was they were allowing supplies thru to China. think this might work against France gaining the contract(s) to train and supply KMT, as they were trying to free the country from foreign domination, but work in favor of them actually being able ... to train and supply.

where would German turn? they would have to barter with half dozen countries to gain the resources they obtained from China (meaning the variety not quantity) or revive 1920's cooperation with USSR.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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Might increased ties with the French lead to better equipment for the Chinese Airforce? IIRC Chiang didn't want to have one country provide all the advisors for the Chinese military. Perhaps in TTL the Germans end up providing aid to the Chinese Airforce instead of the Soviets? While the aircraft provided by the Germans won't be significantly better than what the Soviets, provided, the doctrine and training could have positive ramifications further down the line.

one thing is that France had their adjacent colony with Indochina, one of the putative reasons for Japanese invasion was they were allowing supplies thru to China. think this might work against France gaining the contract(s) to train and supply KMT, as they were trying to free the country from foreign domination, but work in favor of them actually being able ... to train and supply.

where would German turn? they would have to barter with half dozen countries to gain the resources they obtained from China (meaning the variety not quantity) or revive 1920's cooperation with USSR.

Where else do the Germans go? Maybe more of them play both sides of the Chaco war and keep it going?

Indochina can definitely be an asset in terms of having people assigned to the region already. Indochina can be a source of supplies on a limited scale but it’s not like France did not have its own urgent rearmament needs.

I wonder about political complications. How much might the Communists in the French National Assembly protest aid to Chiang when he is doing anti communist extermination campaigns. Conversely, once Chiang is back in a United Front do French conservatives get skittish about aiding him?

Are the French going to expect official hostility by the Chinese government towards expat Vietnamese activists as a quid pro quo for aid and training?
 
There's no reason to believe that French advisers would produce worse results than German ones. French advisers were active across the world in a long list of countries - Japan, Greece, Poland, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, China for its navy etc. and they generally played important work in all of them in modernization and improvement of their efficiencies. In purely intellectual terms, and training regards, given the same size of the mission, the French would do about as well as the Germans - maybe some differences here and there since French and German military culture had some pronounced differences, but while it has been a few years since I have read the articles about German involvement, I do remember the Germans complaining about Chinese reluctance to adopt many German methods and tactics (the famous "Encirclement Campaigns" were won with methods, which as previously mentioned, were highly contrary to what the Germans suggested, and the Germans very much did try to promote the idea of fast moving, elite, dynamic forces, failing to realize that the Chinese army was unable of carrying out such operations, and the Germans complained constantly about Chinese tactical operations during the Battle of Shanghai), so for deeper and more profound changes there probably would have have been little difference. There were some French advisers present throughout the period in any case, and about equal numbers of Chinese officers attended German and French military establishments back in the home countries anyway. The French also had schools in the country, such as at Shanghai, which had a disproportionate influence on the education of future Chinese elites, and there were very substantial numbers of Chinese students who studied in France during the period. The French had the idea that by installing their influence in the country's educated elites and promoting their language they would be able to secure additional export orders for their firms and selection of their equipment. In some regards that was correct, although commerce following the language is generally not as marked as language following the commerce...

Unfortunately, the problems start there. Specifically, for much of the 1930s the French were very anxious about the Japanese and adopted the most conciliatory attitude of the big three Western powers in the region (England, US, and France). Unlike the Germans the French have substantial interests in the region which are very vulnerable to the Japanese, so fundamentally there has to be a very big chance of policy to result in the French deciding to take an an aggressive perspective against the Japanese via massive training and equipping of the Chinese. This might have broader political ramifications as it would provide a more cohesive front of the Western powers against Japanese aggression.

Further problems continue in that as far as economic exchanges, for a barter system, the Chinese are less well placed to trade with the French. In addition to the smaller nature of French industry and the economy, exacerbated by the great depression, fundamentally the French have a much larger resource set from their colonial empire. There may be some resources which the Chinese can trade with the French, but the French have no real interest in doing a barter agreement - by contrast they are a financial nation, with vast reserves of gold, and a status quo one as opposed to the German effort to come up with alternatives to the international system. It would either take French direct investments into the economy in exchange or financial payment. The latter would be quite impossible beyond a limited scale for the Chinese, although it should be noted that there were significant French military exports to China during the period, including tanks, aircraft, both light and heavy machine guns, helmets, (some of this equipment was exported in the 1930s at the height of the desperate French struggle to produce enough material for their own forces, particularly the Munich Crisis, showing the deep... patriotism, of some French companies who were very glad to accept huge government assistance for the aviation industry in particular, but much less willing to accept commensurate government control and national priorities: good respect of the liberal traditions of French economics when the government assured that they would buy the aircraft they produced, socialism when the government tried to rationalize the industry) but the differences between the French and German political economies would make expanding that hard and there is no real path to any sort of bartering agreement in light of the different governments and economies in effect. The different nature of interest groups in France (lots of potential producers in the French Empire and more overlaps with Chinese production who will be more opposed to mass Chinese exports flooding the market: the great German innovation in trade in the 1930s was the bartering agreement: the French one was from my recollection, import quotas on wheat to prop up agricultural prices in the country after tariffs didn't seem to be doing enough, so there is a different mentality and objective at work with many of these raw materials) means a substantive agreement is much harder.

But that furthermore leads to the other problem, in that France is a colonial power in the region with vested interests in China. The Germans weren't. It isn't quite that the French are going to conquer the country and make it into another colony of course! But major expansions of French influence, particularly if it has to come through things like direct investments, are going to be greater infringements on Chinese sovereignty and are going to be more unpopular than otherwise, and they're coming from a power which already has very significant concessions throughout the rest of the country. It would be perceived as further entrenching China's neo-colonial status, and would be bound to be unpopular.

In essence, the Chinese had good reasons to opt for Germany instead. There isn't any intellectual shortcoming on the French part - I would suspect that with the combination of French schools, missionaries, training in French academies, and French advisers in the country, their influence on Chinese intellectual development and education was probably greater as a whole. But the relationship carries important political disadvantages and obstacles which the one with Germany doesn't, and there are severe problems with expanding it on the material side of things. The principal advantage is the political one in helping to shore up an alliance of the Western Powers against Japan, and if the Japanese do invade the ability for French biased neutrality in their concessions in China and their privileges there, plus their railroad connections into China, to enable them to help the Chinese. But there's no real reason I can see for the French to adopt that strategy barring external consideration: inherently, both sides have very major political and economic blocks to any truly close relationship.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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Monthly Donor
There's no reason to believe that French advisers would produce worse results than German ones. French advisers were active across the world in a long list of countries - Japan, Greece, Poland, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, China for its navy etc. and they generally played important work in all of them in modernization and improvement of their efficiencies. In purely intellectual terms, and training regards, given the same size of the mission, the French would do about as well as the Germans - maybe some differences here and there since French and German military culture had some pronounced differences, but while it has been a few years since I have read the articles about German involvement, I do remember the Germans complaining about Chinese reluctance to adopt many German methods and tactics (the famous "Encirclement Campaigns" were won with methods, which as previously mentioned, were highly contrary to what the Germans suggested, and the Germans very much did try to promote the idea of fast moving, elite, dynamic forces, failing to realize that the Chinese army was unable of carrying out such operations, and the Germans complained constantly about Chinese tactical operations during the Battle of Shanghai), so for deeper and more profound changes there probably would have have been little difference. There were some French advisers present throughout the period in any case, and about equal numbers of Chinese officers attended German and French military establishments back in the home countries anyway. The French also had schools in the country, such as at Shanghai, which had a disproportionate influence on the education of future Chinese elites, and there were very substantial numbers of Chinese students who studied in France during the period. The French had the idea that by installing their influence in the country's educated elites and promoting their language they would be able to secure additional export orders for their firms and selection of their equipment. In some regards that was correct, although commerce following the language is generally not as marked as language following the commerce...

Unfortunately, the problems start there. Specifically, for much of the 1930s the French were very anxious about the Japanese and adopted the most conciliatory attitude of the big three Western powers in the region (England, US, and France). Unlike the Germans the French have substantial interests in the region which are very vulnerable to the Japanese, so fundamentally there has to be a very big chance of policy to result in the French deciding to take an an aggressive perspective against the Japanese via massive training and equipping of the Chinese. This might have broader political ramifications as it would provide a more cohesive front of the Western powers against Japanese aggression.

Further problems continue in that as far as economic exchanges, for a barter system, the Chinese are less well placed to trade with the French. In addition to the smaller nature of French industry and the economy, exacerbated by the great depression, fundamentally the French have a much larger resource set from their colonial empire. There may be some resources which the Chinese can trade with the French, but the French have no real interest in doing a barter agreement - by contrast they are a financial nation, with vast reserves of gold, and a status quo one as opposed to the German effort to come up with alternatives to the international system. It would either take French direct investments into the economy in exchange or financial payment. The latter would be quite impossible beyond a limited scale for the Chinese, although it should be noted that there were significant French military exports to China during the period, including tanks, aircraft, both light and heavy machine guns, helmets, (some of this equipment was exported in the 1930s at the height of the desperate French struggle to produce enough material for their own forces, particularly the Munich Crisis, showing the deep... patriotism, of some French companies who were very glad to accept huge government assistance for the aviation industry in particular, but much less willing to accept commensurate government control and national priorities: good respect of the liberal traditions of French economics when the government assured that they would buy the aircraft they produced, socialism when the government tried to rationalize the industry) but the differences between the French and German political economies would make expanding that hard and there is no real path to any sort of bartering agreement in light of the different governments and economies in effect. The different nature of interest groups in France (lots of potential producers in the French Empire and more overlaps with Chinese production who will be more opposed to mass Chinese exports flooding the market: the great German innovation in trade in the 1930s was the bartering agreement: the French one was from my recollection, import quotas on wheat to prop up agricultural prices in the country after tariffs didn't seem to be doing enough, so there is a different mentality and objective at work with many of these raw materials) means a substantive agreement is much harder.

But that furthermore leads to the other problem, in that France is a colonial power in the region with vested interests in China. The Germans weren't. It isn't quite that the French are going to conquer the country and make it into another colony of course! But major expansions of French influence, particularly if it has to come through things like direct investments, are going to be greater infringements on Chinese sovereignty and are going to be more unpopular than otherwise, and they're coming from a power which already has very significant concessions throughout the rest of the country. It would be perceived as further entrenching China's neo-colonial status, and would be bound to be unpopular.

In essence, the Chinese had good reasons to opt for Germany instead. There isn't any intellectual shortcoming on the French part - I would suspect that with the combination of French schools, missionaries, training in French academies, and French advisers in the country, their influence on Chinese intellectual development and education was probably greater as a whole. But the relationship carries important political disadvantages and obstacles which the one with Germany doesn't, and there are severe problems with expanding it on the material side of things. The principal advantage is the political one in helping to shore up an alliance of the Western Powers against Japan, and if the Japanese do invade the ability for French biased neutrality in their concessions in China and their privileges there, plus their railroad connections into China, to enable them to help the Chinese. But there's no real reason I can see for the French to adopt that strategy barring external consideration: inherently, both sides have very major political and economic blocks to any truly close relationship.

I think there are several good points about why a Franco-Chinese relationship might be less of a "fit".

However, I still think it's possible in the late 1920s or 1930s with the right profit motive on the French part and some flexibility or evaluation of France being strong enough in the Far East to be helpful but not so strong as to be a threat (in comparison to others like Japan, Russia or Britain.)

As the situation worsens in Europe in the 1930s, and Sino-Japanese War breaks out (simultaneously with the dangerous-looking Spanish Civil War) France getting increasingly skittish that it's Chinese relations will risk an unwanted conflict with Japan. The profit motive will compete with caution in French minds, and perhaps caution will cause the French to formally distance themselves a bit from the Chinese, by withdrawing trainers and so on.

Interestingly, this was at the same period where there was a Franco-Soviet security pact. Not a pact that stood the test of escalated confrontation, but still an attempt at strategic coordination. I could see the French training and advisory team doing a relatively "graceful" hand-off to a Soviet training and advisory team once the Sino-Japanese war gets too hot.
 
where would German turn? they would have to barter with half dozen countries to gain the resources they obtained from China (meaning the variety not quantity) or revive 1920's cooperation with USSR.

Where else do the Germans go? Maybe more of them play both sides of the Chaco war and keep it going?

they had unique opportunity in China (have been told) in that the country was so large the other Western Powers were o.k. with Germany training the KMT (and assume maintain the status quo against Japan?) if they would, for instance, start arming Turkey or Iran or Argentina? that would be a different matter.
 
I think there are several good points about why a Franco-Chinese relationship might be less of a "fit".

However, I still think it's possible in the late 1920s or 1930s with the right profit motive on the French part and some flexibility or evaluation of France being strong enough in the Far East to be helpful but not so strong as to be a threat (in comparison to others like Japan, Russia or Britain.)

As the situation worsens in Europe in the 1930s, and Sino-Japanese War breaks out (simultaneously with the dangerous-looking Spanish Civil War) France getting increasingly skittish that it's Chinese relations will risk an unwanted conflict with Japan. The profit motive will compete with caution in French minds, and perhaps caution will cause the French to formally distance themselves a bit from the Chinese, by withdrawing trainers and so on.

Interestingly, this was at the same period where there was a Franco-Soviet security pact. Not a pact that stood the test of escalated confrontation, but still an attempt at strategic coordination. I could see the French training and advisory team doing a relatively "graceful" hand-off to a Soviet training and advisory team once the Sino-Japanese war gets too hot.
Sure, that time frame is the best slot for a major Franco-Chinese cooperation, as the French economy and political situation is at its best form, and French attention isn't yet devoted to Europe. But fundamentally in any case the same problems exist, in that 1)The French are painfully aware of their weakness relative to Japan in the region, which means they are reluctant about alienating them excessively, 2)This period which you mention is before the Japanese invasion of China, which does quite a lot to help concentrate the mind upon the danger of Japan: the European colonial powers were not particularly popular among the Chinese in any period, but before Japan was invaded, both the Japanese and colonial powers would be viewed as similarly hated figures infringing on Chinese sovereignty. Being the toady of the French would not sell well among the Chinese people without the Japanese threat looming over them. 3)There is still no real way for the Chinese to pay for a large program of French training and investment, barring direct concessions and French direct investment, which in line with °2, is bound to be highly unpopular. The KMT is fighting to free China from foreign control, not to deliver it to the hands of French bankers.

The Chinese can intensify their links with France, focus more on them as a model, buy more French equipment, etc. But I don't see any way for that to expand to the size and scope of the Chinese-German deals, even during the high point of French Interwar economic power and political stability, in the 1926-1931 period. Both sides have an extensive array of reasons to block a major expansion of their relationships, ones which did not exist in regards to the German-Chinese relationship.

I wonder about political complications. How much might the Communists in the French National Assembly protest aid to Chiang when he is doing anti communist extermination campaigns. Conversely, once Chiang is back in a United Front do French conservatives get skittish about aiding him?
The PCF (Parti communiste français) was tightly aligned to Moscow and Moscow's dictates, and if Moscow decided that helping out China would be a good counterbalance to Japan, then they'll tow the line. Moscow did so historically, so there presumably won't be many problems from the French (far) left (the normal French socialists might have more to say about such affairs....). In addition, the PCF was a relatively marginal force in French political life for much of this period: only 26 in 1925, 11 deputies in 1928, 10 in 1932: it wasn't until 1936 that their numbers jumped to 72.

Furthermore French foreign policy is traditionally more professionalized and removed from popular pressure than that in the Anglo-Saxon countries, although of course the French legislature does have important influence. More importantly is that the French public and legislature were quite marked in their disinterest for extra-European affairs most of the time. I think that Franco-Chinese arrangements would not become a particularly large political question back at home, except perhaps under the even more partisan and charged atmosphere of the Popular Front, where as you note, the United Front might cause tensions with conservatives who were even more paranoid than normal about communist influence.
 
I agree that in the long run would not have changed much.China main problem was the lack of industry,and warlordism. by its size and population China might have been better with Russian advisers maybe trying to sell Stalin the idea that a japanese controlled Manchuria was a dagger aimed at russia throat
 
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