What happens if Germany wins at Stalingrad?

[History Learner]

Eh... all the Russians have to do there is wait until the river freezes solid at the start of December, after which it’s no more a barrier, logistically or militarily, then the open steppe and the Romanians would then go down the same as they did OTL. What they really need are some serious German reinforcements...

The Don River froze late in 1942 and the ice was too thin to be used without bridge equipment.

As long as lend-lease isn’t affected, which it might be, mass starvation probably isn’t in the cards. While the harvest of ‘43 was even worse then that of 1942 (although your figure for ‘42 are a bit lower then what I recall), the food situation in Russia improved from Spring ‘43 onwards anyways, with the preponderance of starvation related deaths occurring during the prior ‘42/‘43 winter, due to shipments of American food supplies. The reclamation of Kuban and Eastern Ukraine simply occurred too late in the year to be of use in the ‘43 harvest.

The citation for 1942 and 1943 figures of crop production:

The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945, by Walter Scott Dunn -

"By November of 1941, 47% of Soviet cropland was in German hands. The Germans had 38% of the grain farmland, 84% of the sugar land, 38% of the area devoted to beef and dairy cattle, and 60% of the land used to produce hogs. The Russians turned to the east and brought more land into cultivation. In the fall of 1941, the autumn and winter crops increased sharply in the eastern area. But despite all efforts, farm yields dropped from 95.5 million tons of grain in 1940 to 29.7 million tons in 1942. Production of cattle and horses dropped to less than half of prewar levels and hogs to one fifth. By 1942, meat and dairy production shrank to half the 1940 total and sugar to only 5%. Farm production in 1942 and 1943 dropped to 38% and 37% of 1940 totals."

Next, the Kuban was reclaimed before the Spring of 1943. As for the starvation, 1943 rations were at their lowest possible point with all Lend Lease food going to the RKKA. Without the reclamation of Kuban production, there is simply no food to go around to make up for that loss; 1943 also marked the highest fatalities for starvation during the war years.

As for delay in liberation impacting further crop growths... well, that depends. Planting and Harvest season in that part of Europe is rather late and intervals short: May/June and August/September. Additionally, a lot of the fields liberated in Southern Russia were left unworked in ‘43 and put back into service only in ‘44. This all means a six months delay in the liberation of East Ukraine and Kuban areas (so their retaken in March/April ‘44 instead of September/November ‘43) probably would still see food production significantly rise in ‘44, since their back in Soviet hands before the planting season. A year’s delay, on the other hand, would likely see the ‘44 production be much closer to ‘43 levels, although still some rise as the Southern Russian fields are put back into use.

This presumes the Soviet state can survive such a defeat and the consequent starvation it would engender. I don't think it could.

 

[Matteo]

What would the ramifications be if the Germans successfully took Stalingrad? Would they be able to take the Caucusus or would their lines be over extended to the point of easily being cut by the Red Army? How would this effect the war effort on both sides?

Ignore how they do it, just assume they somehow managed a victory.

It would just be a Pyrrhic victory.

The USSR’s population was more than twice as big as greater Germany’s population.

Its industrial output, and especially its military production, was much bigger than Germany’s.

The soviet soldiers and civilians knew they were fighting for their very lives because they knew the Germany wanted to exterminate most of them and push survivors far eastward.

So since the USSR had not crumbled in the first months of the war, it was just a matter of time and cost before it finally overcome Germany.

The only way for Germany to have good odds to win this war would have been to lead a genuine liberation war, not a war of conquest and extermination. Which means Germany should not have been Nazi but democratic, in which case a democratic Germany would probably not have gone for a full scale war against the USSR.

 

[History Learner]

It would just be a Pyrrhic victory.

The USSR’s population was more than twice as big as greater Germany’s population.

Its industrial output, and especially its military production, was much bigger than Germany’s.

The soviet soldiers and civilians knew they were fighting for their very lives because they knew the Germany wanted to exterminate most of them and push survivors far eastward.

So since the USSR had not crumbled in the first months of the war, it was just a matter of time and cost before it finally overcome Germany.

The only way for Germany to have good odds to win this war would have been to lead a genuine liberation war, not a war of conquest and extermination. Which means Germany should not have been Nazi but democratic, in which case a democratic Germany would probably not have gone for a full scale war against the USSR.

The Soviet Union was an industrial dwarf compared to Germany.

 

[Matteo]

The Soviet Union was an industrial dwarf compared to Germany.

In the age or iron and coal, the USSR had overcome Germany in 1940.

And for the military production just take a look at the historical figures. It the USSR produced more than Britain which produced more than Germany for most of the war.

 

[Ian_W]

Without the reclamation of Kuban production, there is simply no food to go around to make up for that loss; 1943 also marked the highest fatalities for starvation during the war years.



This presumes the Soviet state can survive such a defeat and the consequent starvation it would engender. I don't think it could.

Unless, of course, the United Nations are not complete idiots, and they send more food to the Soviets, especially nutrition rich canned meat and dried eggs.

Unlike the Nazis, the United Nations are not terrible allies. They largely shared equipment, not according to racial ideology but according to who will help win the war.

Remember, learn from history. Don't just cherry pick sources that supports the side you want to win.

 

[Ian_W]

The Soviet Union was an industrial dwarf compared to Germany.

Lay off the pervetin.

 

[History Learner]

In the age or iron and coal, the USSR had overcome Germany in 1940.

They did not.

Thousands of metric tons, steel, coal, fuel production:

1940:

Germany: 21,540 steel -> 315,500 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 2,562 fuel
USSR: 18,317 steel -> 145,740 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 4,994 fuel

1941:

Germany: 28,233 steel -> 317,900 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 3,163 fuel
USSR: 17,898 steel -> 130,420 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 5,188 fuel

1942:

Germany: 28,744 steel -> 340,400 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 3,657 fuel
USSR: 8,070 steel -> 54,859 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 2,732 fuel

1943:

Germany: 30,603 steel -> 347,600 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 4,279 fuel
USSR: 8,475 steel -> 63,295 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 3,248 fuel

1944:

Germany: 25,853 steel -> N/A bituminous coal-equivalent -> 2,822 fuel
USSR: 10,887 steel -> 86,325 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 4,309 fuel

And for the military production just take a look at the historical figures. It the USSR produced more than Britain which produced more than Germany for most of the war.

1942:

Tanks and SP guns: 6,180 / 24,640
Armored cars: 982 / 2,623
Half-tracks: 10,152 / 0
Trucks: 81,276 / 30,947
Cars: 27,895 / 2,567
Locomotives: 2,637 / 9
Train cars: 60,892 / 147
Artillery and mortar shells: 825,000 metric tons / 635,000 metric tons

1943:

Tanks and SP guns: 12,063 / 24,092
Armored cars: 806 / 1,820
Half-tracks: 16,964 / 0
Trucks: 109,483 / 45,545
Cars: 34,478 / 2,546
Locomotives: 5,243 / 43
Train cars: 66,263 / 108
Artillery and mortar shells: 1,410,000 / 850,000

1944:

Tanks and SP guns: 19,002 / 28,983
Armored cars: 485 / 3,000
Half-tracks: 17,143 / 0
Trucks: 89,069 / 53,467
Cars: 21,656 / 5,382
Locomotives: 3,495 / 32
Train cars: 45,189 / 13
Artillery and mortar shells: 1,735,000 / 1,100,000

Shell production does not include naval.

Unless, of course, the United Nations are not complete idiots, and they send more food to the Soviets, especially nutrition rich canned meat and dried eggs.

Unlike the Nazis, the United Nations are not terrible allies. They largely shared equipment, not according to racial ideology but according to who will help win the war.

Remember, learn from history. Don't just cherry pick sources that supports the side you want to win.

There is no food to send nor capacity to send it. India was actually in the grips of famine in 1943 simply because there wasn't enough shipping; there is spare capacity for the Soviets to get more food, if such supplies exist. Persian Corridor and Northern route expansions for Lend Lease are due to complete later in the year, so at the present time there is not enough port capacity anyway.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Its industrial output, and especially its military production, was much bigger than Germany’s.

The Soviet Union was an industrial dwarf compared to Germany.

The Soviets started the war in ‘41 as Germany’s rough equal, but the damage done by the German invasion knocked her down to about 60/70% of Germany’s position by the start of ‘43. After that, the Soviet economy started steadily recovering while the German economy first stalled and then shrank under the stress of mobilization, bombardment, and invasion. The Soviet economy was smaller then the German economy after the damage done too it in 1941/42, but it wasn’t incomparably smaller to the Germans and especially not to the point one could say the USSR was a "dwarf" next to them like was the case, for example, with the Japanese industry next to the American one.

What really happened, according to Adam Tooze, was that the Germans wanted to reserve resources for a later conflict with Britain and the USA and so did not go economically all out in the critical years of 1941 and 1942. The Soviets, on the other hand, whose war damaged economy was smaller-but-still-comparable to that of the Reich, and weaker in several key areas, committed everything for victory now, and so ensures they gained a decisive advantage before they turned to stabilizing the war effort. By 1943 and 1944 Germany had also committed all her strategic reserves of economic and industrial resources, but by then it was too late and the military balance had irrevocably tipped.

The Don River froze late in 1942 and the ice was too thin to be used without bridge equipment.

Unaware of that. The obvious solution would be to wait until later in December or even January for the ice to firm up, but then we run into the question of whether Stalingrad could hold out that long and whether Stalin would accept such delays.

Next, the Kuban was reclaimed before the Spring of 1943. As for the starvation, 1943 rations were at their lowest possible point with all Lend Lease food going to the RKKA. Without the reclamation of Kuban production, there is simply no food to go around to make up for that loss; 1943 also marked the highest fatalities for starvation during the war years.

Kuban didn’t restart production until the Germans were cleared out in October, so it didn’t produce anything until 1944. Daily Caloric intake of the Soviet adult population increased by nearly 200 calories in 1943 compared to the previous year[1]. In terms of quantity consumed (as a percent when compared to 1940) bread and flour remained static from 1942 to 1943, but goats, legumes, and macaroni increased by 17.5%, Potatoes increased by 69.8%, vegetables and melons increased by 3.3%, milk and milk products increased by 9%, meat and meat products increased by 13.7%, animal and vegetable oils increased by 14.5%, and fish and herring increased by . Only in sugar and confectionary goods was there any decline, which continued into 1944.[3] It is thus undeniable that the Soviet food situation improved even though the harvest situation did not. That lend-lease food went towards the Red Army ignores the fact that freed up domestic food production for the home front. The focus on the quantity of deaths ignores the reality of how death from malnutrition usually works: "Mortality from starvation, however, reached its apex in 1943 and continued into 1944 even after the food supply improved. The year of greatest food shortage was not the year of greatest death. A lag existed between the shortages of 1942 and their subsequent impact. The lag is explained by the fact that food deprivation takes a slow and often irreversible toll on the human organism. There was thus a delayed reaction between the low point for the food supply (1942-1943) and the high point of starvation deaths (1943-1944)."[4]

[1]The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the Soviet Union during WW2 pg 221, Hunger and War: Food Provisioning in the Soviet Union During World War II pg 23.
[2]Bread of Affliction pg 223.
[3]Hunger and War, Pg 24

This presumes the Soviet state can survive such a defeat and the consequent starvation it would engender. I don't think it could.

Except the Soviet Union did make it through OTL 1942, 1943, and most of ‘44 (seeing as the food from the ‘44 harvest wouldn’t be available until the fall and indeed the Soviets didn't begin "refeeding" programs until the latter part of 1944) without such starvation, indeed the food situation improved during ‘43-‘44 well before the ‘44 harvest, which rather contradicts such a claim.

 

[Alcsentre Calanice]

with the preponderance of starvation related deaths occurring during the prior ‘42/‘43 winter, due to shipments of American food supplies.

I know what you mean, but that sounds like a criticism of American fast food.

 

[pattersonautobody]

This has been answered at least once in the last 12 months.

It goes like this:

To win Stalingrad, we have to ask what POD.

The only likely POD is that Hitler sticks with the original Case Blue plan, resulting in Stalingrad falling on the march. (Other PODs, such has aborting Tyfun or something like that still likely don't change German front lines in 1942 nor German logistics, though they may have more vehicles available...still not gonna make it to Baku which is 1500 KM away from the starting point.)

So, Germany takes Stalingrad. Perhaps, they can shore up the entire Don with its fall. Maybe, with the right luck and PODs, they take Astrakhan. The oil fields are not going to fall to Germany. Period.

What are the effects of the preceding?

In short, this puts Germany in a much stronger position in the Eastern Front. Stalin will counterattack. However, without a long attritional slog in Stalingrad and the ability to do an double envelopment (due to the Don and Volga being in defensible positions ITTL) the result is that the Russians have to cross rivers which are (though frozen) very defensible due to their cliffs. The Russians simply did not have the expertise and the training yet to do the sort of offensive operations they were able to do in 1944...I mean, sure they can take on the Germans when they are outnumbered 3 to 1 and stretched beyond comprehension, but as Rhzev shows they could not take on the Germans in a normal, defensible situation...even in an extreme salient.

So, the counterattack fails miserably, which really hurts Stalin. Ironically, this now affects German planning after Torch. Does Hitler go for the coup de grace in the USSR and not reinforce North Africa? Does he go defense in the USSR and try to shore up North Africa (unlikely)?

Honestly, I think we get an equivalent reinforcement in NA as per OTL, but a Kursk-like build up in 1943, with the idea of actually taking Baku. However, as much as we would like to speculate Hitler would be an idiot, have his forces attack straight for Baku, and then leave German reserves so bare that an attack straight for Rostov on the Don will cut off the entire AGS, I think more likely than not Germany picks up on a huge Russian buildup to counter-attack. So, Hitler probably resorts to bombing Baku and otherwise waiting to see what opportunity presents itself.

Unlike Kursk, which is an obvious salient, here Germany would be attacking straight forward through mountains while watching massive Soviet buildups across the Don. This to me changes German planning, unlike OTL where the Kursk salient was built up but there was no other obvious point to attack, or defend for that matter.

Ultimately, I think what we see is a German spoiling attack that cuts off Leningrad again. The Soviet offensive in the south in 43, without the significant attrition of 42 OTL and the additional Soviet attrition ITTL, fails. Look at Germany in 43 IOTL, they performed pretty well statistically in Kursk considering it was almost the worst plan ever. So, I simply don't see the USSR ITTL pulling off a success in 43 with a failure in Stalingrad in 42.

However, North Africa, Sicily, and Italy still go as per OTL. Germany still gets bombed. So, the USSR stays in the war, but they are not going to be looking to do all the fighting anymore. They will re-liberate the surrounding areas around Leningrad. With Baku bombed, I am not even sure they put the same level of attention of attacking across the Don. So, they might wait for an alt-Bagratian when the Allies open a second front.

There are interesting knock-on effects to this (other than A Bombs dropping on Germany). D-Day goes per OTL. The USSR counter-offensive in 1944 succeeds, but they are retaking Smolensk and Kharkov...maybe Kiev by the end of 1944 (if they are lucky). Logisitics for the USSR will get stretched. Rails will be on different gauge, they will have less fuel with no Baku, they really will not be that mobile.

The Germans have way more Ostruppen ITTL. Especially western Ukrainians and Baltic conscripts. Finland stays in the war.

Hitler's 1945 strategy becomes very interesting ITTL. He has to defend Germany, which means, screwing over all of his eastern "allies" and essentially moving 1.5-2 million men from the east to the west.

As for the east, there will be many more Hungarians, Romanians, Ukrainians, Balts, and Finns fighting...due to more time to conscript more men. They will not be able to hold off the Russians with the 2 million or so Germans left in the east, but especially as the Wallies reach the Rhine in a largely attritional contest, Germany will be forced to totally withdraw other than some reserves to quell rebellions among their allies.

By the time Germany loses the war due to the a-bomb, the Soviets probably made it to their 1941 borders, because again, logisitics, rails, and fuel.

What peace in this world looks like is anyone's guess. Poland still exists. No iron curtain in the Balkans. Finland maintains its 1939 borders. Germany is probably totally deindustrialized by western powers (due to casualties being many fold higher in this time line.) Japan probably holds out to 1946. No communism in Asia.

A lot of knock on effects in world history, but Germany is still screwed, if not worse IMHO.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

No communism in Asia.

Why not? Unless there's a butterfly I'm missing, nothing I can see changes the mobilization of popular support the CCP was building up during the war that was the decisive factor in them winning the Chinese civil war...

 

[pattersonautobody]

Why not? Unless there's a butterfly I'm missing, nothing I can see changes the mobilization of popular support the CCP was building up during the war that was the decisive factor in them winning the Chinese civil war...

With a Japanese withdrawl from Manchuria due to US occupation, and USSR in no position to prop up people before they're withdrawal, that changes things, no?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

With a Japanese withdrawl from Manchuria due to US occupation, and USSR in no position to prop up people before they're withdrawal, that changes things, no?

Not decisively. The key base camps were the ones set-up under the Japanese nose around Beijing in '44 which allowed them to cut the Nationalists off, not the ones in Manchuria. Toss into that the overwhelming popularity of the CCP ensuring nationalist armies defected en-masse and the main source of CCP arms being nationalist corruption (Mao once called Chiang the Chinese Red Army's chief supply officer), Manchuria was rather small potatoes

 

[pattersonautobody]

Not decisively. The key base camps were the ones set-up under the Japanese nose around Beijing in '44 which allowed them to cut the Nationalists off, not the ones in Manchuria. Toss into that the overwhelming popularity of the CCP ensuring nationalist armies defected en-masse and the main source of CCP arms being nationalist corruption (Mao once called Chiang the Chinese Red Army's chief supply officer), Manchuria was rather small potatoes.

I really don't know too much about that, so I'll concede that point to you.

 

[Matteo]

They did not.

Thousands of metric tons, steel, coal, fuel production:

1940:

Germany: 21,540 steel -> 315,500 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 2,562 fuel
USSR: 18,317 steel -> 145,740 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 4,994 fuel

1941:

Germany: 28,233 steel -> 317,900 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 3,163 fuel
USSR: 17,898 steel -> 130,420 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 5,188 fuel

1942:

Germany: 28,744 steel -> 340,400 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 3,657 fuel
USSR: 8,070 steel -> 54,859 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 2,732 fuel

1943:

Germany: 30,603 steel -> 347,600 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 4,279 fuel
USSR: 8,475 steel -> 63,295 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 3,248 fuel

1944:

Germany: 25,853 steel -> N/A bituminous coal-equivalent -> 2,822 fuel
USSR: 10,887 steel -> 86,325 bituminous coal-equivalent -> 4,309 fuel




1942:

Tanks and SP guns: 6,180 / 24,640
Armored cars: 982 / 2,623
Half-tracks: 10,152 / 0
Trucks: 81,276 / 30,947
Cars: 27,895 / 2,567
Locomotives: 2,637 / 9
Train cars: 60,892 / 147
Artillery and mortar shells: 825,000 metric tons / 635,000 metric tons

1943:

Tanks and SP guns: 12,063 / 24,092
Armored cars: 806 / 1,820
Half-tracks: 16,964 / 0
Trucks: 109,483 / 45,545
Cars: 34,478 / 2,546
Locomotives: 5,243 / 43
Train cars: 66,263 / 108
Artillery and mortar shells: 1,410,000 / 850,000

1944:

Tanks and SP guns: 19,002 / 28,983
Armored cars: 485 / 3,000
Half-tracks: 17,143 / 0
Trucks: 89,069 / 53,467
Cars: 21,656 / 5,382
Locomotives: 3,495 / 32
Train cars: 45,189 / 13
Artillery and mortar shells: 1,735,000 / 1,100,000

Shell production does not include naval.




There is no food to send nor capacity to send it. India was actually in the grips of famine in 1943 simply because there wasn't enough shipping; there is spare capacity for the Soviets to get more food, if such supplies exist. Persian Corridor and Northern route expansions for Lend Lease are due to complete later in the year, so at the present time there is not enough port capacity anyway.

Sources ?

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_production_during_World_War_II

 

[DrakonFin]

The Germans have way more Ostruppen ITTL. Especially western Ukrainians and Baltic conscripts. Finland stays in the war.

...For some time longer. But eventually, by 1944, the Finns will realize, like IOTL after Stalingrad, that Germany will lose the war. And then they will start looking for a way out with their independence intact.

As for the east, there will be many more Hungarians, Romanians, Ukrainians, Balts, and Finns fighting...due to more time to conscript more men. They will not be able to hold off the Russians with the 2 million or so Germans left in the east, but especially as the Wallies reach the Rhine in a largely attritional contest, Germany will be forced to totally withdraw other than some reserves to quell rebellions among their allies.

The Finns, at least, will not be practically able to conscript any more troops they had under arms in 1941 IOTL. It is beyond the the ability of the nation to maintain such numbers any longer than a few months at a time. In fact what a need to keep more men under arms in 1942-44 than IOTL will only do to Finland is to stretch the Finnish economy to a breaking point, increase Finland's dependence on German imports, and, again, show the Finnish leadership how important, nay, crucial, extricating the nation from the war as soon as possible would be.

Finland maintains its 1939 borders.

This is very, very optimistic, IMO, from the Finnish POV. Stalin would not be amenable to giving Finland back the areas the USSR annexed in 1940. The optics would be very bad: Finland actually benefiting from attacking the USSR with Germany in 1941. As long as the USSR is winning, Stalin will demand at least the 1940 borders from the Finns, if not more. And if the Finns won't accept this, Stalin has time to wait. As 1944 and 1945 roll along, the Finnish position will only get worse, and the Soviet position comparatively better. If the Finns don't make a peace with such terms the Soviets can stomach before Germany falls, they will have to take what terms Stalin accepts after the Nazis have been beaten, and in such conditions where the USSR can focus more of its energy on Finland. The Finns would want the 1920 borders, and would consider them as fair. But if Stalin is committed not giving this to Finland, the 1940 borders are the best realistic deal the Finns can get. Along with war reparations that are at best somewhat smaller than the OTL ones, that is.

 

[pattersonautobody]

I just think that a Russia that loses Stalingrad almsot loses the war. Apart from US bombing Germany into smithareens, winning at Stalingrad probably wins the war. Hence, it would be very, very difficult for Russia to even get back to its 1941 borders by 1945. In fact, Russia loses 2 years of conscripting Slavs which they had IOTL, while Germany gets the opposite. Russia can be facing major famine and manpower crises.

 

[thaddeus]

I just think that a Russia that loses Stalingrad almsot loses the war. Apart from US bombing Germany into smithareens, winning at Stalingrad probably wins the war. Hence, it would be very, very difficult for Russia to even get back to its 1941 borders by 1945. In fact, Russia loses 2 years of conscripting Slavs which they had IOTL, while Germany gets the opposite. Russia can be facing major famine and manpower crises.

my question would be what happens far away from USSR, having avoided Stalingrad do they double down on Tunisgrad? in some respects it would seem a good idea to stall the Allies from more defensible Tunisia, so the logic is still there, and here they are not facing crushing defeat in USSR.

 

[bernardz]

I just think that a Russia that loses Stalingrad almsot loses the war.

Not that much actually changes for Russia, the Russian oil is still far away from the German lines. German airforce is not good enough to take out the Russian oil so the Russian oil is safe. Germany has a strong position on the Volga but its still a logistic nightmare for the Germans to supply Stalingrad. Okay, it might add a year to the war if we discount nuclear weapons.

 

[bernardz]

They did not.

There is no food to send nor capacity to send it. India was actually in the grips of famine in 1943 simply because there wasn't enough shipping; .

Although it could be argued that it was ww2 with its disruption of markets, most would call it incompetence. When the British did act, the solved the problem of the famine very quickly.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bengal_famine_of_1943