What if Bomber comand did not get the man power it did in the war

So the RAF cuts back on bomber comand and only gives them 30% of the man power it did .
So There is no 1,000 plane bombing raids by the RAF .
How would this change the war .
Also rember that bomber Comand lost 6 out of every 10 bomber comand crews in the war .
 
On January 1, 1944, the Bomber Command order of battle lists 1,436 bombers. This does not include OTUs, other training aircraft, and liaison aircraft, but includes the special-duties units. Early that year, the total strength of Bomber Command was about 155,000 personnel, and I didn't write "men" because it includes the WAAF, as well as all other ground personnel.

Assuming the –70% reduction is linear and brought forth as a firm decision throughout the war, this would mean that at this point Bomber Command would have some 430 bombers, and 46,500 personnel.

Bomber Command Operations
The area bombing doctrine cannot make sense with this cap on the force. Bomber Command has to work on targeting, in order to make that 30% of its OTL bomb tonnage really count. This will make for an even slower start of the campaign than in OTL, but may yield some unexpected dividends. Bomber command might cooperate more closely with some USAAF ideas, for instance following up at night the Schweinfurt raids, using the fires as beacons; and thus concentrate on German production bottlenecks. Another example: with this small a force, power stations would probably be targeted, which would have been a smart idea even in OTL. The oil campaign would see a more determined commitment, etc.
There is a down side to this all, of course. No extensive destruction of German cities. No extensive loss of industrial manpower. No resources and money spent on repairing and rebuilding; which means the better targeted, more focused damage described above will be easier to clean up (see below). Plus, many maintain that German morale was not significantly affected by the city bombing. That might be true or not, depending on who you ask, but it is perfectly possible that without widespread destruction of cities the German morale would be _better_, regardless of the fact that maybe the factories would lack ball bearings, or the military vehicles would like even more fuel than in OTL, or the electric power would go off at random.

Other Uses of the Manpower
The British underwent a growing manpower shortage from 1943 on. With 108,500 more personnel, many more things could be done. Not all of this personnel would be suitable for infantry service (remember those WAAFs are included); but a sizable part of that shortage was in the industry (remember the "soldiers" working in the coal mines at the end of the war). Turning no more than 50,000 of this surplus into infantrymen, the Italian campaign or Operation Goodwood might easily be a tad faster. Note Bomber Command creamed mostly from the higher end of the manpower spectrum. Such a small bomber force probably means many more good officers and NCOs for the Army.
It is however quite likely that a fair share of this surplus would still go to the RAF; only, not to Bomber Command. One wonders if, once there is no longer such a pressing need for pure fighters, the British develop a much more robust fighter-bomber, tactical support force. Which again might well be a good idea. One supposes there will be more for the naval side of things, embarked Seafires, Coastal Command units helping out against the U-Boote, that kind of things. More artillery observation aircraft would also be good towards the end of the war.

Other Uses of the Industrial Potential
Of course the aircraft industries develop way less; they can still build more fighters, maritime patrol aircraft, etc. Even so, there's more manpower and resources available here, too.

And the Germans...
Apart from the points above, which depend on the likely choices by Bomber Command, there are the choices the Germans themselves will take. Much less night fighters, searchlights, AA batteries – deployed in Germany, that is. They might well turn up on the Eastern Front or on the Westwall (in the case of the fighters, in the form of daylight units, of course). Most of that reinforced concrete goes on the beaches instead of in those huge shelters.
The very large civil-defense organization, rescue teams, repair and labor outfits etc. will be largely available to concentrate on the more focused damage the British bombers will do, which will cut the advantage.
Life will be much harder for the USAAF, almost unbearably so after the introduction of long-range escorts, and totally so before that. In fact if those German night-fighter units are daylight-fighter units, the daylight skies of Germany might get terribly crowded with black crosses (depending on whether they are redeployed there from the East). Which might in turn nip a series of Schweinfurt-like attacks in the bud, including their night follow-ups by the smaller Bomber Command.

And the 60% Figure...?
Where does this come from? Thank you.
 

Markus

Banned
The very large civil-defense organization, rescue teams, repair and labor outfits etc. will be largely available to concentrate on the more focused damage the British bombers will do, which will cut the advantage.
Life will be much harder for the USAAF, almost unbearably so after the introduction of long-range escorts, and totally so before that. In fact if those German night-fighter units are daylight-fighter units, the daylight skies of Germany might get terribly crowded with black crosses (depending on whether they are redeployed there from the East). Which might in turn nip a series of Schweinfurt-like attacks in the bud, including their night follow-ups by the smaller Bomber Command.
I don´t think a smaller Bomber command will have much of an impact on the AA-units and the civil defence organisation. With fewer bombers they can still strike anywhere, but depending on how the organize things just not as often or as hard. So the whole defence infrastructure has to be there, but will not be used as much.

The impact on the USAAF will be marginal. AAA did not do them much harm and they dealt swiftly with night fighter units converted to day fighters in 1944. More day fighters will be bad before long range fighters are available, but the USAAF can´t conduct more than a handful of unescorted raids anyway. So Schweinfurt-style raids will be more costly per raid, perhaps so costly that they don´t try as often as they did in OTL.
Furthermore it´s most likely the resources will go the the eastern front anyway.

Last but not least I think you underestimate the impact on Coastal Command. If they get first priority the Battle of the Atlantic will be won at least a year sooner. In spite of record production the Allies suffered from a shipping shortage throughout the war. A significant reduction of sinkings will be more beneficial to the Allies than a reallocation of resources for the Germans.
 
Michele, Markus

Some good points. I think the key factor would be what Britain did with the released forces. Like Markus I think a small boost in Coastal Command would pay a hell of a lot of benefits in the Atlantic and hence the wider war.

Michelle I think the other big factor is that the major saving would not be the smaller Bomber Command in itself as in the relevant support structure. I think it consumed far more people and resources in the design, production, maintenance etc than in Bomber Command itself.

Steve
 
So the RAF cuts back on bomber comand and only gives them 30% of the man power it did .
So There is no 1,000 plane bombing raids by the RAF .
How would this change the war .
Also rember that bomber Comand lost 6 out of every 10 bomber comand crews in the war .

Well that means more Fighter Bombers and Mosquitoes. That actually improves bombing accuracy as these planes can go lower and faster, and while they can not hit a pickle barrel, they can definitely hit a house sized target quite well. Being less expensive, their attrition is less a concern money and material wise.

The greater accuracy means fewer civilian causalities and less strain on bomb usage as more bombs are hitting the target in the first place.

This translate in a faster Allied advance as their are six times more fighter bombers providing cover from the material saved.
 

sanusoi

Banned
Well if we have a smaller bombber foce, they could be used for more effective targets. I think that that the British in this TL would do somewhat better. Really there's no need to really to bomb the hell out of cities when you can have a specailied force smashing into cities.

Going on to the greatest topic, what to do with the manpower. I would say having the ability to have a small scale offensive into Italy could be a useful stopgap for the transfer of troops and supplies. Also I would hope that a small bobmber command could be more effective. Waht we have is a RAF that is better, a bombber force that can cities the most important targets
 
I don´t think a smaller Bomber command will have much of an impact on the AA-units and the civil defence organisation. With fewer bombers they can still strike anywhere, but depending on how the organize things just not as often or as hard. So the whole defence infrastructure has to be there, but will not be used as much.

The impact on the USAAF will be marginal. AAA did not do them much harm and they dealt swiftly with night fighter units converted to day fighters in 1944. More day fighters will be bad before long range fighters are available, but the USAAF can´t conduct more than a handful of unescorted raids anyway. So Schweinfurt-style raids will be more costly per raid, perhaps so costly that they don´t try as often as they did in OTL.
Furthermore it´s most likely the resources will go the the eastern front anyway.

Last but not least I think you underestimate the impact on Coastal Command. If they get first priority the Battle of the Atlantic will be won at least a year sooner. In spite of record production the Allies suffered from a shipping shortage throughout the war. A significant reduction of sinkings will be more beneficial to the Allies than a reallocation of resources for the Germans.

The civil defense infrastructure and the air defense systems (radars, AA guns, fighters etc.) _should_ be there, everywhere, anyway.
However, I very much doubt they'd be, in the same strength they had circa 1943-44, if the level of the British threat remains roughly the same as it was in OTL in 1941.

The USAAF dealt quickly with night fighter units converted to daylight fighter units in 1944. To a point, and in any case the issue would be in 1943 (before the USAAF admitted bombers had to be escorted) and on top of that, in this ATL these would not be former night fighter units at all; the number of night fighter units would be reduced in proportion to the reduction of the Bomber Command threat.
Even so, I acknowledge the Fw 190s mostly would be in the East – initially. Now, if there's a type of military unit that can be transferred fast, that's a fighter unit.

As to Coastal Command, you have a point.
 
tankograd would need to make another 10,000 tanks and some factory in siberia 5,000 or so more planes and the result wud have been the same

even if those resources of wehrmacht/luftwaffe were shifted to eastern front the result was never in doubt ...there were simply too few germans no matter how courageous and brave they are
 
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