The Joint Chiefs directed Lieutenant General J. E. Hull, an officer highly ex
perienced in the problems of strategic warfare, to form a group and then study
and report upon the effectiveness of SAC. For planning purposes the target date
for the war they visualized was I January 1950, not I January 1 957. After a
year of study Hull produced a report which was called Evaluation of Effec
tiveness of Strategic Air Operations.
This reports shows that, as in so many other fields, the United States' in
telligence about Russia was lamentable, for clearly Hui: had to make a study of
the effectiveness of an attack force on the basis of an almost total ignorance of
the defense.
The Hull evaluators were, therefore, compelled to assume-a very dangerous
thing to do in war or when planning for it-two different levels of Russian
defense capability. One was a high level of competence, in which Russia had
modernized its World War II apparatus, incorporating the Luftwaffe's experi
ence, equipment, and techniques. The lower estimate assumed that the Rus
sians had not extensively developed their air defenses much beyond the state of
the science as it existed in World War II.
Against this background of ignorance and assumption (two of the great of-
The United States Plan for War with the USSR in 1957 25
fenses in military lore), General Hull and his team examined the evidence to
see whether SAC could or could not get through to targets in nine strategic
areas: Moscow-Leningrad; the Urals; the Black Sea; the Caucasus; the Archan
gel area; Tashkent-Alma-Ata; Novosibirsk; Lake Baikal; and Vladivostok.
The Hull team ran very extensive and expensive aerial tests, war games, and
computations of many kinds, visualizing every conceivable situation. The sum
total of this theoretical experience was then studied and two aerial war games
were played.
The first was a daylight raid by 223 B-29s and B-50s, carrying thirty-two
atomic bombs against the Black Sea target area. Very large numbers of elec
tronic countermeasure (ECM) aircraft were employed to divert the Soviet de
fenses from the atom-bomb carriers and to "red-herring" the ground defenses.
It was assumed that the area was defended by 270 jet fighters and 550 piston
engined aircraft.
The attackers crossed the frontier at a cruising altitude of thirty-five thousand
feet and bombed from thirty-five thousand feet-important factors where
piston-engined aircraft were concerned because of their inability to operate with
any high degree of effectiveness beyond thirty thousand feet. The higher and
lower levels of defense competences were assumed and applied. In terms of
SAC casualties, the findings were close to disastrous.
In the case of the more competent level of defense, SAC was judged to have
lost thirty-five aircraft to fighters (twenty after they had released their bombs
a point, it should be said, in SAC's favor), two to antiaircraft artillery fire, and
five to what were called (without definition) "operational causes." In addition,
fourteen aircraft were judged to have aborted before reaching the target. As a
result, twenty-four of the thirty-two bombs dispatched were judged to have
been dropped on their targets. Three bombs were Jost in crashing aircraft, two
were returned in the aborted aircraft, and three were dropped outside the in
tended target area.
The second war game was a night raid, again into the Black Sea area. The
more competent defense was assumed. Ninety-six aircraft went in with thirty
two atomic bombs (again the majority of the planes were ECMs, there to baffle
the defenses). Fifty night fighters were assumed to be defending the target area.
In the raid seven aircraft were lost to night fighters, two to antiaircraft artillery
fire, and two to "operational causes." Twenty-three bombs reached their in
tended aiming points; three were lost; four returned in aborting aircraft-eight
aborted; and two fell outside the target areas. In neither war game did the Hull
report state how many aircraft were damaged or damaged beyond repair by
enemy action, but other evidence indicates that this type of casualty would have
been heavy.
In any event, in both cases, about 70 percent of the bombers succeeded in
dropping their bombs in the intended target areas, but with this important dif
ference: the night raid was executed with half the bombers used in the daylight
raid and with about a quarter of the casualties. The capacity of SAC to get
through was distinctly encouraging. But the losses were serious because, if they
persisted, SAC would not be able to sustain the campaign without drawing
upon the mothballed reserve. Accordingly, the Hull evaluators turned to this re
serve and discovered an alarming factor: very few of these aircraft would be
airworthy for eighteen months. Here then was another strike to add against the
campaign's feasibility-another strike to add to the base question to limit
SAC's ability to carry out its mission.
With all the data at hand, the Hull evaluators undertook four atomic offen
sives to establish just how serious the casualty and replacement situation might
become. Their findings were embodied in a chapter entitled "Estimate of
Overall Losses and Results for Several Different Hypothetical Atomic Offen
sives.
In Offensive A, the striking force available consisted of 260 B-29s and B-
50s, 30 B-36s, and 72 very-long-range reconnaissance planes.
Against the lower level of defense, 87 1 sorties on three night attacks resulted
in the loss of thirty-three aircraft, with twenty-three damaged beyond repair
fifty-six aircraft, or just over a sixth of the force. These were very heavy
casualties and could not be sustained, as we shall see. On the other hand, 1 86
atomic bombs were delivered to the targets, representing 85 percent of those in
tended.
With the higher Russian defense capability, 1 ,039 sorties were launched in
four night attacks to deliver 1 76 bombs on target (80-percent satisfactory deliv
ery). But the losses were grievous: 123 aircraft were lost over enemy territory,
with 25 damaged beyond repair. This represented a 32-percent loss factor. Such
a rate of loss meant that after the first strikes SAC would become progressively
weakened to the point where very rapidly it would not be able to sustain the
atomic campaign.
These were grave data. But when the Hull group came to evaluate what
would have happened on daylight offensives, the news became even graver.
In four days of massed daylight operations against the higher-level Soviet
defense, 1 ,22 1 sorties delivered 153 bombs (70-percent completion) with the
loss of 222 aircraft over enemy territory and 27 damaged beyond repair. This
was an overall loss of 55 percent of the force availab/e--catastrophically high
and far higher than the worst losses suffered in any strategic attack during
World War II. (During that war the worst loss was that suffered by the Royal
Air Force Bomber Command when Four Group lost 20.6 percent of its air
craft-twenty out of ninety-seven Halifaxes-in the great attack on Nuremberg
on the night of 30--3 1 March 1944.)
For the lower level of Russian defense competence, the dispersed type of day
raids could-Hull judged-be employed. Otherwise daylight raids were out of
the question now and in the future. Even so, the dispersed daylight raids would
suffer heavier casualties than were encountered at any time during World War
II. This war game provided for 993 sorties in four days of operations. The anal
ysis showed that in order to deliver 185 bombs on target (85-percent comple-
The United States Plan for War with the USSR in 1 957 27
tion), SAC would lose 168 aircraft over Russia, and 22 would be lost through
other causes or damaged beyond repair. This meant 41-percent casualties. This
rate was very high indeed-probably unacceptably high-and if such casualties
persisted, it meant that SAC would probably be unable to complete the entire
Dropshot program.
The Hull group now made a final casualty summary. They decided that the
atomic phase of the air campaign could be carried out at night with total losses
of the order of 30 percent of the bomber force for 80-percent completion of the
program. Dispersed raids in daylight would be possible only against the less ef
fective defense. For the better of the two defense systems, only concentrated
raids could be laid on in daylight, and the strike force would lose 55 percent of
the bomber force to complete 70 percent of the offensive.
In conclusion, the Hull group turned to the question of logistic factors in the
campaign. The analysis showed that a strategic bombing effort of the magni
tude of the campaign could not be supported by the supplies of aircraft, parts,
fuel, ordnance, personnel, and transportation that would exist on I May
1950--ven assuming that the bases would be available. However, the evalua
tors agreed, a more limited effort, which included the whole of the atomic
phase of the air attack, could be executed beginning I May 1950. This involved
the delivery of some 300 atomic bombs, including a second-strike allocation of
some 70 such weapons. They found that one of the key factors preventing the
execution of the entire aerial attack program was the current strategic reserves
of fuel. These were not adequate; indeed sufficient fuel only for two thousand
sorties would be available-enough to complete only the atomic phase of the
campaign.
Secondly, Hull reported that in the opinion of his group the bomber force
allocated to SAC for the air campaign was too small to complete the plan satis
factorily, given the expected casualty rates of the campaign. Moreover, addi
tional bombers could be made available only at the expense of those committed
to training, testing, command support, and administration. Hull warned that if
these were used, the Phase 2 of the campaign would be seriously delayed.
To add to SAC' s difficulties, the airlift needed to deploy SAC units overseas
in Phase I was in excess of Military Air Transport Service capacity. The only
way the emergency deployment could be undertaken was by the use of bombers
to help move the men and the equipment needed to launch the air attack-and
this in turn would affect the bombers' ability to launch the immediate retalia
tion which war with Russia would demand. In all, Hull reported, the attack
would require "considerable modification to make it logistically feasible."
As for the British bases, Hull went on, an inspection revealed that they were
"exceedingly vulnerable" to air attack, that no organized defense would exist
at the time SAC began to execute its war plan, and that the British would
require thirty days' warning to organize such a defense. Hull noted that "Since
the Soviets realize the significance of these bases and appreciate the difficulties
of a tight air defense, it is not unlikely that their first hostile move would be to
attack these bases" and deny them to SAC. Such an attack, of course, would
wreck not only the aerial campaign but also the other counterblows in Drop
shot.
On this somber note the study ended. Two months later, on 1 1 April 1 950,
Major General S. E. Anderson, Director of USAF plans and operations, com
menting upon the Hull report, wrote a memorandum to W. Stuart Symington,
the Secretary of the Air Force. Given the acute political tensions that existed, it
must have been an extremely disturbing document for the President, the Cabi
net, and the Joint Chiefs.
General Anderson agreed that the SAC campaign was not entirely a feasible
operation of war. He agreed that only the atomic phase could be carried out
with the men and materiel available on D-Day, but even so SAC would not be
able to guarantee a primary requirement built into the air plan: that the atomic
attack be compressed into the shortest possible time "in order to create the
greatest possible shock effect on the USSR." Such was the state of SAC in
those days that Plan Trojan, for example, did not propose to atomize either
Moscow or Leningrad until the ninth day of the war. But why would SAC's
counteroffensive as planned be so slow in getting airborne? Because, as Ander
son reported, of "insufficient bases overseas [and] insufficient prestocked fuel
supplies overseas.''
But there were also other factors: too few Military Air Transport Command
planes to ferry the ground crews, weapons, and ground handling equipment;
sabotage and bombardment at both ends of the flight; political negotiations with
the governments concerned; and the general effects and shock of the surprise
attack the Russians were expected to launch.
These matters were, of course, corrected later, and SAC did soon afterward
reach a degree of efficiency that was almost superhuman. However, at that time
Anderson was compelled to declare that: "In the event of war in 1950, the Air
Force can (a) complete the atomic phase of the planned strategic air offensive
(b) provide inadequate air defense for the United States and Alaska (c) initiate
mobilization and training. " The Air Force could not "(a) complete the entire
air offensive called for in Trojan or (b) provide the air defense for the United
States and Alaska with the maximum risk we can afford to take. "
To sum up, if the Hull and Anderson reports are accepted as being in the
realm of accurate forecasting and analysis, then the aerial campaign as planned
could not have succeeded. It was true that appalling damage could have been
inflicted on Russia, but only at appalling loss to the U.S. Air Force. Presum
ably Truman, the Cabinet, and the Joint Chiefs would have accepted this loss,
but would SAC have done so? If the evidence of World War II and the Viet
nam war has validity, air crews are prepared to accept serious losses up to a
point. But as was demonstrated after the terrible losses suffered by the Royal
Air Force Bomber Command at Nuremberg during the raid of 30-3 1 March
1 944, a form of mutiny spreads through even elite forces when casualties
become catastrophic-and as the above figures show, Dropshot losses would
have been catastrophic.