What happens if Jutland is a decisive British victory?

...assuming the High Seas fleet loses 8BBs and 2-3BC while the Grand fleet suffers only minor losses

  • no major changes except the grand fleet is largely immobilised as its escorts go on to other duties

    Votes: 77 53.5%
  • a British battle fleet enters the Baltic and bombards/blockades the German coast

    Votes: 15 10.4%
  • a British battle fleet supports a Russian amphibious assault on Germany

    Votes: 1 0.7%
  • the British attack Helgoland/Borkum/Sylt and fail

    Votes: 9 6.3%
  • the British attack Helgoland/Borkum/Sylt and succeed, enabling a closer blockade

    Votes: 21 14.6%
  • something else?

    Votes: 21 14.6%

  • Total voters
    144
I think Beatty was the best Admiral the Kaiser had. The RN never had a more cavalier, incompetent, blustering, political arse kissing, back stabbing Admiral. The performance of the Battle Cruiser Force would have been improved immeasurably if he had stepped in front of an Edinburgh Tram.

Can only partly agree with you there (and not at all about the Kaiser comment).
Cavalier - no, he was aggressive, but not reckless. In three battles he attacked with superior forces.
Incompetent - no (but with reservations). He did learn the wrong lessons from his failures on at least two occasions. One of those (fast firing) is arguably an "exigencies of war" situation. He should have beached his flag lieutenant, but there your point (4) stands.
Blustering - no, he practiced what he preached.
Political arse kisser - Yes, definitely, but he was hardly unique in that.
Back stabbing - Somewhat. He was to Jellicoe, but Jellicoe's reputation survived nonetheless. He certainly conspired with others to cover up his failures on several occasions.

Like so many great men, he had great failures and successes, which tend to balance out - for instance he tried to encourage a sense of independent action among his officers (contrary to accepted theory at the time), and he did a lot of good work after the war (again, not all good, but on balance - not bad).

I'll not disagree that the performance of the BCF could have been better in several ways, and marginal victories could have been greater ones, while losses could have been smaller. However, I would point out that on all three occasions (Heligoland Bight, Dogger Bank and Jutland) the BCF did what it was supposed to do.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
Even though the German Government hyped the 'Battle of the Skagerrak' as Huge HSL victory they never fooled their own sailors. The HSL sailors new that they were lucky to get as many ships home as they did and many of those had horrendous damage and only made it back due to herculean efforts of seamanship. It is AFAIAA still accepted by most historians that Jutland broke the fighting spirit of the crews of the HSL surface force and this continued to decline until the mutinies of late 1918.
If the 'Battle of the Skagerrak' had been an overwhelming defeat for the HSL then the moral collapse of the crews would almost certainly be faster and deeper and might well have hade a greater effect on the will of the general population to continue to support the 'Kaisers war'.

I don't think it was the actual battle that did it. My understanding was that as the HSF role was eventually reduced to escorting U-Boats into & out of harbour, the best officers & men decided to move to the naval arm that was active in the war - the U-Boats. So there was a gradual decline not only in talented officers & men but also the loss of the more aggressive types, leaving behind officers who did not associate with or understand the lower decks, a factor in the breakdown of morale first noticed on two Dreadnoughts in 1917, and finally in November 1918. In that way the "result" was the German reaction, not how many ships or men were lost, and the slope down which the HSF was inexorably starting to slide down.
 
I don't think it was the actual battle that did it. My understanding was that as the HSF role was eventually reduced to escorting U-Boats into & out of harbour, the best officers & men decided to move to the naval arm that was active in the war - the U-Boats. So there was a gradual decline not only in talented officers & men but also the loss of the more aggressive types, leaving behind officers who did not associate with or understand the lower decks, a factor in the breakdown of morale first noticed on two Dreadnoughts in 1917, and finally in November 1918. In that way the "result" was the German reaction, not how many ships or men were lost, and the slope down which the HSF was inexorably starting to slide down.

But the reason the HSF was in harbour near-permanently was because the battle broke the morale of the German commanders; it showed that, no matter how many clever tricks they tried, they were never going to run into a beatable section of the Grand Fleet. To some extent, this attitude was also present in the men of the HSF. The long period of inactivity that followed only magnified these tensions.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
But the reason the HSF was in harbour near-permanently was because the battle broke the morale of the German commanders; it showed that, no matter how many clever tricks they tried, they were never going to run into a beatable section of the Grand Fleet. To some extent, this attitude was also present in the men of the HSF. The long period of inactivity that followed only magnified these tensions.

Agreed. Number of ships sunk at Jutland did not determine the outcome of the war in the North Sea. It was Scheer's realisation that the HSF could not challenge the GF in a stand-up fight. As that realisation percolated through the ranks the best of the HSF left to serve in U-Boats, and come October 1917 the remaining crews had a pretty good idea that Hipper's planned death ride would be exactly that - and for what? So the Navy could point to a butcher's bill to show they did their bit too along with the Army?
 
But the reason the HSF was in harbour near-permanently was because the battle broke the morale of the German commanders; it showed that, no matter how many clever tricks they tried, they were never going to run into a beatable section of the Grand Fleet. To some extent, this attitude was also present in the men of the HSF. The long period of inactivity that followed only magnified these tensions.

It was the August 1916 sortie, and the fact that the Grand Fleet was again bearing down on the HSF undetected until rather late in the game, that caused the reversion to a more passive stance with the fleet, until 1918 when yet another isolated detachment on the Norway convoy run presented an opportunity.
 
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Damn. So I got the stats on shell performance, then I promptly lost the notes. General impression is that German shell performance was pretty good, but that British was quite poor. IIRC, about 18 hits on armor of which the 12" and 13.5" and 15" hits, only about 3 penetrated the armor and detonated properly, and all of those might have been 15". (15" performance was also poor overall though).
 
Damn. So I got the stats on shell performance, then I promptly lost the notes. General impression is that German shell performance was pretty good, but that British was quite poor. IIRC, about 18 hits on armor of which the 12" and 13.5" and 15" hits, only about 3 penetrated the armor and detonated properly, and all of those might have been 15". (15" performance was also poor overall though).

John Brooks' Battle of Jutland includes such a breakdown (table 10.3, pg 456), though he does not break down the hits by type. As you say, German shells generally performed better, though their fuses performed worse. Of their 19 hits on armour, nine burst behind the plate properly, while five had failed fuses, four failed to penetrate the plate, and one burst while penetrating. For the 39 British hits on armour, five burst behind the plate, while seven fuses failed. Thirteen did not penetrate, and fourteen burst outside the plate or while penetrating.
 
Ah, found it.

German shells vs. British armor

Gun calibre - armor thickness - range - effect

11" vs Barham (17,000) - none
11" vs Tiger (?) - none
12" vs 9" (13,000) - penetrated
11" vs 9" (13,000) - penetrated?
12" vs 3 1/4" (?) - penetrated
12" vs 8" (?) - penetrated
11" vs 8" (?) - holed
12" vs 6" (?) Penetrated 4 times, no effect 3 times
11" vs 6" (?) Penetrated 2 times, no effect 1 time

British shells vs. German armor

Gun - armor - range - effect (no effect if not noted)

15" vs 14" (13000)
12" vs 12" (10,000)
12" vs 12" (8500) - holed
12" vs 12" (12,500)
12" vs 12" (10,000)
12" vs 12" (9500) - holed x 2
15" vs 10 3/4" (15500, 16,500)
12" vs 10 1/2" (8500) - holed
12" vs 10 1/4" (10000)
15" vs 10 1/4" (9000) - penetrated
15" vs 10" (19000) - holed


Average thickness of German shell vs. British armor - 6.5"
Average thickness of British shell vs. German armor - 11.25"
 
while doing some quick research I came across this table on Wiki comparing accuracy by squadrons during the battle
superb data I had not realised how Good Hoods 3rd BCS were or how Poor Beatty's shooting was.

RE the who won debate, the German BCS was out of action until the end of the year. pointing out the ineffectiveness of the German tactics.

I also think Jellicoe gets the man of the match award.


View attachment 389885

There are some problems with the figures given in the tables. As Norman Friedman says:

After World War I the Germans used comparative figures of hits at Jutland to demonstrate their superiority. Their official history showed 120 hits out of 3597 heavy shells fired ( 3.33 % ), compared to 100 hits out of 4598 British heavy shells fired ( 2.17% ). These figures are less impressive then they appear however, given that over a quarter of the German hits (37) were made at short range against three British cruisers – Warrior, Defence, and Black Prince – that were not firing back. As for their assessment of British performance, the German figures credit no heavy-calibre hits on the light cruiser Wiesbaden (which was sunk). They recorded eight heavy-calibre hits on the battleship Markgraf and nine on Derfflinger, ascribing them to medium-calibre guns, not in action against those ships. These hits would bring the British total of 117. If Wiesbaden and three British cruisers are omitted, the score becomes 117 British hits (2.54%) versus 83 Germans (2.3) and the apparently crushing German superiority evaporates.

Additionally, the British scored some hits at greater ranges than the German guns could reach - notably those by the 5th Battle Squadron - and longer range inevitably means fewer hits.
 
A quarter of the German hits were at short range against three British AC's, all of which were sunk. While the German BC's charged the Grand Fleet and then all escaped. So isn't the take away from that is that when given the opportunity, the German gunnery put ships on the bottom and the British gunnery didn't?
 
A quarter of the German hits were at short range against three British AC's, all of which were sunk. While the German BC's charged the Grand Fleet and then all escaped. So isn't the take away from that is that when given the opportunity, the German gunnery put ships on the bottom and the British gunnery didn't?

Well, part of this comes down to the fact that the old armoured cruisers were hugely vulnerable - much of their armament was supplied with cordite using ammunition passages, which had no flash protection, and were commonly more full of cordite than the hoists in the battlecruisers. Any fire that started in them would propagate rapidly, and could not be stopped. This did for Defence. Black Prince escaped the initial engagement, but ultimately ended up about 750 metres from an entire battle squadron, though this was at night. It's not surprising that she sank. Warrior escaped, but would founder later, as flooding progressed. The armoured cruisers were less well-armoured than even the British battlecruisers, so a comparison to the German ships is not entirely fair. It's a bit disingenuous to say that all the German battlecruisers escaped, but none of the British ones did - much like Warrior, Lutzow would sink thanks to progressive flooding. Also, Seydlitz and Derfflinger would likely have sunk had they had to travel as far as Warrior did. Finally, yes, German gunnery had more effect than British gunnery. It helps if you have shells that work properly.
 
Ok, but it's important not to let trivial details about whose gunnery was 2% and whose was 2.2% get in the way of the bigger principles . At Jutland, each side had a number of chances to put the puck in the net, to hit and sink enemy ships in key fleeting moments. The Germans did better in this than the British, who had Hipper under ideal conditions at ideal ranges under the guns of much of the Grand Fleet but still somehow didn't come through. Now, you say British shells didn't work. That's fine, but I'm pretty sure the average armor of 11.25" on the receiving end might have helped those shells not to work. Whereas, the thin British armor was a factor. (One case where the Germans had a kill opportunity and whiffed was the Warspite, which also happened to have the best armor of any British warship that day).
 
Ok, but it's important not to let trivial details about whose gunnery was 2% and whose was 2.2% get in the way of the bigger principles . At Jutland, each side had a number of chances to put the puck in the net, to hit and sink enemy ships in key fleeting moments. The Germans did better in this than the British, who had Hipper under ideal conditions at ideal ranges under the guns of much of the Grand Fleet but still somehow didn't come through. Now, you say British shells didn't work. That's fine, but I'm pretty sure the average armor of 11.25" on the receiving end might have helped those shells not to work. Whereas, the thin British armor was a factor. (One case where the Germans had a kill opportunity and whiffed was the Warspite, which also happened to have the best armor of any British warship that day).

If you'd switched the armour schemes of the British and German ships, while keeping the armaments the same, the results would have been pretty much the same. Six inches of armour plate could reliably keep out British shells, while thinner plates could prevent them from operating properly. According to the 1915 Gunnery Manual, a 1/2in plate at 30 degrees would cause a Lyddite-filled 13.5in shell to fail at least half the time. Similarly, the losses of British ships were primarily down to failures in the choice of propellant and in the safety procedures for ammunition supply. The larger British shells were, when they worked correctly, able to do far more damage to German ships, even with the heavier armour. The rate at which German and British ships suffered turret fires was roughly equal, even with the thicker German armour and worse British shells. Ships like Lion and Tiger took a considerable number of hits, and came away relatively fine. Hits below and around the waterline were far more dangerous to German ships; they were less-effectively subdivided, and had a lower freeboard. This explains why the only British ship to founder was an obsolete armoured cruiser, while the only German ship to do so was one of their most modern battlecruisers, with two more nearly succumbing.
 
Lions with German propellant would have been very nice ships indeed - I've long thought the Cats got a raw deal. German ships seem to have had design problems that allowed for vulnerability to bow flooding. Lutzow was lost to this plus faulty sealing on its watertight compartments which caused uncontrolled, gradual flooding.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
A crushing British victory at Jutland might allow Asquith to hang on his PM position, which would not be a positive thing for British industrial mobilization.

For the German, the impact of such defeat would be huge on civilian morale. It could strengthen revolutionary forces within Germany.

RN forces can be released for tasks such as anti-sub and clearing the mines around Flander coast.

Finally, the impact on Versaille could have been profound. The "stab in the back" myth would be shattered since ITTL Germany clearly lost the naval war fare and square. IOTL, HSF at least remained as a fleet-in-being.
 
The main consequences would be political. Central Powers morale was dangerously low in OTL winter 1916/1917, and the impact of a major naval disaster could mean that the SPD support for the continuation of the war might be withdrawn even with OHL talking about a war wining submarine offensive (which, without the threat of the HSF would be met by convoys escorted by large numbers of destroyers and by a close blockade of submarine bases, including agressive offensive mine laying).
That creates an ideal situation for Wilson's "Peace without victory" plan to be accepted by both sides, since the British have what they wanted (no more HSF threat) and both them and the French are deeply in debt with the US. This might either prevent the Russian March (February in Russia) revolution or at least the November (October in Russia) Bolshevik coup.
 
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