In fairness much of this takes some hindsight, but I think you touch on what was obvious even in 1914, the British had far less to gain from the war yet could not see a way to sidestep it. Each of the belligerents really had no business going to war, a saner world would have sanctioned an invasion of Serbia and sanctioned Russia for abetting its terrorism, but we had no such mechanism and each leader saw the war as not merely unavoidable but winnable. I will argue that without Belgium, the British cannot get a consensus to go to war, a thing I see hand waved, or outright denied, because I respect just how blatantly provocative it was, the military "necessity" of it should never have trumped the diplomatic reality and strategic necessity to preserve Belgium as neutral and keep Britain at arms length from any war in Europe. With hindsight we can see how failing to get the casus belli spins Britain and her Empire into a better orbit. I am shocked this is not already a novel or movie.
What if Britain had stayed out of WW1?
- Thread starter nuggetsfan112
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In fairness much of this takes some hindsight, but I think you touch on what was obvious even in 1914, the British had far less to gain from the war yet could not see a way to sidestep it. Each of the belligerents really had no business going to war, a saner world would have sanctioned an invasion of Serbia and sanctioned Russia for abetting its terrorism, but we had no such mechanism and each leader saw the war as not merely unavoidable but winnable. I will argue that without Belgium, the British cannot get a consensus to go to war, a thing I see hand waved, or outright denied, because I respect just how blatantly provocative it was, the military "necessity" of it should never have trumped the diplomatic reality and strategic necessity to preserve Belgium as neutral and keep Britain at arms length from any war in Europe. With hindsight we can see how failing to get the casus belli spins Britain and her Empire into a better orbit. I am shocked this is not already a novel or movie.
I actually have been thinking of an Anglo-American Alliance TL where this happens.
To what end?
The US and UK are essentially rivals. Both will be making money hand over fist selling to both sides, but it will be the UK keeping the trade lanes open. No risk for the US and no desire to get embroiled in Europe. At the same time Asia remains wide open for exploitation and the main rival there is again, the UK with some Japan thrown in.
This is not to say that the US and UK would be coming to blows. Rather there is no reason for them to come together.
The US and UK are essentially rivals. Both will be making money hand over fist selling to both sides, but it will be the UK keeping the trade lanes open. No risk for the US and no desire to get embroiled in Europe. At the same time Asia remains wide open for exploitation and the main rival there is again, the UK with some Japan thrown in.
This is not to say that the US and UK would be coming to blows. Rather there is no reason for them to come together.
Sure. But that is not an alliance. It took two world wars to convince the US of the need to get into foreign entanglements.
There is no benefit to the US with closer ties to the UK. And why the UK? Why not Germany? The real money is in Europe and that is Germany's playground for the medium term. I get the feeling that the UK would be about to be on the receiving end of Sir Appleby's maxim about the balance of power in Europe with the US as the outsider. Perfidious America perhaps?
Either way decolonization is going to begin to bite the UK soon robbing the UK of the material resources needed to be a great power. Russia is going to rise, if only because it does have access to the material resources to be a great power and that will put Germany on notice. Somewhat ironic Germany will "win" then barely get the chance to enjoy it. And eventually one day China will get back on its feet because it always does.
There is no benefit to the US with closer ties to the UK. And why the UK? Why not Germany? The real money is in Europe and that is Germany's playground for the medium term. I get the feeling that the UK would be about to be on the receiving end of Sir Appleby's maxim about the balance of power in Europe with the US as the outsider. Perfidious America perhaps?
Either way decolonization is going to begin to bite the UK soon robbing the UK of the material resources needed to be a great power. Russia is going to rise, if only because it does have access to the material resources to be a great power and that will put Germany on notice. Somewhat ironic Germany will "win" then barely get the chance to enjoy it. And eventually one day China will get back on its feet because it always does.
Just anothe wee bit of detail
:IOTL the cabinet on 2nd August agreed to naval action taken in case of war, to protect the french northern coast as well as french merchantmen in range of the RN from eventual attacks of the german HSF. The latter was specifically named in the cabinet discussion (notions in numerous biographies and diary-entries of the time) as well as in the communication Grey had with Cambon as well as his diplomatic service (Sir Bertie in Paris specifically).
During the discussion on this matter it was actually proposed to 'neutralize' the channel by the might of the RN for any power engaded in the upcomming war - including France - and thereby taking a ... neutral position. But Grey successfully argued (though personally I am lost on how uneducated the other cabinet members were on military-technical questions to actually follow his reasoning) that this would somehow give the french an advantage over the germans what might again compromise any position of neutrality.
On Wednesday 29 July two decisions were taken at Cabinet. Firstly, the Armed Forces were placed on alert (the "Precautionary Period" was declared and the War Book was opened at 2pm). Secondly, the Cabinet agreed to guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. Had that been communicated to Berlin then I am convinced that German war plans could have been changed in time to avoid Belgium and so keep Britain out of the war. As a belligerent neutral Britain would police Belgian waters and the Channel, thus limiting the High Seas Fleet to a path north of Scotland and, at closest, onto the Biscay coast.
Actually, Tirpitz's wireless orders to Souchon on August 4 were pretty simple: "Alliance with government of CUP concluded 3 August. Proceed at once to Constantinople." Though you could say he did exercise his own initiative a little bit, since he went ahead and did his shore bombardment at Philippeville and Bône anyway. It was just a brief digression from orders, however.
Tirpitz did follow up with a more equivocal order on August 6, while Souchon was coaling at Messina. But here is where Souchon *did* show his most initiative, and that inititiative was to go to Constantinople as quickly as possible. It's very difficult to see how a scenario where Britain remains neutral changes that decision, rather than reinforcing it. The French fleet in the Western Med is already an overwhelming overmatch for Goeben and Breslau even without RN help. (And even if Britain is neutral, you can bet that Milne would be closely monitoring Souchon's location and bearing, and relaing that information to the French, which Souchon would be all too well aware of.) And he didn't want to retreat to Pola, where he'd be trapped for the remainder of the war unless the Austrians ever decided to force the Strait of Otranto.
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Then it depends upon how far back this alliance is cemented, with changes not later than August 1, likely July 31, German attention may be drawn in other directions. An alliance with the CUP is good for war with Russia, sending the German warships to the Straights to close them is a good strategic move, but if Belgium is called off, the thinking is open to change. Even with an alliance, and I presume a rather less eventful sail to the Aegean, the Ottomans are allied but as yet not fully belligerent as in OTL. And is there no British pressure applied to steer them back?
With Germany and A-H racking up some big opening victories you can argue that motivates the Ottomans to jump on things. So where do they go? Attack the Caucasus? As things go the OE becomes more burden and complication than asset.
Any hypothetical that gets Venice back is a good one for me.
Side note - "Venice as a buffer state between Austria and France" is what I do in my timeline that I'm working on to ensure Venice survives to the modern day.
I think it would be an easier sell to other great powers (to say nothing of U.S. opinion, for whatever that would be worth) at that point to take this route, since it nods hard to self-determinism and doesn't formally aggrandize Austrian power. The devil, of course, woud be in the details.
Have you posted any of the timeline yet? Intrigued to read it.
I have not. I've sketched out the broad strokes and written a prologue/POD entry. Hopefully I'll be able to put pen to paper and get a lot more done in the next few weeks.
Once past the initial crisis, I would suspect that domestic issues rear up to turn eyes away. If in here Grey is called out and resigns, and Asquith feels he must resign too, then Lloyd George and his clique gain the government and party. While there may be some split it should be less pronounced, but there is a scheduled election near on the horizon and the biggest issue is Ireland. Between the two I do wonder if the Liberals can secure another government or if the Conservatives can take their edge. My suspicion is that it is really close and we see some working coalition as the Irish PMs might lose their ability to keep the Liberals in power or wag them like a tail, Lloyd George seemed to work well with the Conservatives and they do not look eager to take full control and get their hands dirty. Ireland should be thorny enough to distract Britain from the losing war in Europe. But do we see some better resolution than civil war and independence for Ireland? And does Ireland indeed act as enough distraction to hold Britain too divided to commit to war as I opine? Ireland was the beginning of Empire, I think how it goes sets the tenor for how the Empire evolves, in OTL the Empire began a bloody and acrimonious dissolution from Ireland on, with something better here does Empire have a prettier future?
Wales then Scotland and only then Ireland.
A more decentralised and Catholic union to include Canada and Newfoundland? You must build something if the Empire is to not fall apart. Ireland will only stay in if it is something less anti-Catholic and more devolved. Including British North America makes it less English and Protestant.
It seems reasonable to focus on three shorter term developments that pushed the Turks into war:
1) The seizure by the British government of the two completed dreadnoughts that had been under construction in British yards - the Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel and the Reşadiye;
2) The arrival (and "purchase") of Goeben and Breslau and the resulting political shift to a more pro-German faction in Constantinople led principally by Enver Pasha, culminating in Goeben's attack (at the initiative of Souchon) on Sevastopol on October 29;
3) A shift in German political pressure to obtain belligerency after the Western Front (and, uh, the Carpathian and Serbian fronts) have settled into a basic stalemate.
Until October, of course, the German foreign ministry had been content to merely have the Turks close the Straits to Russian commerce. This would be a great blow all by itself, since it would deny any possible supply of munitions or war materials to Russia's only available year-round ice free ports (ports which were also fairly close to the front, and to Russian army marshalling centers and industry). This development seems pretty hard to butterfly away. A Britain which is not at war is going to have even less diplomatic leverage over Constantinople.
And this will be even more true once it has seized the Turks' two brand-spanking new dreadnoughts, mighty ships on which many Turkish hopes rested and which had been largely funded by popular subscription from millions of Anatolian peasants. Churchill had already given written orders to bar the Turkish crews (by armed force, if necessary) from manning the ships on July 31, almost a week before Britain entered the war, and less than two weeks before Britain informed Constantinople that it was formally seizing the ships for the duration of the war - and it is clear from Churchill's memoirs and cabinet minutes that this was something of a slam dunk decision for Asquith's government facing the threat of an outbreak of war on the Continent. Even if the cabinet decides *not* to go to war, they are not going to turn those ships over to the Ottomans - not until the war is over, or at least they are quite certain that Britain will stay out of the war, and what Ottoman intentions really are. Effectively, then, the ships are already seized.
Britain was the great power which could most threaten the Ottomans. This was by virtue of a long and ill-defended littoral facing the world's greatest naval power, and the proximity of important British bases and protectorates adjoining Palestine, the Hejaz, and Mesopotamia, with the Raj itself only a few days steam away. Whereas they shared only one reasonably short and mountainous border with the Russian Empire. If Britain is not in the war, Ottoman belligerency no longer entails making this potential threat a live and actual one.
There remains, then, the question of Souchon's behavior From August 3 onward in such a scenario. At the time, he was with his ships in Pola, having the Goeben's boilers overhauled, with weeks to go before the work was complete. He was also short on coal. Neither he nor Tirpitz wanted the ships bottled up in the Adriatic once war was declared. So the only alternative worth considering is whether British neutrality would impel Souchon to try to run the gauntlet of French warships in the Western Med to escape into the Atlantic (with the RN watching his every move once he neared Gibraltar - and transmitting it to the French), or whether he would end up going to Constantinople. Souchon's ships were poorly suited to long distance commerce raiding, and the uncertainty of British policy would make attempting to return to German ports (via the Norwegian Sea, presumably) a highly risky one.
Honestly, however, even if Souchon's entire presence in the Med is butterflied away by any British political POD we choose here, the calculus pushing the Turks into the war is still a strong one. Even the absence of Souchon is offset by the basic removal of the British military threat; and the Central Powers are going to look even more like a winning ticket for the Turks to restore some lost luster and even territory with limited risk.
I would be very much interested to see if/where DLG continues his social reforms unmolested by WWI.
There is no way, even with the most isolationist US possible, that the two Anglosphere empires cannot become rivals. The fact that they are built by financial supremacy and preserved by naval power is something that will bring things to a boil.
When? I don't know, perhaps if Britain stays out of the war the earnest US challenge may still not have happened, though I believe it does eventually.
How would it play out? The last time Britain and the US openly come to blows is 1812 and even then neither side had their heart in the war: the British still had their hands full with Napoleon in Spain when war was declared, whilst the northern US states and many of the merchant/business classes saw it as a potential disaster, both in military and business terms. Both sides then readily agreed to a settlement before New Orleans. There is a case that the rivalry is a cold war of sorts or war purely by business and trade. The US by 1914 has already succeeded by and large with the Munroe Doctrine and operates according to the free-trade Open Door policy, gaining dominance by opening up markets to US economic and industrial might as opposed to colonial or imperial ambition.
As for decolonisation, I am unsure whereabout this comes: if Britain stays out of the war then the military threats to her colonies from Germany/Russia (who I believe would still be too busy with each other after the war) wouldn't come until well after the war where Britain is still financially powerful if not dominant, with a rising Japan in the East to boot, if not others. The US is still on the other side of the world and although in OTL they were the ones to ultimately order Britain's dismantlement of the empire, it took 2 World Wars, with all the financial and economic damage those conflicts wrought on Britain in order to be in that position to finally finish her off. The fact that War Plan Red didn't take place when the US was as strong as it was and Britain as weak as it was, I think shows the level of caution with which US politicians approached Britain (or their own voters on the subject) even then.
I have a few ideas but they are limited by my lack of knowledge about the parliamentary politicking of the time. Lloyd George and the other anti-war members of the cabinet were apparently blindsided on the 2nd of August by Asquith's revelation that the tories had openly backed the war and would happily coalesce with the pro-war liberals to achieve this. Grey actually used his resignation as a threat since if he and Asquith resigned, a coalition might well be formed in Parliament in support of war. After Grey got his way, he successfully convinced a good portion of Liberal MPs in Parliament with a speech the following day, with the day after that seeing Britain declare war.
What would have happened in Parliament had Lloyd George done as John Burns and John Morley had done - stand firm and forced Grey and Asquith's hand? Cabinet probably makes no decision/refuses to endorse Cambon's request for the RN's defence of the French coast (he apparently broke into tears when he met Grey before that cabinet meeting, something he used to try and emotionally convey the situation). Without this, Grey will have to resign, he may well not make his 3rd August speech and even if there is not a government properly in place (as I've mentioned before, I back Lloyd Geroge to succeed here if so) come the 4th of August then it would seem to me that Parliament would get a vote on the matter. Whether a Parliamentary majority for war can be formed, I truly do not know. Your guess is as good, maybe better than mine, though I believe there's every chance Kier Hardie, Ramsey McDonald and co. can get the noes to keep Britain out once and for all.
Other things to consider is, if Grey is gone (and but quick) after he fails to get his cabinet decision, who negotiates with Prince Lichnowsky (German Ambassador to Britain) the following day? PL was desperate to keep Britain out of the war, even going as far as to offer his country respecting Belgian neutrality in exchange for Britain's neutrality. Could a settlement be reached, or failing that, could the mere act of negotiating bring an extension to Germany's ultimatum to Belgium (You have until midnight on the 4th August to let us through or we're coming in any way)? What could/might be achieved, could it keep Britain out of the war?
Britain's next General Election had to be held at most 5 years after the previous one, meaning the government could remain in office until December 1915 if, by ASB, dodged the whole thing entirely. France by then would be beaten and I doubt even the tories could do anything about it.
Getting back to Ireland, I again have limited scope in what I can say for sure, if the Liberals cannot get a majority with the IPP, it may well have to find another partner to coalesce, maybe labour assuming they are asked to form the Government. Even with the tories in, the issue of Ireland doesn't spiral out of control or at least I find it much less likely. The Third Home Rule actually made it to Royal Ascent, only to be postponed until after the war, but I don't know whether this happens if Britain stays out. For me the THR bill won't bring peace, it will likely shift the unrest to the Protestant North, with all the complications of potential British Army mutinies, Ulster Volunteers and anything the Catholic south does. Yet, with no Easter Uprising I doubt Eamon De Valera, Michael Collins and Sinn Fein are the ones Britan has to deal with here, John Redmond and his IPP will likely be the main beneficiaries and the Dublin Parliament would eventually serve as a decent safety valve for many of the pressing issues the Irish had. I think there may have been talks in Parliament at the time about what I would have regarded as the best-but-not-perfect solution of a borderless political partition between North and South, with the Protestant counties under Direct Rule and Catholics given Home Rule, similar to now except that Southern Ireland is still part of the UK. It's a shame no quid-pro-quos involving Protestant emancipations/protections in return for Home Rule were considered AFAIK, which I think might have helped reduce the tensions.
The issues surrounding Ireland didn't stay in Ireland, they eventually transmitted themselves through activists etc. to places such as India and Africa, in this ATL where there is some resolution then there is little chance of this actually happening.
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Do not take my questioning for a criticism of your logic. To tease out the problem, I might question whether Churchill's orders stand or are eased. My understanding is that the seizure was an injury but the insult was refusing to compensate them. The necessity to retain the ships appears weak but the case for simply telling the Ottomans to bugger off should be nullified.
If the Germans can get the Ottomans to close the Straights then I think their work is done but I do agree that overreaching might step in. But I might disagree that Britain has less not more diplomatic leverage. As a neutral she is fully able to go to war with Constantinople, she still holds much of the Ottoman debts and has the reins on what will be the rest of the global trade. In OTL I feel the Three Pashas were varied in their commitment and their foot dragging shows they are not fully racing to get into the war. At bottom I think a co-belligerent OE is in TTL a burden that adds not enough to the defeat of Russia for the demands she makes.
With eyes turned East Tirpitz might go looking for a mission but I think the pressure is off. Souchon can complete his refit, combined with the A-H navy break out of the Adriatic and by remaining in place threaten Italy to stay neutral. Sailing to the Ottomans feels premature and without the RN in pursuit, I am not fully convinced the French motivate the run.
But if you are correct, does the Ottomans going to war push Britain to reconsider?
I doubt he does, he might try, he might lay plans, but then Britain might see an influx of cash, boon to industry, and feel confident it can carry on.
In response to @swanner95 Post #78 and to not create a wall of text, I do not quote it.
Overall I think you hit the salient issues. First I think an Anglo-American "Alliance" is too much a product of how Wilson steered the USA and the by product of both wars in Europe, the salient feature being that the UK became the junior partner if not dependent party. Here the UK should be far too healthy to concede so much and this will be an attrition of markets and influence, the USA under Wilson saw Germany as the Number Two, sink her and the USA moves to that spot poised to unseat the British who are weakened. None of that pans out here. The USA retains the single biggest national economy and great advantages but the Empire is the biggest economy overall and outwardly is still first among equals if not more.
If anything, without the forced suppression of German culture in America, the perceived "English-ness" of the USA will not occur, cultural ties remain but they flow to Germany as well, the USA is more like Germany here, a nation that wants the British markets open to her industry, the seas open to her trade, the opportunity to make wealth on the world monopoly board. Enough to ally them? Likely no, but I think the realignment is there, until Russia does something, or China rises, the world is equally divided between the British, the USA and Germany. Britain is still the yardstick.
In order to make this POD work, I suspect we need Grey to get sidelined either just before the crisis breaks or earlier in it. It would be nice if his vague diplomacy was taken away and his push to side Britain with France is missing, somewhere at the end of July we might ASB a more open move by him that exposes how entangled he has promised Britain, with the German moves not yet so blatant then we might see more weight to calling him out, discrediting his gamesmanship and having none of his moves the response to Germany. If that can add gravity to Wilhelm's decision then I think we cement it, likely another ASB tipping to give Moltke a stroke mid argument with Wilhelm over "we must invade France, its our only option." All a bit heavy handed but at least as plausible as any other tangled web of departure.
So far my best guess is that the Tories prevail by a thin margin in 1915, the voting trend was going that way. Avoiding the war might slow it, Ireland might speed it, I do not know. But I think the next Government has no clear mandate, this Britain is very uncertain of what comes next. So I think policy is simply muddled. The Parties are forced to debate more, compromise more and fear no confidence at every major turn. This is why I argue the once we get into that election mood and after, there likely is no solid consensus, unless Germany goes nutty, I see little to force the war upon the Empire.
Decolonialization is a wicked complex set of dominoes, but at bottom I think it begins in Ireland, the way it occurred sparking off how the Empire would break rather than evolve. And here Ireland has none of the hammer blows, it is a rambling devolution, the nastiness shifts to the Ulster minority who wants carved out, Dublin stays engaged. And if we see Russia bow out without the ascent of Lenin's vision for revolution prevailing, then we unravel the fire starter and the reactionaries who followed, taking away so much of the following ideological battle that I am not confident the Empire implodes. Instead I think it should evolve, devolve political power, hollow out its industry to Japan, Germany, the USA, retain the air of solidarity despite becoming a loose association. But we still see London calling the shots, the currency is British, the figurehead is British, the links all flow back to London. Manchester might still lose her factories but the brokers in London will be even wealthier, James Bond might be less fictional, and the RN likely holds on as world cop, today the Empire would be a valid paradigm, like how we use the term "First World," and misuse it.
Overall I think you hit the salient issues. First I think an Anglo-American "Alliance" is too much a product of how Wilson steered the USA and the by product of both wars in Europe, the salient feature being that the UK became the junior partner if not dependent party. Here the UK should be far too healthy to concede so much and this will be an attrition of markets and influence, the USA under Wilson saw Germany as the Number Two, sink her and the USA moves to that spot poised to unseat the British who are weakened. None of that pans out here. The USA retains the single biggest national economy and great advantages but the Empire is the biggest economy overall and outwardly is still first among equals if not more.
If anything, without the forced suppression of German culture in America, the perceived "English-ness" of the USA will not occur, cultural ties remain but they flow to Germany as well, the USA is more like Germany here, a nation that wants the British markets open to her industry, the seas open to her trade, the opportunity to make wealth on the world monopoly board. Enough to ally them? Likely no, but I think the realignment is there, until Russia does something, or China rises, the world is equally divided between the British, the USA and Germany. Britain is still the yardstick.
In order to make this POD work, I suspect we need Grey to get sidelined either just before the crisis breaks or earlier in it. It would be nice if his vague diplomacy was taken away and his push to side Britain with France is missing, somewhere at the end of July we might ASB a more open move by him that exposes how entangled he has promised Britain, with the German moves not yet so blatant then we might see more weight to calling him out, discrediting his gamesmanship and having none of his moves the response to Germany. If that can add gravity to Wilhelm's decision then I think we cement it, likely another ASB tipping to give Moltke a stroke mid argument with Wilhelm over "we must invade France, its our only option." All a bit heavy handed but at least as plausible as any other tangled web of departure.
So far my best guess is that the Tories prevail by a thin margin in 1915, the voting trend was going that way. Avoiding the war might slow it, Ireland might speed it, I do not know. But I think the next Government has no clear mandate, this Britain is very uncertain of what comes next. So I think policy is simply muddled. The Parties are forced to debate more, compromise more and fear no confidence at every major turn. This is why I argue the once we get into that election mood and after, there likely is no solid consensus, unless Germany goes nutty, I see little to force the war upon the Empire.
Decolonialization is a wicked complex set of dominoes, but at bottom I think it begins in Ireland, the way it occurred sparking off how the Empire would break rather than evolve. And here Ireland has none of the hammer blows, it is a rambling devolution, the nastiness shifts to the Ulster minority who wants carved out, Dublin stays engaged. And if we see Russia bow out without the ascent of Lenin's vision for revolution prevailing, then we unravel the fire starter and the reactionaries who followed, taking away so much of the following ideological battle that I am not confident the Empire implodes. Instead I think it should evolve, devolve political power, hollow out its industry to Japan, Germany, the USA, retain the air of solidarity despite becoming a loose association. But we still see London calling the shots, the currency is British, the figurehead is British, the links all flow back to London. Manchester might still lose her factories but the brokers in London will be even wealthier, James Bond might be less fictional, and the RN likely holds on as world cop, today the Empire would be a valid paradigm, like how we use the term "First World," and misuse it.