Assuming a 1945 dead Stalin and a USSR with a lighter touch, maintaining a sphere of influence in eastern Europe but content to allow the countries of OTL's Warsaw Pact to maintain their political systems and so forth, what do these countries look like? Specifically Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria?
What does a Finlandized Eastern Europe look like?
- Thread starter Mynock
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Well, Finland was historically paranoid of Russia and managed to be cowed regardless by calculation of national self-interest.
I think that the region would have a varied response. You would have everything on the spectrum from perhaps happiness for countries like Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria with relatively pro-Russian histories and fears of their neighbours to deep hostility in countries like Hungary and Romania which warred with the Soviet Union.
I do wonder if one thing Finlandization needed were examples, for Finland, of how badly things could go if Finlandization was rejected.
I do think this is easier for Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria who leaned fairly pro-Soviet initially. Perhaps their communist parties retain their post-war successes aided by association with a popular USSR. Romania I'm not sure, do the Soviets install Groza before they leave? If they do then his policies of land reform and woman's suffrage may be enough for a decent genuine electoral performance, at least for a plurality. In Hungary the communists lost the first immediate postwar election, in Poland we never saw a reasonably fair post-war election and I suspect there's a reason for that. I would suspect they will be the most difficult candidates for Finlandization. This is all a product of a very surface level understanding mind you.
Perhaps a restless Hungary or Poland could serve as this, or East Germany perhaps.
In the case of Czechoslovakia, too, the degree to which Czechoslovaks were disappointed by the lack of Western support in 1948 should not be underestimated. Similarly, approval of the Soviet Union as a friendly Slavic power was at a high immediately after the Second World War. I think that there is a real possibility of a democratic Czechoslovakia staying friendly with Moscow after 1948, to the extent that it might even welcome Soviet protection.
Perhaps Romania?
That is exactly my thinking.
Maybe. I think there's a case that East Germany represents a pretty strong vision of "stay in line or else."
Is it not more they are too large and too easily supported by the west (if the west controls or includes Germany) for them to be Finland-ized?
The west doesn't necessarily control Germany in this TL. Though keeping with a theme of Finlandisation, this could be a TL featuring a united neutral Germany. Which in itself would probably help the Soviets, Czechoslovakia and Poland may want to stick closer to the Soviets out of a fear of German resurgence. While this fear wouldn't come to pass, it could be a useful carrot for the Kremlin.
US money would control everybody in that case would it not if USSR doesn't stop people from taking it, and It's still on the table....? If the entire of Europe starts taking US (and other international, but it's mostly US as US was something like 50% of world economy in 1945) trade (and rebuilding money) after WW2 and they will without USSR stopping them, ending up all growing ever closer to the West Europe and harder for USSR to keep Finland-ized? Just like OTL Finland joining EU and then now NATO....
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I think that the OTL outcome we had, of a unified Europe encompassing both western and eastern Europe closely linked to the United States, may have been relatively unlikely. The unity of this Europe and its transatlantic connection may have been enabled by the extreme rigidity of Cold War alignments, something that was enabled arguably more by the Soviet Union than the United States. The decision to clamp down entirely on Czechoslovakia, opting to end the possibility of a friendly pro-Soviet democracy in place of a more reliable dictatorship, ensured the Cold War, while the intense drama of Yugoslavia showed how the Soviets were unable to tolerate any deviation from their ideological line. The US was certainly willing to intervene against Communists in western Europe, but it did not impose the same ideological hegemony in western Europe that the Soviets did in eastern Europe.
A less pragmatic and more permissive Soviet policy in eastern Europe could have worked well. Imagine a Soviet Union that let Yugoslavia do whatever, let Czechoslovakia make itself a Soviet-friendly neutral, perhaps even create the conditions for Poland to accept something like a Soviet alliance (fear of revanchist unified Germany?). There would still be plenty of issues, but a Soviet policy in eastern Europe that did not present an appearance of an expanding empire might undermine the whole Cold War.
And at that point the USSR loses the Cold War before it starts as soon as the European economies recover from WW2 USSR is far less dominant than OTL and simply can't dictate policy to 1/2 of Europe?
Is that necessarily an issue? USSR could never win the Cold War so it’s better not to play. Just need to make sure that the stronger USA doesn’t undermine the state covertly and MAD will prevent any military attacks.
If you think it’s a betrayal of communism, soviet leaders just need to remind people that communism is inevitable, USSR just needs to survive until then
It is unclear to me that there would even be a Cold War in Europe, if (say) you had a unified neutral Germany, a pro-Soviet Czechoslovakia that remained a democracy, a Yugoslavia that happily went its own way, etc. Especially if things in Poland go well enough, what would the big threat be that would unify western Europe with the United States in a transatlantic alliance? If the Soviet Union does not present an appearance of an expanding empire, would there even be a single Cold War?
What would, I wonder, be American policy if the Soviet Union had established itself as a status quo power that it could deal with? It is not at all clear to me that you would get anything like a world-dividing conflict, at least out of events in Europe. (What of China?)
And what happens when Poland gets into an argument with USSR and UK & France and USA this time provide it with guarantees.....
The issue is that a developing open capitalist Europe will inevitably end up closer to the USA than USSR simply due to trade links and the fact that USSR is not willing to open up its secrecy or banks like the USA is? Unless the US retreats into isolationism again as policy It's going to be a stronger force in Europe and it far richer anyway as well so a more attractive partner if you are give a choice in the matter.
Now, unlike Finland and Czechoslovakia, none of these countries did not have a recent democratic tradition to build upon.
So the most likely version would a larger version of interwar Baltic states: a single "party of power" led by a paternal autocrat figure who cements his reign by claims that His special wits and charm are the only thing keeping the Bear at bay. State media and newspapers would follow the public line, with perhaps token outlets of dissent left open for human rights activists and intellectuals.
All leading political figures would have their personally assigned "aprons" from the local Soviet embassy and Soviet intel services, and they would cultivate these friendships and networks to promote their own careers in domestic politics.
Domestically there would be publicly taboo subjects (the war era), with active historiography that would seek to explain away the prewar attitudes and foreign policy as tragic mistakes and showcase the postwar Soviet generosity towards Eastern Europe as proof of the faulty basis of the prewar anti-Soviet stance.
Access to Soviet resource markets and more mutually beneficial trade than in TTL together with a lack of costly arms races would most likely witness a rise of DDR-type social policies mixed with conservative "family values". People dissatisfied with the postwar status quo or linked to prewar elites would often migrate West instead of being deported to Soviet Union like in TTL, creating early brain drain.
Without venturing to modern-day politics too much, there already is a country in central Europe that follows this model.
So the most likely version would a larger version of interwar Baltic states: a single "party of power" led by a paternal autocrat figure who cements his reign by claims that His special wits and charm are the only thing keeping the Bear at bay. State media and newspapers would follow the public line, with perhaps token outlets of dissent left open for human rights activists and intellectuals.
All leading political figures would have their personally assigned "aprons" from the local Soviet embassy and Soviet intel services, and they would cultivate these friendships and networks to promote their own careers in domestic politics.
Domestically there would be publicly taboo subjects (the war era), with active historiography that would seek to explain away the prewar attitudes and foreign policy as tragic mistakes and showcase the postwar Soviet generosity towards Eastern Europe as proof of the faulty basis of the prewar anti-Soviet stance.
Access to Soviet resource markets and more mutually beneficial trade than in TTL together with a lack of costly arms races would most likely witness a rise of DDR-type social policies mixed with conservative "family values". People dissatisfied with the postwar status quo or linked to prewar elites would often migrate West instead of being deported to Soviet Union like in TTL, creating early brain drain.
Without venturing to modern-day politics too much, there already is a country in central Europe that follows this model.
That could be one thing spoiling this project, but I would note that it would not be inevitable.
Will it? Even in the OTL.Cold War, western Europe as a whole and as individual states was more than willing to collaborate with the Soviet Union on different economic projects, oil and gas being big. (Western Europe was, of course, much more eager to collaborate with the satellites.) The biggest factor restraining western Europe was the fear of the Soviet threat.
In a timeline where there is not an acute arms race with and threat from the Soviet Union, with Germany unified and central and southeastern Europe under relatively independent governments, there will be much more collaboration, much more credible space for win-win agreements. Anti-Communist and anti-Soviet solidarity will be hardpressed in the face of the real potential for mutual profit.
Central and eastern Europe, then, would look a lot like southern Europe, which laboured under military regimes or even fascists well into the 1970s.
Continuing this discussion, the question becomes how much rapprochement between this central/eastern Europe and western Europe becomes possible. I would suggest that we might be able to look towards southern Europe, with the Iberian republics and Yugoslavia and Greece being mostly outside the main alliances of western Europe (NATO, the EEC) but being.on the periphery and definitely integrated economically.
The example of Finland gives us an example of how far this could go. Finland was able to become a model Nordic social democracy, it was able to be a full participation in the Nordic Council, and it was an associate member of EFTA. The Soviet Union, however, kept it from anything tighter; they vetoed Finnish participation in the proposed Nordek economic community, scuppering that project.
I suspect that there might not be that much interest in doing this, given resentments from the Second World War. I kind of think that, after the extreme levels of violence of 1939-1945, it might well have been impossible for Poland or even Czechoslovakia to have the sort of friendly if cautious relationship with Germany that they developed after 1990 much earlier. It would just be too soon.
The example of Finland gives us an example of how far this could go. Finland was able to become a model Nordic social democracy, it was able to be a full participation in the Nordic Council, and it was an associate member of EFTA. The Soviet Union, however, kept it from anything tighter; they vetoed Finnish participation in the proposed Nordek economic community, scuppering that project.
I suspect that there might not be that much interest in doing this, given resentments from the Second World War. I kind of think that, after the extreme levels of violence of 1939-1945, it might well have been impossible for Poland or even Czechoslovakia to have the sort of friendly if cautious relationship with Germany that they developed after 1990 much earlier. It would just be too soon.
When it comes to Poland, prewar Sanacja regime was completely discredited in the eyes of the Poles for the failure from September Campaign, and the polish government-in-exile was composed of the prewar democratic opposition.
Are you sure about that? When the Soviets invaded Poland under the excuse of "protecting the minorities", Rydz-Śmigły ordered the polish armies to do not fight the Soviets in other situations than in self-defence or to prevent being disarmed, and to negociate with the Soviets the withdrawals of the polish armies to Hungary or to Romania. The polish armies listened and used to surrender their garrisons to the Soviets after being promised to go away. And even after the Soviets broke these promises every single time, even after the massive arrestments and deportations of Poles to Gulag, Sikorski's government-in-exile agreed on 30 July 1941 to restore the diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in an alliance against Germany. And even after the revelation of Katyń Massacre and the way Stalin ostentatiously broke off the diplomatic relations with Sikorski's government, the Home Army still chose to cooperate with the Soviets in the Operation Tempest in a hope that maybe the Soviets will honour this gesture. They didn't, the Home Army faced the massive arrestments and executions of its key leaders, and even after all of it the Poles still started the Warsaw Uprising with a hope to get help from the Soviets. The Poles didn't receive it, the survivors from Warsaw faced the arresments and executions at the hands of the bolsheviks, and even after all of that, the leaders of the Polish Underground State still agreed to go to the meeting proposed to them by the Soviets (a meeting which in the end ended up with the Trial of the Sixteen).
Shortly said, during ww2 the Poles showed plenty of will to coexist with the USSR. The bolsheviks are those who never honoured it.
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No independent Polish government would have willingly accepted Stalin's seizure of the eastern half of prewar Poland, even traded for Prussia as it was. Not to mention the violent ethnic cleansing of the Polish populations of Belarus and Ukraine, completing the UPA's agenda of racial purity. For Polish-Soviet relations to be good postwar, Stalin has to go, period.