What if an alternate Hull Note was accepted by Japan

[Martoto]

I've been wondering what would happen if Japan and the US agreed on a diplomatic solution to their issues in the lead up to the attack on Pearl Harbor 1941. Say, the demands of the US in the Hull Note from OTL were less harsh on the Japanese. The problem was that at the time, Japan saw the Hull Note as an ultimatum and casus belli because they couldn't accept the demands. What if the two countries agreed that Japan would withdraw from French Indochina and China and agree not to seek expansion in South East Asia and in China in return for the US lifting the oil embargo and China recognizing Manchukuo. Would the communists fill the power vacuum left from the Japanese leaving and the Chinese civil war would start anew? Would WW2 in Europe end earlier than it did OTL? And how would the Cold War look with an Imperial Japan that manged to hold on to it's empire in Taiwan, Korea, and a puppet state in Manchuria?

 

[RMcD94]

Japan would not withdraw from China as everyone knew, especially not losing everything that you're suggesting. Any government that attempted to do so would face assassination

 

[Athelstane]

Japan would not withdraw from China as everyone knew, especially not losing everything that you're suggesting. Any government that attempted to do so would face assassination

Yeah. There's just no way that's gonna happen. If Tokyo tried, there would be a coup. Konoye would have to hide in his wine cellar.

If the Hull note merely required withdrawal from French Indochina in exchange for some kind of agreement of authorities in Hanoi to cut off all shipments over the Chinese border, and perhaps some nebulous promise of Sino-Japanese negotiations...well, I think even THAT is unlikely to win Japanese agreement - it's going to look like a Japanese climbdown - but it might be as far as FDR could have gone in weakening the note.

Otherwise, you need a very different president to go any further. A much more isolationist, or much mor Germany-focused, president.

 

[Martoto]

Japan would not withdraw from China as everyone knew, especially not losing everything that you're suggesting. Any government that attempted to do so would face assassination

“Japan and the U.S. engaged in negotiations during the course of 1941 in an effort to improve relations. During these negotiations, Japan considered withdrawal from most of China and Indochina after drawing up peace terms with the Chinese. Japan would also adopt an independent interpretation of the Tripartite Pact...” - from Wikipedia, the source is “Chapter V: The Decision for WarMorton, Louis. Strategy and Command: The First Two Years“.

The Japanese were no fools and knew they were screwed as soon as China didn’t fall after the capture of Nanking. The main guy against peace was Hideki Tojo who was powerful but still just one guy.

Besides, with all due respect, I’m not looking for people to tell me that this scenario is unrealistic. I know it is, as is most alternate history. I was asking more for what would happen if we accepted that the Hull Note I’m proposing WAS accepted by both sides.

 

[ArtosStark]

after drawing up peace terms with the Chinese

This would be the sticking point. Japan's ideas of peace terms are unlikely to be accepted by the U.S.

Besides, with all due respect, I’m not looking for people to tell me that this scenario is unrealistic. I know it is, as is most alternate history. I was asking more for what would happen if we accepted that the Hull Note I’m proposing WAS accepted by both sides.

This comes up sometimes, and I understand where you are coming from. But we cannot determine semi-realistic outcomes without establishing the situation in the TL. And that requires looking at what is realistic and what is not. If I put up a thread that asks "What happens in WW2 if both sides have dragons?" I would need to explain where the dragons came from, what their presence has changed throughout history and how they interact with early 20th Century culture. Or simply put it in another section of the forum.

 

[ArtosStark]

That said, the Japanese Empire remaining would probably butterfly the Korean war. And I think Chaing would use the time while the Soviets are distracted and mostly supportive of him to try to end the Communist party. It might not be easy but my guess is he will mostly succeed. So you probably have KMT China. The war in Europe will depend on whether and when the U.S enters the war.

 

[Athelstane]

Besides, with all due respect, I’m not looking for people to tell me that this scenario is unrealistic. I know it is, as is most alternate history. I was asking more for what would happen if we accepted that the Hull Note I’m proposing WAS accepted by both sides.

Well, it's more unrealistic than most scenarios that get major discussion here. The Army basically has to be broken, and broken hard, for this to even have a chance: lots of key officers shot or put to rot in prison.

But since you ask:

Would the communists fill the power vacuum left from the Japanese leaving and the Chinese civil war would start anew?
It's hard to see how they would. The CCP will no longer have the advantage of the Soviet intervention and assistance they received in 1945; and Chiang in turn is not drained by carrying the burden of most of the war with Japan for four long years, and can instead turn to confronting the CCP. Nor will the CCP benefit from the good will and witness they built up through guerrilla operations in 1941-45. The bottom line is, the communists were in considerably worse shape in 1941 than they were in 1945, and this peace deal isn't going to help them.

EDIT: I really ought to also mention that Chiang is going to get the credit, to the extent that any Chinese actor can get credit, for getting the Japanese to pull out of China, and that will be no small boost to his reputation in the country.

Would WW2 in Europe end earlier than it did OTL?
It all depends on when the United States enters the war in Europe (or indeed, if it does at all). If it enters on schedule, the war likely ends by the end of 1944, as both America and Britain can devote more resources to it from Day One, a considerably higher chance of OVERLORD/ROUNDUP happening in 1943. If Hitler finds a way to avoid provoking U.S. entry, things get messier.

And how would the Cold War look with an Imperial Japan that manged to hold on to it's empire in Taiwan, Korea, and a puppet state in Manchuria?
Awkward. A bit like having a much bigger Franco sitting in East Asia, tilting a bit westward (Stalin being the greater threat now), but in a way that makes neither Washington or Tokyo terribly happy.

 

[RMcD94]

“Japan and the U.S. engaged in negotiations during the course of 1941 in an effort to improve relations. During these negotiations, Japan considered withdrawal from most of China and Indochina after drawing up peace terms with the Chinese. Japan would also adopt an independent interpretation of the Tripartite Pact...” - from Wikipedia, the source is “Chapter V: The Decision for WarMorton, Louis. Strategy and Command: The First Two Years“.

The Japanese were no fools and knew they were screwed as soon as China didn’t fall after the capture of Nanking. The main guy against peace was Hideki Tojo who was powerful but still just one guy.

Besides, with all due respect, I’m not looking for people to tell me that this scenario is unrealistic. I know it is, as is most alternate history. I was asking more for what would happen if we accepted that the Hull Note I’m proposing WAS accepted by both sides.

You can say Japan weren't fools all you want but they were. They attacked the greatest economic power on Earth in what can only be described as a foolish move. They spent a decade bogged down in a land war in China where they repeatedly and continuously sabotaged the only hope of success by committing inefficient and worthless war crimes. Since Meiji's death Japan has issues with committing to a plan and vascillitation in foreign policy is the height of foolishness.

Just to quote your source:

With no agreement in sight Konoye sought to win an extension. On 12 October he invited War Minister Tojo, the Navy and Foreign Ministers, and the president of the Planning Board to his home for a final conference on the question of war and peace. At the meeting the Premier argued strongly for continuing the negotiations beyond the deadline, then set at 15 October. The Navy Minister would not commit himself but General Tojo, on the ground that success in the negotiations would require concessions in China, refused to go along with Konoye. The issue had now been narrowed to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and on the morning of the 14th the Premier again sought Tojo's consent. "On this occasion," he urged the War Minister, "we ought to give in for a time . . . and save ourselves from the crisis of a Japanese-American war." Tojo again refused, and at a Cabinet meeting later in the day demanded that the negotiations be terminated. Finally, late that night, he sent Konoye a message stating that the Cabinet ought to resign, "declare insolvent everything that has happened up to now, and reconsider our plans once more."4

Tojo was not just one guy. He represented the Army, the only reason Japan was in China to begin with. The Army dragged Japan into Manchuria, the army dragged Japan into China, the army dragged Japan into Northern Indochina and then Southern Indochina. In fact many have called, quite reasonably, Tojo as one of the least independent Ministers to exist he was almost completely a puppet, and his toeing of the Army line was how he ended up being their representative in the first place. To say "
Hideki Tojo who was powerful but still just one guy." demonstrates an absolute crucial misunderstanding about Japanese politics from Meiji onwards. The only power he possessed was given to him by those who decided he should represent them and he was completely replaceable. Regardless the important part is that Japanese government's cannot exist without both an Army and Naval minister who have to be Generals/Admirals. So when Tojo resigns because Konoye tries to go over him as he threatened in the above what does Konoye do?

Well Konoye will search high and wide for an Army General who will go against the Army. First of all, good luck. Second, should such a lucky guy appear he would be assassinated sharply or a coup would be attempted. Third, even if we imagine that Tokyo manages to secure itself with navy soldiers and avoid a coup what's going to happen in China? Just as in Manchuria and in Shanghai and in Hubei the Army will ignore the orders from Tokyo to leave China. In fact if they got wind of this attempt to agree to the Hull note, likely from Tojo then they would just begin offensives across the front so that Japan is even more committed.

---

Now your final point that this AH.com and that's the premise so we should try to work to finding 0.0001% scenarios where it is pulled off is totally reasonable and I agree with that, but I do think the context should be acknowledged at least especially if you demonstrate that you're not confident about the situation at the time.

Q: Would the communists fill the power vacuum left from the Japanese leaving and the Chinese civil war would start anew?
A: Yes and yes. Japan in conjunction with their new American allies would very quickly suppress the Communists by funding the KMT or other puppets as Japan did prewar.

Q:Would WW2 in Europe end earlier than it did OTL?
A: Potentially, if Japan goes to war with the USSR it could delay the resolution but nukes in Berlin give you a small window.

Q: And how would the Cold War look with an Imperial Japan that manged to hold on to it's empire in Taiwan, Korea, and a puppet state in Manchuria?
A: I have my doubts the Cold War lasts very long at all. With the Soviets trapped in Siberia and China still in a warlord situation there will be no way the Soviets can supply the anti-colonialist movements around the world. In addition since the draw from SEA and India is less and European power unchallenged it's likely colonialism lasts far longer. Additionally racism in the USA will be prevalent for far longer as post-war American involvement in Japan did a lot to undo the racists attitudes of centuries.

I don't know how Japan will deal with internally them folding to a country that refuses to believe in racial equality but I can't imagine that will be good for them so probably this forces a turn to conservatism and isolationism.

 

[Athelstane]

The Japanese were no fools and knew they were screwed as soon as China didn’t fall after the capture of Nanking.

You can say Japan weren't fools all you want but they were.

Yeah. The ability of senior IJA leadership to deny reality in this period was truly breathtaking. Jawdropping, really. The refusal of Chiang to Cry Uncle didn't change their conviction.

 

[David T]

A post of mine from 2017 at https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...th-modus-vivendi-1941-2.432663/#post-16209180

***
Richard Leopold in *The Growth of American Foreign Policy* dicussses the endgame of US-Japanese negotiations in 1941:

"Konoye's downfall edged the two nations closer to war, but with shooting having begun in the Atlantic, Roosevelt still tried to keep things quiet in the Pacific. He hoped "to baby the Japanese along" until the Philippines were adequately manned with B-17 bombers. The first nine arrived on September 12, 1941, but a second echelon of twenty-five did not touch down until November 6. In Washington, time was a precious commodity, but in Tokyo, Tojo was determined to break the deadlock, by diplomacy or force, before the end of the year. The weather was growing less suited to amphibious landings, and the oil reserves were dwindling. On November 5 an Imperial Conference agreed to wage war against the United States and Great Britain if the conversations in Washington failed to produce results by November 25. Before that date two proposals, A and B, would be offered. The former contained a broad settlement in line with the minimum objectives of September 6; the latter was a stopgap measure. Should both be declined, the Japanese would ask their Axis allies to enter the fray; but they were prepared to go it alone.

"Thanks to its breaking the Japanese diplomatic code, the American government learned at once of this deadline. Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark urged Roosevelt to play for time and on November 5, 1941, asked that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan." They reminded him that Germany's defeat was the primary objective and argued against fighting in case the Japanese invaded Russia from Manchukuo, China from northern Indochina, or eastern Thailand from southern Indochina. They said war in Asia was justified only if the United States and its dependencies or certain areas essential to their security were attacked. Those areas were the British Empire and its mandates, the Dutch Indies, Thailand west of the hundredth meridian and south of the Kra Isthmus, Portuguese Timor, and French New Caledonia. Roosevelt endorsed this estimate but made no promise of any sort.

"A diplomatic impasse was reached at the end of November, 1941. When Hull quickly rejected Plan A as offering nothing new, Nomura — joined dramatically by a special envoy, Saburo Kurusu — pressed frantically for acceptance of Plan B before the revised deadline expired on November 29. Presented on November 20, Plan B ignored the Tripartite Pact. It bound both governments to forego further advances in Southeast Asia, to restore trade relations as they had been on July 25, and to cooperate in getting from the East Indies the resources each needed. The Japanese undertook to evacuate Indochina when a general peace was established; meanwhile they would withdraw from the southern sector. The United States was obliged to supply Japan with "a required quantity of oil" and to desist from actions prejudicial to terminating hostilities in China. The last meant no more diplomatic and economic support for Chiang Kai-shek.

"Hull dismissed Plan B as "preposterous." Not content with a curb on their southward drive, he insisted that the Japanese abandon their four-year campaign against China and all gains made at China's expense since 1931. To please Marshall and Stark, however, he drew up on November 25, 1941, a counteroffer, a three-month modus vivendi. It required Japan to get out of southern Indochina at once, to reduce its forces in northern Indochina, and to renounce expansion in any direction. In return, the United States would admit Japanese imports and allow limited exports in cotton and oil, the latter for civilian use only. Tojo probably would have balked at the oil item, but he never had the opportunity. From London a not fully informed Churchill warned against weakening Chiang's regime; from Manila came reports of troop movements which suggested Japan was not negotiating in good faith. Worried by charges of appeasement at home and cries of protest in Chungking, Hull reversed himself that evening and decided to answer Plan B in another way.

"His resulting ten-point note of November 26, 1941, proposed in effect to turn back the hands of the clock to September, 1931. It called for the complete evacuation of Indochina and its joint protection by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, China, Holland, and Thailand. These six nations, plus the Soviet Union, would also sign a nonaggression pact. As to China, Japan would have to withdraw all its troops — thereby forsaking Manchukuo — to deal only with Chiang — thereby deserting its puppets — and to join the United States in giving up extraterritorial rights. For its part, the American government would lift restrictions on Japanese trade, conclude a new commercial convention, and stabilize the dollar-yen rate. Nomura and Kurusu realized immediately that the men in Tokyo would not — indeed, could not — accept those terms..."

https://archive.org/stream/growthofamerican00inleop#page/588/mode/2up

Hull's ten-point note was not an "ultimatum" as has sometimes been claimed--but it was for all practical purposes an admission that negotiations had failed, and that the next move was up to Japan (with the only real question being not whether she would attack but where). What if instead Hull had gone ahead with the three-month *modus vivendi*--and Japan had accepted? (Does the business about the oil being for civilian use only have to be a sticking point? After all, oil is fungible.) Obviously, it was not a permament solution, and no agreement on China was likely to be reached, certainly not in the next three months.

So let's say the three month *modus vivendi* does delay the Pacific War--by three months. Consequences? When I raised this question in soc.history.what-if years ago, Rich Rostrom suggested some:

"The postponement of the Pacific War would very likely allow the British/Commonwealth forces in North Africa to follow up the CRUSADER victories to completion - Tripoli falls in March 1942. OTL the pursuit in N Africa continued for about two months after Pearl Harbor, but by 2/42 forces were being diverted massively to SE Asia and the pursuit stalled. Give the B/C forces three months of sole focus on North Africa and two months after to follow up, and IMHO Rommel is finished.

"This has major knock-on effects for French North Africa; most likely the pro-Allied conspirators there take over in mid-summer, obviating TORCH. Where the Second Front, then? Sicily? Crete?

"The other big knock-on is Burma. The Japanese starting three months later, and possibly meeting more effective resistance in Malaya, may not be able to finish the Burma campaign before the monsoon rains hit, or may even be stopped at the eastern side of Burma.

"This would leave the Burma Road open, which makes it far easier to get aid to China, and perhaps even possible to deploy a corps or weak army of US troops there. Which could lead to major field defeats of the Japanese army in China."
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/fg3JQ2CWuWY/1thZTrojFOsJ

Any other thoughts?

 

[Martoto]

This would be the sticking point. Japan's ideas of peace terms are unlikely to be accepted by the U.S.


This comes up sometimes, and I understand where you are coming from. But we cannot determine semi-realistic outcomes without establishing the situation in the TL. And that requires looking at what is realistic and what is not. If I put up a thread that asks "What happens in WW2 if both sides have dragons?" I would need to explain where the dragons came from, what their presence has changed throughout history and how they interact with early 20th Century culture. Or simply put it in another section of the forum.

I know you’re exaggerating to make a point but dragons in WW2 is a far cry from a peace between Japan and China/US that was actually discussed in reality. But anyway, thanks for being respectful and engaging in my other points.

 

[Athelstane]

Q: Would the communists fill the power vacuum left from the Japanese leaving and the Chinese civil war would start anew?
A: Yes and yes. Japan in conjunction with their new American allies would very quickly suppress the Communists by funding the KMT or other puppets as Japan did prewar.

Honestly, it's going to be in Japan's interest to see China tied down in civil war for as long as possible. Much as they loathe and fear communism, a CCP that sticks around as a credible regional insurgency through the 1940's will be very much in their interest. It will retard Chiang's ability to build China up into a powerful, unitary state . . . you know, once that might try to fight to get Manchuria or Formosa back. The Japanese seem pretty certain to assist the CCP and any credible regional warlord they can find to keep China weak and divided.

But unless their assistance to the CCP is on a massive scale, Chiang is going to have the upper hand, despite the corruption, inefficiency, and weak logistics of the KMT army.

Q: And how would the Cold War look with an Imperial Japan that managed to hold on to it's empire in Taiwan, Korea, and a puppet state in Manchuria?
A: I have my doubts the Cold War lasts very long at all. With the Soviets trapped in Siberia and China still in a warlord situation there will be no way the Soviets can supply the anti-colonialist movements around the world. In addition since the draw from SEA and India is less and European power unchallenged it's likely colonialism lasts far longer.

You know, I really had not reflected on the possibility of a Japanese attack on the USSR. I think it is unlikely because in my view the entire scenario requires a massive breaking of the IJA in its leadership and political role, and this will require a lot of work to remake the Army into a pliant and effective force again. Also, a war with the Soviets would only increase army influence and power again.

But if it happens, and happens in timely fashion, then it will certainly result in a weaker USSR and a stronger West after the war, if indeed America enters the war by the end of 1941. The Allies likely end up on the Oder or even beyond, and the Soviets end up with a much more limited empire in Eastern Europe. But Martoto does not seem to be assuming a Japanese attack on the USSR in the OP.

 

[ArtosStark]

I know you’re exaggerating to make a point but dragons in WW2 is a far cry from a peace between Japan and China/US that was actually discussed in reality. But anyway, thanks for being respectful and engaging in my other points.

True enough. But the reasons it didn’t happen in OTL are pretty compelling. A change in these reasons likely require changes in the character of the nations involved. And how that happens will change the way they react going forward. It’s like getting dropped into the middle of the story and being asked what happens next, if that makes sense.

 

[Hugh Third of Five]

If you want America not to go to war with Japan, the easiest way to do that is to have them invade the Russian Far East rather than China. The Hull note is way too late a POD to make avoiding a war between Japan and the USA feasible.

 

[Martoto]

Thanks for all the input guys. It's pretty late where I'm at but I'll read everything you've written in the morning. No doubt, some really interesting points being brought up here. And again, I know the POD is rather unrealistic, but honestly I just wanted to have Japan stay out of WW2 and survive alongside its Manchukuo puppet state So thanks for engaging

 

[Aisha Clan-Clan]

Really low probability unless you get someone less racist than FDR. US leadership wouldn't moderate their OTL extreme demands under FDR.

 

[David T]

Really low probability unless you get someone less racist than FDR. US leadership wouldn't moderate their OTL extreme demands under FDR.

There is just so much wrong with this:

(1) First of all, the notion that FDR was intent on war with Japan is false. He was much more concerned with stopping Hitler (anti-German racism, no doubt?) and for a long time was willing to temporize with Japan. "The problem in 1941 was not that Roosevelt was relentlessly pushing Japan's leaders toward the brink; the problem was that he could not find a viable way to stop them from taking the plunge of their own accord. The Supreme Command in Tokyo had various goals in mind, not the least of which was a preemptive strike designed to capture the resources that abounded in Southeast Asia—resources and territory that might fall into the hands of Japan's competitive ally, Germany, if Hitler succeeded in conquering his enemies in Europe. Roosevelt was forceful enough in the Atlantic to cause some observers to think that Hitler might take up the challenge in circumstances favorable to his own malevolent designs. In the Pacific, however, the President was prepared to be conciliatory. Over a period of months, he had resisted the tempting advice of several members of his cabinet who had urged him to adopt stringent measures..." https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1996/fall/butow.html

(2) The Hull note was by no means as "extreme" as it has been portrayed, and was not an ultimatum:

"The note was tendered on a "Tentative and Without Commitment" basis; it outlined reciprocal undertakings and offered room to maneuver. On the critical issue of Japanese troops on the continent of Asia, for instance, Hull stipulated a withdrawal of "all military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indochina." He did not say when this had to be done; this was negotiable. 29 There was no mention whatsoever of Manchuria—the Japanese presence there was also negotiable. 30 Hull did not call for a concrete response within a specified deadline; therefore, his note was not an "ultimatum."

"On November 27, the President told Nomura and Kurusu: "We are prepared . . . to be patient if Japan's courses of action permit . . . such an attitude on our part. We still have hope . . . [but] . . . [the United States] cannot bring about any substantial relaxation in its economic restrictions unless Japan gives this country some clear manifestation of peaceful intent. If that occurs, we can also take some steps of a concrete character designed to improve the general situation." 31

"Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark were frankly opposed to doing anything that might precipitate war. They were eager to buy time to develop enough strength to cope effectively with whatever action the Japanese government might take in the southwestern Pacific—the area where the Imperial Army and Navy were most likely to strike. Until the Philippines could be reinforced more fully, General Marshall and Admiral Stark recommended that military counteraction against Japan be considered only if the Japanese attacked or directly threatened American, British, or Dutch territory in Southeast Asia. 32.." https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1996/fall/butow.html

(3) Even if Hull was wrong to insist on a general commitment by the Japanese to get out of China, how is that "racist"? The last I heard, the Chinese are not any whiter than the Japanese.

(4) To the extent that FDR had any prejudices on the Far East, they were pro-Chinese, and hardly racist:

"Two members of FDR's "brains trust," Rexford Tugwell and Raymond Moley, were unhappy about the conversation. They felt Stimson had persuaded the President-elect "to underwrite the Hoover-Stimson policy in the Far East." Conferring with Roosevelt later in the month, they tried to convince him that he was making "a tragic mistake." Describing the encounter six years later, Moley expressed his disillusionment: "We might as well have saved our breath. Roosevelt put an end to the discussion by looking up and recalling that his ancestors used to trade with China. "I have always had the deepest sympathy for the Chinese," he said. 'How could you expect me not to go along with Stimson on Japan?'" After Seven Years (1939), pp. 93 - 95. Sumner Welles, who knew FDR well, later wrote: "No one close to the President could have failed to recognize the deep feeling of friendship for China that he had inherited from his mother's side of his family. . . . and he himself loved to tell over and over again stories of the dealings members of his family had had with various Chinese dignitaries and merchants. . . ." Seven Decisions That Shaped History (1951), p. 68' https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1999/fall/roosevelt-family-history-5.html

As for Japan, in the 1920's FDR took a friendly attitude toward it. See his 1923 article "Shall We Trust Japan?" (His answer was Yes.) https://books.google.com/books?id=C7I5AQAAIAAJ&pg=PA475 Of course the Japan of 1923 was not the Japan of 1941 and the world situation was different--in 1923 France and Britain seemed invincible, in 1941, one had been conquered and the other was fighting for its life. The fate of their colonies in the Far East could not be a matter of indifference to anyone who cared about the outcome of the war in Europe. That was what led to a gradual hardening of FDR's position on Japan. "Racism" had nothing to do with it.

 

[Athelstane]

There is just so much wrong with this:

(1) First of all, the notion that FDR was intent on war with Japan is false. He was much more concerned with stopping Hitler (anti-German racism, no doubt?) and for a long time was willing to temporize with Japan. "The problem in 1941 was not that Roosevelt was relentlessly pushing Japan's leaders toward the brink; the problem was that he could not find a viable way to stop them from taking the plunge of their own accord. The Supreme Command in Tokyo had various goals in mind, not the least of which was a preemptive strike designed to capture the resources that abounded in Southeast Asia—resources and territory that might fall into the hands of Japan's competitive ally, Germany, if Hitler succeeded in conquering his enemies in Europe. Roosevelt was forceful enough in the Atlantic to cause some observers to think that Hitler might take up the challenge in circumstances favorable to his own malevolent designs. In the Pacific, however, the President was prepared to be conciliatory. Over a period of months, he had resisted the tempting advice of several members of his cabinet who had urged him to adopt stringent measures..." https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1996/fall/butow.html

(2) The Hull note was by no means as "extreme" as it has been portrayed, and was not an ultimatum:

"The note was tendered on a "Tentative and Without Commitment" basis; it outlined reciprocal undertakings and offered room to maneuver. On the critical issue of Japanese troops on the continent of Asia, for instance, Hull stipulated a withdrawal of "all military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indochina." He did not say when this had to be done; this was negotiable. 29 There was no mention whatsoever of Manchuria—the Japanese presence there was also negotiable. 30 Hull did not call for a concrete response within a specified deadline; therefore, his note was not an "ultimatum."

"On November 27, the President told Nomura and Kurusu: "We are prepared . . . to be patient if Japan's courses of action permit . . . such an attitude on our part. We still have hope . . . [but] . . . [the United States] cannot bring about any substantial relaxation in its economic restrictions unless Japan gives this country some clear manifestation of peaceful intent. If that occurs, we can also take some steps of a concrete character designed to improve the general situation." 31

"Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark were frankly opposed to doing anything that might precipitate war. They were eager to buy time to develop enough strength to cope effectively with whatever action the Japanese government might take in the southwestern Pacific—the area where the Imperial Army and Navy were most likely to strike. Until the Philippines could be reinforced more fully, General Marshall and Admiral Stark recommended that military counteraction against Japan be considered only if the Japanese attacked or directly threatened American, British, or Dutch territory in Southeast Asia. 32.." https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1996/fall/butow.html

(3) Even if Hull was wrong to insist on a general commitment by the Japanese to get out of China, how is that "racist"? The last I heard, the Chinese are not any whiter than the Japanese.

(4) To the extent that FDR had any prejudices on the Far East, they were pro-Chinese, and hardly racist:

"Two members of FDR's "brains trust," Rexford Tugwell and Raymond Moley, were unhappy about the conversation. They felt Stimson had persuaded the President-elect "to underwrite the Hoover-Stimson policy in the Far East." Conferring with Roosevelt later in the month, they tried to convince him that he was making "a tragic mistake." Describing the encounter six years later, Moley expressed his disillusionment: "We might as well have saved our breath. Roosevelt put an end to the discussion by looking up and recalling that his ancestors used to trade with China. "I have always had the deepest sympathy for the Chinese," he said. 'How could you expect me not to go along with Stimson on Japan?'" After Seven Years (1939), pp. 93 - 95. Sumner Welles, who knew FDR well, later wrote: "No one close to the President could have failed to recognize the deep feeling of friendship for China that he had inherited from his mother's side of his family. . . . and he himself loved to tell over and over again stories of the dealings members of his family had had with various Chinese dignitaries and merchants. . . ." Seven Decisions That Shaped History (1951), p. 68' https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1999/fall/roosevelt-family-history-5.html

As for Japan, in the 1920's FDR took a friendly attitude toward it. See his 1923 article "Shall We Trust Japan?" (His answer was Yes.) https://books.google.com/books?id=C7I5AQAAIAAJ&pg=PA475 Of course the Japan of 1923 was not the Japan of 1941 and the world situation was different--in 1923 France and Britain seemed invincible, in 1941, one had been conquered and the other was fighting for its life. The fate of their colonies in the Far East could not be a matter of indifference to anyone who cared about the outcome of the war in Europe. That was what led to a gradual hardening of FDR's position on Japan. "Racism" had nothing to do with it.

Every word of this, seconded.

A racism charge, in this context, is a discourse killer, @interpoltomo . I mean, there's not even any attempt to articulate what that means for this discussion.

There is ample room for criticism of FDR and especially Hull in their handling of diplomatic relations with Japan (even granted that Tojo's government had become far from ideal as a diplomatic partner). Hull had an obtuse disposition, and neither man took proper heed of Joseph Grew's warnings about how dangerous the Japanese leadership had become under Tojo. But the idea that FDR had some race-driven program to goad Japan into war is not only not supported by any evidence, but runs counter to what was much more obviously his real interest: Confronting Germany. A war with Japan in 1941 would only undermine that interest, and Roosevelt understood that.

 

[Pesterfield]

Is it possible for the Roosevelt government to order Hull to accept A or B, or just to fire him and put somebody else in?

 

[Aisha Clan-Clan]

If confronting germany was the priority for FDR why keep escalating with Japan instead of just ignoring the china situation or indochina/dutch east indies?