What if Britain had stayed out of WW1?

To answer the question literally, something like this (from quora.com and deviantart)
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main-qimg-3898f8af10eb9d1ffd3ebe4578b119cd.jpeg
 
To answer the question literally, something like this (from quora.com and deviantart) View attachment 479835 View attachment 479836
The first one isnt happening, especially with Britain out of the war,
The later is more likely although I doubt Belgium would lose any land, I doubt Austria would take any Italian land and for all the talks of border strips at the end of the day I dont think Germany would annex any polish land either, they didn't want any more poles than what they already had, I'm fairly confident they would of just left Congress poland largely as is despite the fact that almost no one would be satisfied with it.
 
It seems evident based on what we know of Japanese cabinet sentiment that they would have been forced to sit back, watch and wait for a while - and the war might be over before they could find an opportunity to go to war with Germany on their own hook.
More likely, Tokyo takes the opportunity instead to expand their position in Manchuria and China.
Interesting.
The first thing that comes to mind with greater Japanese interest in Manchuria and China are the Daqing Oil Fields.
 

Deleted member 1487

TFW Edward Grey realizes he's stopped one hegemony by creating another.
Grey was only concerned about one sort of hegemony and was rather blatant about it. Russia was apparently in his view too far away to be a significant concern, while France was manageable.
 
A definite scenario others have pointed out is that the UK keeps its empire at for a longer period than OTL.

I can see another ramification is the continued advance of technology. Mind you that the Industrial Revolution of the 1800s happened largely because the UK was isolated from continental Europe.
 
I think the one thing to note about the September Programme, was Niall Ferguson's comment that its initial drafts had very little to do with anything west of the Rhine, even less with Britain. Whilst it probably was only a matter of time before that changed, German domination of the continent would have been more gradual. Britain's entry into the war exacerbated the conflict and drove the Germans to do it quickly, and more at Britain's expense, instead.

Considering that France is humiliated on the battlefield (again) between anywhere from 6 weeks to 6 months (considering the rate at which the French army accumulated casualties it would be a blessing in disguise), German aims probably are similar to those of 1870: minimal territorial acquisition, heavy financial reparations, perhaps some colonial acquisition as well. Maybe the French commune makes an unwelcome return to Paris. Yet, regardless of post-war difficulties, the end of France's position as a top tier power is even more apparent than it actually was by Versailles 1919.

Russia would probably be beaten in or around 1915/16 if the Tsar doesn't sue for peace first (he did so in 1905, without France he is fighting a losing battle and doesn't have an ally to betray). The German terms imposed are harsher than those of France, but whether they are akin to those at Brest-Litovsk I do not know. Germany's aims in the war, to begin with, are by and large eastward expansion at Russia's expense. I believe it is highly likely that Russia might well have a re-run of the 1905 unrest after the Russo-Japanese war. Without Lenin, who needed Germany's gold and 1917 desperations to get him back to Russia, the Bolsheviks may well have never factored significantly in the resultant regime. Whether or not the Tsar survives is debatable, but a more democratic Russia to me seems likely.

Personally, I think this case is actually much better for Britain: she retains her financial and naval dominance, which are the two things she needs to sustain and protect her empire and two of her 19th-century rivals, France and Russia are up the creek financially and otherwise, at home she has a chance to in proper and orderly fashion resolve the Irish question. The United States does not get the chance to gorge itself on massive Anglo-French loans and so not becoming the giant superpower that it probably does become until at least mid-century, even then perhaps an isolationist presence on the world stage. The Great German threat to British interests beyond Europe is to me unlikely until decades afterwards: she would be too busy at home trying to keep peace in her new territories, not to mention that the German SDP will be breathing down the neck of anything the elite is doing politically, Russia might still be a factor. I think in terms of how post-war France and Russia might behave towards Britain and her interests would be in her favour, as likely they will need her money and influence to help rebuild their economies. Britain may well also be more receptive to dealing with a more democratic Russia and a deferential France.
 
One of my most perplexing of alternatives, it offers the greatest difference to not just the war or Europe but to modern history. And since it is more a British-wank than any other I can hardly imagine why it is not cheered for more. I have toyed with this one and never found a way to pursue it that doesn't get way, way off script.

First, I always look for the last POD I can to minimize the butterflies and would pick the Kaiser calling off the invasion of Belgium, shifting weight East. That discussion has been done many times and is still a great basis. Next, I would presume that in the first weeks only a small portion of troops can actually get shifted, the French stick to Joffre's plan, the Russians may pull off shifting an Army north from A-H to face the Germans, etc. That should minimize this war actually ending by end of 1914, leaving 1915 as a decisive year.

With the British sitting hostile neutral towards Germany, that should long term butterfly the Italians joining with France, staying a neutral. It should sideline the Ottomans too, but that gets dicier. Basically we see the Battle of the Frontiers take place, hopefully more on script with more withdraw, draw them into the box, envelope them, kill them from Germany. We have plenty of manpower, i doubt the Third Army moves so it can attempt a limited envelopment of the French, striking behind the 5th. Overall I think France does even worse in its offensive and shifts to the defense sooner, yet intending to resume the offense. Russia should still face a major defeat in East Prussia, likely worse as well, and gain no clear victory over A-H. This starts wanking A-H as it can move to an offensive footing, not face Italy, perhaps see no French intervention from Greece, etc. At bottom setting Germany and A-H for a difficult, still costly but winnable war through 1915.

Assuming we are still going to war through 1915, the French retain all their industry, Russia retains sea access to France and the world, both giving them more staying power than I think is granted, Germany does not face a true blockade, maybe a British boycott, but its sea trade can continue albeit perhaps reduced. If I really stretch it I can get the war into 1916. France and Russia have gold enough to finance themselves, likely gaining huge loans from London, transferring wealth there instead of New York, setting the UK up to deepen its financial hold, and with Germany no longer exporting, restore some industrial independence too.

I think we butterfly the Lenin led revolution, so no USSR as we know it, France eventually gets crushed or seeks terms, Russia seeks terms when Germany pushes to St Petersberg and has systematically dismantled the Russian field armies. Russia's economy should falter first, so the Czar calls it or someone brighter does.

Japan has not bothered the Germans in the Pacific or China, not starting the ball rolling, it will not see the USA as a rising threat, secure in its friendship with the UK it does not seek to realign with Russia or usurp Manchuria. This Japan stays a trading cog in the British sphere, Asia remains more under the European thumb, as will Africa and colonialism is barely hurt. London remains at the center of global finance, brokerage and trade, it will be strong enough to engage the Germans and return Europe to balance and recovery.

I do not see Germany demanding much territory, a few minor adjustments to the A-L borders, stealing the iron ore at Briey, better ground to push off the French, a few hundred square kilometers at best, instead Germany demands crippling cash indemnity, maybe some colonial bits but Britain can moderate that. Poland gets shuttled off to A-H, the Baltics get put under German rule, Finland goes independent within the German sphere, maybe, and maybe some bits of Ukraine get carved off to A-H. A-H gets to oppress Serbia forever. Nothing as grand as B-L or even the ambitions of a few dreamers.

All that should sound on par with a sober outlook, Germany spends a lot to win not enough, A-H comes out better, Britain comes out far better, France is worse for wear and Russia despite losing faces a brighter potential future, the rest of Europe has not been dragged into the fire. If I were to argue a downside, it would be a quicker end to the East, if the Czar can call for peace and leverage his friendship with Wilhelm, Russia can bow out in time to open the door for a realignment to become the breadbasket and raw material purveyor to Europe, specifically German and Austrian industry, if in there they get better politics and industry, then the British nightmare is born, Europe can fend without depending upon the Empire for materials or markets, sea power becomes far less pivotal and Russia can resume its appetite for China, the Middle East and even India. If you want a bogeyman it is still the Russians, with some democracy, more capitalism, investment from Germany, and its natural wealth, it can become the other global power, if it keeps German dominated Europe in its corner, it is the other super power in reality not on paper. That gives you the USA, who has money but perhaps no power, the British Empire and Europe, a three way split of things. Familiar enough to our current world really.
 
It should sideline the Ottomans too, but that gets dicier.

Your analysis reflects a lot of the conventional wisdom of this scenario, and I can't really dispute it in a significant way - except for your argument about the Ottomans. I'm perplexed, in fact, why you think British neutrality actually makes Ottoman belligerency *less* likely.

In OTL, the Sublime Porte declared war on the Entente in November, 1914, with the benefit of a full three months experience of just what British belligerency manifested itself as - a Britain with three months to complete its mobilization, and make significant headway into restructuring its economy on a war footing. Three months in which to understand that the Western Front had reached an effective stalemate, and that there would be no rapid victory by either side in the East, either.

Here, however, British neutrality greatly reduces the possible risks to Turkey in entering the war. It does not need to fear a British invasion into Palestine or Mesopotamia, let alone its Arabian provinces. Nor need it fear any Entente attempt to force the Straits, since France by itself will not have the resources available to do so on its own.

The key turning point in taking the Turks down the road to war was of course the entrance of Admiral Souchon into the Straits at the outset of the war. And there is no reason to believe that British neutrality would have caused the German high command to alter its orders to Souchon. And once he is there, German arguments for belligerency are going to be even more persuasive.
 
One of my most perplexing of alternatives, it offers the greatest difference to not just the war or Europe but to modern history. And since it is more a British-wank than any other I can hardly imagine why it is not cheered for more. I have toyed with this one and never found a way to pursue it that doesn't get way, way off script.

I defer again to Niall Ferguson - he said it was the worst foreign policy mistake in modern history. That mistake, along with the war it caused, has been compared to the fall of Rome in terms of everything it wrought. Britain's position, amongst many other things, has declined ever since.

First, I always look for the last POD I can to minimize the butterflies and would pick the Kaiser calling off the invasion of Belgium, shifting weight East. That discussion has been done many times and is still a great basis. Next, I would presume that in the first weeks only a small portion of troops can actually get shifted, the French stick to Joffre's plan, the Russians may pull off shifting an Army north from A-H to face the Germans, etc. That should minimize this war actually ending by end of 1914, leaving 1915 as a decisive year.

The Belgian issue is one I find very perplexing: Britain did make threats of intervention against France and the Prussians in 1870 for the sake of Belgium's neutrality. Gladstone however, made 2 separate agreements with the belligerents to do so, both expiring after that war's conclusion. Gladstone was questioned in Parliament about whether doing that was recognising that the 1839 Treaty of London (The treaty that created Belgium, enshrined her neutrality and which Germany called 'a scrap of paper' in 1914) did not compel Britain to intervene in Belgium's defence if her neutrality was threatened. Anti-war liberals in the 1914 cabinet made similar arguments, and Asquith himself apparently wrote the King before war saying that it was not a matter of treaty obligation, but of government policy.

Having seen the Treaty of London - https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/be1839.htm (In French), all there is to be found is Article Seven:

Belgium, within the limits indicated in Articles 1, 2 and 4, will form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It will be bound to observe this same neutrality towards all other States.

Certainly, neutrality is binding if you are Belgian, but British? Hardly, assuming I have not missed something or lost it in translation.

Alternatively, if it truly was binding, the German Ambassador in London was desperate to reach a settlement, even after Germany sent an ultimatum to Belgium on the 3rd August. Unfortunately, that meant negotiating with the Foreign Secretary - Sir Edward Grey. I don't think I need to elaborate on the lack of success that entailed.

What is really perplexing to me is that famed historians and a good chunk of the modern public believe Germany's invasion of Belgium was a sacrilegious act worth Britain's march to war or that Britain's obligations were bound in iron and steel. Indeed most of the 1914 cabinet (including previously robust anti-war advocates such as Lloyd-George), Parliament and public, rallied to the colours as soon as the Germans marched on their way to Liege.

Assuming we are still going to war through 1915, the French retain all their industry, Russia retains sea access to France and the world, both giving them more staying power than I think is granted, Germany does not face a true blockade, maybe a British boycott, but its sea trade can continue albeit perhaps reduced. If I really stretch it I can get the war into 1916. France and Russia have gold enough to finance themselves, likely gaining huge loans from London, transferring wealth there instead of New York, setting the UK up to deepen its financial hold, and with Germany no longer exporting, restore some industrial independence too.

This point about the huge loans and debts in OTL, worth around £250 billion in modern terms, is one that receives far too little attention. It should really be known as the Great Atlantic Gold Rush or something of the kind. Britain providing loans, finance and materiel to Russia instead of fighting is to me, potentially a viable and effective strategy, but it does have downsides: it might provoke the Germans, if Turkey is in the war it might be difficult to get those supplies to the Russians, it might work too well as you speak of later to Britain's detriment in the East and finally it would mean propping up the autocratic tsarist regime which was very unpopular in Britain.

I do not see Germany demanding much territory, a few minor adjustments to the A-L borders, stealing the iron ore at Briey, better ground to push off the French, a few hundred square kilometers at best, instead Germany demands crippling cash indemnity, maybe some colonial bits but Britain can moderate that. Poland gets shuttled off to A-H, the Baltics get put under German rule, Finland goes independent within the German sphere, maybe, and maybe some bits of Ukraine get carved off to A-H. A-H gets to oppress Serbia forever. Nothing as grand as B-L or even the ambitions of a few dreamers.

I think the Germans would have made some moves, if they could, for large parts of Ukraine: it is geopolitically the most important region in Eastern Europe: whoever has it has control of the Black Sea, and a vast stretch of the most fertile soil west of the Caucasus. Very important for logistics, supplies etc especially for Russia. The Balkans are as they always have been the crossroads between the rise and wane of different empires over centuries.

The position of France in global terms had been waning even before the First World War and emerging victorious did not reverse that predicament in OTL. I have wondered what Britain might do with a beaten France, she would still have an empire, but would be a second-tier power at best, in need of vast remuneration and rebuilding which the British could provide on their own terms. In OTL wartime and interwar periods, Britain and France developed something of a relationship: Sykes-Picot, League of Nations, even the Hoare-Laval debacle and of course their joint guarantee of Poland. At that time, I think France would be faced with an unpalatable choice: accept being something like a client of the Perfidious Albion, or accept the dominance of Germany, who for 40 years had been the subject of French irredentism and had humiliated and defeated France beyond all doubt twice in that time. In making that decision she may well choose Britain over Germany.

All that should sound on par with a sober outlook, Germany spends a lot to win not enough, A-H comes out better, Britain comes out far better, France is worse for wear and Russia despite losing faces a brighter potential future, the rest of Europe has not been dragged into the fire. If I were to argue a downside, it would be a quicker end to the East, if the Czar can call for peace and leverage his friendship with Wilhelm, Russia can bow out in time to open the door for a realignment to become the breadbasket and raw material purveyor to Europe, specifically German and Austrian industry, if in there they get better politics and industry, then the British nightmare is born, Europe can fend without depending upon the Empire for materials or markets, sea power becomes far less pivotal and Russia can resume its appetite for China, the Middle East and even India. If you want a bogeyman it is still the Russians, with some democracy, more capitalism, investment from Germany, and its natural wealth, it can become the other global power, if it keeps German dominated Europe in its corner, it is the other super power in reality not on paper. That gives you the USA, who has money but perhaps no power, the British Empire and Europe, a three way split of things. Familiar enough to our current world really.

I don't know if Germans and Russians can shake hands right after a war, it would take some time afterwards for this scenario to play out which I find unlikely and even if it did, Britain will likely still have her Japanese ally (only lost due to US insistence) and potentially others to help defend her holdings in the East. As for the US, I think she becomes something like the superpower she was after 1945, but later and with a more isolationist outlook, since its likely she hasn't fought a major conflict since her own civil war. The fate of A-H is probably to be drawn ever closer to its German cousin, although what happens to the non-German bits toward the Balkans is anyone's guess.
 
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The POD where Germany does not invade Belgium has in fact been explored at length on this site, and Michael West above gives a good summary. Without the German invasion of Belgium it would have been hard for a British government to sell a war done for purely balance of power reasons to the public.

One issue that Michael West didn't bring up would be the possibility of an invasion of Turkey, by either Britain (the British pick a fight while still neutral against Germany) or France. With a much shorter western Front and more of their industrial base intact due to no German occupation of the northeast, the French would have the resources to pull it off. That would be the most direct way to aid Russia, which would be doing most of the fighting against Turkey. But even with British economic support of France and Russia you still probably get a peace in late 1916 or early 1917 favorable to the Central Powers.

A POD where the invasion of Belgium happens but Britain opts not to go to war with Germany requires the Liberal anti-imperialist left, instead of the Liberal imperialist right or the Tories to be in power, and the government basically does what the Gladstone government did in 1870. There were reasons why that didn't happen, but if such a government had been in place British diplomacy in the prewar years also would have changed. There would be a good chance of the war being butterflied away.
 
One issue that Michael West didn't bring up would be the possibility of an invasion of Turkey, by either Britain (the British pick a fight while still neutral against Germany) or France. With a much shorter western Front and more of their industrial base intact due to no German occupation of the northeast, the French would have the resources to pull it off. That would be the most direct way to aid Russia, which would be doing most of the fighting against Turkey. But even with British economic support of France and Russia you still probably get a peace in late 1916 or early 1917 favorable to the Central Powers.

The difficulty here, though, is that a Germany that stands on defense in the West creates as many problems as it solves for the French. Yes, it's a shorter front, but then they also don't have the benefit of the BEF and the Belgian Army to defend any of it, either. More importantly, there won't be the same necessity for Joffree to abandon his Plan XVII offensives into the Vosges, and with the Russians reeling even more heavily from losses than in OTL, there will be even more pressure coming from St Petersburg to divert Germany forces to give Joffre his head. And a French penetration deep into the Rhineland (let alone beyond!) is going to do more for that cause than anything France can do in the Aegean. And the casualties are going to pile up rapidly.

Meanwhile, the secret pact with Westminster to divide up naval responsibilities between the Med and the Atlantic/Channel won't be operative in quite the same way, requiring the French to divert more forces away from the Med - and remember, all German u-boat efforts will now be free to concentrate on French shipping. That, plus the uncertainty created by Italian neutrality is going to make any decision to go into the Dardanelles (which France would have to shoulder all by itself) a very fraught one.

After all: the first priority in the Med for Paris is going to be to keep open the sea lines to Algeria....

A POD where the invasion of Belgium happens but Britain opts not to go to war with Germany requires the Liberal anti-imperialist left, instead of the Liberal imperialist right or the Tories to be in power, and the government basically does what the Gladstone government did in 1870. There were reas,ons why that didn't happen, but if such a government had been in place British diplomacy in the prewar years also would have changed. There would be a good chance of the war being butterflied away.

The most obvious thing would seem to be to butterly away Grey's presence before the crisis breaks. Perhaps the Regulas Compact breaks down at some point, and Asquith manages to shuffle off Grey and Haldane. This would allow David Lloyd George to dominate the cabinet, and if that happens early on enough, discussions with Paris about war preparations don't get as far as they did OTL. Even if Churchill rats and makes it into the cabinet, it will be a less interventionist Liberal cabinet he's ratted his way into, and he'll trim his sails accordingly (which, after all, he basically did anyway before he went to the Admiralty).

But the easiest way to keep Britain out really does seem to be having Germany turn East, and leave Belgium alone.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
... and more of their industrial base intact due to no German occupation of the northeast, the French would have the resources to pull it off.
...
Before adding some other comments on what has already been so well informed said a question I somewhat lack and lacked the means to properly answer and find an answer (in reasonable time) :
- What actually was that 'industrial base' about that France so often ist said (but never detailed) to have lost due to germans occupying northeastern France ?
- What kind of industries were actually located between Dunkirk - Peronne - Soissons - Reims - Verdun - Nancy and St Die and more important
- What was their share on these industries in pre-war France ?
I.e. the steel 'consumed' in french industry was just a quarter to a third provided by french smelters and ore mines, with about a third to half of the coke for the french smelters (esp. in french Lorraine) came from ... Hugo Stinnes and Germany and his buddies of the Ruhr-region (a 'trade' kept alive via neutral Switzerland until Feb./March 1915 btw ... reason for quite some ... quarrels between Stinnes/Rathenau as well as Stinnes and Groener [freight space on trains ...] in winter 1914/15)
A 'loss' that was mostly replaced in early 1916 by simply relocating esp. coal-mining to yet un- to less developed deposits in central France.
... aside from increasing imports from non-german sources
- What was this region actually 'worth' in industrial terms for the war effort ?​
 
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Your analysis reflects a lot of the conventional wisdom of this scenario, and I can't really dispute it in a significant way - except for your argument about the Ottomans. I'm perplexed, in fact, why you think British neutrality actually makes Ottoman belligerency *less* likely.

In OTL, the Sublime Porte declared war on the Entente in November, 1914, with the benefit of a full three months experience of just what British belligerency manifested itself as - a Britain with three months to complete its mobilization, and make significant headway into restructuring its economy on a war footing. Three months in which to understand that the Western Front had reached an effective stalemate, and that there would be no rapid victory by either side in the East, either.

Here, however, British neutrality greatly reduces the possible risks to Turkey in entering the war. It does not need to fear a British invasion into Palestine or Mesopotamia, let alone its Arabian provinces. Nor need it fear any Entente attempt to force the Straits, since France by itself will not have the resources available to do so on its own.

The key turning point in taking the Turks down the road to war was of course the entrance of Admiral Souchon into the Straits at the outset of the war. And there is no reason to believe that British neutrality would have caused the German high command to alter its orders to Souchon. And once he is there, German arguments for belligerency are going to be even more persuasive.

Thus my caveat, "dicier." The Ottomans have plenty of incentive to go to war against France or Russia, against the former it reduces the capitulations, might cancel debts and curbs French ambitions to break up the OE or carve off more territory. Against Russia we have some old territories up for grabs, but not much else. The UK here is not at war so could focus its full strength against the Ottomans, thus the biggest thumb on them is free to retaliate. And I do not see the British annoying them, the two battleships are not being seized, instead diplomacy would move to keep the OE out of the war, Britain is smart enough to want the straights kept open.

Britain holds more allure for the Ottomans, war against them with German help meant Egypt, Cyprus, Kuwait, and more might be returned, the British as neutrals are not Germany's enemy, in fact as hamfisted as Germany could be, the diplomacy will be seeking the British blessing for Germany conquering all of Europe. Germany will be bellicose but still courting London. How can the Ottomans push Germany to widen the war?

My understanding was that Souchon was acting more on his initiative than clear instructions from Berlin. And Souchon is more likely to organize an effort to interdict the French lines of supply than escape the French alone, without the RN poised to hunt him I think his math changes. So the Ottomans are not pushed into the war by his attack on Russia under their flag. With Italy holding steady, the CP fleet can act more aggressively against the French, so the focus is to the western not eastern Mediterranean. The French likely see a British cordon sanitaire imposed upon the Channel, in effect as good as what the British vague promised and freeing France to keep most of her navy in the Med. On whole drawing Souchon and the A-H towards France once they get themselves ready for a naval show down.

So even if the Ottomans are inclined to war, and things are tipped for them to join Germany's causes, I still do not see it so easy to get them moved. It took months and a rather back door opening shot to push the Porte in OTL, and you had some bigger pressures and obvious moves by the Entente. With Britain sitting out the lever gets weaker. I would more likely be persuaded that Greece intercepts the first battleship as it sails home, sinks her and sparks a Greco-Ottoman war inside this war, with French backing Greece looks pilot fish for France, German gains an ally, Britain must choose how to react to this cock up. Those are the odd butterflies that keep this one a moving target.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
A couple of things I would like to add to the discussion :

Ottomans and their entry into the war.
I would like to support @Athelstane's view, that ITTL the Porte would have - at least at first - less reason to NOT become belligerent. But due to finnacial reasons, turkish issues to mobilization as well as the ... different directions of its leading clique in diplomatic activities I wouldn't see much changes regarding the timing of events.
Souchon would still be ordered first (on 2nd August IOTL) not to have any "buisness" at Constantinople when the german anbassador to the Porte asked in Berlin for his assistance. But would still receive from Tirpitz as well as from v.Pohl on 3rd August their rather exited orders to move there ASAP.
However, IMHO the ottomans would close the straits at least as IOTL in late September/beginning October 1914 to civilian shipping and thereby russian trade options. ... and now we might see an option for whoever remaining 'hawk' and his followers within the british cabinet to move Britain into the war as they might want to 'deliver' whatever freight to the russians had ordered as well as receiving 'payment' - or means of payment in terms of grain from the Ukraine.

Oh, and ... Souchon being the one pushing/propelling the OE into belligerence ...
It seems to me that with this notion its often forgotten that Souchon did NOT act on himself. He might have pressured for but the order to do so - attacking the russians and 'provinding' a starting point for belligerency - was actually given to him by ... the acting War Minister Enver Pasha (after a first attempt a few days before Souchon sailed to eventually bombard Sewastopol on 30.10.1914) and NOT the german high command.

Btw :
the 2 battleships were already seized by Churchill/the british goverment on 1st August, being on of the reasons the pro-entente members of the OE-goverment turned towards signing the alliance with Germany on 2nd August.


Britain and the 'belgian' casus belli
Ofc the treaty of London was actually a 'scrap of paper' IOTL ... serving solely as a fig leaf for the true british interest in Belgium :
the belgian channel coast not to be occupied/controlled by any major power.


The 'secret pact' about distribution of naval ... 'responsibilities' between France and GB
Well technically it wasn't truly 'secret' ... just not told everybody about or made public (until Grey told about in his speech of 3rd August IOTL) to the PMs at Westminster.
However, very likely France would IMO not have to relocate any - or much of its naval assets from the Med. As said above, the british cabinet was nervous about the possibility of naval war - and warships esp. of Germany to materialize in british coastal waters ... like the channel.
As IOTL they would make it clear to ITTL not only to Germany (that was happy to oblige alreayd IOTL) that they would nat accept any at least major warships wihtin the channel. Given the rather low to mediocre (at best) range of german cap ships of the era it would seem rather unlikely that they would appear before the french coast. ... not to speak of the even smaller ranged submarines.


And as a last notion for today about a possible 'outcome' in the east and the Ukraine :
It seems this guy would have had quite some ... not too bad outlook in gaining a ukraine crown ina somewhat earlier end of the war overall.
Let him become king of Ukraine (or however you would name his position) as well as this laddy king of Poland ... ofc both still 'subject' to the head of the habsburgian house (to please the 'mummy' on the austrian throne) while being 'well counselled' in their kingdoms by mainly german advisors, in Poland maybe more obvious than in ITTL Ukraine.
 
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I can't say I know much about the Ottomans, I can see how their control of access to the Black Sea potentially complicates any attempts Britain makes to supply the Russians and potentially could drag Britain into the war. If Britain stays out, she avoids Gallipoli, denies Mustapha Kemal an opportunity to make a name for himself. The Ottomans probably would survive a lot longer in this ATL, potentially becoming powerful through their near-monopoly on oil reserves.

Britain and the 'belgian' casus belli
Ofc the treaty of London was actually a 'scrap of paper' IOTL ... serving solely as a fig leaf for the true british interest in Belgium :
the belgian channel coast not to be occupied/controlled by any major power.


The 'secret pact' about distribution of naval ... 'responsibilities' between France and GB
Well technically it wasn't truly 'secret' ... just not told everybody about or made public (until Grey told about in his speech of 3rd August IOTL) to the PMs at Westminster.
However, very likely France would IMO not have to relocate any - or much of its naval assets from the Med. As said above, the british cabinet was nervous about the possibility of naval war - and warships esp. of Germany to materialize in british coastal waters ... like the channel.
As IOTL they would make it clear to ITTL not only to Germany (that was happy to oblige alreayd IOTL) that they would nat accept any at least major warships wihtin the channel. Given the rather low to mediocre (at best) range of german cap ships of the era it would seem rather unlikely that they would appear before the french coast. ... not to speak of the even smaller ranged submarines.

These points completely admonish Grey's actions before and at the war's inception. As I have already said, German objectives in the west were fleeting to begin with, Germany only truly considers turning Belgium into a vassal well into the war in OTL. Britain also had beaten Germany in the pre-war Dreadnought race, the Germans not really concerned with going toe-to-toe with the RN on the high seas: some believed even before the war that the only nation capable of doing so was the US.

Of course the main reason when all is said and done is that Grey spent a large amount of time staking his political career on forging Britain's links with the Entente, when the issue of war finally came to a head in cabinet on the 2nd August 1914 he was already committed and had been so for a while. If he had failed there and then to convince cabinet to agree to naval action in defence of France he would have had to resign, likely along with Asquith. David Lloyd George may well have replaced them and kept Britain out of the war.
 
Of course the main reason when all is said and done is that Grey spent a large amount of time staking his political career on forging Britain's links with the Entente, when the issue of war finally came to a head in cabinet on the 2nd August 1914 he was already committed and had been so for a while. If he had failed there and then to convince cabinet to agree to naval action in defence of France he would have had to resign, likely along with Asquith.

It actually says as much in the Guns of August that there was the general understanding Britain would protect France in the even of hostilities even if Belgium were not attacked. The problem here is that is exceedingly unlikely given that Liberals's would be divided on the merits of intervention; David Lloyd George himself, if I remember correctly, only came around to the idea when the Germans smashed their way through Belgium.

The foreign fallout for leaving France in the cold (Perfidious Albion) would be pretty severe too because it would mean any security arrangement with Britain is effectively nullified due to self interest in the hour of need.
 
It actually says as much in the Guns of August that there was the general understanding Britain would protect France in the even of hostilities even if Belgium were not attacked. The problem here is that is exceedingly unlikely given that Liberals's would be divided on the merits of intervention; David Lloyd George himself, if I remember correctly, only came around to the idea when the Germans smashed their way through Belgium.

The foreign fallout for leaving France in the cold (Perfidious Albion) would be pretty severe too because it would mean any security arrangement with Britain is effectively nullified due to self interest in the hour of need.

I don't particularly disagree with that assumption that Britain had been roping herself into the Franco-Russian web for about a decade. As for being the Perfidious Albion or Angleterre Perfide, Britain wasn't shy of being ruthless in her own interests, personally I find its something of a badge of honour, rather than of shame. Lord Palmerston decided Britain's ideal role in the Schleswig-Holstein debacle was to sit it out, leave the Danish in the lurch and take the political blowback that came with it. He mentioned that Britain 'had no eternal allies or perpetual enemies, only her perpetual and eternal interests which it was the duty of Parliament to follow'. If the British government had decided it was in its interests at the eleventh hour to turn tail and sail there was the precedent to do so. The French and Russians afterwards would certainly be furious, but if they are humbled on the battlefield as was highly likely, they would have much more pressing issues to attend to.
 
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