Molotov in 1947 proposed that with a few amendments--like restricting the president's powers--the Weimar Constitution should be used as the constitution for a united Germany. Just how serious the Soviets were about unification in 1947 is debatable but at least some historians (like Carolyn Woods Eisenberg) think they were serious--*provided* they got reparations from current production.
https://books.google.com/books?id=JlRZM_VKzrMC&pg=PA487 Marc Trachtenberg, who is very skeptical that the "Stalin Note" of 1952 was intended seriously, thinks there is a much more plausible case for 1947 as a lost opportunity: "Ulam refers specifically to the 1947 Moscow conference and the Stalin Note business in 1952. Of these two, I personally think the 1947 affair is more puzzling. There is a vast, mostly German language, literature on the 1952 episode, and there is a good deal of evidence bearing on this issue in U.S., British and French archives. Many of the documents to be found in those western sources are quite suggestive, but the piece of evidence that struck me as decisive came from a Soviet source. This new evidence was cited on p. 127 of John Gaddis's WE NOW KNOW: "Soviet diplomat Vladimir Semyonov," Gaddis writes, "recalled Stalin asking: was it certain the Americans would turn the note down? Only when assured that it was did the Soviet leader give his approval, but with the warning that there would be grave consequences for Semyonov if this did not prove to be the case." (Gaddis's source for this is an unpublished 1994 paper by Alexei Filitov.) This, I thought--and if I'm wrong, I'd appreciate it if someone could tell me why--was as close to a smoking gun as we ever get in historical work.
"There are other reasons for not taking the Stalin Note affair too seriously, but the 1947 business is another matter entirely. The puzzle here is that when you read the records of the Moscow conference, Soviet policy does not seem the least bit intransigent. But the Americans, and especially Secretary of State Marshall, had exactly the opposite impression..."
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/comment8.htm
What puzzles me is that the all-German elections Molotov was arguing for in 1947 would--as he must have known--produce a Reichstag where Communists were decidedly in a minority. Even if the elections in the Soviet zone were totally manipulated (and as late as September-October 1946 the SED suffered embarrassing defeats in some local elections
https://books.google.com/books?id=pIIeG_yn72wC&pg=PA153) it would easily be outvoted by the other three zones. Maybe Stalin thought the economic situation in western Germany was so desperate that an all-German government would be left-leaning if not immediately Communist. In any event, the Western powers must themselves have feared a unified Germany with Soviet influence still strong in the eastern zone might be too left-wing; they argued in favor of a looser, more federal structure for Germany. The Soviets thought this would just allow more power for locally influential "reactionaries" to undermine a left-of-center all-German government.
The differences between the western and Soviet positions have been summed up as follows:
"When he got to Moscow, Marshall also tried to sell the demilitarization pact to the Russians. Molotov, however, questioned its benefits. He was much more concerned with obtaining reparations from current German production to fuel Russian recovery. This issue became the major stumbling block at the conference. If the United States agreed to this demand and to Soviet participation in the control of the Ruhr, Molotov indicated that he would accept an upward revision in the level of German industry as well as economic unification of the four zones.
"Although the bleakness of Russian life lent credibility to Molotov's arguments, the U.S. delegates had no desire to accommodate the Soviet position. They feared that reparations from current production would tie the western zones of Germany to the Soviet economy. Moreover, if the Russians participated in the supervision of the Ruhr, they could meddle in West European economic affairs and add to the costs of the U.S. occupation. Likewise, if the United States accepted a more centralized structure for the German provisional government. the German Communists might well increase their influence. The American delegates contended that the Potsdam accords forbade reparations from current production. But Marshall was uncomfortable with this argument. Not only did the British disagree, but even some U.S. officials doubted its veracity..."
https://books.google.com/books?id=pIIeG_yn72wC&pg=PA153
BTW, here are Ernest Bevin's recollections of a conversation with Molotov in 1947 (well, at least according to what Guy Burgess told Harold Nicolson--and despite Burgess' obvious credibility problems, this really does sound like Bevin):
"Now, Mr Molotov, what is it that you want? What are you after? Do you want to get Austria behind your Iron Curtain? You can't do that. Do you want Turkey and the Straits ? You can't have them. Do you want Korea? You can't have that. You are putting your neck out too far, and one day you will have it chopped off.. .. You cannot look on me as an enemy of Russia. Why, when our Government was trying to stamp out your Revolution, who was it that stopped it? It was I, Ernest Bevin. I called out the transport workers and they refused to load the ships. Now again I am speaking to you as a friend... If war comes between you and America in the East, then we may be able to remain neutral. But if war comes between you and America in the West, then we shall be on America's side. Make no mistake about that. That would be the end of Russia and of your Revolution. So please stop sticking out your neck in this way and tell me what you are after. What do you want?"
"I want a unified Germany," said Molotov.
"Why do you want that? Do you really believe that a unified Germany would go Communist? They might pretend to. They would say all the right things and repeat all the correct formulas. But in their hearts they would be longing for the day when they would revenge their defeat at Stalingrad. You know that as well as I do."
"Yes," said Molotov, "I know that. But I still want a unified Germany."
http://spartacus-educational.com/TUbevin.htm
