What do the British do in late 1942 if the Americans refuse to do 'Torch'?

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Let's say that for domestic reasons, in June 1942, just after the fall of Tobruk, President Roosevelt tells Churchill that it's now absolutely out of the question that the Americans participate in any landings in French North Africa that year.
And let's assume that Churchill decides that for political reasons, if the Americans aren't along with it and leading it, the British Empire can't do it, in case it causes Vichy to throw-in with the Axis.
Would there have been any operations that the British and their (imperial) allies could have carried out either on their own or working with the Russians in the remainder of 1942 with forces in the UK that would have otherwise been used in Operation Torch? Would an attempt to liberate the Channel Islands or an effort in Norway have had any chance of success? Or would there have been something else that forces based in the UK could have tried, given potential limitations to distance coverable by shipping and/or air-cover?
 
The question would be what happens after the Afrika Korp gets chased out of Eygpt? Do they stop at the Tunisian border or not?
 
The question would be what happens after the Afrika Korp gets chased out of Eygpt? Do they stop at the Tunisian border or not?

Rommel is not going to make the lunge for Egypt without making far better preparations if he isn't deeply worried about the US landing to his West in a few months. He will be drawn in, but not in the same sort of mad dash way.

Take away the fear of America landing anytime soon and you have a very different North Africa campaign in 42 and 43 as Rommel was motivated to take big risks even by his standards as he knew if he didn't take Alex by the Fall he would be hammered by two armies on either side in various hard to defend positions compared to sitting on the port of Alex.
 
Rommel is not going to make the lunge for Egypt without making far better preparations if he isn't deeply worried about the US landing to his West in a few months. He will be drawn in, but not in the same sort of mad dash way.

Take away the fear of America landing anytime soon and you have a very different North Africa campaign in 42 and 43 as Rommel was motivated to take big risks even by his standards as he knew if he didn't take Alex by the Fall he would be hammered by two armies on either side in various hard to defend positions compared to sitting on the port of Alex.

:rolleyes:

Some evidence for the above?

Rommel took risks because he was Rommel, and because he knew from intercepted communications from the US embassy in Egypt exactly how weak the British position was after Gazala.

The US not participating in Torch is either due to:
- abandoning Germany first, in which case the British are going to be a lot more cautious, as there is a risk that the Soviet Union will collapse. This could result in more forces going to Persia/Iraq to cover a German attack through the Caucasus
- deciding to go for Roundup, an invasion of Northern France in 1943, in which case the British would be preserving their forces at home.
 

SsgtC

Banned
Rommel was a gambler. But he wasn't a careless gambler. He'd make the risky move when he considered the payoff worth the risk. If it wasn't, he was more than happy to go another route and play it safe. At least until a situation presented itself that he considered favorable. With no looming invasion, Rommel wouldn't be under the same pressure to throw the British out of Egypt. He could take his time and pick what he considered the perfect opportunity to launch an attack, not feel forced to attack in less than ideal circumstances.

:rolleyes:

Some evidence for the above?

Rommel took risks because he was Rommel, and because he knew from intercepted communications from the US embassy in Egypt exactly how weak the British position was after Gazala.
 
With no looming invasion, Rommel wouldn't be under the same pressure to throw the British out of Egypt. He could take his time and pick what he considered the perfect opportunity to launch an attack, not feel forced to attack in less than ideal circumstances.

The OTL Torch took the Germans completely by surprise. IIRC even after the convoys passed Gibraltar they didn't expect an invasion of French North Africa. Therefore there is NO LOOMING INVASION in the eyes of the Germans.

Rommel wasn't under pressure to attack deep into Egypt, in fact his high command were concerned about the logistics. However after the overwhelming victory at the Battle of Gazala, and with knowledge of the state of British forces from intelligence (especially their lank of tanks), then the invasion of Egypt was a reasonable gamble. He was barely stopped at El Alamein on 1st July and that was more because of the weaknesses of his own forces than a solid British defence.
 

Redbeard

Banned
AFAIK the idea behind Torch was not at least to create a "string of airbases" in North Africa to improve communications with India and SEA. The immediate threat to India and the option of a major allied offensive in SEA were over however by the time NA was cleared for Axis presence. In this context a "no-Torch" ATL wouldn't mean much, and I'm quite certain events in the eastern part of North Africa will not be significantly different from OTL.

What is really interesting is what will happen to Vichy France if no Torch? The longer Vichy France is allowed to exist the more it will be obvious seen from Vichy, that Germany is loosing the war and they need to approach the allies if they want a position for France after the war. I guess that could mean the French navy one night suddenly leaving port and next showing up in an allied port - greeted by bands, girls and champagne.

The Germans would guess that too, so the question is who will act first and when? But de Gaulle might have a rival to the role of "first lover to the Anglo-Saxons".
 
Or would there have been something else that forces based in the UK could have tried, given potential limitations to distance coverable by shipping and/or air-cover?

Sorry, but the answer isn't that fanciful.
The British would have cleared Libya, first. It's not as if Tobruk is the end of it. There's Tripoli on the other side of a loooong one-road desert; a distance that historically, with their enemy in full retreat to Tunisia, the British covered not that quickly.
In this scenario, the Axis troops have a neutral-friendly border at their backs. They will fight a maneuvered delaying action in the desert, then more positional operations in the Tripoli region; operations for which they need less armor and mobile troops. The reinforcements that were squandered in Tunisia might well be sent along, even though they'll take much much longer to debark. The British have to keep pushing there, that's what they'll do with additional troops. Sending them in by way of the Cape, in turn, takes a long time for them too.
 
If Torch doesn't happen then the British would have the ability to reinforce Montgomery, not so much with troops but with aircraft and logistic assets - the Desert Air Force only had one wing of Spitfires, and getting another wing or two would greatly increase the attrition of the Luftwaffe and RA - and having some of the amphibious craft now going spare (notably the experimental LST's Misoa, Tasajera and Bachaquero) would enable the British to use coastal convoys to speed up the advance.

The interesting thing is what would happen when Rommel was pushed back to the Tunisian frontier. Either he'd have to have his troops disarmed and interned (which I doubt would appeal to Hitler) or he'd have to try to take over the territory, which would be a recipe for disaster. I imagine the French would be observing the German approach with some trepidation and would man the Mareth Line as a precaution. Rommel would be faced with having to attack a fortified enemy in terrain not well-suited to armoured warfare with the 8th Army breathing down his neck.
 
Rommel is not going to make the lunge for Egypt without making far better preparations if he isn't deeply worried about the US landing to his West in a few months. He will be drawn in, but not in the same sort of mad dash way.

Take away the fear of America landing anytime soon and you have a very different North Africa campaign in 42 and 43 as Rommel was motivated to take big risks even by his standards as he knew if he didn't take Alex by the Fall he would be hammered by two armies on either side in various hard to defend positions compared to sitting on the port of Alex.
how would he know us planning?
 
Strange scenario as OTL the driving force behind it was FDR - for political reasons - wanted it to happen before the elections, but delayed till just after. There was a need to have US forces in the UK fighting the Germans during '42, Churchill, was in favour - Marshall was the one against - too afraid it would mean no Channel invasion in '43 - he was right. But it gave the US Forces decent on-the-job training, to prepare for the mean event.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
But it gave the US Forces decent on-the-job training, to prepare for the mean event.
This is an important point. Kasserine Pass highlights that the US divisions needed a lot of work before they were ready for first-line combat.

That's not to impugn the American troops at all, their skill level was perfectly understandable given that (as per ISO regulations) the US Army was building up very rapidly from a comparatively small cadre. This time, at least, they took the time to do it right.
 
Sorry, but the answer isn't that fanciful.
The British would have cleared Libya, first. It's not as if Tobruk is the end of it. There's Tripoli on the other side of a loooong one-road desert; a distance that historically, with their enemy in full retreat to Tunisia, the British covered not that quickly.
In this scenario, the Axis troops have a neutral-friendly border at their backs. They will fight a maneuvered delaying action in the desert, then more positional operations in the Tripoli region; operations for which they need less armor and mobile troops. The reinforcements that were squandered in Tunisia might well be sent along, even though they'll take much much longer to debark. The British have to keep pushing there, that's what they'll do with additional troops. Sending them in by way of the Cape, in turn, takes a long time for them too.

Tell me of this 'slow advance West' that the British made and then explain why it was considered slow when it was a damn sight faster than Rommel had come East? In fact the only thing that went faster West at the time was Rommels forces.
 
My guess is an amphibious landing in Cyrenaica or even Tripolitania so that Rommel has nowhere to retreat to.

No Torch also means the Luftwaffe can concentrate its transport aircraft on Stalingrad. However, the Sixth Army will still be starved into surrendering.
 
Tell me of this 'slow advance West' that the British made and then explain why it was considered slow when it was a damn sight faster than Rommel had come East?

Huh, it was faster than Rommel's advances because it was unopposed - which can't be said of Rommel's advances. So that's not exactly the right comparison.

In fact the only thing that went faster West at the time was Rommels forces.

Yes indeed, also because "Rommel's forces" in this instance mean his German troops - motorized. Italian unmotorized troops were left behind. Rommel fully intended for his own motorized units to break contact with the British, and the British let him go.

Had the British managed to keep up with the Germans and nibble at their heels all the way to Tripoli, or to inflict a major defeat, then the endgame in Tunisia would have been much easier and shorter - assuming it even took place. But the British didn't.
 
Had the British managed to keep up with the Germans and nibble at their heels all the way to Tripoli, or to inflict a major defeat, then the endgame in Tunisia would have been much easier and shorter - assuming it even took place. But the British didn't.

But they did eg at El Aghelia the New Zealand Division outflanked Rommel's forces and got behind them, but was unable to stop their escape across open desert.

http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Bard-c3-6.html

The British also had an issue with Ultra in the pursuit; they had Rommel's messages to Hitler saying that he would fight each holding position, but in reality Rommel fled before a serious assault could be mounted.
 
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