What did the Germans want in 1914

It was clear that the Nazis wanted to dominate Europe if not the World because Aryans were in their crazy world superior and deserved it.

Though they had an authoritarian nasty regime neither Austria nor Germany had such an ideology in 1914.

Had they managed to get France to come to terms in 1914 and Russia in 1915 what did the Central Powers want?
 
The German war aims were set out by Bethmann-Hollweg and Erzberger in September 1914 and were as follows:

  • Annexation of Luxembourg
  • Cession of Belfort and the western side of the Vosges (to be decided by the military
  • The ore field of Briey to be ceded
  • France to pay war indemnity in instalments
  • France to be made dependent on Germany with its markets open to Germany and closed to Britain
  • Liege and Verviers to be annexed to Prussia
  • Antwerp with a corridor to Liege to be annexed (to be decided)
  • Belgium to exist as a vassal state with ports open to Germany, and economically a German province.
  • French Flanders, with Dukirk, Calais and Boulogne to be annexed to Belgium
  • Creation of a European economic area, with France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Norway, nominally equal but in effect under German control
  • Cession of colonial possessions to be decided later
  • Aims vis-a-vis Russia to be decided later
  • Netherlands to be left independent but dependent on Germany. Perhaps the cession of Antwerp to the Netherlands to secure an alliance and the right to station troops in Antwerp and the Scheldt.
 
It was clear that the Nazis wanted to dominate Europe if not the World because Aryans were in their crazy world superior and deserved it.

Though they had an authoritarian nasty regime neither Austria nor Germany had such an ideology in 1914.

Had they managed to get France to come to terms in 1914 and Russia in 1915 what did the Central Powers want?


And sort of in original wording:
The general aim of the war is security for the German Reich in west and east for all imaginable time. For this purpose France must be so weakened as to make her revival as a great power impossible for all time. Russia must be thrust back as far as possible from Germany's eastern frontier and her domination over the non-Russian vassal peoples broken.

  1. France. The military to decide whether we should demand cession of Belfort and western slopes of the Vosges, razing of fortresses and cession of coastal strip from Dunkirk to Boulogne.
    The ore-field of Briey, which is necessary for the supply of ore for our industry, to be ceded in any case. Further, a war indemnity, to be paid in instalments; it must be high enough to prevent France from spending any considerable sums on armaments in the next 15-20 years. Furthermore: a commercial treaty which makes France economically dependent on Germany, secures the French market for our exports and makes it possible to exclude British commerce from France. This treaty must secure for us financial and industrial freedom of movement in France in such fashion that German enterprises can no longer receive different treatment from French.
  2. Belgium. Liége and Verviers to be attached to Prussia, a frontier strip of the province of Luxemburg to Luxemburg.
    Question whether Antwerp, with a corridor to Liége, should also be annexed remains open. At any rate Belgium, even it allowed to continue to exist as a state, must be reduced to a vassal state, must allow us to occupy any militarily important ports, must place her coast at our disposal in military respects, must become economically a German province. Given such a solution, which offers the advantages of annexation without its inescapable domestic political disadvantages, French Flanders with Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, where most of the population is Flemish, can without danger be attached to this unaltered Belgium. The competent quarters will have to judge the military value of this position against England.
  3. Luxemburg. Will become a German federal state and will receive a strip of the present Belgian province of Luxemburg and perhaps the corner of Longwy.
  4. We must create a central European economic association through common customs treaties, to include France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland "sic", and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Norway. This association will not have any common constitutional supreme authority and all its members will be normally equal, but in practice will be under German leadership and must stabilise Germany's economic dominance over Mitteleuropa.
  5. The question of colonial acquisitions, where the first aim is the creation of a continuous Central African colonial empire, will be considered later, as will that of the aims to be realised vis-à-vis Russia.
  6. A short provisional formula suitable for a possible preliminary peace to be found for a basis for the economic agreements to be concluded with France and Belgium.
  7. Holland. It will have to be considered by what means and methods Holland can be brought into closer relationship with the German Empire. In view of the Dutch character, this closer relationship must leave them free of any feeling of compulsion, must alter nothing in the Dutch way of life, and must also subject them to no new military obligations. Holland, then, must be left independent in externals, but be made internally dependent on us. Possibly one might consider an offensive and defensive alliance, to cover the colonies; in any case a close customs association, perhaps the cession of Antwerp to Holland in return for the right to keep a German garrison in the fortress of Antwerp and at the mouth of the Scheldt.
 
The Septemberprogramm is the most well known of several proposals for German war aims. But it was only drafted by a staffer of the chancelor and met strong opposition. It was more of a wish list of the military and economical elites. Some other groups demanded things more radical (Lebensraum ideology for example) and especially on the left several voices called for a moderate peace. Earlier historians often took the proposal seriously but today it is mostly rated as either a propanga tool or an informal list for orientation. Germany had no real idea what to demand on the peace table but the demands of the september program show at least the general direction: expanding of the colonial empire, securing the eastern border (either through satellites or direct conquests) weakening of France and the creation of an economical sphere of influence.
 
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