What if America fought on Germany's side during WWI?

[Riain]

I'm confused at what you're arguing; Britain only sent 277,000 tonnes to France, which isn't enough to make up for the 5,261,000 tonnes the U.S. sent?

Yeah, its a rabbit hole we've gone down.

Britain was a huge consumer of oil in 1918, vastly more than France, Italy and Germany, probably more than all combined despite having much less industry than those three combined. My point is that if France, Italy and Germany each can get by on a fraction of the almost 6 million tons Britain used then perhaps Britain can too, and would do so by hundreds or even thousands of little and big decisions accumulating from 1914. Two decisions that might make a big (in relative terms of course) impacts are keeping some 277,000 tons of oil sold to France and some 400,000 from Egypt sold to Italy because it was easier to ship it there when American oil was coming to Britain.

Of course this comes at a cost, and eventually this lack of resources will allow the CP to win the war, but not in months.

 

[History Learner]

Yeah, its a rabbit hole we've gone down.

Britain was a huge consumer of oil in 1918, vastly more than France, Italy and Germany, probably more than all combined despite having much less industry than those three combined. My point is that if France, Italy and Germany each can get by on a fraction of the almost 6 million tons Britain used then perhaps Britain can too, and would do so by hundreds or even thousands of little and big decisions accumulating from 1914. Two decisions that might make a big (in relative terms of course) impacts are keeping some 277,000 tons of oil sold to France and some 400,000 from Egypt sold to Italy because it was easier to ship it there when American oil was coming to Britain.

Of course this comes at a cost, and eventually this lack of resources will allow the CP to win the war, but not in months.

They could last through 1914 by cutting the civilian economy right down to the bone given they'd have a deficit of ~230,000 tonnes:
"Earlier in the month Sir Albert Stanley, the President of the Board of Trade, had pointed out that UK petrol stocks were declining because demand exceeded imports. Shortages of shipping meant that imports in 1917 were likely to be lower than in 1916. Civilian consumption of 10,000,000 gallons per month could be reduced to 8,000,000. Any further cuts would severely disrupt the life and commerce of the country. Military use at home had to be restricted; the War Office and the Admiralty were both taking measures to economise on the use of petrol."

I'd expect a general collapse by the end of 1915, however, as the lack of food and oil takes a hold and the cut off the French would result in their collapse:
"On 11 December Bérenger reported that France was dependent on its Allies for supplies and transport of oil. Three days later Clemenceau attended a meeting of the Comité Général du Pétrole. The immediate need was for tanker tonnage to bring oil to France; the next day Clemenceau issued a plea to President Wilson for extra tanker tonnage. There was a risk that a 'shortage of gasoline would cause the sudden paralysis of our armies and drive us all into an unacceptable peace.' French stocks of gasoline were currently 28,000 tons, compared with a target minimum of 44,000 and consumption of 30,000 tons per month. Wilson must get the US oil companies to allocate an additional 100,000 tons of tankers to France. These could come from the Pacific and from new construction. Clemenceau's final lines to Wilson were: "There is for the Allies a question of public salvation. If they are determined not to lose the war, the fighting French must, by the hour of supreme Germanic blow, have large supplies of gasoline which is, in the battle of tomorrow, as necessary as blood."

 

[Riain]

Any further cuts would severely disrupt the life and commerce of the country.

I'd suggest that this was a rose coloured glasses view, particularly given Britain's economy grew by 8% while France's shrunk 23% during the war and was referencing what is needed to eventually win the war.

ITTL Britain would have an entirely different view; severe disruption of the civilian economy would be a given and every scrap of everything would be fought hard for, cherished and expended with extreme parsimony.

There was a risk that a 'shortage of gasoline would cause the sudden paralysis of our armies and drive us all into an unacceptable peace.' French stocks of gasoline were currently 28,000 tons, compared with a target minimum of 44,000 and consumption of 30,000 tons per month.

Was this risk realised, or accepted, or mitigated against? The rest of the sentence shows that having reserves of less than 1 month consumption is not a reason to surrender to the invader.

Britain's OTL was is not the model to look at in order to see a country under the pump at war. Virtually every other combattant did it tougher than Britain and hung on for years and years despite privation, death and destruction, yet it is assumed that the British will throw in the towel at the risk of hunger at some point in the future.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

The Americans will surely put more effort into shutting down British oil production in Mexico as the war goes on though? It will be an “easy” way for their Army to be involved in the War

 

[West]

ultimently the issue is this.

At the time the british empire could defeat the united states or they could defeat the central powers but they simply did not have the resources or men to do both. I think it would be a long fight a hard fight but the combined naval and fincial power is too much.

 

[Riain]

The Americans will surely put more effort into shutting down British oil production in Mexico as the war goes on though? It will be an “easy” way for their Army to be involved in the War

Not at the start, and by the time the US has the hard power to physically shut down the oil they'll likely make an agreement with Mexico to stop the flow without an invasion.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Not at the start, and by the time the US has the hard power to physically shut down the oil they'll likely make an agreement with Mexico to stop the flow without an invasion.

Fair enough.

 

[History Learner]

I'd suggest that this was a rose coloured glasses view, particularly given Britain's economy grew by 8% while France's shrunk 23% during the war and was referencing what is needed to eventually win the war.

ITTL Britain would have an entirely different view; severe disruption of the civilian economy would be a given and every scrap of everything would be fought hard for, cherished and expended with extreme parsimony.

Britain IOTL didn't have to undergo rationing nor was its industrial heartland gutted like the French. Likewise, the fact that economic growth occurred is not an argument against the threat of oil being cut off; indeed, when the Department heads are outlining in detail how serious the situation is, given their expertise and knowledge, I'm inclined to believe them.

Was this risk realised, or accepted, or mitigated against? The rest of the sentence shows that having reserves of less than 1 month consumption is not a reason to surrender to the invader.

It never occurred because the U.S. was in the war and brought its vast industrial production to bare, most prominently by producing nearly two thirds of Allied merchant tonnage in 1918. The tanker crisis was resolved via this development, allowing North American oil to flow. It was also not a matter of having low reserves without the U.S. but the fact they'd have no oil at all; that the U.S. supplied 75% of their needs and no other replacement exists for France, Italy and the UK is the decisive factor here. In 1914, for example, the Royal Navy had a four to six month reserve; even if they completely took every drop from the Empire they'd still overall be in the whole -230,000 tonnes. Their reserve would be exhausted in 1915 and they'd either have to accept mass famine or basically concede the military fight because they couldn't sustain the BEF and the Home Fleet otherwise.

Britain's OTL was is not the model to look at in order to see a country under the pump at war. Virtually every other combattant did it tougher than Britain and hung on for years and years despite privation, death and destruction, yet it is assumed that the British will throw in the towel at the risk of hunger at some point in the future.

Britain, unlike the other major combatants, is an island nation that is not self-sufficient. France and Germany could feed themselves with rationing, Britain couldn't nor did the French or Germans have such large navies to fuel.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Britain, unlike the other major combatants, is an island nation that is not self-sufficient. France and Germany could feed themselves with rationing, Britain couldn't

Do what?

 

[Riain]

Britain IOTL didn't have to undergo rationing nor was its industrial heartland gutted like the French. Likewise, the fact that economic growth occurred is not an argument against the threat of oil being cut off; indeed, when the Department heads are outlining in detail how serious the situation is, given their expertise and knowledge, I'm inclined to believe them.

My point is that Britain could have taken steps, like all other combattants, to reduce consumption in all areas. To say it's impossible reminds me of the pre-war idea that the war would be over by christmas because no country would be able to finance it, but as we saw this was wronger than wrong.

It never occurred because the U.S. was in the war and brought its vast industrial production to bare, most prominently by producing nearly two thirds of Allied merchant tonnage in 1918. The tanker crisis was resolved via this development, allowing North American oil to flow. It was also not a matter of having low reserves without the U.S. but the fact they'd have no oil at all; that the U.S. supplied 75% of their needs and no other replacement exists for France, Italy and the UK is the decisive factor here. In 1914, for example, the Royal Navy had a four to six month reserve; even if they completely took every drop from the Empire they'd still overall be in the whole -230,000 tonnes. Their reserve would be exhausted in 1915 and they'd either have to accept mass famine or basically concede the military fight because they couldn't sustain the BEF and the Home Fleet otherwise.

I don't disagree with you, Britain will be defeated. My point is that a shortage oil oil will not lead to immediate collapse, nor will a shortage of food because the evidence in France, Germany, italy, AH and Russia shows that it doesn't. As long as the military can't put up a reasonable fight the civilians will not surrender, its only after the military in the field gets flogged that the hungry civilians at home get jack of the fight, and the evidence shows that this takes years.

Britain, unlike the other major combatants, is an island nation that is not self-sufficient. France and Germany could feed themselves with rationing, Britain couldn't nor did the French or Germans have such large navies to fuel.

France was not self sufficient in coal and iron, Germany was a net importer of coal IIRC and Italy had virtually no resources at all.

In any case the oil for the navy is vastly overstated as the RN got 12 oi fired destroyers in 1907 which were considered unsatisfactory* and didn't really turn to oil destroyers until 1910-11. The cruisers began with 75% coal and 25% oil in 1909 and fully oil fired from 1913, and the QE class BBs of 1915 were the first oil fired battleships. The turn to oil wasn't complete, the R class BBs and the Hawkins class heavy cruisers were both oil and coal fired. Britain had huge reserves of high quality black coal, produced more than Germany and exported it widely. The RN can fight all the way to the bitter end on coal available in Britain alone.

*As it turns out the oil fired Tribal class were the backbone of the 6th flotilla of the Dover Patrol and did awesome work in WW1 in a theatre where their short range wasn't a massive problem.

 

[VoidStalker]

In the event the US enters the war I would not expect any offensives on land until the following year beyond a few demonstrations or possible invasions of undefended islands or ports. Numbers wise the army is just not there.

I think the bigger impact is both the cutting of resources, money and shipping (both US merchant marine and merchant ships produced by dockyard for the Entente) and the stretching of RN assets. Against the USN you need to deploy forces to Halifax but anything deployed there is unavailable to fight the HSF and with maintenance and refit the RN would prefer to maintain more ships at each posting to ensure equal or better numbers when they to sortie in response.

You are also forcing the RN to conduct more extensive patrols consuming fuel and parts from additional wear and tear on ships no longer resting at dock and if the RN is forced to send more ships on guarding Atlantic traffic then those ships are traveling further than channel or north sea patrols.

Going to have to look and see what coal and oil was being used for and how much can be freed up from OTL use to feed the RN and what effect cutting that OTL use will have. It was mentioned that Britain increased mechanization during the war, if some of that was to increase food production than if they skip on that they are looking at lower domestic food production at the same time as losing access to some of their food imports and with other food import locations requiring more transit time which reduces the number of trips per year per merchantman

 

[Riain]

The sequence of events IOTL 1916 to 1917 is instructive to how the US Congress reacted to the DoW. This sort of thing fascinates me.

The 1916 Defense Act authorised the creation of a bunch of new infantry, cavalry and artillery regiments over a period of 5 years to increase the size of the Regular Army about over 50%. Similarly a huge amount of new Regiments were authorised in the National Guard to almost quadruple it's size, both the RA and NG regiments were kept at peacetime establishment; infantry coys 65 of 150 men, cavalry 70 of 100 and artillery something like 100 of 130. This gave the RA and NG legislate authority to grow to 175,000 and 440,000 men respectively in peacetime. Only a few of these regiments had been created between their authorisation in mid 1916 and the DoW 9 month later, certainly the RA had formed 3 extra artillery regiments bringing it's total from 6 to 9.

When Congress declared war they authorised the immediate creation of all the regiments authorised under the 1916 Act, and authorised the sub units to go to war establishment. BOOM, ~300,000 man RA and ~900,000 NG ! There's your million+ man Army, all done according to plan from day 1. Later Congress legislated the cavalry regiments authorised in 1916 to be actually raised as infantry and artillery regiments instead, and Pershing increased the size of companies from 150 to 250 men, again a big increase in numbers with a stroke legislative of the pen. This is an unsung step the US took towards preparedness.

The situation in Aug 14 - May 15 is very different. There was no list of regiments planned to be raised over the next 5 years, no plan of expansion. All Congress could do on day 1 is authorised the existing RA and NG regiments to go to Wartime strength, bringing the RA to less than 200,000 and the NG to somewhere over 300,000; incidentally the 1914 SecWar report stated the US had a stock of 500,000 rifles but everything else was inadequate for expansion. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.32101050739513&view=1up&seq=1

What does the US do upon DoW? Firstly, I think they'd have their hands full enough undertaken the expansion to 500,000 that the lack of a plan for million+ wouldn't be an immediate problem, they could make such a plan while absorbing the new recruits. I also doubt they'd go onto a full offensive in Canada, I'd suggest maybe 2 + 1 RA divisions backed by maybe 3 or 4 of the best NG divisions conduct a limited thrust into SE Canada while the other RA division and 8 or 9 NG divisions induct new recruits while stationed on thew Mexican border and other guard/blocking positions. Once inducted these full sized divisions would rotate to Canada to hold the line so the initial and now very much understrength divisions can be rotated out after a couple of months.

 

[History Learner]

Do what?

Pre-War, both Germany and France were fairly self-sufficient. What hurt them during the war was, in France's case the occupation of much of its territory while Germany was hit with a crop blight in late 1916 that caused the Hunger Winter immediately followed by the idiotic Hindenburg Progamme.

 

[Nivek]

They Win..them What..?

 

[Dilvish]

Thinking about the scenario where it is a slow drift to war for the USA. There would be a period of increasing tensions. On the US side this would mean getting ready for a war, including an expansion of the Army and Navy. Well in the Navy's case, an expanded expansion. More of the armaments industry's production would go to the US military, less to the Entente.

On the British side, the RN will need to keep more ships on the western side of the Atlantic and in the Caribbean. Canada, as tensions get worse, will not be sending men and weapons over to Europe. The French, they can't be happy about the situation.

Japan always winds up fighting the USA in these scenarios. I've been wondering what if... Sure, Japan can grab the Philippines and possibly Hawaii. But, what benefits are there for Japan if the Japanese look elsewhere? Come 1916, if the Americans and Japanese can put their differences aside for awhile...

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Pre-War, both Germany and France were fairly self-sufficient. What hurt them during the war was, in France's case the occupation of much of its territory while Germany was hit with a crop blight in late 1916 that caused the Hunger Winter immediately followed by the idiotic Hindenburg Progamme.

I get that, but it was the implication that Britain could not survive on rationing that confused me.

 

[Riain]

Thinking about the scenario where it is a slow drift to war for the USA. There would be a period of increasing tensions. On the US side this would mean getting ready for a war, including an expansion of the Army and Navy. Well in the Navy's case, an expanded expansion. More of the armaments industry's production would go to the US military, less to the Entente.

We saw how the US reacted to increasing tensions IOTL with the trouble in Mexico and the war in Europe, where basically it took over a year of talking to arrive at a politically acceptable path to expansion coupled with a coupe of key flashpoints.

The US, and to a lesser extent Britain, had a traditional dislike of large standing armies so in an a period of increasing tension is just as likely to decide to do little to nothing with the military, absorb any initial blow and expand drastically during the war, then they are to build up a more powerful permanent standing military over a decade or whatever.

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

We saw how the US reacted to increasing tensions IOTL with the trouble in Mexico and the war in Europe, where basically it took over a year of talking to arrive at a politically acceptable path to expansion coupled with a coupe of key flashpoints.

On all your points that you raise, this is the one that I find as the only real point of contention, and that is that you seem to be thinking that OTL should serve as a reasonable approximation of a starting point for America's actions here, which I feel it is not.

In OTL, the US is going to have to face the possibility that it may need to use military force in a 'police action' type of situation against the problems in Mexico spilling over into the US side of the boarder. So not even a war with mexico, but rather just some limited intervention, and even if that were to take place, there would be time to train up an army to do so...

I think in this ATL, however, the US is going to have to face the possibility of war with the UK. War with the UK is also going to mean war with the rest of the British Empire, and possibly the Dominions, as well. It also means, more likely than not, the US could reasonably assume the unlikely but not impossible situation where the French and Japanese Empires might declare war on the USA, as well. All this, mind you, still doesn't mean that the problems in Mexico are going to go away, far from it, and might some of the new potential enemies think to themselves, "gee, look at the already pre-existing conditions in US-Mexican relations. We could just simply ally with Mexico, and instantly have an ally to immediately give the USA a land-warfare southern front, and the British empire can stage troops to Canada, and give the USA a nice land warfare northern front, while the Japanese Empire can base it's fleets on the Canadian west coast, and the British Empire can base it's navy in Mexico, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, and the Canadian coast/St Lawrence river." Note that none of this needs to happen, just that the US public needs to be made to fear that it might happen. And how bad things could go from there, such as coastal raids, blockades, and invasions of all three US coasts, at the same time, and while already fighting two ground warfare fronts...

So I don't see OTL serving anything at all like a template for this ATL. For something that may make some kinda sense, I could see the US reaching out to the Germans, long before things get anywhere to the point where relations are for sure going to start going south with the UK, but rather more like within the month of the UK's blockade being announced, and asking for a submarine to sail to the US, with engineers and civilian shipyard personnel aboard, that can help the US determine what they would need to do , in the unlikely event of a shooting war with the UK dragging the USA into it on Germany's side, to prepare to not only provide parts and munitions, but to also build submarines in the US shipyards, both for the German and US navies, and to develop operational plans for joint US-German naval actions in the Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean, and Gulf of Mexico.

 

[Riain]

@Naval Aviation Fan it's not the specifics that OTL serves as a guide but the generalities. There seems to be a general idea that the US will identify a looming threat early and act rationally to take appropriate measures that will mature at more or less the right time. However IOTL the US did face twin threats from a troubled Mexico AND war in Europe with global consequences from mid-late 1914. Instead of taking immediate, if small at first, steps they argued first about the need then about the reaction for almost 2 years before starting on a programme of defence expansion that was to take 5 years: ie 7 years from the invasion of Veracruz and start of war in Europe.

My point is that in an environment where the US does face a building threat from the Entente there is no guarantee that the US will react well and in time.

 

[Tre' T.]

Well for one thing, is this even possible. Japan was on Germany's side after Pearl Harbor. I don't think The United States would've been on the Axis' side in OTL circumstances tbh.