What effects does a longer WWI have on the US military as a whole?

I woke up about an hour ago because I had to vomit, seeing as I'm sick, and while cleaning up the mess the idea came to me.

I have been reading up on the performance of American forces during WWI, I have to say the indivdual American Marine, and Solider performed well and recived much praise of from friend and foe alike but as a whole they were more like a mob of men with guns careening across the French country side looking for souvenirs and after some tough initial lessons early on the American soliders and officers actually started to come together as a cohesive and capable fighting force but it happened that they got their act together too late and the war was over.

Now here is what I ask, lets say the war last well into 1920. What are effects the protracted war have on American forces post war and post war American doctrine? Becuase the US was starting to field M1918 BAR in conjuction with the Pedersen device for use during the 1919 offensive, how would these weapons fair and could we see an earlier push by the US for an effective SLR?

So opinions on the short and long term effects of a longer war on the American military technology and doctrine?

I'm tired and I don't feel good so I'm sorry if it makes no sense.:(
 
I woke up about an hour ago because I had to vomit, seeing as I'm sick, and while cleaning up the mess the idea came to me.

I have been reading up on the performance of American forces during WWI, I have to say the indivdual American Marine, and Solider performed well and recived much praise of from friend and foe alike but as a whole they were more like a mob of men with guns careening across the French country side looking for souvenirs and after some tough initial lessons early on the American soliders and officers actually started to come together as a cohesive and capable fighting force but it happened that they got their act together too late and the war was over.

Now here is what I ask, lets say the war last well into 1920. What are effects the protracted war have on American forces post war and post war American doctrine? Becuase the US was starting to field M1918 BAR in conjuction with the Pedersen device for use during the 1919 offensive, how would these weapons fair and could we see an earlier push by the US for an effective SLR?

So opinions on the short and long term effects of a longer war on the American military technology and doctrine?

I'm tired and I don't feel good so I'm sorry if it makes no sense.:(

BrotherToAll

I think you mentioned the key point yourself. They would be a lot more knowledgable, both in terms of the senior staff in future years and the sizeable number of veterans who would be in civilian life in later years. Simply put, given the vast change in the nature of combat over previous wars, you needed a lot of experience and blood to learn the lessons fully.

There might be down sides. A much higher butcher's bill could mean a demoralisation of the population and distrust of the military. The latter could learn some of the wrong lessons and prepare for the last war, as the French so drastically did. This would be unlikely however as they wouldn't have suffered as much as the European powers and also their experience would be occurring when the weakening Germany and developing of armoured warfare restores more mobility to the battlefield. Far more likely they will be in a position to learn more about and adopt to mechanised warfare tactics.

A couple of potential effects later on to think about.

a) With a much bigger involvement in the conflict, especially if Germany does manage to linger on until 1920 its likely to see a harsher peace, at least territorially and America less likely to withdraw into isolationism. You might see a continuation of the western alliance, which even if Russia still collapses into chaos, will greatly stablise western and central Europe. [Because France is a lot more secure and German revanchment by military means looks so much a lost cause that fanatics suggesting that sort of tactic are likely to be sat on heavily].

b) If we still get the depression and the Bonus March then it could well be far larger and will have much more public support as a lot of people know veterans. Hence possibly no violent suppression or it could cause a lot of problems if a government does that.

Steve
 

The Vulture

Banned
First off, hope you're feeling better soon.

My two cents is that the United States comes out feeling that they've had their war and not want another. To mutilate the quote from Red Dawn, "Once in a century is enough."

Therefore, growing isolationism, more so than OTL. Might lead to a general distrust of the military and Europe. I doubt it lead to complete withdrawal from Europe, but people won't be as wiling to support overseas adventures.

As for postwar US military doctrine, I can see it being built more around static warfare and the frenzied close combat of trenches. I think the push for a modern assault rifle is not inconceivable (IIRC, Colonel Thompson was drawing up plans for one. Think of a larger Tommy gun that fired American .30.) Less focus on tanks and airplanes than IOTL.

Think of the US initially going into the second war in an isolationist climate with a WWI military mindset.
 
As for postwar US military doctrine, I can see it being built more around static warfare and the frenzied close combat of trenches. I think the push for a modern assault rifle is not inconceivable (IIRC, Colonel Thompson was drawing up plans for one. Think of a larger Tommy gun that fired American .30.) Less focus on tanks and airplanes than IOTL.

Think of the US initially going into the second war in an isolationist climate with a WWI military mindset.

In OTL, the Army ground forces were pretty much gutted in the interwar era, and hardly anything was done with tanks, or really getting away from an updated WW1 mindset except in some professional journals, until shortly before WW2 except for some experimental prototypes that weren't picked up upon, due to a belief in much of the Army that tanks were just to support infantry (Pershing's beliefs on the subject, enshrined into law in the first post-war Congressional actions dealing with the Army), and Congressional parsimony. What defense money there was went into the Air Corps & the Navy, because it was hoped that they could defeat any threats several hundred miles out to sea, making a ground war unecessary, and I'm not sure how a longer WW1 would change that basic paradigm, regardless of funding (although politicians may be more likely to support attempts at arms control by treaty)

Not sure how feasible that proposed assault rifle would have been- .30-06 is way too much for an automatic rifle being used as a rifle, not an LMG, and the other rifle cartridge the Army was looking at, the .276 Pedersen (rejected largely because it was much cheaper to use existing stocks of .30-06, which MacArthur, as Army Chief of Staff thought was politically expedient to do so) would probably have been too much as well. Unless the extended war produces radical changes in US thinking about small arms, the sort of cartridge necessary to make an assault rifle practical would run counter to the entire weight of US thinking in small arms right until MacNamara forced the M-16 on the military, which emphasized accurate, long-range capability. (The Pedersen device for the M1903 Springfield used a pistol-class cartridge.)

There was a desire to improve the firepower of the rifleman, which along with new artillery, were the major inter-war Army ground forces R&D projects. which led to the M-1, as a selective fire weapon using rifle cartridges then considered appropriate for military applications wasn't practical, and I suppose TTL's M-1 could have a high-capacity detachable magazine assuming there's funding, but in OTL it took about 10 years to develop that variation of the Garand to the point where'd it be acceptable for use as a service rifle, because apparently it was a real PITA trying to get it to feed properly with a detachable box magazine. That prototype, after a couple more years of development to rechamber it for 7.62 NATO & add selective fire capability resulted in the OTL M-14.
 
The US was gearing up for 1919, if my memory serves as its should and it isn't the fever talking the US was actually starting to build its own aircraft, artillery, and tanks and the US build up leading to 1919 was to field an unprecidented number of men, guns, tanks, and aircraft.

The US offensive was supposed to be a copy of the combined arms stratgy used by British during the Hundred Days Offensive with heavy emphasis on armor and cavalry and achieving a breakthrough to turn the battle into a fast moving mobile fight in which American cavalry and light tanks would swarm all over retreating German forces.

Now like I said I could be delusional (which no doubt I most likely am) but I would argue in 1919 the US military was looking to free up the war and turn it into a mobile fight.

Now on a seperate note I wonder how the offensive would play out and how the American troops, after learning its initial bloody lessons and eventually forming themselves into a capable modern fighting force, would perform. Based on what I've read it semed the British and French planned on letting the Americans take progressivly more and more of the brunt of the fighting in order to give their forces a rest (again I'm not sure I'm a tad bit delusional from my fever my brain isn't really working how it should).
 
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