What if Argentina won the falklands war?

I cannot help but feel a lot of this is coloured by hindsight bias; that basically put, all those British military officers and politicians worrying during the conflict were basically fretting about nothing - that the UK was almost destined to win regardless. Instead - as I suspect - much more of a close-run thing which was done on the slenderest of resource-bases and like many a thing done by Britons - relied too much on the extra sweat and blood to make things work at all. There were several points where differing tactics or a shifting of mere chance could have thrown everything into the wind.

As with the political side... I don't think a 'Task Force II' would pass the 'bodybag test'. This is a fight for around 3,000 islanders, not the future survival of the country. What, you think that Britain isn't the past-master of the shoddy sell-out deal? Hell, they'd tried to deny the islanders citizenship the year before. Patriotic and sentimental reasons may say a clear 'yes' for a re-run but that wouldn't cut much ice when confronted by unemotional logic. Hell, if the damage from the first force was serious enough, the Forces brass may not even feel they could do it. There has to come a point where someone at the top has to put their foot down and say no more. If nothing else, there were other threats to the UK [for example, the Warsaw Pact] which arguably had a bigger claim for attention.
 
I cannot help but feel a lot of this is coloured by hindsight bias; that basically put, all those British military officers and politicians worrying during the conflict were basically fretting about nothing - that the UK was almost destined to win regardless. Instead - as I suspect - much more of a close-run thing which was done on the slenderest of resource-bases and like many a thing done by Britons - relied too much on the extra sweat and blood to make things work at all. There were several points where differing tactics or a shifting of mere chance could have thrown everything into the wind.

I bow to your greater knowledge and experience of the course of the war.
 
I cannot help but feel a lot of this is coloured by hindsight bias; that basically put, all those British military officers and politicians worrying during the conflict were basically fretting about nothing - that the UK was almost destined to win regardless. Instead - as I suspect - much more of a close-run thing which was done on the slenderest of resource-bases and like many a thing done by Britons - relied too much on the extra sweat and blood to make things work at all. There were several points where differing tactics or a shifting of mere chance could have thrown everything into the wind.

My belief that Britain was destined to win certainly comes from hindsight. I know things that Thatcher and Co couldn't have known in April 1982; like HMS Illustrious would commission at sea 6 days after the surrender and would have 2 AEW Helicopters on board, or that Sea Harriers would have the Blue Eric ECM pod, an extra 180 gallons of fuel and twin sidewinder launch rails.

Destiny wasn't God-given, it derived from basic facts like an average of 22 Sea Harriers flew 1,300 sorties in 45 days, compared to ~500 sorties the Argentine fast jet fleet flew in the same period. If you want to talk resources, 1,300 Sea Harrier and ~130 GR3 sorties gives the British almost triple the fast jet resources in terms of output of the Argentines. In contrast for example the Argentines had 4 x 155mm artillery pieces and 12 Panhard Armoured cars, but what did these resources achieve?

That's not to say Argentine didn't try, they most certainly did and did a couple of things I find quite startling. For example they rigged up an Exocet trailer from scratch in about 3 weeks. Another thing was once the MEZ was declared they conducted an airlift of 205 flights in 10 days into that little 4,100' airstrip, draining out the fuel they didn't need for the return journey to keep the islands tanks topped up. Not just military aircraft either, 36 civilian 737 and 4 BAC111 flights as well as the 165 military flights.

But the fact of the matter was that Britain was a great power in 1982, one that had artificially hobbled itself, but great nonetheless. Also, what is often attributed to chance can in fact be traced back to a rational source, and be seen as a forced error.
 
Yeah.. It also occurs to me that reportedly the decision to invade the Falklands was at least somewhat based on a belief that the UK was unlikely to mount a serious military effort to reclaim them.
Sounds similar to the belief of the Axis countries in WW2 that the democratic west would give up when the going gets tough.
 
I would think any timeline in which Argentinian aircraft sink either Invincible or Hermes would be followed by a chapter called "Lusty heads south". To have any other outcome requires a pre-1900 PoD (if not a primordial one)!
 
I think the whole Falklands was close thing is because of the decision to chop down the FAA and give it Harriers instead of Phantoms and Buccaneers. Nobody would say it was a close run thing if the RN deployed its old carriers or their intended CVA01 replacements. Apart from this single capability shortfall Britain had all the capabilities of a great power to deploy against Argentina, so it's hardly surprising that they won.
 
I generally agree - that while all things being equal, the British should win but the 'margin of error' is tight until they manage a full-scale landing. A few miscalculations, errors or sheer chance more against the British, it could have all have ended badly for them. I never forget that so many things depend on luck / fate / chance - much more than we'd care to admit.
I can’t help but feel this is coloured by anti-British bias failing to take national attitudes, resources, socioeconomic balances, governmental systems and military structures into account.
No, more a fair attempt to be impartial in a conflict between my own country and a regime which I find utterly disgusting, plus a bit of simple devil's advoctating [as how many of us want the Junta to win this?]. Plus, the premise is an 'Argentinian victory'.

I never said an Argentinian military victory was possible; at best, they could score a stalemate and hope that the British give it up. Whether they did or didn't all would - I think - depend on a series of events which are very hard to predict; if / how hard Thatcher falls, who replaces her, the American response, how hard biting the embargos are on Argentina and so on. Defeat breeds dissension and recrimination; it's possible [for example] the Conservatives topple Thatcher and promptly tear themselves to pieces while the 'Second Force' is being mustered that when the Americans manage to broker some kind of cease-fire it's accepted.

Another possibility is that Thatcher remained as PM, but so weakened she's unable to force though any decision. However, the opposition is fragmented to the point they're a 'negative majority' - a similar situation May found herself in 2018. That when a half-decent peace offering appears, she deploys the handbag to the max but finds the Commons votes against her on it.
 
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Deleted member 94680

No, more a fair attempt to be impartial in a conflict between my own country and a regime which I find utterly disgusting, plus a bit of simple devil's advoctating [as how many of us want the Junta to win this?]. Plus, the premise is an 'Argentinian victory'.
But what you’re proposing for that to come about is not likely.
I never said an Argentinian military victory was possible; at best, they could score a stalemate and hope that the British give it up. ...it's possible [for example] the Conservatives topple Thatcher and promptly tear themselves to pieces
This is the part I find hardest to believe. The Tories of all people are the least likely to be keen to find a way out of the conflict quickly. To suggest the Nasty Party would attempt to distance themselves so thoroughly from the War that they prevent a second attempt is a compete misreading of the Conservatives of the early 80s IMO. After all, they’re the government that launched the first attempt. In complete solidarity with Thatcher. To turn round and attempt to distance themselves from the War whilst wounded and bodies are still coming home is political suicide.

What’s more likely (how likely, I don’t know) is a Vote of No Confidence is called, a SDP-Liberal or Labour government gets in and they prevent a second attempt. Even then, I think SDP-Liberal is more than likely to “stay the course” given their leadership.
 
If the first attempt failed and the senior officers are not overly confident of success a second time around? And no, they won't distance themselves in public, merely slide away from it in private while hotly denying any such sliding and snarling 'traitor' at others for suggesting, say that it's a lost cause.

And remember the optics of UK politics at this very point. A loss of the Task Force means the Conservatives would slump in the polls - however, the backbenchers might decline to 'pull the plug' on Thatcher because they'll then get a massive drubbing at the snap election. However, conversely they may think a snap election on a jingoist 'Get The Falklands Back!' line may secure them a surprise victory as Labour / Alliance between them may split the vote in enough constituencies. Or, they try this line but the British public are both ashamed and disgusted and the UK ends up with a very odd result due to a true three party battle, the first true one since 1923.
 

Deleted member 94680

If the first attempt failed and the senior officers are not overly confident of success a second time around?
Why wouldn’t they be confident, given that the Argentine success must surely come from a string of unlikely successes?
And no, they won't distance themselves in public, merely slide away from it in private while hotly denying any such sliding and snarling 'traitor' at others for suggesting, say that it's a lost cause.
Again, absent of any evidence that this is at all likely, I’d have to disagree.
And remember the optics of UK politics at this very point. A loss of the Task Force means the Conservatives would slump in the polls - however, the backbenchers might decline to 'pull the plug' on Thatcher because they'll then get a massive drubbing at the snap election. However, conversely they may think a snap election on a jingoist 'Get The Falklands Back!' line may secure them a surprise victory as Labour / Alliance between them may split the vote in enough constituencies.
So how does “Get the Falklands back!” tally with your supposition the Conservatives would “slide away from it in private”? How exactly would these perfidious Tories manage to concurrently stop a second attempt for the Islands whilst publicly calling for a second attempt? How is that even possible?
Or, they try this line but the British public are both ashamed and disgusted and the UK ends up with a very odd result due to a true three party battle, the first true one since 1923.
Unlikely.
 
Why wouldn’t they be confident, given that the Argentine success must surely come from a string of unlikely successes?
One, people are illogical. Two, they wouldn't know how much of it was simply poor luck. Three, the loss of materiel.
Again, absent of any evidence that this is at all likely, I’d have to disagree.
There's no evidence for your assertions either. This is all conjecture. And having watched the British Conservatives practising doublethink repeatedly over twenty years of my life, I wouldn't put it past them to try it in 1982, if needed.
So how does “Get the Falklands back!” tally with your supposition the Conservatives would “slide away from it in private”? How exactly would these perfidious Tories manage to concurrently stop a second attempt for the Islands whilst publicly calling for a second attempt? How is that even possible?
I proposed those two things in two different endings of an option. Note the 'However' part in the middle of the very quote. The very complete contradiction of the two endings was the point - that the situation had gotten so far off the 'known' that it could go any way - that one side the backbenchers chickened out knifing Thatcher in fear of a snap election decimation, on another they decide to 'capture the public mood' by causing a snap and wrapping themselves up in jingoism in the hopes of an election victory.
Unlikely.
What, from the original fork back in April? Yes. From a point of the 'failure' in June? Not so much, I don't think.
 
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Deleted member 94680

One, people are illogical. Two, they wouldn't know how much of it was simply poor luck. Three, the loss of materiel.
Being illogical would make it more likely to go again wouldn’t it? They would know because you know militaries study these things. They don’t just shrug their shoulders and go “Oh? We were defeated? How the hell did that happen?” and leave it at that. They find out. A crippling loss of materiel would be pushing into wank territory, no?
There's no evidence for your assertions either. This is all conjecture. And having watched the British Conservatives practising doublethink repeatedly over twenty years of my life, I wouldn't put it past them to try it in 1982, if needed.
No evidence apart from the entirety of the history of the Conservative Party, no. But if your assertion is based on the fact you don’t like the Tories I think we should leave it there.
I proposed those two things in two different endings of an option. Note the 'However' part in the middle of the very quote.
Well pick one or the other. Unless the point you’re trying to make is “I don’t like Tories” in which case it’s not very good AH.
The very complete contradiction of the two endings was the point - that the situation had gotten so far off the 'known' that it could go any way - that one side the backbenchers chickened out knifing Thatcher in fear of a snap election decimation, on another they decide to 'capture the public mood' by causing a snap and wrapping themselves up in jingoism in the hopes of an election victory.
‘Knifing’ Thatcher would cause a decimation. It makes no sense politically after they’ve all been so keen to wrap themselves in the flag. If the decision to go had been contentious or if a Cabinet member had resigned, maybe they could do what you suggest, but the OTL Tories after their OTL decisions can’t do what you think they would do and politically survive.
What, from the original fork back in April? Yes. From a point of the 'failure' in June? Not so much, I don't think.
Disagree.
 
I think the whole Falklands was close thing is because of the decision to chop down the FAA and give it Harriers instead of Phantoms and Buccaneers. Nobody would say it was a close run thing if the RN deployed its old carriers or their intended CVA01 replacements. Apart from this single capability shortfall Britain had all the capabilities of a great power to deploy against Argentina, so it's hardly surprising that they won.
I wouldn't say the loss of Atlantic Conveyor was the only reason it was a close-run thing historically but it seriously contributed, possibly more so than the loss of Ark Royal (possibly not, I am on the fence). With Atlantic Conveyor and her helicopters though, it is a vastly different story. I would argue the Argentinians were about as lucky as they were going to get OTL right there.

To turn the tide is going to take a major intervention on the side of Argentina. Neither of the superpowers are likely to want to mess with NATO without some pretty heady divergences so perhaps a far more (bizarrely) aggressive France sells far more Etendards/Exocets than historical? Argentina can't do it with the OTL OOB IMO.

If you take the timeline in the other direction and defang the British sufficently to solve the problem, the Falklands are likely not and never were British anyway.
 
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I am thinking a true Agentinian victory is "A Bridge to Far" for realism. In the end the numbers dont hadd up:

In short, the best the Argentinians could hope for is a draw:

South Georgia: Argentinians prepare a very nasty surprise on South Georgia in the form of a reinforced airborne company, advanced ATGMS, mortars and Manpads. The Argentiain unit are all triple volunteers. They know that their sole purpose is to serve as a momentum breaking tripwire to give their nation military and political breathing room.

They perform their mission very well. The commander broadcasts a day to day account of their inspiring resistance Yes, they are eventually reduced and the surviors beome POWs. But.... UK casualies are also unexpectadly heavy. A chill settiles over London. This is a real war, not just a flag raising campaigns. There will be no easy ground victories.

Falklands: Trepidation after Soith Georgia settles over British commanders as the South Georgia phyric victory settles in. Should the landings be delayed for reinforcements? Can reinforcements be supported logistically? Will delays result in even more UK casualties? A decision is made to drive on with the landing schedule with available forces.

British efforts around the main Argentinian force run into uhmm...."difficulties" as casualties mount. House to house fighting is a real possibility. UK commanders , knowing that the long term degradation of Argentian forces is inevitable, redeploys the ground forces for a casualty light campaign of retaking areas that are not actively defended.

The pregnant Pause: UK and Argentinian commanders know that a UK victory is inevitable- but will need ground reinforcements to end the conflict even remotely quickly. But..... must UK pay the price if they dont really need to? Aregentians offer peace negotiiations.

Enter the USSR and China: Both nations have a geo political interest in a delayed and difficult British victory and also have the same interest in an incomplete UK victory . Both also have a propaganda interest in presenting Argentinian resistance as Soldiers, Sailors and Workers standing up and standing tall against western powers. Both make it clear they are gravely concerned over the conflict.

China takes the lead: The British Embassy gets a note: China has concerns about .air and sea navigational rights in an around Hong Kong. A discussion of the navigation concerns is requested- and oh yeah, they also want clarifications on the timetable for British departure. No- the discussions and statement cant wait, They need to occur immediately lest navigational "misunderstandings" quickly occur.

The Pressure: The UK knows China is not going to go to war in Hong Kong over Argentina- at least they almost know it. Even still, they dont want a tit for tat fishing and ferry boat dispute around Hong Kong as unlike in the Falklands, China holds the last card.

The Treaty: Argentinian troops leave under arms and in stages. The Falklands go "Northern Ireland". UK and Argentina renounce inherent claims to the islands. Argentinians get limited amounts of largely, but not entirely symbolic local authority. They also get periodic referendums on which county the islands belong to. UK has no fear of losing a referendum.
 
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I really don't think Argentina is getting any support from the USSR or PRC considering that the Argentine junta's main claim to fame is murdering Communists and anyone who even vaguely looks like they might be a Communist under poor lighting.
 
I really don't think Argentina is getting any support from the USSR or PRC considering that the Argentine junta's main claim to fame is murdering Communists and anyone who even vaguely looks like they might be a Communist under poor lighting.
The relationships between Argentina and both the USSR and China were actually good, because diplomacy can be weird like that. That said, they are not going to war for Argentina, although it's in their interests to have the UK bleed as much as possible
 
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