What does a 1950s WWIII look like?

Whenever I see discussions on this forum of how the Cold War could have devolved into a world war, they tend to focus on either the immediate aftermath of WWII (Operation Unthinkable, etc.), when nuclear weapons would probably play a relatively minor role, or decades after the fact (the Cuban Missile Crisis, Able Archer, etc.), when such weapons would figure in much more prominently. I’ve seen comparatively little discussion, though, of what WWIII would look like had it broken out in the 1950s. Now, I suspect that there would be a huge difference between a world war that starts in early 1950 and a world war that starts in late 1959, so let’s narrow things down to the middle part of that decade. More specifically, let’s pick 1956 as the year, given that there were several geopolitical crises that year, including the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution (indeed, the two were almost conterminous). So let’s say that one or both set off a chain of events that quickly ends with NATO and the Warsaw Pact going to war.

What does such a war look like? What countries would comprise the two factions, beyond the obvious. My understanding is that the Sino-Soviet split was only have been in its very earliest stages, so is it fair to say that China likely would have entered the war on Moscow’s side? What would have been the relative strength of the two factions in manpower, equipment, and nuclear weapons? What would be the major theaters of such a conflict? And how is such a conflict likely to conclude, and what would be the long-term implications?
 

thorr97

Banned
The Soviets would have the advantage in Europe with conventional forces. Depending on how early in the 50s you set your TL. the US would have either a considerable or an overwhelming advantage in strategic nuclear bombing capability. Thus the Red Army might well wind up on the eastern shores of the English Channel coast but all of Mother Russia would be a glassed over smoking ruin.
 

Jack Brisco

Banned
The Soviets would have the advantage in Europe with conventional forces. Depending on how early in the 50s you set your TL. the US would have either a considerable or an overwhelming advantage in strategic nuclear bombing capability. Thus the Red Army might well wind up on the eastern shores of the English Channel coast but all of Mother Russia would be a glassed over smoking ruin.

Yeah, pretty much.

We had a pretty good-sized military during the 1950's. Gained a lot of combat experience in Korea. The USSR might not have gotten to the Channel after all.

https://historyinpieces.com/research/us-military-personnel-1954-2014
 
Soviet advantage in conventional military power is rather well offset by NATO superiority in nuclear weapons, especially with the mass introduction of tactical nukes from the mid-50s on. As noted above, stopping the Soviet military on the east bank of the Rhine is feasible in such circumstances, although the West Germans might not appreciate it very much... well, those who survive.
 
A war in the early 1950s would be horrifically destructive, but it would not be as bad as one that occurred in the mid to late fifties, after the invention of the hydrogen bomb and the exponential growth of the American nuclear arsenal.

SAC_Targets.gif
Here is a target map from 1950, in which about 120 cities are targeted in the Eastern Bloc.

And here is a target map from 1956, which lists over one thousand targets
 
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A war in the early 1950s would be horrifically destructive, but it would not be as bad as one that occurred in the mid to late fifties, after the invention of the hydrogen bomb and the exponential growth of the American nuclear arsenal.

View attachment 417626 Here is a target map from 1950, in which about 120 cities are targeted in the Eastern Bloc.

And here is a target map from 1956, which lists over one thousand targets

Regarding the 1956 map, what percentage of those targets would actually be reasonably likely to be hit?
 
Regarding the 1956 map, what percentage of those targets would actually be reasonably likely to be hit?

Unfortunately I don't have any numbers for the 1956 map, but I do have some for the 1950 one. However, given the greater number of bombers available, the better specs of B52s vs older ones like the B36, and the shorter time period of the war (days and weeks vs months and years) I think SAC losses would be lower in the late fifties.

From the introduction to the print edition of Operation Dropshot:

The Joint Chiefs directed Lieutenant General J. E. Hull, an officer highly ex
perienced in the problems of strategic warfare, to form a group and then study
and report upon the effectiveness of SAC. For planning purposes the target date
for the war they visualized was I January 1950, not I January 1 957. After a
year of study Hull produced a report which was called Evaluation of Effec
tiveness of Strategic Air Operations.
This reports shows that, as in so many other fields, the United States' in
telligence about Russia was lamentable, for clearly Hui: had to make a study of
the effectiveness of an attack force on the basis of an almost total ignorance of
the defense.
The Hull evaluators were, therefore, compelled to assume-a very dangerous
thing to do in war or when planning for it-two different levels of Russian
defense capability. One was a high level of competence, in which Russia had
modernized its World War II apparatus, incorporating the Luftwaffe's experi
ence, equipment, and techniques. The lower estimate assumed that the Rus
sians had not extensively developed their air defenses much beyond the state of
the science as it existed in World War II.
Against this background of ignorance and assumption (two of the great of-
The United States Plan for War with the USSR in 1957 25
fenses in military lore), General Hull and his team examined the evidence to
see whether SAC could or could not get through to targets in nine strategic
areas: Moscow-Leningrad; the Urals; the Black Sea; the Caucasus; the Archan
gel area; Tashkent-Alma-Ata; Novosibirsk; Lake Baikal; and Vladivostok.
The Hull team ran very extensive and expensive aerial tests, war games, and
computations of many kinds, visualizing every conceivable situation. The sum
total of this theoretical experience was then studied and two aerial war games
were played.
The first was a daylight raid by 223 B-29s and B-50s, carrying thirty-two
atomic bombs against the Black Sea target area. Very large numbers of elec
tronic countermeasure (ECM) aircraft were employed to divert the Soviet de
fenses from the atom-bomb carriers and to "red-herring" the ground defenses.
It was assumed that the area was defended by 270 jet fighters and 550 piston
engined aircraft.
The attackers crossed the frontier at a cruising altitude of thirty-five thousand
feet and bombed from thirty-five thousand feet-important factors where
piston-engined aircraft were concerned because of their inability to operate with
any high degree of effectiveness beyond thirty thousand feet. The higher and
lower levels of defense competences were assumed and applied. In terms of
SAC casualties, the findings were close to disastrous.
In the case of the more competent level of defense, SAC was judged to have
lost thirty-five aircraft to fighters (twenty after they had released their bombs
a point, it should be said, in SAC's favor), two to antiaircraft artillery fire, and
five to what were called (without definition) "operational causes." In addition,
fourteen aircraft were judged to have aborted before reaching the target. As a
result, twenty-four of the thirty-two bombs dispatched were judged to have
been dropped on their targets. Three bombs were Jost in crashing aircraft, two
were returned in the aborted aircraft, and three were dropped outside the in
tended target area.
The second war game was a night raid, again into the Black Sea area. The
more competent defense was assumed. Ninety-six aircraft went in with thirty
two atomic bombs (again the majority of the planes were ECMs, there to baffle
the defenses). Fifty night fighters were assumed to be defending the target area.
In the raid seven aircraft were lost to night fighters, two to antiaircraft artillery
fire, and two to "operational causes." Twenty-three bombs reached their in
tended aiming points; three were lost; four returned in aborting aircraft-eight
aborted; and two fell outside the target areas. In neither war game did the Hull
report state how many aircraft were damaged or damaged beyond repair by
enemy action, but other evidence indicates that this type of casualty would have
been heavy.
In any event, in both cases, about 70 percent of the bombers succeeded in
dropping their bombs in the intended target areas, but with this important dif
ference: the night raid was executed with half the bombers used in the daylight
raid and with about a quarter of the casualties. The capacity of SAC to get
through was distinctly encouraging. But the losses were serious because, if they
persisted, SAC would not be able to sustain the campaign without drawing
upon the mothballed reserve. Accordingly, the Hull evaluators turned to this re
serve and discovered an alarming factor: very few of these aircraft would be
airworthy for eighteen months. Here then was another strike to add against the
campaign's feasibility-another strike to add to the base question to limit
SAC's ability to carry out its mission.
With all the data at hand, the Hull evaluators undertook four atomic offen
sives to establish just how serious the casualty and replacement situation might
become. Their findings were embodied in a chapter entitled "Estimate of
Overall Losses and Results for Several Different Hypothetical Atomic Offen
sives.
In Offensive A, the striking force available consisted of 260 B-29s and B-
50s, 30 B-36s, and 72 very-long-range reconnaissance planes.
Against the lower level of defense, 87 1 sorties on three night attacks resulted
in the loss of thirty-three aircraft, with twenty-three damaged beyond repair
fifty-six aircraft, or just over a sixth of the force. These were very heavy
casualties and could not be sustained, as we shall see. On the other hand, 1 86
atomic bombs were delivered to the targets, representing 85 percent of those in
tended.
With the higher Russian defense capability, 1 ,039 sorties were launched in
four night attacks to deliver 1 76 bombs on target (80-percent satisfactory deliv
ery). But the losses were grievous: 123 aircraft were lost over enemy territory,
with 25 damaged beyond repair. This represented a 32-percent loss factor. Such
a rate of loss meant that after the first strikes SAC would become progressively
weakened to the point where very rapidly it would not be able to sustain the
atomic campaign.
These were grave data. But when the Hull group came to evaluate what
would have happened on daylight offensives, the news became even graver.
In four days of massed daylight operations against the higher-level Soviet
defense, 1 ,22 1 sorties delivered 153 bombs (70-percent completion) with the
loss of 222 aircraft over enemy territory and 27 damaged beyond repair. This
was an overall loss of 55 percent of the force availab/e--catastrophically high
and far higher than the worst losses suffered in any strategic attack during
World War II. (During that war the worst loss was that suffered by the Royal
Air Force Bomber Command when Four Group lost 20.6 percent of its air
craft-twenty out of ninety-seven Halifaxes-in the great attack on Nuremberg
on the night of 30--3 1 March 1944.)
For the lower level of Russian defense competence, the dispersed type of day
raids could-Hull judged-be employed. Otherwise daylight raids were out of
the question now and in the future. Even so, the dispersed daylight raids would
suffer heavier casualties than were encountered at any time during World War
II. This war game provided for 993 sorties in four days of operations. The anal
ysis showed that in order to deliver 185 bombs on target (85-percent comple-
The United States Plan for War with the USSR in 1 957 27
tion), SAC would lose 168 aircraft over Russia, and 22 would be lost through
other causes or damaged beyond repair. This meant 41-percent casualties. This
rate was very high indeed-probably unacceptably high-and if such casualties
persisted, it meant that SAC would probably be unable to complete the entire
Dropshot program.
The Hull group now made a final casualty summary. They decided that the
atomic phase of the air campaign could be carried out at night with total losses
of the order of 30 percent of the bomber force for 80-percent completion of the
program. Dispersed raids in daylight would be possible only against the less ef
fective defense. For the better of the two defense systems, only concentrated
raids could be laid on in daylight, and the strike force would lose 55 percent of
the bomber force to complete 70 percent of the offensive.
In conclusion, the Hull group turned to the question of logistic factors in the
campaign. The analysis showed that a strategic bombing effort of the magni
tude of the campaign could not be supported by the supplies of aircraft, parts,
fuel, ordnance, personnel, and transportation that would exist on I May
1950--ven assuming that the bases would be available. However, the evalua
tors agreed, a more limited effort, which included the whole of the atomic
phase of the air attack, could be executed beginning I May 1950. This involved
the delivery of some 300 atomic bombs, including a second-strike allocation of
some 70 such weapons. They found that one of the key factors preventing the
execution of the entire aerial attack program was the current strategic reserves
of fuel. These were not adequate; indeed sufficient fuel only for two thousand
sorties would be available-enough to complete only the atomic phase of the
campaign.
Secondly, Hull reported that in the opinion of his group the bomber force
allocated to SAC for the air campaign was too small to complete the plan satis
factorily, given the expected casualty rates of the campaign. Moreover, addi
tional bombers could be made available only at the expense of those committed
to training, testing, command support, and administration. Hull warned that if
these were used, the Phase 2 of the campaign would be seriously delayed.
To add to SAC' s difficulties, the airlift needed to deploy SAC units overseas
in Phase I was in excess of Military Air Transport Service capacity. The only
way the emergency deployment could be undertaken was by the use of bombers
to help move the men and the equipment needed to launch the air attack-and
this in turn would affect the bombers' ability to launch the immediate retalia
tion which war with Russia would demand. In all, Hull reported, the attack
would require "considerable modification to make it logistically feasible."
As for the British bases, Hull went on, an inspection revealed that they were
"exceedingly vulnerable" to air attack, that no organized defense would exist
at the time SAC began to execute its war plan, and that the British would
require thirty days' warning to organize such a defense. Hull noted that "Since
the Soviets realize the significance of these bases and appreciate the difficulties
of a tight air defense, it is not unlikely that their first hostile move would be to
attack these bases" and deny them to SAC. Such an attack, of course, would
wreck not only the aerial campaign but also the other counterblows in Drop
shot.
On this somber note the study ended. Two months later, on 1 1 April 1 950,
Major General S. E. Anderson, Director of USAF plans and operations, com
menting upon the Hull report, wrote a memorandum to W. Stuart Symington,
the Secretary of the Air Force. Given the acute political tensions that existed, it
must have been an extremely disturbing document for the President, the Cabi
net, and the Joint Chiefs.
General Anderson agreed that the SAC campaign was not entirely a feasible
operation of war. He agreed that only the atomic phase could be carried out
with the men and materiel available on D-Day, but even so SAC would not be
able to guarantee a primary requirement built into the air plan: that the atomic
attack be compressed into the shortest possible time "in order to create the
greatest possible shock effect on the USSR." Such was the state of SAC in
those days that Plan Trojan, for example, did not propose to atomize either
Moscow or Leningrad until the ninth day of the war. But why would SAC's
counteroffensive as planned be so slow in getting airborne? Because, as Ander
son reported, of "insufficient bases overseas [and] insufficient prestocked fuel
supplies overseas.''
But there were also other factors: too few Military Air Transport Command
planes to ferry the ground crews, weapons, and ground handling equipment;
sabotage and bombardment at both ends of the flight; political negotiations with
the governments concerned; and the general effects and shock of the surprise
attack the Russians were expected to launch.
These matters were, of course, corrected later, and SAC did soon afterward
reach a degree of efficiency that was almost superhuman. However, at that time
Anderson was compelled to declare that: "In the event of war in 1950, the Air
Force can (a) complete the atomic phase of the planned strategic air offensive
(b) provide inadequate air defense for the United States and Alaska (c) initiate
mobilization and training. " The Air Force could not "(a) complete the entire
air offensive called for in Trojan or (b) provide the air defense for the United
States and Alaska with the maximum risk we can afford to take. "
To sum up, if the Hull and Anderson reports are accepted as being in the
realm of accurate forecasting and analysis, then the aerial campaign as planned
could not have succeeded. It was true that appalling damage could have been
inflicted on Russia, but only at appalling loss to the U.S. Air Force. Presum
ably Truman, the Cabinet, and the Joint Chiefs would have accepted this loss,
but would SAC have done so? If the evidence of World War II and the Viet
nam war has validity, air crews are prepared to accept serious losses up to a
point. But as was demonstrated after the terrible losses suffered by the Royal
Air Force Bomber Command at Nuremberg during the raid of 30-3 1 March
1 944, a form of mutiny spreads through even elite forces when casualties
become catastrophic-and as the above figures show, Dropshot losses would
have been catastrophic.
 
Was the nuclear bombing plan solely busting the largest cities or was there also a plan to focus on transportation hubs?
The Soviets might have more troops, but they won’t move fast if supplies can’t get to the front.
 
The space race goes hot as the US and USSR compete to keep satellites in orbit for military needs and the ASAT weapons needed to knock them down? Combined with some wunderwaffe like rods from god being used once or twice?
 
A war in the early 1950s would be horrifically destructive, but it would not be as bad as one that occurred in the mid to late fifties, after the invention of the hydrogen bomb and the exponential growth of the American nuclear arsenal.

View attachment 417626 Here is a target map from 1950, in which about 120 cities are targeted in the Eastern Bloc.

I wouldn’t put much stock in the 1950 target map panning out realistically. It was cobbled together using some pretty awful intelligence gathering methodology. The 1956 target map, on the other hand, is excellent and benefitted from far greater intelligence gathering undertaken during the early and mid-1950s.
 
As has been said before on this subject:

The US suffers a couple of glancing blows. If our luck is really bad we lose a couple of cities.

Western Europe gets its teeth kicked in.

The USSR ceases to exist as a sovereign nation.
 
Here is a target map from 1950, in which about 120 cities are targeted in the Eastern Bloc.
Hang on a moment there. I see Denmark below Scandinavia in the top left corner of the map. Is it just because of the map projection, or does it look like there are nuclear targets in West Germany as well as East? And one a bit east of that, in Warsaw?

Yikes. Nuclear planners don't mess around.
 
The space race goes hot as the US and USSR compete to keep satellites in orbit for military needs and the ASAT weapons needed to knock them down? Combined with some wunderwaffe like rods from god being used once or twice?

Exceptionally unlikely. It took everything the US could do to get a man to the moon in the late 60s. In the mid 50s neither side had the capability to do much. Satellites were extremely rudimentary. Sputnik, which was launched a year after the desired POD, basically just beeped. Even with a full mobilization towards that goal with blank checks to do whatever with it would still take them several years to accomplish weaponizing space. Meanwhile one or the other (or both) would be dealing with the loss of significant cities to nuclear attack.

A 1956 POD probably isn't kind to Europe. The Far East might be a little better off, but probably gets set back again.

The winner would be the global South. Even a mild nuclear Winter would cause millions more deaths and a breakdown of remaining civilization in some of the affected Northern Hemisphere countries. India would be a clear leader in Asia only a few years after independence. Africa would probably get ignored. For the first time ever that would be a positive thing. South America would not only be ignored by the fighting, but would probably become the target for a wave of skilled immigrants fleeing the radioactive ruins of Europe. Australia and New Zealand would join the US in getting a wave of British Isles refugees. The cold & threat of starvation might cause a huge wave of immigration from Scandinavia (which probably isn't a bomb target) as well. The French and British still held most of their African empires as well and you may see some of those heavily affected (like Algeria).
 

Geon

Donor
There was considerable popular fiction written during that period about World War III. Four novels I could recommend from that general period are Tomorrow! and Triumph by Phillip Wylie (note while Triumph was written in 1963 it clearly sees things from a fiftyish perspective.) Also the well-known Alas Babylon and Forbidden Area by Pat Frank.

In Triumph the war begins with Tito's death and a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia and escalates from there.
 
There was considerable popular fiction written during that period about World War III. Four novels I could recommend from that general period are Tomorrow! and Triumph by Phillip Wylie (note while Triumph was written in 1963 it clearly sees things from a fiftyish perspective.) Also the well-known Alas Babylon and Forbidden Area by Pat Frank.

In Triumph the war begins with Tito's death and a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia and escalates from there.

Are any of them reasonably realistic?
 
US has an ICBM designed in 1946 with 8000 mile capacity, we tested at least 3 and perhaps as many as 10 were in some way *publically* acknowledged. Much of that information and research went to the Atlas program later.

In addition, in the early 1950s the US has a near-monopoly on supply for nukes and will bring that to bear. Same for late 50s but worse. The Soviet units in West Germany and Austria find everything behind them a radioactive graveyard and ahead of them a porcupine defense of death by tactical nukes and chemical weapons if necessary.

Overall: varying degrees of NATO/US win with much Europe a massive graveyard (especially east of the Rhine); Scandinavia, Bavaria, central/southern Italy, Spain, and chunks of the Balkans likely survive largely intact as might Albania by default if the war occurs in the late 1950s. Switzerland pulls a full-on Gunnison and all communication is -radio only- with deadly consequences for interlopers. America survives and loses at least two cities, at most six, heck you could get a Soviet bomber <i>landing</i> in exchange for pardons and refugee status. America is also a hated single power in a unipolar world that rejects Communisim in all forms, it also halts civil rights for a decade and the capital may change to New York City or Denver or Chicago depending on what cities are/not lost. Decolonization accelerates but becomes much blander, the British colonies come under the auspices of a revitalized Commonwealth led by Canada, South Africa, and Australia - essentially the 'Five Eyes' treaty turned tradong bloc to encompass much of the Third World and English-speaking First World. French colonies may either descend into chaos or organize into a distinct bloc of West African states with perhaps French Guiana becoming a refugee site or American protectorate. South Asia breaks out into open warfare with the Middle East becoming a bloodbath and India locked in internecine warfare until finalizing a brutal victory over its Pakistani rival once and for all a few yeats later. Eventually India grows into a Federation encompassing the former Raj but with additional states including Afghanistan, her monarchy revitalized and a council of Princes becoming an equal to a House of Lords. Indochina unites and damns any foreigners who try to meddle in local affairs, Japan begins a mild Self-Defense remilitarization and provides what aid it can to South Korea, Taiwan, and even China - this helps heal the deep wounds from years past but by no means resolves them completely. South America hardly notices, especially as the United States emerges as a unipolar power.
 
US has an ICBM designed in 1946 with 8000 mile capacity, we tested at least 3 and perhaps as many as 10 were in some way *publically* acknowledged. Much of that information and research went to the Atlas program later.

In addition, in the early 1950s the US has a near-monopoly on supply for nukes and will bring that to bear. Same for late 50s but worse. The Soviet units in West Germany and Austria find everything behind them a radioactive graveyard and ahead of them a porcupine defense of death by tactical nukes and chemical weapons if necessary.

Overall: varying degrees of NATO/US win with much Europe a massive graveyard (especially east of the Rhine); Scandinavia, Bavaria, central/southern Italy, Spain, and chunks of the Balkans likely survive largely intact as might Albania by default if the war occurs in the late 1950s. Switzerland pulls a full-on Gunnison and all communication is -radio only- with deadly consequences for interlopers. America survives and loses at least two cities, at most six, heck you could get a Soviet bomber <i>landing</i> in exchange for pardons and refugee status. America is also a hated single power in a unipolar world that rejects Communisim in all forms, it also halts civil rights for a decade and the capital may change to New York City or Denver or Chicago depending on what cities are/not lost. Decolonization accelerates but becomes much blander, the British colonies come under the auspices of a revitalized Commonwealth led by Canada, South Africa, and Australia - essentially the 'Five Eyes' treaty turned tradong bloc to encompass much of the Third World and English-speaking First World. French colonies may either descend into chaos or organize into a distinct bloc of West African states with perhaps French Guiana becoming a refugee site or American protectorate. South Asia breaks out into open warfare with the Middle East becoming a bloodbath and India locked in internecine warfare until finalizing a brutal victory over its Pakistani rival once and for all a few yeats later. Eventually India grows into a Federation encompassing the former Raj but with additional states including Afghanistan, her monarchy revitalized and a council of Princes becoming an equal to a House of Lords. Indochina unites and damns any foreigners who try to meddle in local affairs, Japan begins a mild Self-Defense remilitarization and provides what aid it can to South Korea, Taiwan, and even China - this helps heal the deep wounds from years past but by no means resolves them completely. South America hardly notices, especially as the United States emerges as a unipolar power.

To what extent might the United States spare Soviet satellite states that undergo active anticommunist unrest? After all, one of the PODs that I suggest is the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 spiraling out of control, and under the circumstances, it’s certainly possible that you could see renewed/exacerbated tensions in East Germany and Poland.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uprising_of_1953_in_East_Germany

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poznań_1956_protests

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish_October
 
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