Oh I know that - but there seemed to be a little Soviet apologia going on. They didn't really collaborate, of course not. They were desperate to fight the real enemy after reading Mein Kampf.
The Soviets tried for years to contain the Nazi threat through diplomacy and collective agreements. That was specifically the task of Litvinov. The replacement of Litvinov with Molotov is the sign of the sea change in the Soviet foreign policies; every attempt to come to terms with the enemies of the Nazis have come to naught, so it's time to consider the alternative. People tend to forget about Litvinov and to focus on the final rush to war with Molotov.
That doesn't mean that
a) the Soviets wouldn't try to scoop up any fringe benefit that could windfall their way, if possible; it's not as if every power didn't do that, and
b) the Soviets, once they had to, did not cooperate with Germany. They did.
Note the "when they had to". If you look at the amounts of supplies sent to Germany in 1940, you'll notice that it was just a trickle, until the Germans won big in the West. Only then did they pick up. One could hypothesize that Stalin did not want to "really" help Germany, as long as there was a chance that the Polish stunt had been an exception and that the best army in the world would teach the Heer a lesson. Once that had not come to pass, well, the Soviets had to start delivering the goods.
During the Winter War WAllies were very close to the bombing of soviet oil fields in Baku, not to the actual bombing of german industries. Isn't that a sign of overwhelming distrust they feel for Soviet Union? 'We would better fight Soviets in Finland and Baku than Germans in Ruhr'.
You fail to see the basics of these plans. Neither of which was motivated by a preference to fight the Soviets instead of the Germans.
The Scandinavian idea wasn't really to "help the Finns", though that is how it was portrayed in propaganda. The real points were
a) in Norway, to stop the transit of U-Boote and German surface ships,
b) in Sweden, which would be stumbled into by mere chance even though it was a neutral like Norway, to stop the iron ore from being shipped to Germany.
Note the Scandinavian operation also had another hallmark of age-old British strategy: a peripheral attack relying on superior sealift against a continental enemy. Attacking straight into the Westwall was exactly a no-no for the british under this respect. It also was very unpalatable for the French, for obvious reasons linked with the expected butcher's bill and their manpower situation.
Operation Pike was meant to bomb the main source of oil for the Soviets and for the Germans. At the time, Romania was neutral, and though it was selling oil to Germany, it was doing so at nearly normal market conditions, and as a neutral it could be pressured, diplomatically and economically (outbidding), to sell less and less to Germany. In prospect, Baku and the other oilfields were the only other significantly large oil source.
And the Ruhr?
First thing, stopping the imports of iron and oil harms the Ruhr industries without having to bomb them.
Secondly, finding and bombing an immense refining complex on the tip of a peninsula over a sea with prevailing dry weather was something the Bomber Command of 1940 might be expected to do. Finding and bombing a city in the inland, foggy Ruhr - let alone a specific industrial plant within the city - would have been so difficult as to make the effort essentially ineffective.
So don't project your present-day political prejudices onto the Allied strategic plans of 1940. Operation Pike was a monumentally bad idea and the Scandinavian operation might have worked solely as to its Norwegian objectives, probably, assuming it had been launched before the Germans' operation; but this has nothing to do with a preference to fight the Soviets.