What happens to France without Napoleon?

The point is Louis XVIII needs to be more compromising than he OTL was in the late 1790´s to have a monarchist restoration accepted by the silent majority. The silent majority wanted what Napoleon gave it in his first years of power : the return of order, prosperity and the acceptance of the revolutionary principles (legal equality for all and the French kind of bill of rights).

Even if the revolt is temporarily successful in Paris, it would fail to change a regime because an army still was strongly republican and return of a monarchy would mean the end of the promotions by merit putting back in charge all these aristocratic nincompoops who fled the country and fought against the Republic. Ditto for the peasants and "3rd estate": the Directorate was unpopular but an idea of returning the emigrees' properties would be even less popular idea.

France’s interest is to have a monarchist restoration if it wants to be accepted back again in the european concert of kings.

Not necessarily. Paul I (and you hardly can be more "monarchist of a principle" than he was) had been quite satisfied with the situation when "France got a king in everything by name" and not just made a peace but became quite friendly with the 1st Consul. OTOH, neither Paul nor Alexander demonstrated noticeable sympathy or compassion to the future Louis XVIII when he was in exile (Alexander was quite reluctant to support his candidacy in 1814). So a less annoying alt-Nappy could be accepted by the European establishment (well, he was in OTL but this was a shotgun marriage) especially if he minimizes French activities outside the borders.
 
Are you sure that this was the case? I was under the impression that primogeniture was not applicable (even as far as nobility was involved) to all HRE states and while it definitely did not exist in Russia (on all social levels) this did not prevent it from a high rate of population growth in the XIX century. Probably it would be helpful to compare growth rates in France before and after Napoleon (with some allowance to the huge losses of the male population during the Revolution and the 1st Empire).
I looked it up, and it turns out that France already had a lower fertility rate than Germany by 1800 (due to factors such as early contraception, France has had a complicated relationship with the Church for some time),but without the land reform laws I don't think it'd have dropped as much in the 19th Century.
 
I looked it up, and it turns out that France already had a lower fertility rate than Germany by 1800 (due to factors such as early contraception, France has had a complicated relationship with the Church for some time),but without the land reform laws I don't think it'd have dropped as much in the 19th Century.
Eh, the truth is we don't really know why France had her demographic transition so early. My pet theory is that France had simply less room to grow compared to the other European nations: France had been Europe's most fertile land for much of Europe's history, so when advances in agriculture allowed marginal lands to get high yields France didn't have as much to gain as Germany or Britain.
That doesn't explain why today's France has such an anomalously low population density though.
 
Eh, the truth is we don't really know why France had her demographic transition so early. My pet theory is that France had simply less room to grow compared to the other European nations: France had been Europe's most fertile land for much of Europe's history, so when advances in agriculture allowed marginal lands to get high yields France didn't have as much to gain as Germany or Britain.
That doesn't explain why today's France has such an anomalously low population density though.
France is the largest country in Western Europe, so I don't think that's it.
 
France is the largest country in Western Europe, so I don't think that's it.
I meant in term of land fertility: France had very fertile soil, hence its high population density during the Middle Ages (a third of Europe's population was French at that time!). However that also means that once agricultural progress made marginal lands suitable for cultivation France had much less lands to improve that the rest of Europe.
I don't have numerical proofs for any of that though :/
 
Eh, the truth is we don't really know why France had her demographic transition so early. My pet theory is that France had simply less room to grow compared to the other European nations: France had been Europe's most fertile land for much of Europe's history, so when advances in agriculture allowed marginal lands to get high yields France didn't have as much to gain as Germany or Britain.
That doesn't explain why today's France has such an anomalously low population density though.

In addition to all the things mentioned (France already being in demographic decline by the Revolution compared to the rest of Europe), France was the only major European power without large scale emigration to the Americas or any of its colonies - compare to Britain, Spain, Portugal and even Germany (which did not have colonies like the others but emigrated widely) and Italy (ditto) and even Russia (which spread Eastward instead of West). The French never had to replenish its population due to emigration or promote large families to provide people for "the Empire" (an unspoken policy in Britain, and Mussolini later tried to do it in Italy). Even in Algeria, many of the Pied Noir population were from other Mediterranean countries.

As for Napoleon goes, long-term it would probably help France. The French Marshals were good and many were ambitious (several of these "Republicans" had dreams of becoming a King of their own fief like Bernadotte) but none had the military and political acumen of Bonaparte, nor the hubris to try and proclaim himself another Charlemagne. They probably keep the Rhine and Alps borders permanently, and there are not a zillion Coalitions. Europe itself doesn't become as depopulated. The Spanish Ulcer (and Spanish resistance) never happens, the Portugese Royals never flee to Brazil, Russia is never invaded (which probably leads to a different Alexander I), the Republics of Venice and Ragusa probably last longer. German nationalism and Italian nationalism (which Bonaparte turbo boosted by his actions) lay dormant. Austria - not Prussia - remains the dominant German power. If there is ever is a Restoration of the monarchy in some form in France it probably happens in a different way or not at all.

In the short-term it is more of a mess. There will be no Concordat with the Pope (Napoleon did that against many of his anti-clerical marshals) and so the Church will remain underground and a thorn in the side of the Republican state for the foreseeable future (and there will be no repatriation of the body of Pius VI who died a prisoner of the French). The Napoleonic Code might come about but it would be different and maybe in bits and pieces. The Directory was unpopular and ineffective and was just waiting for a coup and some strongman would have emerged but there is no one in sight like Bonaparte. The French Republic will probably make peace if it leaves Italy and Germany (to the east of the Rhine) and stops spreading the Revolution. The other powers would accept this even if Britain does not. On the upside, without Napoleon sending LeClerk to bring back slavery in Haiti and put Toussaint L'Overture in chains, Haiti probably remains part of France and is spared the bloodbaths and the divided governments that came afterwards.
 
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In addition to all the things mentioned (France already being in demographic decline by the Revolution compared to the rest of Europe), France was the only major European power without large scale emigration to the Americas or any of its colonies - compare to Britain, Spain, Portugal and even Germany (which did not have colonies like the others but emigrated widely) and Italy (ditto) and even Russia (which spread Eastward instead of West).

A little bit of a nitpicking:

While Russia was, indeed, expanding Eastward, there was no significant migration in that direction until mid-/late XIX and really serious migration (in millions) started only after the RJW. Even before that happened, there were sizable emigrations of the Russian Jews but this phenomena hardly had anything to do with the issue of land ownership.

AFAIK, there were no big emigration from the Hapsburg-held territories (unlike Spain and Portugal, Austria/AH was the major European power all the way to the end of WWI).

Portugal never was a major European power and Spain ceased to be one in the XVII century. Not sure how big was emigration in both cases.

If we are talking about the pre-Napoleonic times or even pre-mid XIX times, there was no “Italy” and there was no “Germany” until 1871 so how can we talk about emigration?

As for France, there were at least two big waves of emigration: 1st after the Edict of Nantes was revoked and 2nd during the French Revolution. Later there were big migrations into the French colonies, especially those of the North Africa.
 
In addition to all the things mentioned (France already being in demographic decline by the Revolution compared to the rest of Europe), France was the only major European power without large scale emigration to the Americas or any of its colonies - compare to Britain, Spain, Portugal and even Germany (which did not have colonies like the others but emigrated widely) and Italy (ditto) and even Russia (which spread Eastward instead of West). The French never had to replenish its population due to emigration or promote large families to provide people for "the Empire" (an unspoken policy in Britain, and Mussolini later tried to do it in Italy). Even in Algeria, many of the Pied Noir population were from other Mediterranean countries.

I think emigration was a result of the population growth in those countries rather than a cause. People emigrated because the population of young adults was too high for the economic opportunities available.

In the short-term it is more of a mess. There will be no Concordat with the Pope (Napoleon did that against many of his anti-clerical marshals) and so the Church will remain underground and a thorn in the side of the Republican state for the foreseeable future (and there will be no repatriation of the body of Pius VI who died a prisoner of the French).

I'm not sure. Although the history of the Directory does not predict it, I think some form of reconciliation with the Church will happen, as it makes political sense. Now the terms could be different than the OTL Concordat though.
 
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A little bit of a nitpicking:

While Russia was, indeed, expanding Eastward, there was no significant migration in that direction until mid-/late XIX and really serious migration (in millions) started only after the RJW. Even before that happened, there were sizable emigrations of the Russian Jews but this phenomena hardly had anything to do with the issue of land ownership.

AFAIK, there were no big emigration from the Hapsburg-held territories (unlike Spain and Portugal, Austria/AH was the major European power all the way to the end of WWI).

Portugal never was a major European power and Spain ceased to be one in the XVII century. Not sure how big was emigration in both cases.

If we are talking about the pre-Napoleonic times or even pre-mid XIX times, there was no “Italy” and there was no “Germany” until 1871 so how can we talk about emigration?

As for France, there were at least two big waves of emigration: 1st after the Edict of Nantes was revoked and 2nd during the French Revolution. Later there were big migrations into the French colonies, especially those of the North Africa.

I didn't mean Italy and Germany as nation-states persay but Italians and Germans as nationalities. Germans immigrated widely and so, later, did Italians in the 19th century. In addition, many Americans, for example, are descendants of someone from the Habsburg lands (Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, Croatia, etc.). So even without colonies there was immigration from those lands. The French? In comparison to the rest and for a percent of their overall population? At the lower end of the scale.
 
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I wonder if a long-term ramification of No Napoleon is a no Italian and/or German unification. Napoleon's actions (esp. the Confederation of the Rhine) played a big part in those two countries coming together.
 
I wonder if a long-term ramification of No Napoleon is a no Italian and/or German unification. Napoleon's actions (esp. the Confederation of the Rhine) played a big part in those two countries coming together.

Austria was already in the process of rationalizing/consolidating and secularizing the HRE, and I wouldn't put it past them (especially with a weaker Prussia) to steadily work it into unity if left unopposed though. Once you break the customs union and have a hegemon for the Nationalists to glob onto, at least closer relations are hard to pull off especially since the customs barriers are going to get increasingly troublesome for trade and the development of railroads and factory production breaks the influence of the localized guilds. Keep Prussia out of the Rhineland, and they lack the decisive weight to fill thatrole
 
I didn't mean Italy and Germany as nation-states persay but Italians and Germans as nationalities. Germans immigrated widely and so, later, did Italians in the 19th century. In addition, many Americans, for example, are descendants of someone from the Habsburg lands (Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, Croatia, etc.). So even without colonies there was immigration from those lands. The French? In comparison to the rest and for a percent of their overall population? At the lower end of the scale.

The most obvious conclusion is that people had fewer reasons to leave France than any of the countries you mentioned: AFAIK, Hungary or Croatia did not suffer from the overpopulation and it does not make sense to talk about “Slovakia” prior to WWII. Then, of course, when you are talking about the people from the former Hapsburg lands you need to be more precise about the timing of their presumably mass migration.
 
Who in the military or elsewhere can credibly consolidate power?
Most of the known military figures of that period did not demonstrate a needed combination of the administrative and political qualities needed for staying in power as opposite to being just a figurehead. Of course, the problem with a figurehead position would be obvious: unless he is a complete idiot, sooner or later that person will became annoyed with the fact that after inducting the coup he ends up without any power which is being grabbed by the civilians like Syies. If he is still popular among the troops, these civilians are easily removed leaving him in charge. After which he, due to a complete incompetence in the issues not military makes a mess out of everything with the unpredictable consequences.
So what do we have realistically by the 1799?

Syies - intrigant with an excessively high opinion regarding his own mental capacities and no clear record of being a good administrator, diplomat or anything else. When given an opportunity, wrote a constitution that was complicated and lacking the basics (see recent thread about the re-elections of the consuls).

Moreau - the best general of the Republic. In conflict with the Directorate (hence support of the OTL coup) so seemingly suitable figure. Even better, no political ambitions whatsoever and sincere wish to enjoy the life and hunting. However, rather sensitive to the issue of a military glory (hence OTL conflict with the 1st Consul) so he would hardly willingly abandon the military career and, being a formal head f the state, he could deal harshly with those responsible for the problems with supplies, etc., which means inevitable conflict with the civilian government.

Massena - 2nd most reputable general. No known political ambitions, no administrative abilities to talk about. Great tactician but not a strategist at all so it is not clear if he could handle the “grand strategy”. Leaving it all to Syies? Stingy and greedy to a somewhat indecent degree (no item was too small to steal :)) which was damaging his reputation among the colleagues. Hard to say how this combination may work out in a long term, especially in a country which needed “law and order” regime.

Joubert - IIRC, was expected by Syies to be his “sword” but had been killed. Acted mostly in the subordinate positions and there is no reason to assume that he would be willing to play a clown doing Syies biddings: in 1798 he resigned his position due to a conflict with the civilian authorities so how about him, being formally a head of the government, ordering to execute these “authorities”?

Thomas-Alexandre Dumas. The divisional general with a successful experience of army commander (Army of the Alps). Handsome and dashing to an extreme and very popular among the troops. No known political ambitions, administrative capacities. Seems to be rather hot-tempered (quarreled with Nappy in Egypt) and as such potentially dangerous for the people like Syies. The interesting twist is him ending up as a founder of a French dynasty: Alexander II and Alexander III could be very interesting monarchs (if they do not give up their main occupation). With a benefit of a hindsight, would be the most politically correct figure possible: just imagine mulatto as a head of an European state in the early XIX. :)

Bernadotte. The only (besides Nappy) military figure of that period who had military, administrative and diplomatic skills proven by the time in question (unlike Nappy, his idea of a diplomacy was not limited to the bullying). Reasonably popular among the Republican military but, as the future events demonstrated, quite flexible when it came to his personal ambitions. Moreau’s friend, which could come handy. The main OTL problem was that sometimes he was more concerned with screwing up others more than with promoting himself (hence his neutral position during Nappy’s coup). Notwithstanding the ambivalent personal relations, Nappy could not afford not to make him a marshal. Based upon his experience as a governor of Hanover and later in Sweden, probably the best candidate.
 
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Moreau

Thomas-Alexandre Dumas :)

Bernadotte

As much as I like to think about all these colorful prospective military dictators forming an orderly triumvirate, I would hope that there was more republican answer to the power struggles of the Republic.
Do you think that any of those Generals would have took on a more limited role than the one Napoleon did? Something like a military supervised provisional government/constitutional convention that doesn't completely destroy the idea of the First Republic.
 
As much as I like to think about all these colorful prospective military dictators forming an orderly triumvirate, I would hope that there was more republican answer to the power struggles of the Republic.
Do you think that any of those Generals would have took on a more limited role than the one Napoleon did? Something like a military supervised provisional government/constitutional convention that doesn't completely destroy the idea of the First Republic.

The military was no longer dependent on the civilian government for troop loyalty or funding by this point and was in fact the pillar holding that government up against the tide of political chaos at home and forceful removal from abroad. Their superior position means the generals are going to have the say in who is in charge, as if they disagree and don't actively get behind those leaders they aren't going to survive. You need to avoid getting so deep into the cycle of "war feeding itself" and restore a functional beuracracy and law enforcement before there's grounds on which to build electorial legitimacy
 
As much as I like to think about all these colorful prospective military dictators forming an orderly triumvirate, I would hope that there was more republican answer to the power struggles of the Republic.
Do you think that any of those Generals would have took on a more limited role than the one Napoleon did? Something like a military supervised provisional government/constitutional convention that doesn't completely destroy the idea of the First Republic.

Well, at least as a joke, that trio could form a perfect triumvirate:
Moreau would provide the strategic component, Bernadotte - administrative and diplomatic aspects and Dumas - spectacular fits of an individual heroics on a battlefield (and popularity with the women in a time of peace, importance of which can not be ignored). Taking into an account that Moreau and Bernadotte had been friends and Dumas looks like an amicable person, they could rule together happily for quite a while without visible conflicts of interests (Moreau was explicitly not interested in the governing and administration and there is nothing to indicate that Dumas was).

BTW, they could easily retain the Republic: Bernadotte was a Jackobine, Moreau was a staunch republican and Dumas should not be a problem either. As for the civilian aspect of a government, AFAIK (short of Nappy) it would be difficult to find in France of that period someone with noticeably better administrative skills than Bernadotte. His short (thanks to Syies) tenure as a Minister of War was quite effective and few years later as a governor of Hanover he did not only managed territory effectively but became quite popular among the locals. The same goes for his future reign in Sweden (not that it was trouble free but he remained quite popular).

Of course, it is going without saying that there should be a reasonably effective civilian administration to handle non-military affairs and to run the country. The main issue, IMO, was the fact that both before and during the Directorate that administration was not very effective in anything besides killing and looting. Nappy’s great domestic achievement was turning the mess into a properly functioning state and any a.ternative would face the same task. There were no civilian figures capable of accomplishing it on their own while OTOH there were quite capable subordinate figures like Taleirand and Fouche and probably others less known who could form a Cabinet working under Triumvirate’s supervision.
 
Most of the known military figures of that period did not demonstrate a needed combination of the administrative and political qualities needed for staying in power as opposite to being just a figurehead. Of course, the problem with a figurehead position would be obvious: unless he is a complete idiot, sooner or later that person will became annoyed with the fact that after inducting the coup he ends up without any power which is being grabbed by the civilians like Syies. If he is still popular among the troops, these civilians are easily removed leaving him in charge. After which he, due to a complete incompetence in the issues not military makes a mess out of everything with the unpredictable consequences.
So what do we have realistically by the 1799?

Syies - intrigant with an excessively high opinion regarding his own mental capacities and no clear record of being a good administrator, diplomat or anything else. When given an opportunity, wrote a constitution that was complicated and lacking the basics (see recent thread about the re-elections of the consuls).

Moreau - the best general of the Republic. In conflict with the Directorate (hence support of the OTL coup) so seemingly suitable figure. Even better, no political ambitions whatsoever and sincere wish to enjoy the life and hunting. However, rather sensitive to the issue of a military glory (hence OTL conflict with the 1st Consul) so he would hardly willingly abandon the military career and, being a formal head f the state, he could deal harshly with those responsible for the problems with supplies, etc., which means inevitable conflict with the civilian government.

Massena - 2nd most reputable general. No known political ambitions, no administrative abilities to talk about. Great tactician but not a strategist at all so it is not clear if he could handle the “grand strategy”. Leaving it all to Syies? Stingy and greedy to a somewhat indecent degree (no item was too small to steal :)) which was damaging his reputation among the colleagues. Hard to say how this combination may work out in a long term, especially in a country which needed “law and order” regime.

Joubert - IIRC, was expected by Syies to be his “sword” but had been killed. Acted mostly in the subordinate positions and there is no reason to assume that he would be willing to play a clown doing Syies biddings: in 1798 he resigned his position due to a conflict with the civilian authorities so how about him, being formally a head of the government, ordering to execute these “authorities”?

Thomas-Alexandre Dumas. The divisional general with a successful experience of army commander (Army of the Alps). Handsome and dashing to an extreme and very popular among the troops. No known political ambitions, administrative capacities. Seems to be rather hot-tempered (quarreled with Nappy in Egypt) and as such potentially dangerous for the people like Syies. The interesting twist is him ending up as a founder of a French dynasty: Alexander II and Alexander III could be very interesting monarchs (if they do not give up their main occupation). With a benefit of a hindsight, would be the most politically correct figure possible: just imagine mulatto as a head of an European state in the early XIX. :)

Bernadotte. The only (besides Nappy) military figure of that period who had military, administrative and diplomatic skills proven by the time in question (unlike Nappy, his idea of a diplomacy was not limited to the bullying). Reasonably popular among the Republican military but, as the future events demonstrated, quite flexible when it came to his personal ambitions. Moreau’s friend, which could come handy. The main OTL problem was that sometimes he was more concerned with screwing up others more than with promoting himself (hence his neutral position during Nappy’s coup). Notwithstanding the ambivalent personal relations, Nappy could not afford not to make him a marshal. Based upon his experience as a governor of Hanover and later in Sweden, probably the best candidate.

Very good post. Saved for my future reference, when I can get around to attempting my first timeline. I'll need to research all of these men, but the most all-around effective regime looks like a power-sharing agreement between Bernadotte, Dumas, and Moreau.
 
Here's another possible outcome of No Napoleon:
During the 19th Century, France had a chronically low birth rate as compared to other European countries like Britain, Germany and Italy. While part of this was due to cultural factors (namely, France being more liberal), a big part of it was inheritance laws that dictated estates be distributed equally among the deceased's children, rather than being passed to the firstborn son. IIRC these laws were introduced under Napoleon, so if Napoleon never rises to power, then France may be stronger demographically during the 19th and Early 20th centuries.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_France#1800_to_20th_century

(1) "However, the key to the difference is to be found within the distinctive French pattern of economic development in the long nineteenth century, the major feature of which was the survival of a large agrarian sector. On the eve of the French Revolution, the productivity of workers employed in British agriculture was already well above that of the French; in familiar fashion, the more favorable British land-to-labor ratios fostered more capital-intensive agriculture, producing a surplus for urban investment, which in turn increased rural out-migration. But in France, the revolution 'gave the peasantry what they had long wanted--full rights of ownership and freedom from the burden of feudal exactions from all kinds.' 76 Although French agricultural output remained consistently below that of the British, the landless peasantry formed a far smaller proportion of the rural population. The characteristics of the agrarian sector in turn conditioned the pace and pattern of industrial development along different lines. Compared with Britain, the workshop sector in France survived much longer, and industry used much less unskilled labor. Most significantly for the present purpose, the rural exodus was long delayed. *The French could afford to love their land, so long as they kept their families small.* [my emphasis--DT]… https://books.google.com/books?id=Dqawo0Kpvz0C&pg=PA53

(2) For a related but somewhat different analysis:

"It is instructive, in this regard, to review two recent syntheses of what has been called French exceptionalism, the peasant-based fertility decline of France.

"One is by Jean-Claude Chesnais, who begins by citing the revolution of ideas and decline of religious sentiment that unfolded in the course of the eighteenth century, culminating in the political and social revolution of 1789... Dismantling the hereditary estates of the past, this transformation resulted in a more open society in which social ambitions and the thirst for equality were realized. The "pursuit of happiness" thereafter came to include the enhancement of material well-being, perhaps at the cost of having more children.

"Consistent with his interest in migratory movements, Chesnais goes on to cite the failure of France's colonial policy to secure overseas outlets for "excess population," this limitation being reinforced through anti-emigration laws. In addition he analyzes the divergence of French from English agricultural history. Already smallholders before the revolution, French peasants, through their rebellions, interdicted the penetration of a central feature of agrarian capitalism—legally sanctioned enclosures—into the countryside. (Significantly, neither potatoes nor cottage industry gained much of a foothold either [see Lesthaeghe 1990: 18].) This, Chesnais argues, delayed the formation of an industrial proletariat and with it France's industrial revolution, but precipitated a demographic revolution as yet more smallholders remained on the land. The "triumph of the small" or the "revenge of the small against the large estate" was realized. Two-thirds of France's 32 million inhabitants in 1830 belonged to landowning families; in Britain, including Ireland, only 54 percent had this status (see Hobsbawm 1962).

"Chesnais considers, but rejects, the nineteenth-century thesis of Le Play that the Napoleonic Code, with its provision for equal divisions of property among all heirs, was the decisive element inducing peasants to limit family size or face an intolerable fragmentation of their resources. Fertility decline began before the code was instituted--indeed in some regions before the revolution. There was even early evidence for it in places of single-heir inheritance in southern France. He concedes, however, that enforced partibility may well have intensified a process already underway..." https://books.google.com/books?id=Hgzorr7xG3QC&pg=PA200

https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...on-to-the-united-states.442819/#post-16961648

***
In short, it seems that (1) the structure of the French economy even before the Revolution and (2) developments in the Revolution before Napoleon came to power were more important than the Napoleonic Code.
 
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