What does a Japanese victory in the second war with China look like?
- Thread starter Glory2Cabinda
- Start date
There wasn't an end goal. Japan lost control of its Army after WWI, which proceeded down a path of increasingly reckless adventurism. This ultimately had the consequence of uniting China against it. As a result, Japan was sucked into war with China with no real strategy apart from killing and brutalizing as many Chinese as possible, in order to intimidate them into seeking terms (which didn't work). There's really no chance of formal victory in China for Japan - the Japanese Army was too small to occupy the entire country, meaning that the further they push their frontline, the more disorderly the occupied territory becomes. The only realistic result in a scenario where the US doesn't get involved is that Japan gets exhausted and bled white from the conflict and is forced to withdraw.
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Grey Wolf
Donor
Wars which are fought for discrete territory of am enemy are usually winnable, whereas wars fought for complete subjugation of them are not - eg China, here, or the Germans against the USSR. If the aim had to be to annex more territory or set up border buffer states (like Putin in Ukraine) then it's a winnable goal.
The Vietnam War had more of a goal than the Second Sino-Japanese War, and it still ended in failure. Realistically, if the United States hadn't got dragged in, the Japanese invasion would end the same way, a quagmire that drains lives and money for years until they have to pull out. At least the militarists would be discredited.
Grey Wolf
Donor
Well, Japan WAS winning by any ABSOLUTE count of the conflict. It was that the end point was "Get China to Surrender" which made their winning increasingly problematic. They clearly WERE expanding the territory they held, taking strategically important cities, defeating the Chinese armies. The problem was that without an end-point, this was not achieving an overall goal.
Grey Wolf
Donor
Who? Me? That wasn't my point.
My point is that it is not really comparable to Afghanistan, as the Japanese are objectively winning against the Chinese BUT without an end point, then this becomes void.
The answer, to me, is for Japan to define an end-point that is achievable - not just that China has to surrender, but to limit their goals - permanent cession of some sea ports, perhaps, the outer Manchurian provinces etc?
Since the OP is explicitly asking for victory unlike the last 10 comments who somehow want to point out how a victory can't be achieved (it's like you read the word victory as defeat) I'll posit an actual answer:
1) France and Britain close the border with China, for whatever reason (say they want Japan to ally them not be in a war against them, perhaps Brits are at war with USSR)
2) USA also stops supporting Chinese nationals
3) Japan continues to support the tons of collaborators
4) USSR distracted more, for longer, potentially collapsing, so once they're gone the nationalists will have no more arms supply. Without the USSR they run out of ammo and guns
5) With no foreign support there is no Afghanistan (seriously why do people act like Afghanistan is some magic battle warden as if it wasn't the billions that Soviet opponents spent arming the militia?)
6) Eventually Chiang is killed, Wuhan is seized probably around 1943. Resistance continues but Japan transitions to the collaborationist government who had strong incentives to put down revolts (to keep their positions). Japanese presence limited to governmental roles, minimal Japanese garrisons.
7) Almost certainly reorganized China would give Tibet, East Turkestan, potentially parts of Inner Mongolia (to newly independent Mongolia), independence as they are too ravaged by war to keep pushing
8) With the end of the war the Japanese military have a civil war to restore civilian government, Western allies interfere. Alternatively military sent north to fight against the collapsing USSR (at war with Nazis and Allies) where they can avoid making more problems for Tokyo
I wonder if Japan might not promote the dialects of China more? Perhaps less cultural indoctrination by Beijing Mandarin clique. More writing systems than OTL? The co prosperity sphere could decide together on what to do about literary chinese since otl they went like twenty different ways
The end goal was Japanese influence over China, there were no plans to annex the whole country as prefectures
1) France and Britain close the border with China, for whatever reason (say they want Japan to ally them not be in a war against them, perhaps Brits are at war with USSR)
2) USA also stops supporting Chinese nationals
3) Japan continues to support the tons of collaborators
4) USSR distracted more, for longer, potentially collapsing, so once they're gone the nationalists will have no more arms supply. Without the USSR they run out of ammo and guns
5) With no foreign support there is no Afghanistan (seriously why do people act like Afghanistan is some magic battle warden as if it wasn't the billions that Soviet opponents spent arming the militia?)
6) Eventually Chiang is killed, Wuhan is seized probably around 1943. Resistance continues but Japan transitions to the collaborationist government who had strong incentives to put down revolts (to keep their positions). Japanese presence limited to governmental roles, minimal Japanese garrisons.
7) Almost certainly reorganized China would give Tibet, East Turkestan, potentially parts of Inner Mongolia (to newly independent Mongolia), independence as they are too ravaged by war to keep pushing
8) With the end of the war the Japanese military have a civil war to restore civilian government, Western allies interfere. Alternatively military sent north to fight against the collapsing USSR (at war with Nazis and Allies) where they can avoid making more problems for Tokyo
I wonder if Japan might not promote the dialects of China more? Perhaps less cultural indoctrination by Beijing Mandarin clique. More writing systems than OTL? The co prosperity sphere could decide together on what to do about literary chinese since otl they went like twenty different ways
The end goal was Japanese influence over China, there were no plans to annex the whole country as prefectures
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The most I can see Japan getting away with is making China recognize manchukuo.
Japan wanted to be a colonial power just as the colonial system was collapsing. Ultimately I think they would have been no more successful in holding on than the British and French were in Africa. I am sure the Soviets would have concentrated on supporting the war of national liberation on their southern border.
Victory would look something like this:
Of course, after Chiang throws in the flannel, it's anyone's guess. The Generalissimo will probably get bumped off not long after, but if it's done by a fanatical nationalist (note the lowercase 'n', I'm not necessarily referring to a KMT member here), a Communist, or a Japanese agent, I couldn't tell you. Meiling might take off for the States, knowing her. Mao will have a slight problem in that Manchuria is denied to him, so he'll have to get creative if he wants to conquer the non-occupied bits of China. I don't image Wang Jingwei's regime will last too long; everyone will see it as the puppet it is, and it might assume a similar relationship to Tokyo as South Vietnam ended up doing to Washington: a tinpot client dictatorship that needs constant propping-up. Warlord Period 2.0? Maybe.
As for the Japanese, they'll obviously get Chinese recognition of Manchuria and Wang Jingwei's regime, preferential rights to Chinese natural resources, and a few other things, I'm sure.
For a start, the Japanese ditch their racial propaganda and outlook. No "superior to the Chinese" crap, no "saving China from itself", none of that. This means too that all the IJA atrocities against the Chinese are butterflied (no Unit 731, no Nanjing Massacre).
Second, the Japanese are a lot savvier, playing up the discontent within China. On the eve of the Japanese invasion, the KMT barely controlled half of China- yes, it was the valuable heartland with the most people and the most natural resources, but looking on a map, a huge portion of the country's landmass was out of their control. Obviously, those warlords had armies; they fought with Chiang before the war, and one of the main reasons they sided with him during it was that Japan put its foot in it with Nanjing et al. But if Tokyo doesn't portray itself as out to destroy China, you think Long Yun or Sheng Shicai won't be happy to hang Chiang out to dry? They don't have to do anything much- just work out a modus vivendi with Tokyo and stay home while Chiang goes off to fight. Will it make a war-winning difference? No, but it will mean Chiang (a, has less cannon-fodder to use up, (b, anyone in the KMT and his army has places to bolt to if they want to get out, and (c, one or two of the warlords might actually start fighting the KMT if Japan gets very lucky. Of course, Japan can always backstab the warlords later on, but that's not the point.
Third, establish better relations with the West. Without getting into butterflies too much, don't be quite so hostile to Western interests (up to and including not grabbing French Indochina if you're really serious), and play up the dictatorial nature of Chiang's government. Do your best to make Wang Jingwei's government seem quasi-legitimate (it's a stretch, I know). All this to say: get the flow of aid to Chiang cut off, or better yet, don't start it in the first place. According to Jonathan Fenby's The Penguin History of Modern China (an excellent read, by the way, can't recommend it enough!), the West loaned the Nationalists over half a billion during the war (1). That's in US currency, not worthless Nationalist banknotes. From 1943 onwards, the Allies were committing to ship Chiang some 5,000 tonnes of supplies a month. I could go on; my point is that if Japan can, through insanely good diplomatic manoeuvring, get this tap turned off, they'll be in a much better position.
Fourth, establish stronger relations with the Soviet Union. Play down the anti-Communist rhetoric. Why is this important, given that the USSR didn't intervene in the war until it was too late anyhow? Well, this allows you to do a couple of things. If the USSR isn't funnelling fighters to Chiang (decent fighters, too), that helps. Good aircraft are just a microcosm, of course; if aid from the West and aid from the USSR is cut off, Chiang will be up a certain creek. But wait, there's more. Xinjiang and Mongolia are both in Stalin's pocket at this point. If Moscow can send weapons to Sheng Shicai or Khorloogiin Choibalsan (whew!), and they start pushing their autonomy and claims on Inner Mongolia respectively, that'll help.
Better still, a modus vivendi with the USSR enables Japan to co-operate, at least tacitly, with Mao. Now, the Chairman might not listen, but if he's not establishing bases behind Japan's lines and forcing Tokyo to waste men eliminating them, that can only help.
(1) Fenby, Jonathan, The Penguin History of Modern China (2008), pg 304
Second, the Japanese are a lot savvier, playing up the discontent within China. On the eve of the Japanese invasion, the KMT barely controlled half of China- yes, it was the valuable heartland with the most people and the most natural resources, but looking on a map, a huge portion of the country's landmass was out of their control. Obviously, those warlords had armies; they fought with Chiang before the war, and one of the main reasons they sided with him during it was that Japan put its foot in it with Nanjing et al. But if Tokyo doesn't portray itself as out to destroy China, you think Long Yun or Sheng Shicai won't be happy to hang Chiang out to dry? They don't have to do anything much- just work out a modus vivendi with Tokyo and stay home while Chiang goes off to fight. Will it make a war-winning difference? No, but it will mean Chiang (a, has less cannon-fodder to use up, (b, anyone in the KMT and his army has places to bolt to if they want to get out, and (c, one or two of the warlords might actually start fighting the KMT if Japan gets very lucky. Of course, Japan can always backstab the warlords later on, but that's not the point.
Third, establish better relations with the West. Without getting into butterflies too much, don't be quite so hostile to Western interests (up to and including not grabbing French Indochina if you're really serious), and play up the dictatorial nature of Chiang's government. Do your best to make Wang Jingwei's government seem quasi-legitimate (it's a stretch, I know). All this to say: get the flow of aid to Chiang cut off, or better yet, don't start it in the first place. According to Jonathan Fenby's The Penguin History of Modern China (an excellent read, by the way, can't recommend it enough!), the West loaned the Nationalists over half a billion during the war (1). That's in US currency, not worthless Nationalist banknotes. From 1943 onwards, the Allies were committing to ship Chiang some 5,000 tonnes of supplies a month. I could go on; my point is that if Japan can, through insanely good diplomatic manoeuvring, get this tap turned off, they'll be in a much better position.
Fourth, establish stronger relations with the Soviet Union. Play down the anti-Communist rhetoric. Why is this important, given that the USSR didn't intervene in the war until it was too late anyhow? Well, this allows you to do a couple of things. If the USSR isn't funnelling fighters to Chiang (decent fighters, too), that helps. Good aircraft are just a microcosm, of course; if aid from the West and aid from the USSR is cut off, Chiang will be up a certain creek. But wait, there's more. Xinjiang and Mongolia are both in Stalin's pocket at this point. If Moscow can send weapons to Sheng Shicai or Khorloogiin Choibalsan (whew!), and they start pushing their autonomy and claims on Inner Mongolia respectively, that'll help.
Better still, a modus vivendi with the USSR enables Japan to co-operate, at least tacitly, with Mao. Now, the Chairman might not listen, but if he's not establishing bases behind Japan's lines and forcing Tokyo to waste men eliminating them, that can only help.
(1) Fenby, Jonathan, The Penguin History of Modern China (2008), pg 304
Of course, after Chiang throws in the flannel, it's anyone's guess. The Generalissimo will probably get bumped off not long after, but if it's done by a fanatical nationalist (note the lowercase 'n', I'm not necessarily referring to a KMT member here), a Communist, or a Japanese agent, I couldn't tell you. Meiling might take off for the States, knowing her. Mao will have a slight problem in that Manchuria is denied to him, so he'll have to get creative if he wants to conquer the non-occupied bits of China. I don't image Wang Jingwei's regime will last too long; everyone will see it as the puppet it is, and it might assume a similar relationship to Tokyo as South Vietnam ended up doing to Washington: a tinpot client dictatorship that needs constant propping-up. Warlord Period 2.0? Maybe.
As for the Japanese, they'll obviously get Chinese recognition of Manchuria and Wang Jingwei's regime, preferential rights to Chinese natural resources, and a few other things, I'm sure.
Well, assuming Japan is actually successful in subjugating China into surrender and setting up a client state to administer the nation/territories/however China might be reorganized, I don't see Japan actually maintaining control for very long.
Even if Japan manages to win in China the effort to subjugate such a huge territory and population would exhaust Japan's ability to put manpower and materiel in the field, even assuming they never have to fight anyone else but China. I'm just speculating but trying to hold onto China might collapse Japan's economy before any real resources can be shipped back to the Home Islands or much (if any) of China's manpower can be put to work. Without a functioning economy the government likewise collapses and then it's anyone's guess how Japan fares after that.
Perhaps the Japanese forces in China would be recalled to stabilize what's left of the Japanese government, ending Japan's dominion over the mainland almost as soon as it began.
Maybe the government is overthrown in a popular rebellion when the promised riches from China aren't forthcoming fast enough to stave off hardships imposed on the Japanese by their own leadership, installing a new regime of your favourite political flavour (except communism, Japan was hard opposed to that, even in the general population).
Mayhaps the whole adventure on the mainland stagnates into just another flavour of Chinese Warlordism (or whatever you call it) when local government is in the hands of whoever can command the most soldiers without centralized control beyond some tribute/taxes being funneled back to Tokyo, leaving the whole edifice weak and ripe for overthrow by locals across Japan's would-be empire.
However it cracks, I just don't see Japan maintaining control over China or any of their other territories on the mainland. They might even lose Korea, but I recon they could maintain enough of a naval advantage to hold Formosa and their island possessions. The Powers That Be in Europe/Americas might leave it at that, considering Japan's collapse a nice bit of "I told you so" just desserts.
Even if Japan manages to win in China the effort to subjugate such a huge territory and population would exhaust Japan's ability to put manpower and materiel in the field, even assuming they never have to fight anyone else but China. I'm just speculating but trying to hold onto China might collapse Japan's economy before any real resources can be shipped back to the Home Islands or much (if any) of China's manpower can be put to work. Without a functioning economy the government likewise collapses and then it's anyone's guess how Japan fares after that.
Perhaps the Japanese forces in China would be recalled to stabilize what's left of the Japanese government, ending Japan's dominion over the mainland almost as soon as it began.
Maybe the government is overthrown in a popular rebellion when the promised riches from China aren't forthcoming fast enough to stave off hardships imposed on the Japanese by their own leadership, installing a new regime of your favourite political flavour (except communism, Japan was hard opposed to that, even in the general population).
Mayhaps the whole adventure on the mainland stagnates into just another flavour of Chinese Warlordism (or whatever you call it) when local government is in the hands of whoever can command the most soldiers without centralized control beyond some tribute/taxes being funneled back to Tokyo, leaving the whole edifice weak and ripe for overthrow by locals across Japan's would-be empire.
However it cracks, I just don't see Japan maintaining control over China or any of their other territories on the mainland. They might even lose Korea, but I recon they could maintain enough of a naval advantage to hold Formosa and their island possessions. The Powers That Be in Europe/Americas might leave it at that, considering Japan's collapse a nice bit of "I told you so" just desserts.
I don't know about that. The banks weren't broke on the colonial empires until world war two. I think a fair number of interwar PODS around 35-36 could see the British and French empires survive in a few forms.
Regardless, as to the OP, i think that if the long march failed and the communists destroyed as a force, and then the nationalists surrendered, then that's the only Chinese authorities who matter out of the game. Japan could mop up the guerrillas given enough time (the real hard part given the militarist control). Personally, I think the demographics alone mean that this would become less a Japanese empire and more of a Chinese one separating ethnic Koreans from the population they'd only be about 20% Japanese in their claimed territory. (assuming they have the same claims as the PRC or ROC or even the Qing). A settler colony would be impossible and unlike British India, I don't think that they'd be able to just extract to supply Japan. The demographics aren't on japan's side, the tech difference isn't insurmountable for china, and japan would need china to be more than a piggy bank if they want to compete with the established european powers
I agree that some have speculated that avoiding World War II might have extended the colonial system. I disagree. Look no further than the 1931 Statute of Westminster freeing the white colonies and the revolutionary activities in India. The desire for freedom was afoot, including in the US. I would quote Senator Dirksen “Stronger than all the armies is an idea whose time has come”. The time has come for equality of opportunity in sharing of government, in education, and in employment. It must not be stayed or denied. It is here!"
As to China you are right that the simple population demographics make a traditional colonial system unachievable, I believe the quest for freedom would have been as strong in China as elsewhere. Indeed it was in the US where the returning Afro American GIs had seen a different system where World War II had the greatest home front social effects.
The statute of westminister didn't exactly get rid of British control in the settler colonies, given that britain still had legal influence into the 80s. Plus, that's only true of britain. France could likely hold more of their empire, since they integrated it with Paris instead of decentralizing like Britain
Puppet states.
First, my knowledge of this period is very limited, and second I agree that the army was just fighting a war for the sake of fighting a war, with no real end goal. However, the one way out the Japanese had that would provide some benefit to the Japanese ruling class, was to have China consist of puppet states, where the Japanese were free to haul off their raw materials and women and set up factories with slave labor, plus the Chinese would not be a threat to Japan.
Except for the sex slave part, this is pretty much what the British did achieve in India between the 1750s and 1940s, so its doable, but it means going a lot softer. Plus the colonial power that contested the British in India was the French, and France was spread thin. Japan has to face the United States (as in IOTL), the Soviet Union, and possibly Germany and Britain supporting any native Chinese resistance. The Japanese IOTL did set up a workable collaborator government in Manchukuo and had another potential one in Wang Jingwei's regime. They could get a situation where these are supported by Chinese troops against other Chinese factions, while collaborating with Tokyo, but this means keeping down the looting and it wouldn't be as fun.
First, my knowledge of this period is very limited, and second I agree that the army was just fighting a war for the sake of fighting a war, with no real end goal. However, the one way out the Japanese had that would provide some benefit to the Japanese ruling class, was to have China consist of puppet states, where the Japanese were free to haul off their raw materials and women and set up factories with slave labor, plus the Chinese would not be a threat to Japan.
Except for the sex slave part, this is pretty much what the British did achieve in India between the 1750s and 1940s, so its doable, but it means going a lot softer. Plus the colonial power that contested the British in India was the French, and France was spread thin. Japan has to face the United States (as in IOTL), the Soviet Union, and possibly Germany and Britain supporting any native Chinese resistance. The Japanese IOTL did set up a workable collaborator government in Manchukuo and had another potential one in Wang Jingwei's regime. They could get a situation where these are supported by Chinese troops against other Chinese factions, while collaborating with Tokyo, but this means keeping down the looting and it wouldn't be as fun.
To add to my earlier comment, in the 18th century the East India Company faced a similar situation, a power vacuum after the collapse of an empire, and weren't really much more disciplined than the Japanese in China, so it is possible the Japanese could have gotten a similar result.
Eh. I'm not too sure of this.
Sure China had the space and manpower to trade but Chiang's government couldn't withstand war in perpetuity.
Moreover, a Japan that still gets it's oil shipments from the US on schedule is a Japan that can continue the fight for much longer.
With no escalation of Japanese military operations post 1940, and pressures from within his United Front growing to the point of fracture, Chiang probably sues for peace between 1942- 1945.
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