What if Britain had stayed out of WW1?

If anything, without the forced suppression of German culture in America, the perceived "English-ness" of the USA will not occur, cultural ties remain but they flow to Germany as well, the USA is more like Germany here, a nation that wants the British markets open to her industry, the seas open to her trade, the opportunity to make wealth on the world monopoly board. Enough to ally them? Likely no, but I think the realignment is there, until Russia does something, or China rises, the world is equally divided between the British, the USA and Germany. Britain is still the yardstick.

I agree that the pro-British tilt may not be quite so pronounced in this timeline.

But at least three factors will create an affinity with Britain that Germany will not benefit from:

1) Common language.
2) Britain in 1914 was far and away the #1 foreign investor in the U.S..
3) American business elites were still marrying into British nobility - not German - with some zeal.

Offsetting that, of course, will be anti-British sentiment among Irish and even some German American immigrant communities...

At any rate, the global economy will be still be dominated by Sterling, at least for the time being. The more interesting question will be how the free trade/imperial preference debate plays out in Westminster. The Germans may be weakened by the war, but as U.S. competition heats up, the free traders may end up on the back foot once again.
 
I agree that the pro-British tilt may not be quite so pronounced in this timeline.

But at least three factors will create an affinity with Britain that Germany will not benefit from:

1) Common language.
2) Britain in 1914 was far and away the #1 foreign investor in the U.S..
3) American business elites were still marrying into British nobility - not German - with some zeal.

Offsetting that, of course, will be anti-British sentiment among Irish and even some German American immigrant communities...

At any rate, the global economy will be still be dominated by Sterling, at least for the time being. The more interesting question will be how the free trade/imperial preference debate plays out in Westminster. The Germans may be weakened by the war, but as U.S. competition heats up, the free traders may end up on the back foot once again.

All valid points but I would chalk it up to a draw. English will likely remain the de facto, and in many ways de jure, language of trade and business, markets will set their watches to GMT and eye London, but German will continue to be a handy language for the sciences, engineering, and technical fields, and the USA will retain a large German speaking community with German language newspapers, radio and education. That will divide the American mind over two distinct cultures and languages long before we see the rise of Spanish, pushing the USA towards a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic sensibility we only began to embrace in fact generations later.

Although the British are the biggest investor in the USA, I suspect the USA grows to become the biggest investor in Germany. The opportunity post-war will be there and the German-American community will see a lot of industrial concerns that can benefit from buying into German industry. Standard Oil did OTL, Fokker came to the USA to work with North American, ITT bought into Folke-Wulf, etc., and that is under less cordial times. German invention and patents will draw American capital, unless the British get there first. And that might make for odd bedfellows indeed. Especially as British industrialists speak German better than French, not as social but more lucrative. Why not let the financial ties bind the two Empires together?

The USA has a cultural affinity to France stemming from the Revolution, I think that might keep the sentiment anti-German here, but this Germany is also not guilty of war, not the rapist of Belgium, so German culture has not been as fully equated to savage. I think that helps, the German-American community might get an itch to marry into the German nobility in emulation, but we might ponder that the British Monarchs are still House Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, a very German family after all. Besides, I think there might less impoverished British families to sell off daughters or woo commoner stock American heiresses. Here the Irish-American sensibility might not be so anti-Britain, if Ireland is devolved to a Dominion like status, the civil war averted, the IRA types never raised to power, the Irish might feel far more Anglophillic.

And I agree, at bottom, Sterling will be the key currency, it might slip to a basket currency with Dollars and Marks, but is that so bad? The better part of all industrial trade is between, from or to these three countries, each is about as good as the other, hiding behind gold the global medium of trade is stable and predictable, a Banker's, and thus City of London's, paradise. Japan will be Sterling pegged, likely too China, Russia might be the only other big country to work more on Marks, oil is traded in Sterling as much as Dollars, the sinews of finance still touch London as often as not, more really. With Britain riding high I would be loathe to toss in a tariff fight, of course the USA did that, but I think the underlying forces are different. Britain benefitted from imports, her domestic economy was reducing to luxury brands and the sort of stuff poor farmers in rural corners of the Empire needed, Made in Germany was already as good as gold, her balance of payments offset by oil purchases from mostly British dominated trade, raw materials and food stuffs from across the Empire, the London policy makers are not as beholden to a huge agricultural and industrial base, indeed those fools work for their money and are beneath them. Working class England might lose a lot of industrial jobs to free trade but their bread is cheaper. I could argue it either way but tend to think the free traders prevail, likely the whole financial elite has profited greatly from the war and not just selling to France or Russia, they have loftier sights than preserving factories up north.

As always, I look forward to your thoughts!
 
...
Secondly, the Cabinet agreed to guarantee the neutrality of Belgium.
...
Sry, but ... I somewhat have to disagree.

On that day, 29th July, Grey brought the original treaty-papers of 1839 with him, covered with the original handwritten notes of the Godfather of the Liberal Party at same time himself - Gladstone - in an attempt to 'push' the cabinet towards a decision pro-Belgium, pro-France and anti-Germany.
This rather backfired.
Grey had to make quite some effort that at the end of the day - as until the cabinet of 2nd August - the "decision to not decide" was actually made and NOT a decision to stay aloof of all this continental fray. The cabinet was actually short of. The conclusion he could manage to be taken was that it won't be a question of legalisms of treaties but a political to be taken. ... at some point in the future of the development of events.

Aside from Count Morleys account, a IMHO good source of the cabinets deliberations of these events is still Cameron Hazlehurst : POLITICIANS AT WAR of 1971.
It is also - with the citations of many of the actors diaries of the time - a great source to somewhat 'relativated' some IMHO mispercetion of Greys attitude, as hinted at with notions like :
Once past the initial crisis, I would suspect that domestic issues rear up to turn eyes away. If in here Grey is called out and resigns, and Asquith feels he must resign too, ...
Grey actually threatened on two occasions to possibly resign in case the cabinet would take the position of John Burns :
to stay out of the upcomming conflict and stay neutral at all costs whatever might happen

He did NOT demanded support for France at all costs whatever might happen .
For that reason he was able to stay on the cabinet on the 1st as well as on the 2nd August when the conditions for a possible involement of GB were drawn up :
violoation of Belgium/threat of capturing of the belgian coast by the germans
the HSF attacking France through the channel/freely operatiing within reach of british homewaters.
ITTL even these two conditions would be met by the germans.
So ... I don't see whay Grey and according to the IMHO slightly overrated note of Asquith to Venetia Stanley also Asquith would 'quit' in such a scenario.
 
It's probably an easier POD here to remove Grey from the scene before the Sarajevo crisis erupts - probably the earlier, the better, to give Lloyd George's more pacific faction time to dominate the Asquith cabinet.

Of course, it's even better if you can keep Germany out of Belgium.
 
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Britain neutral in WWI likely butterflies away the Representation of the People Act (1918) that allowed all men and part of women to vote, and expanded the electorate from 7.7 to 21.4 millions of voters.

This, in itself, has a huge impact on British society and policies, including foreign policy.
 
Britain neutral in WWI likely butterflies away the Representation of the People Act (1918) that allowed all men and part of women to vote, and expanded the electorate from 7.7 to 21.4 millions of voters.

This, in itself, has a huge impact on British society and policies, including foreign policy.
The issue of universal suffrage was already a hot topic and I feel it was likely to be expanded with or without WW1. Maybe sooner maybe later but it was coming.
 
It's probably an easier POD here to remove Grey from the scene before the Sarajevo crisis erupts - probably the earlier, the better, to give Lloyd George's more pacific faction time to dominate the Asquith cabinet.

Of course, it's even better if you can keep Germany out of Belgium.

For me one needs to forego the right-wing sweep through Belgium to attain British neutrality. Invading Belgium triggers British fears and locks them into belligerence to defend their perceived interests, not simply to defend Belgium or France.
 
Sry, but ... I somewhat have to disagree.

On that day, 29th July, Grey brought the original treaty-papers of 1839 with him, covered with the original handwritten notes of the Godfather of the Liberal Party at same time himself - Gladstone - in an attempt to 'push' the cabinet towards a decision pro-Belgium, pro-France and anti-Germany.
This rather backfired.
Grey had to make quite some effort that at the end of the day - as until the cabinet of 2nd August - the "decision to not decide" was actually made and NOT a decision to stay aloof of all this continental fray. The cabinet was actually short of. The conclusion he could manage to be taken was that it won't be a question of legalisms of treaties but a political to be taken. ... at some point in the future of the development of events.

Aside from Count Morleys account, a IMHO good source of the cabinets deliberations of these events is still Cameron Hazlehurst : POLITICIANS AT WAR of 1971.
It is also - with the citations of many of the actors diaries of the time - a great source to somewhat 'relativated' some IMHO mispercetion of Greys attitude, as hinted at with notions like :Grey actually threatened on two occasions to possibly resign in case the cabinet would take the position of John Burns :
to stay out of the upcomming conflict and stay neutral at all costs whatever might happen

He did NOT demanded support for France at all costs whatever might happen .
For that reason he was able to stay on the cabinet on the 1st as well as on the 2nd August when the conditions for a possible involement of GB were drawn up :
violoation of Belgium/threat of capturing of the belgian coast by the germans
the HSF attacking France through the channel/freely operatiing within reach of british homewaters.
ITTL even these two conditions would be met by the germans.
So ... I don't see whay Grey and according to the IMHO slightly overrated note of Asquith to Venetia Stanley also Asquith would 'quit' in such a scenario.

The "crisis" I refer to is the Germans invading Belgium, I assume that does not occur, thus Grey's position collapses. I think after that he no longer can get the Cabinet or fellow PMs to see an exigent threat to British interests. He may resign then, Asquith with him, the cabinet shakes up.
 
..., thus Grey's position collapses. ...
May I ask what you actually assume as "Grey's posistion to collapse" here ?

With the germans NOT invading Belgium, threatening to take the belgian coast most of british interest - esp. as perceived by his fellow cabinet members - were actually achieved :
Britains doorstep stays secured​

Not to forget that this might be sold as his diplomatic success having 'moved' the germans to step back from this by everyone expected move.
 
May I ask what you actually assume as "Grey's posistion to collapse" here ?

With the germans NOT invading Belgium, threatening to take the belgian coast most of british interest - esp. as perceived by his fellow cabinet members - were actually achieved :
Britains doorstep stays secured​

Not to forget that this might be sold as his diplomatic success having 'moved' the germans to step back from this by everyone expected move.

Perhaps, but I see Grey as actually wanting in the war, he has failed France and his diplomacy dangerously exposed Britain to being dragged into France's war. He took a course beyond policy, nearly rogue and I doubt he takes credit for Germany turning East. But if you are correct, he is quite the political animal.
 
For me one needs to forego the right-wing sweep through Belgium to attain British neutrality. Invading Belgium triggers British fears and locks them into belligerence to defend their perceived interests, not simply to defend Belgium or France.

The strength of opposition within Asquith's cabinet to going to war even so still still strikes me. I don't think it's at all impossible to keep Britain from going to war if the Liberal imperialist faction is weakened further (say, be removing Grey from the picture).

But yes, the easiest way to ensure British non-beliggerency is for Germany to stand on defense in the West.
 
The strength of opposition within Asquith's cabinet to going to war even so still still strikes me. I don't think it's at all impossible to keep Britain from going to war if the Liberal imperialist faction is weakened further (say, be removing Grey from the picture).

But yes, the easiest way to ensure British non-beliggerency is for Germany to stand on defense in the West.

I am more on the fence. I can see even with a push through Belgium getting the British to stand aside, but I think the "readership" just can't buy it, feels too academic and not "real" enough. Any better ways to get Grey to resign earlier or have his diplomacy have him pushed out?
 
Sry, but ... I somewhat have to disagree.

On that day, 29th July, Grey brought the original treaty-papers of 1839 with him, covered with the original handwritten notes of the Godfather of the Liberal Party at same time himself - Gladstone - in an attempt to 'push' the cabinet towards a decision pro-Belgium, pro-France and anti-Germany.
This rather backfired.
Grey had to make quite some effort that at the end of the day - as until the cabinet of 2nd August - the "decision to not decide" was actually made and NOT a decision to stay aloof of all this continental fray. The cabinet was actually short of. The conclusion he could manage to be taken was that it won't be a question of legalisms of treaties but a political to be taken. ... at some point in the future of the development of events.

Aside from Count Morleys account, a IMHO good source of the cabinets deliberations of these events is still Cameron Hazlehurst : POLITICIANS AT WAR of 1971.
It is also - with the citations of many of the actors diaries of the time - a great source to somewhat 'relativated' some IMHO mispercetion of Greys attitude, as hinted at with notions like :Grey actually threatened on two occasions to possibly resign in case the cabinet would take the position of John Burns :
to stay out of the upcomming conflict and stay neutral at all costs whatever might happen

He did NOT demanded support for France at all costs whatever might happen .​

I believe this is somewhat concurrent with what I think happened in cabinet. Grey's cause is helped on that Sunday 2nd by the dual developments of Paul Cambon begging him to get the Royal Navy into the war, and the Tories signalling to Asquith that they would back the 'hawk' liberals on the warpath. This meant that the anti-war faction faced being undone by a war coalition if they resigned from cabinet. However, if Grey resigned with the rest of the 'hawks' the government might fall and risk putting the pro-war Tories into office. Grey, therefore, was able to use Cambon's request to weaponise his resignation, if he did not get clearance to tell Cambon that the RN would defend the northern coast of France he would resign.

For that reason he was able to stay on the cabinet on the 1st as well as on the 2nd August when the conditions for a possible involement of GB were drawn up :
violoation of Belgium/threat of capturing of the belgian coast by the germans
the HSF attacking France through the channel/freely operatiing within reach of british homewaters.
ITTL even these two conditions would be met by the germans.
So ... I don't see whay Grey and according to the IMHO slightly overrated note of Asquith to Venetia Stanley also Asquith would 'quit' in such a scenario

The "crisis" I refer to is the Germans invading Belgium, I assume that does not occur, thus Grey's position collapses. I think after that he no longer can get the Cabinet or fellow PMs to see an exigent threat to British interests. He may resign then, Asquith with him, the cabinet shakes up.

It would probably take the Germans not invading Belgium to keep Britain out of the war. Especially, as I mentioned earlier, just how quickly all the ducks fell in line for war in Britain after they did. I think the problem is that the Germans ignored their ambassador's (Prince Lichnowsky) warnings about Britain's entry, even as he was trying in vain to keep Britain out of the war and to an extent the Germans out of Belgium. If they hadn't, Grey's position is tentative, but not untenable: even if he fails to convince the cabinet he might get a Parliamentary majority for war.

Having read Prince Lichnowsky's version of events https://archive.org/details/mymissiontolondo00inlich/page/2 it seems as though he was out of the loop - he wasn't aware of Britain's entanglements with the Entente until much too late, he is also perhaps overly positive in his opinions of Grey, Asquith and Britain in general. He also gives the overriding impression that Germany and A-H were hoping for escalation, particularly to bring Russia to the brink of war. The German foreign office didn't seem to smile on his attempts to get them to mediate the issues in the Balkans via various means, and even accused him of 'Austrophobia'. It seems even by this point it was already too late, save Britain choosing at the eleventh hour to abandon everything and set sail.
 
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To tease out the problem, I might question whether Churchill's orders stand or are eased. My understanding is that the seizure was an injury but the insult was refusing to compensate them. The necessity to retain the ships appears weak but the case for simply telling the Ottomans to bugger off should be nullified.

Actually, the Foreign Office settled on offering to give the ships back to the Turks once the war was over, or replace them if sunk, along with £1,000 for every day they were withheld. Pretty arguably not an adequate offer, and not diplomatically handled - certainly the perception of the Turks - but it's not true that the Brits offered *no* compensation.

If the Germans can get the Ottomans to close the Straights then I think their work is done but I do agree that overreaching might step in. But I might disagree that Britain has less not more diplomatic leverage. As a neutral she is fully able to go to war with Constantinople, she still holds much of the Ottoman debts and has the reins on what will be the rest of the global trade. In OTL I feel the Three Pashas were varied in their commitment and their foot dragging shows they are not fully racing to get into the war. At bottom I think a co-belligerent OE is in TTL a burden that adds not enough to the defeat of Russia for the demands she makes.

I'm actually inclined to agree with your last point. The Caucasus Front only diverted 100,000 Russian troops at the outset, and never went over 700,000 or so - to be set against the considerable German investment of men and weapons there. But there was a mindset that every ally to be had should be gotten. I believe it was Wilhelm who once said that once war broke out, the objective should be to get every gun in the Balkans shooting at Slavs.

But as for Britain, her non-involvement in the war doesn't give her so much freedom as that. Britain will be walking a tense knife's edge as war gets underway, on full alert in fear that she might be dragged into the war; the Grand Fleet will be perpetually on its war station even if it's not technically at war. And then there's the problem of Ireland, which will have to be sorted out and not put off. That will distract British energies, too.
 
Am surprised no won has menchend the obvious yet, have the attack on Belgium be delade. The surprise attack on leage was A.) Not in the original plan, moltky added it later on, and B.) Only succeeded becuse the Belgian army was far worse then the German army at the tactical level (franckly it had no right to sucsed consdering how badly it was planed and executed). So keep the attack form happening untill at lest the front line corps have mobilized along whith the sige artillery, that would take 3 to 4 more days before Belgium has to be invaded (and may not cost Germany any time considering even before the war the Belgian chief of staff had been trying to git the 3ed divition out of leage sense he felt it couldn't be held without the intiere Belgium field army there to help) that could buy the anti-war liberals in the cabinet time to keep brition out of the war, or attest damage the cabnet enuff to delay britons entry.
 

marathag

Banned
Hmm. Not sure if anyone has done 'Germany waits for France to launch Plan XVII first' that I can recall

Having Joffre go Balls deep into Alsace-Lorraine for a week before launching the Big Right Hook is an interesting scenario.

Could the French resist the temptation of taking the Meuse valley south of Namur in Belgium as well?

Joffre expected the German to attack from A-L, and that in a Meeting engagement, the 75mm and Elan from bayonet waving guys in Red Trousers would be enough to brush off the attaching Germans, and then 'On to Berlin'

Don't see the Brits jumping in on the 3rd if Germany is still on her borders
 
I am more on the fence. I can see even with a push through Belgium getting the British to stand aside, but I think the "readership" just can't buy it, feels too academic and not "real" enough. Any better ways to get Grey to resign earlier or have his diplomacy have him pushed out?

Yes, but there would be very significant butterflies. Otherwise, have him go blind in the summer of 1914 and resign.

IMG_0359.PNG

From The Pity of War
 
Perhaps, but I see Grey as actually wanting in the war, ...
Well, I think in that point we have rather opposing opinions.
IMHO Grey never and likely would never "want" war. IOTL to me he seemed VERY eager to avoid war if ever possible as long as what he saw as Britains interests were achieved otherways. And following Lord Palmerston : "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." this did not include to stand aside allying withFrance may come what wants.
On several occasions during the late July-crisis he tried to make it clear to Cambon and thereby France also ordering Sir Bertie to tell the same in Paris that France can and should not count on Britains military assistence/participation in a continental, military conflict. Grey tried to keep Germany and France away from any warring against each other at all by "threatening" Germany with Britains - potential - participation in war and "threatening" France with its - potential - NON-participation in war.

To me Grey was "pro-intervention" but not "pro-war" seeing intervention as a diplomatic one. Since 1904/05 despite whatever loud the 'sabe-rattling' was international conflicts were solved diplomatically :
both Moroccan crises, the 'Great Game' with Russia, the italo-türkish war, the Balkan-wars, Bagdad-Bahn and Lieman-von-Sanders affair.
All these crises had been solved without military involvement of a great or self-perceiving great power not counting the rather dilettantic colonial intervention against a dying, uncivilized wanna-be empire (italo-turkish war).
And Grey was - though unsuccessfully - trying to sell his 'conference-approach' on each and every occasion. Unfortunatly this time it did not stuck with the 'usual' participants, despite at one point or the other one or other diplomat of these ventilated a possible favour for this. ... if some conditions might be met beforehand.
So he 'failed' on his own approach and standards : the diplomatic one.

If he would have been really commited to "war-on-France-side-whatever" IMHO he wouldn't have carried the cabinets decisions as it did on making Belgium the "casus belli"-Litmus-test, neglecting the sending/embarkation of the BEF, waiting until midnight 4th when the germans finally rejected (by non-answering) even the last request/ultimatum to keep away from Belgium (and thereby the belgian channelcoast). ... even after everybody knew they had already invaded it.
From all written I've read he was truely and deeply affected when war actually came though he seems to have accepted it as the very last remaining card to be drawn.


(proposal for different development ot follow ... as soon as RL lets me)
 
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