What if Britain trusts Vichy in 1940?

What if Britain in 1940 trusts the French not to surrender their fleet to the Axis? How would the internal politics of Vichy have been altered? Would Vichy have still agreed to allow German aircraft to operate from Syria in 1941? If a few aircraft arrive as OTL, can the British get them out without a serious clash? What happens in Indochina or New Caledonia? Can the British still have a Free French force without fighting against Vichy? Do the British miss out on using significant numbers of merchant ships?

If we reach late 1942 without any serious fighting (or large butterflies), might it be tempting for Vichy to allow an unopposed landing in the South of France. At first sight, the Anglo-American forces are too weak but it would be possible for most of the RAF and the 8th Air Force to fly to bases in Southern France and thus the Allies should have air superiority. Also they would have the support of a French army, which was limited to 100,000 men and lacked equipment but might have been able to recall men trained over 1939-40 and bring over most of another 100,000 men from North Africa (limited by transport and fighting in Tunisia).

Obviously, German can pre-empt this by invading Southern France but then North Africa falls to the Allies as OTL or sooner and the Allies acquire the French fleet undamaged.

Finally, how would postwar Anglo-French relations have changed?
 
This remind me one of the first things you learn wile plaing "making history":

When You POWN France you better to force them in to your alliance, this will give your enimy plenty of Africa to play with to divert attention from the real prize!
 

Markus

Banned
I think trust is not the right phrase. The UK and France agreed not to make a seperate peace with the Germans but the French did it anyway, making Vichy untrustworthy.

But the British could have realized the KM did not have the manpower to operate the French capital ships. Assuming they could get them, which is unlikely given Darlan´s decision to withdraw the warships to bases in North Africa, where they are out of reach of the Germans.
 
First, one and half million French POWs spent the war in prison camps so Vichy can't call them up, nor can they call up the 'volunteers' for labor in Germany.

Second, the Allies can't casually land their air power in southern France, nor would it be sufficient in 1942 to make up for the weakness in the British and especially American armies. During a book on the campaign in Norway I came on an excellent piece by a German pilot who explained how the reality of air power's movement was so different from the concept in the mind of the public, that moving a single wing-sized unit was comparable to moving an entire regiment with all the supplies and logistics.


Neither did the German occupation of southern France in 1942 have any impact on the North African campaign...except for some British and Americans noting that the French fought them but not the Axis.
 
To be honest, the sinking of the French fleet was one of the major factors in causing Roosevelt to recognise the fact that Britain had the guts to fight the war. The US may not even get involved now
 

Markus

Banned
To be honest, the sinking of the French fleet was one of the major factors in causing Roosevelt to recognise the fact that Britain had the guts to fight the war. The US may not even get involved now

*hrmmmpf*

Wait until the Brits win the BoB. Besides FDR was borderline paranoid in regard to Germany. Sure he´ll move heaven and hell to get the US into the war.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
I think the British would only have "trusted" the Vichy if they had agreed to remove their fleet away from European waters, probably to a French port in the Caribbean.
 
I think the British would only have "trusted" the Vichy if they had agreed to remove their fleet away from European waters, probably to a French port in the Caribbean.

Was French Indochina ever considered a possible destination for (at least some of) the French fleet?

I find the prospect of Thailand and Japan having to deal with a large Vichy military establishment in Asia rather entertaining.
 
First, one and half million French POWs spent the war in prison camps so Vichy can't call them up, nor can they call up the 'volunteers' for labor in Germany.
I have been struggling to work out how many men the French could have found. I don't think that a huge number of Frenchmen had been sent from the unoccupied zone to work in Germany by November 1942. The total number of prisoners after capturing the Vichy army in 1942 was 1.8 million. As there must have been approximately 3 million French men in the 18 to 30 years age group, over a million remained. The unoccupied zone must have contained at least a third of total French men of military age but many of these would have been untrained. The obvious source of trained men would have been the forces fighting on the Alps. These were not captured during 1940 and were initially in the unoccupied zone. Unfortunately OTL it is probable that some were sent to Syria and North Africa, so there is some double counting possible below.

Second, the Allies can't casually land their air power in southern France, nor would it be sufficient in 1942 to make up for the weakness in the British and especially American armies. During a book on the campaign in Norway I came on an excellent piece by a German pilot who explained how the reality of air power's movement was so different from the concept in the mind of the public, that moving a single wing-sized unit was comparable to moving an entire regiment with all the supplies and logistics.
One question is how long the Allies would have to prepare air bases. OTL the Germans gave orders to prepare for Case Anton (the occupation of Corsica and the South of France) on the 8th November 1942 and were ordered to execute Case Anton on 11th November. It then took two days to advance the 200 miles to the Mediterranean without opposition. If the German advance can be slowed down, the allies may have a week to get ground crews, spare parts, ammunition and fuel to the many French air fields which should be possible.

However, the weakness of the Allied armies has led me to propose a revised chronology. My new suggestion is that negotiations with Vichy go slowly over September to November 1942 and Vichy only agrees following the news of the Russian attack at Stalingrad. Thus 'Super Torch' is only launched around Christmas 1942. The invasion fleet initially sails towards Sardinia and Sicily and swerves towards Marseilles and Corsica (for air bases) at the end. The carriers and battleships attack Sardinia ahead of the convoy to reduce the threat of air attack. As Benghazi was taken OTL on 20th November, there might be time to reinforce Malta to launch an air attack against Axis bases in Sicily.

OTL the Allies managed to land over 250,000 men in North Africa before the end of November 1942. I assume that they could do slightly better IOTL as they have no opposition and excellent working ports. The Allied Armies are numerous but inexperienced. The Torch numbers given were more constrained by the problems of transport than by overall availability (for example, more than a division was wasted OTL in Madagascar). I guess that the French can raise 150,000 troops quite quickly from the unoccupied zone and move 75,000 from North Africa within a month with the help of Allied transports. There may be a snag in that some forces might be needed ready to respond to a Spanish entry on the Axis side, which would be unlikely but very dangerous.

The Axis forces for Case Anton included 7th and 10th Panzer Divisions, the SS-Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf and perhaps seven German infantry divisions together with the Italian 4th Army with 10th semi-motorized division Piave, 5th alpine division and 7th, 48th and 58th infantry divisions (OTL some of these were sent to Tunisia including 10th Pz.). However, I am hoping that by Christmas 1942, significant forces will be heading either towards Stalingrad or Africa. There were other German infantry formations on the Channel Coast and I am not sure how many of those would be sent South or how fast.

If the Allied forces manage to prevent the locally available Axis forces from breaking through to the Mediterranean, Germany would be in a very difficult position in January-February 1943. Moving forces from the Eastern Front might involve the destruction of Army Group A. The Luftwaffe must fight the Anglo-American air forces over the battle and might well be destroyed approximately a year earlier than OTL. Italy might decide to change sides and without a German army in Italy, might even succeed.
 
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